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THE WORKS OF

ORESTES A. BROWNSON,

COLLECTED AND ARRANGED

BY

HENRY F. BROWNSON.

VOLUME XII.

CONTAINING THE THIRD PART OF THE WRITINGS ON CHRISTIANITY AND HEATHENISM IN POLITICS AND IN SOCIETY.

DETROIT:
THORNDIKE NOURSE, PUBLISHER.
1884.

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1882x
vol. 12
cop. 2

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THE CHURCH AND THE REPUBLIC; OR, THE CHURCH NECESSARY TO THE REPUBLIC, AND THE REPUBLIC COMPATIBLE WITH THE CHURCH.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1856.]

I. The objection to the Catholic Church just now most insisted on in our country is, that she is hostile to our form of government. From all quarters, from the press, the rostrum, the legislative hall, and the Protestant pulpit, we hear it proclaimed, in every variety of tone, that the church ought not to be tolerated in these United States, for she is anti-republican in her spirit and influence, and if once permitted to gain a foothold on our soil, she would destroy our free institutions, and deprive us of the inestimable advantages of self-government. This objection I propose to meet and refute, by showing what really is the relation of Catholicity to republicanism.

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* The following article consists of the substance of two lectures given in Broadway Tabernacle in this city, the first in February, and the second in April. The first was given extempore, and has been revised from the very full report of the *New York Times;* the second is corrected from the report in the *New York Freeman's Journal,* printed from the lecturer's notes. Both, as printed in the newspapers, contained many errors, and several of our friends have expressed to us the wish that they should appear in the *Review;* and as we have believed them worth preserving, we have concluded to insert them in our present number, although many of the views and arguments are already familiar to our readers. They are adapted to the times, and meet, in a popular manner, the principal objections just now urged with the most vehemence against the church. We may, perhaps, be pardoned for thinking them not undeserving the serious consideration of our honest and patriotic statesmen, if such we have left. The author is a Catholic, and glories in his religion; but he is also an American, by birth, by education, by feeling, and by interest, and yields to no man living in his love of his country. He has not been wholly unknown to the political world, and he has had the honor of the intimate acquaintance and friendship of some of the most eminent and distinguished statesmen our country has produced. No man doubts his honesty or sincerity, and he claims that what he writes seriously on questions of the nature discussed in these lectures, is entitled to the respectful consideration of his countrymen. They are questions he has

I must, however, premise that I am always humbled in my own opinion, when I am called upon to reply to an objection of this sort. It is humiliating in the extreme to be forced to defend the spiritual against objections drawn from the temporal, or religion against objections drawn from politics. Religion, if any thing, is for man the supreme law, and must take precedence of every thing else; and the very idea of a church, is that of an institution founded by Almighty God, for the purpose of introducing and sustaining the supremacy of his law in the government of human affairs. If religion and politics are opposed, politics, not religion, must give way. No man, I care not who he is, whether a Catholic or a Protestant, a pagan or a Mahometan, if he has any conception of religion at all, denies, or can deny, that he should place his religion first, and that all else in his life should be subordinated to it. He who denies that his religion should govern his politics, as well as all his actions, virtually denies morality, denies the divine law, and asserts political atheism. To subject religion to politics, or to object to a religion because incompatible with this or that political theory, is, in principle, to deny the sovereignty of God himself, and to fall below the most degrading form of gentilism.

It is also humiliating, in this nineteenth century, in this free and enlightened country, when most of us profess to be Christians, to be obliged to meet the objections urged by the old carnal Jews against our Lord. Is it not mortifying, after Christianity has been preached for eighteen hundred years, to find one's own countrymen still back in the gross

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studied,—questions which his antecedents and his present position enable him to understand, perhaps, better than many who are far his superiors in learning and ability.

The time has gone by when it would do in this country to ignore, or to dismiss with contempt, the views on great national questions of Catholic publicists. Our country is in danger, and our statesmen cannot afford to forego the aid they may derive from Catholic citizens, who have devoted themselves no less to the interests of their country than of their church. All the light and aid that can be obtained from all sources, will prove to be no more than is needed to save the republic, in the fearful crisis through which it is passing. But be this as it may, we have endeavored to do what we could in our humble sphere to serve our country, and to enable it to realize the high hopes of our patriot fathers. Without religion our republic will prove a failure, and we leave it to thinking men of all parties to answer to themselves, whether it is not as plain as the sun at noonday, that without the Catholic Church we cannot have religion.

carnal views of those who crucified its Founder between two thieves? The objection strikes at the very foundation of Christianity itself. The objection is not that Catholicity is hurtful to the soul, or insufficient to secure salvation in the world to come. As a religion, looking to the eternal welfare of the soul, there are few to find fault with it, and the majority even of those who urge the objection, would, no doubt, confess, if man's chief end was to make sure of heaven, that the Catholic religion, as far as there is any difference, is probably the best. The real character of the objection is not, that our religion is not a good religion for heaven, but that it is a bad religion for this world. It is unfavorable to our worldly interests, to our temporal prosperity, and to our political and social well-being. "We do not like the Catholic religion," say our non-Catholic friends, "because it neglects this world, and we find in Catholic countries a vast amount of poverty, idleness, and dirt, and a lack of that thrift, that activity, that enterprise, and that industry, whose hammer rings from morning till night, till far into the night, so remarkable in Protestant countries. It does not favor the development of the material resources of a nation, does not extend commerce, manufactures, trade, industry, as does Protestantism, that religion so well adapted to our earthly wants." So, as man's business is to make sure of this world, and "jump the world to come," it is concluded that Protestantism is true, and Catholicity is false!

Examine this objection and you will find that it is at bottom the objection of the old carnal Jews to our Lord. They interpreted the prophecies in a carnal sense, and applied them to this world. They expected a Messiah, but they expected him to come as a temporal prince, to establish a temporal kingdom, and to secure his followers all the riches and pleasures of this world, to enable them to overcome all their enemies, and enjoy an earthly paradise. When he came, not in all the pomp of an earth-born grandeur, not with the retinue and majesty of an earthly monarch, but as a spiritual prince, meek and lowly of heart, followed only by poor fishermen, despised publicans, and a few pious women, promising indeed happiness to his followers in another world, yet in this world only self-denial, persecution, and mortification, they could not recognize him as the expected Messiah; they rejected him, and in the bitterness of their rage cried out, "Crucify him, crucify him!"

The objection against the church now urged in our country is precisely the same, and expressed almost in the same words. "If," said they, "we let this man go on, the Romans will come and take away our name and nation." "If," say our Know-Nothing adversaries, "we let this church go on, get a foothold in the country, the Romans (Roman Catholics) will take away our republic, and reduce us to slavery."

But though I regard it as a reproach to our age and country that such an objection should be brought, I still feel it necessary, as things go, to meet it, and to meet it fairly; and this I hope to be able to do without recognizing its legitimacy, or in the least subordinating religion to politics. I shall not attempt to meet it by showing what some Catholics may have done, that Catholics have at times resisted the ecclesiastical authority, bid defiance to the pope, and sustained their temporal sovereign against him. I do not propose to meet it by citing instances of liberty or of despotism among Catholics, nor the opinions professed by individual Catholics, because I may be answered, and answered truly, that Catholics do not always obey their religion, or act in accordance with its spirit. I propose, therefore, to show, first, what are the constituent elements of a republic, and secondly, that the church, in order to its salutary working, must be one of them.

A republican government does not necessarily stand opposed to a constitutional monarchy. That government, according to the proper sense of the word, is republican, that is instituted and administered for the common weal, the public good, in which power is a trust to be exercised for the common good of the governed, and not a private indefeasible right of the governors, to be exercised for their private benefit. Man is social by nature, is born, as Cicero says, in society, and stays there. He cannot subsist without society; society cannot subsist without government; and a government instituted and administered for the common interests of society, is a republic, although not necessarily a democracy.

Society demands for its constitution and good government, three elements,—authority, liberty, and religion; or as I prefer to say, the state, the individual, and the church. Without these three elements, you can have no well constituted society, no social order, or social well-being. They must all three be recognized in their independence, guaran-

tied in their freedom, and placed in such relations to one another that they can all operate harmoniously, and each freely to its own respective end, according to its own intrinsic nature.

In our country we have a republican government, and two of three elements,—the state and the individual,—distinctly recognized. Our government, though popularly constituted, that is, constituted and in some sense administered by the people, as well as for the people, is intended to be a real government, and in its sphere to be clothed with plenary authority to govern. We have, also, liberty, or individual freedom. The individual is recognized, for our whole system of jurisprudence proceeds on the principle that the individual has certain natural and inalienable rights as a man,—rights which he derives not from civil society, but from his Creator, and which he may hold up before the state, and say, "These are mine; touch them not, at your peril." These are rights which the state is instituted to protect, rights which it neither gives nor can take away, and which can be forfeited only by the criminal misconduct of the individual himself.

It is in the recognition and guaranty of these rights of the individual, that our republic chiefly differs from the ancient republics of Greece and Rome. The ancient Greeks and Romans recognized the city, or state, and asserted its authority. But with them it was supreme and exclusive. They were great statesmen; and so far as organizing the city or state for its own protection, and the maintenance of its supremacy, I can conceive nothing more admirable than the Græco-Roman republic. It was absolute, it was strong, it was majestic, and its majesty is everywhere traceable even in its ruins. But under the Græco-Roman civilization there was no such thing as individual liberty. There were rights of the citizen, but no rights of the man. The city was every thing, the man was nothing. The man was absorbed in the citizen, and the citizen in the state. Whatever the state commanded, the individual must do, and it was free to command whatever it pleased. No higher law was known, no higher law was admitted, than the decrees of the state. Rome commands, Athens ordains, and each individual must obey, whether in accordance with justice, or against it. Under that order of civilization, both religion and the individual were entirely subjected to the state; and when it reached its complete development in imperial

Rome, the emperor assumed to himself all the majesty of the state, all the elements of liberty and authority, and was recognized by the enslaved nations subjugated by Roman arms, as at once, emperor, supreme pontiff, and God. There was no law, no power above him; and though there was freedom for him as the state, there was none for the individual. Athens, when boasting of her freedom, held her four hundred thousand slaves, to twenty or thirty thousand freemen, and saw no incompatibility between the liberty she boasted and the slavery she maintained.

It is precisely its denial of individual freedom, and its accumulation of all rights and powers in the state, rendering the state unlimited, that constituted the weakness of the Græco-Roman society, and prepared its final dissolution. Why did Rome fall before the attack of the northern barbarians? It certainly was not for the lack of population, of wealth, of military science and discipline, or political organization, for in all these respects she was vastly superior to the Goths, Vandals, Franks, and Huns, who invaded her empire, and finally seated themselves on its ruins. Why then did she fall? She fell for the lack of freemen, for the lack of men, who felt they had personal rights and dignity to defend,—because the mass of her population were slaves, and it is only men, free men, who have the courage and the energy to sustain a state, and repel the enemy from its frontiers.

We have in our American society all that was wise, just, or desirable, in the Græco-Roman republic, and we have added what that republic wanted, the element of individual freedom. We recognize the state; we also recognize the individual, the man who is prior and superior to the citizen. With us, man is man, and counts as an integer, not as a fraction, by no means as a mere cipher. This element of individuality, of personal freedom, was introduced into modern society, partly by the northern barbarians, and partly by Christianity. With the northern barbarians, individual freedom predominated. With them the state was not constituted. The authority of the chief, as with our North American Indians, was personal rather than political, and he represented the personal authority of his tribe, his race, or the confederacy of chiefs, rather than the majesty of the state. His followers were his relations, his comrades, rather than his subjects. Christianity introduces and consecrates individual freedom, in recognizing each as possessing an im-

mortal soul, as endowed with free-will, for the use of which he is personally responsible; in declaring all men to be equal before God, and equal one to another, and maintaining that each is an entire human being, a soul, with all the rights, dignity, and worth of the soul; also, by asserting a law for all men, binding on the people as well as on individuals, above all human law, the law of God, which is the will of him who is the King of kings and Lord of lords.

When too strong, when it is predominant, this element of individual freedom is fatal to the government, and tends to anarchy, or complete individualism, which is worse than despotism. In what are called the "Dark Ages," but more properly the barbarous ages, while the barbarians, who seated themselves on the ruins of the Roman empire, were undergoing the process of civilization, this element of individual freedom was too strong, and society was filled with disorders, and was frequently menaced with dissolution. During this period, the struggle of European society was to restrict it, by introducing and establishing a strong and permanent central authority. But, owing to the barbarism of the times, aggravated, down to the thirteenth century, by new barbaric invasions, it could only imperfectly succeed, and never have they been able in old Europe to succeed in properly adjusting the two elements. Either the individual has been too strong, and tended to absorb the state, or the state has been too strong, and tended to absorb the individual.

For a moment, indeed, it seemed that the true order was hit upon, when St. Leo III. revived, at the beginning of the ninth century, the imperial dignity in the person of Charlemagne, king of the Franks. The three elements, the state, the individual, the church, were recognized. In the imperial system you had the authority of society, in the feudal system the freedom of the individual, and in the church you had religion to mediate between the two. The theory of society was correct, and all its constituent elements were present and operative. But, unhappily, the relations between the imperial element and the individual were not properly adjusted. Feudalism for several centuries was too strong for imperialism, and, what is more to the purpose, did not truly represent the element of individual freedom. The liberty it asserted was a vested and not a natural right, and was liberty for the nobles, not for the people. The feudal baron was free, he was a man; but the barons

were only a small minority of the population. The bulk of the population were burghers, peasants, and serfs, who were none the more free because the barons were free. If the theory held the barons to be men, it held these to be less than men. They naturally, therefore, sided with the emperor or the monarch against them. The church could not take exclusively either side, for to have sustained the monarchy would have favored social despotism, and to have sustained the nobles would have been to sustain only the freedom of the few, and, practically, the freedom of the few to oppress the many. She had then in the main to leave the two elements to fight out their own battles. The struggle between them continued from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, when monarchy or imperialism triumphed, religious unity was broken, and the nations of Europe became so divided and so hostile to each other in their interests and feelings, that the experiment of reorganizing society and establishing the Christian republic in the Old World, may be said to have failed, and it will be a long time before it can be renewed there with any prospect of success. The first realization of the Christian republic seems in divine providence to have been reserved for our New World.

Our fathers, whether we speak of the earlier or the later immigrations, fled to this country from oppression, and with the purpose of gaining true freedom for themselves and their posterity. Most of the Anglo-American colonies were founded during the struggle in England between the crown and parliament, when the English nation were endeavoring to prevent or to throw off the absolute monarchy represented by the unhappy Stuarts. It was, in most cases, the party opposed to the royal prerogative, and in favor of the old rights, liberties, and franchises of the middle ages, that immigrated hither, and through the providence of God became the founders of our republic. They brought with them the element of liberty, for they brought with them all those principles of personal freedom, of individual right, which had been introduced into European society, after the downfall of pagan Rome, by Christianity and the barbarian conquerors, and incorporated into the English common law. They brought these principles with them winnowed from the chaff mingled with them in old Europe, and purer, stronger, more living and energetic than they had ever been found with any other people. While they thus brought the element of freedom, the glory of modern civilization, they

also brought a reverence for authority, a just appreciation of the state, and all that was sound, wise, and just in the political principles of the Græco-Roman republic, the glory of the ancient gentile civilization. We extend the freedom of the baron to every citizen, and recognize it as an inalienable right, which the government must regard as sacred and inviolable. We do not recognize the absolutism of society, and we hold the authority of the state to be limited. We have a civil constitution, the very design of which is to restrict its power, to limit the action of society, and to guaranty to minorities and individuals their natural rights,—to secure to each and to all free scope for the development and growth of their proper manhood.

But, however wisely our republic is organized, however nicely adjusted theoretically may be the balance between the two elements, the state and the individual, we have not secured the end proposed and guarded effectively against the tendency of each to absorb or exclude the other. Whoever is attentive to what is going on among us is aware that we are exposed to two opposite dangers,—on the one hand, to a tendency to the absolutism of the state, and on the other, to a tendency to the absolutism of the individual; that is, a tendency to social despotism, and a tendency to pure individualism or anarchy. Either tendency is alike destructive to the order and well-being of the republic and the individual. The danger is great and imminent. Nearly all our political movements tend to destroy the fundamental character of our institutions, and to substitute for genuine Americanism the Jacobinism of the old French republic, or the red-republicanism of the more recent European revolutionists. There is a radical difference between European democracy and American democracy. American democracy, or democracy in the true American sense, is, that the people under God are the source of all political power, but that they can originate or rightfully exercise no power that is incompatible with the rights of individuals; European democracy puts the people in the place of God, asserts their freedom as the state to do whatever they please, and maintains that their will is law, and the rule and measure of right. Our American system maintains that the people are under law collectively as well as individually, are as much bound in their collective capacity by the law of God, as much bound to observe natural justice when acting as the state, as they are when acting in their individual capacity, as sim-

ple individuals; that a majority has no more right to tyrannize than a minority; it concedes that the people are not infallible, that they may have their moments of vertigo, be carried away by passion or caprice, and do great injustice, and therefore that safeguards, guaranties against their abuse of their power are necessary,—although there is, if you can once get it fairly expressed, less danger to be apprehended from the absolute will of the people, than from the absolute will of the one or of the few;—and therefore it teaches that the power of the state is limited by the rights of individuals, and prescribes in the constitution the sphere beyond which it may not lawfully act, and authorizes the supreme judicature to arrest it, and declare its acts null and void whenever it ventures beyond the prescribed limits.

Yet we find that no small portion of the people, bent upon carrying certain purposes, are constantly laboring to induce the state to go beyond these limits. Under plausible pretexts, often under the influence of laudable motives, or noble and generous sentiments, they tempt the government to encroach on the rights of individuals. We see this in the various philanthropic movements of the day. Philanthropy is not Christian charity; it is far inferior to that supernatural virtue; but it is a natural sentiment, a good sentiment, and one of the highest, noblest, and most respectable sentiments natural to the human heart. Moved by this sentiment, people look over society and see an evil which grievously afflicts them. This evil may be intemperance. And surely intemperance is a great evil, and must be so regarded by every one in whose bosom beats a heart, or who has the least regard to the welfare of his fellowmen. Our philanthropists, deploring this evil, undertake very properly its removal. For that purpose they form an association, appoint a committee, and begin to agitate. These committees form new associations, till the country is covered over by a net-work of affiliated associations. Agitation goes on increasing, till the managers imagine that through that agitation, the excitement they have produced, the clamor they have kept up, the noise they have made, the appeals they have addressed to the fears of time-servers, and to the better feelings of the honest and well-disposed, they are strong enough to demand the support and aid of the state. They appeal to the legislature, and obtain a Maine liquor law. All this seems just and fair, noble and praiseworthy. But we

forget that we have urged the government beyond its province, have forced it to take a step towards social despotism; that we cannot through legislative enactments seek even good ends at the expense of natural justice, or the natural rights of individuals; for in this way philanthropy tramples down more good by the way, than it would secure by obtaining the end it seeks. It is seldom in his own person, with his horns, his cloven foot, and his tail in full sight, that Satan appears among us, when he has some diabolical end to accomplish. He knows better. He usually comes disguised as an angel of light, in the shape of an end not bad, perhaps truly good in itself considered, but to be gained by means which are not good, or in circumstances which render it inopportune.

The evil may be slavery. No word is dearer to man, is larger in his estimation, or can fetch a deeper echo from his soul than liberty, and all that is true, just, and noble, in the human heart, cries out against slavery. Unhappily in a portion of our country slavery in a mitigated form still exists, and is upheld by the constitution and laws. It is in my judgment even there, however mild may be its form, and whatever the mutual good feeling there may be between the master and his people, an evil of no small magnitude. But that is not the question. The question is, How shall it be removed? can it be removed at all? or is it our business to attempt to remove it? Our philanthropists see the evil. They look only at that, and think nothing of the evil they may do, or the good they may trample down in their efforts to remove it. "There is the slave in chains, writhing under the lash of his master, let me rush to his rescue. Talk not to me of constitutions and expediencies. My brother is in chains. Do I not see him stretch out his hands to me? Do I not hear his plaintive cry for deliverance? Away with you! Let me run to him, let me knock off his fetters, and bid him stand up in his manhood." Ay, do so, and break down the constitution of your country, and with it all guaranty of freedom for either the white man or the black man! Liberty for neither can exist without the security given by the constitution. Break down that, and you have no guaranty of liberty, no means of securing the freedom even of your black man, when you have emancipated him from his master. The abolition movement may have been started by philanthropic sentiment, but its success through the agency of the government would

change the fundamental character of our federal system, throw so much power into the hands of the federal government, that the balance between the states and the Union would be lost, and with it that between the state and the individual.

Other philanthropic movements I might mention, but it is not necessary. Now all these movements, unable to accomplish their ends by simple individual effort, call in the aid of society, and then of government, the organ of society, and thus enlarge the power of the state, and strengthen the tendency to social despotism. Already have we advanced far in the work of absorbing the individual in society. These philanthropic associations have left us very little personal freedom or individual liberty. They take or are threatening to take the entire management of our private as well as public affairs into their own hands. They tell us what we may or may not drink, and they will soon tell us what we may or may not eat, when we shall go to bed, at what hour we shall get up, when we may go out, and when we must come in. They invade the most private sanctuary of our lives, and their committees are like the frogs of Egypt. They come into our houses, into our kneading-troughs, our ovens, and our sleeping chambers. There is no escape from their noisome presence. There is no covert from their attacks. Nor do these societies stop with their annoying officiousness, but they seek to gain the authority of the legislature, and to pounce upon us with the whole force of the state; and what is worse still, there are legislatures in this free country, and in this nineteenth century, that are quite willing to place themselves at their disposal.

On the other hand, we find a tendency to exclusive individualism. There is a growing tendency to regard government as a mere agency, to deny its authority, and to treat loyalty as an exploded superstition. Government is an old fogy, and young America is puzzled to understand why he should be dependent on the "Governor." Usually these two tendencies are found in the same persons. While the tendency of all our philanthropic movements is to concentrate power in the hands of the government, the very persons who favor them, when the government is not sufficiently docile to their instructions, cry out against it, and assert the supremacy of the individual. They appeal to what they call a "higher law," but which in reality is only

a lower law, since it is only private judgment, or individual opinion. Multitudes among us see nothing sacred in the state or inviolable in the constitution, and it is a widely diffused doctrine, that the people, at any time they please, without any regard to existing law, may subvert the constitution, and introduce any new political order that seems to them good. All views of this sort are anarchical, and incompatible with the assertion of the just authority of the state.

Here, then, we are, exposed to two powerful and dangerous tendencies, rushing, on the one hand, into social despotism, and on the other, into anarchy. What, in this state of things, do we need in order to escape them? We need, it is evident, a power alike independent of the state and of the individual, to step, as it were, in between them and harmonize them,—a power strong enough to restrain the state when it would become despotic, and the individual when he would become disloyal and rebellious. Without such a power we cannot save our republic, and have that security for individual and social liberty, it was instituted to protect and vindicate. With only the state and the individual we have, and can have, only antagonism. The two elements are, and will be pitted one against the other, each struggling for the mastery. They cannot be made to move without collision one with the other, unless there is between them a mediating term, the third element I mentioned as essential to the constitution of society. That term, power, or constituent element, is religion, and I need not add, the Christian religion. Religion is the manifestation of love, and is the sole element of unity; the sole power in existence capable of bringing together discordant elements, and giving them an harmonious arrangement. There is no other power conceivable that can mediate between the state and the individual, and prevent either from invading the province of the other. All history, all experience proves that the contrivances of statesmen, the playing off of interest against interest, the division of powers, and the nicely adjusted checks and balances so much relied on by constitution-mongers, are, and must be inefficient without the presence and energetic support of religion.

But religion, if it is to serve our purpose, and save our republic from degenerating, on the one hand, into social despotism, and on the other, into individualism and anarchy, must be a constituent element of society, and stand on a

basis of its own, independent both of the individual and the state. It cannot serve our purpose, if it depends on the individual, for it can then neither strengthen him against the tyranny of the state, nor restrain him, when disposed to invade the rights of authority. It cannot do it if it depends on the state, for then it can do nothing to restrain the tendency of the state to invade the rights of individuals, and nothing to protect it against their disloyalty and tendency to anarchy. If it depends on the individual, it is whatever the individual chooses to make it, and subject to his control; if it depends on the state, it must be what the state chooses to make it, and be simply the slave of the civil power. It must then rest on a basis independent of both, and higher than that of either, and be a power which neither the national authority nor the individual authority can control, but which is strong enough to restrain both.

This you will willingly concede me. Then you must concede that religion, to answer our purpose, must be the Christian church, or religion organized. Religion without the church, without an organization, is not a power, is only an idea, a simple opinion, and therefore nothing but individualism. Unorganized, existing not as a church, or as an organism, with no organs through which it can speak, it is nothing but the private conviction of the individual, and adds to the individual nothing beyond the strength of his conviction. If it be a church, an organism, and yet dependent on the individual for its organization, the individual can make or unmake it at his will, and though he may exercise power over it, it can exercise none over him. If it be a church, and dependent on the state, and under its control, as is the Russian church, the Prussian church, and the English church, it is simply a function of the state itself. It must be what the civil power chooses to make it; and its ministers, instead of being independent in face of the state, and free before the magistrate, will be simply a part of the constabulary. Religion must then be religion organized, and as religion organized, or as the church, it must be independent alike of the state and the individual, or it will not answer the purpose.

Can we find in Protestantism religion so organized, and thus independent? In a word, can Protestantism answer the end found to be necessary? Protestantism, whatever may be thought or said of it by its friends, is either individual,

depending on the individual, or political, depending on the state; and, therefore, must follow the will either of the one or of the other. In most countries where it prevails, it depends on the state, and is obliged to conform to the civil law. His Majesty Frederick William III. of Prussia, took it into his head one day to unite the Lutherans and Calvinists in one and the same communion. He drew up a liturgy, and ordered them to unite. The greater part obeyed, and all were bound to obey. In England, the queen and parliament have the supreme control of the Anglican church, and plenary authority to decree what shall be the religion of the English people, and to make such alterations in the doctrines, the liturgy, and discipline of the English establishment, as they judge proper. In our country the state claims no authority in spirituals, and here Protestantism depends on the individual. Here every individual is free to make his own church, and not seldom we hear very good Protestants say, "I am my own church." Now, let this English, or Prussian church, or this Protestantism, that depends on the civil power, and is forced to be its slave, attempt as a spiritual authority to interpose between the state and the individual, in behalf of individual freedom, and against social injustice, and to its expostulations it would be answered in the spirit of Elizabeth Tudor's note to the Bishop of Ely: "Proud prelate, I made you, and by God, if you do not cease your insolence I will unmake you!" Where the state has the power of making and unmaking bishops and priests, the church is merely a part of itself, and has no power to resist civil tyranny, and in point of fact is merely an instrument of oppression. So with regard to the church as depending on the individual; if he is his church, then his church is himself; if he makes it for himself, it is his creature, and must submit to his will. I have a right to command my creature; and if my religion is of my own make, I have a right to modify it to suit my varying convictions and exigencies. Hence, in those old times, almost forgotten now, when I was in the habit of framing my own religion, I usually took care to frame it to suit myself.

I am saying nothing about the intrinsic truth, beauty, or worth of Protestantism; I am merely considering it in its political relations, and testing its ability to serve the necessities of Christian society. I think what I have said is sufficient to show that Protestants should never urge us to accept it for political reasons. It has no independence, and

is forced to follow public opinion instead of controlling it. We see this strikingly proved every day, especially in our own country. Public opinion acts on the sects, and the strongest and most numerous sects in the land are obliged to yield to it. Have we not Methodists South, and Methodists North, Baptists North, and Baptists South, and have we not come very near having Presbyterians South, and Presbyterians North, that is, sects dividing geographically, according to public opinion, and holding on one side of an imaginary line, that to be a mortal sin, which on the other is almost counted a Christian virtue? What can a religion that divides in this way, that is pro-slavery in one section of the Union, because there public opinion is pro-slavery, and abolitionist in another, because there public opinion is against slavery,—what can such a religion do in those emergencies, when, to maintain the right, public opinion must be resisted, not followed?

Truth and justice are not dependent on geographical lines. What is just and right at the South, is just and right at the North. Virtue is virtue the world over. What is true to-day was true yesterday, and will be true to-morrow, and for ever. Protestantism is not catholic, but national, sectarian, or individual, and no religion not catholic will answer our purpose. If national, it will follow the national opinion, and be subject to the national authority, as were all the heathen religions of antiquity. It will not serve us unless it is independent of all nations, sects, and individuals; speaking the same language to all, suffering no control or modification from any difference of time, race, nation, or person, and proclaiming the same *credo* for the king and the subject, the proud Caucasian and the humble and degraded African. It must be more than a man-made religion, more than a skilful human contrivance. It must be from God, and speak from high to low. Such is not Protestantism. It has no authority. It speaks not from high to low, but from low to high. Under it, the sheep direct the shepherd, the people teach their teacher, and if he assert his independence, and teach what they do not believe, or preach what does not please them, they quietly tell him, "We do not want you; we can employ you no longer; you may go, and find elsewhere a congregation, if you can."

These remarks, of themselves, prove that the only religion that will answer our purpose is the Catholic Church. It is she or none. There is no choice in the case, because there-

is no other that is not obviously inadequate. She is catholic, not national; that is, she teaches all nations, and is subject to none. She is not an English church, a French church, or a German church, or an Italian church; but is, and can be, at one and the same time, the church of all nations, without interfering with their respective nationalities. She suppresses no nationality. Though her centre of unity is in Rome, she has made no nation Italian by converting it. She leaves to all their national independence, their national institutions, laws, customs, usages, manners, in so far as they are not repugnant to the morality of the Gospel. She leaves the Italian an Italian, the Greek a Greek, the Frenchman a Frenchman, the Englishman an Englishman, the German a German, the American an American. All she aims to do, is to convert the soul, and to lead it to union with God, with whom there is no respect of persons, but in every nation they who do his will are acceptable to him. She belongs to no particular nation, and no one nation has any more claim to her than another. She is in spiritual matters over all, superior to all, and no one can change or modify her creed, for all the other Catholic nations would cry out against it. With Englishmen, Irishmen, Americans, her doctrine and discipline are the same, emanating from one and the same centre, and, therefore, under the control of no party or faction in the state or nation. She derives her power, not from governments, from peoples, or individuals, but from a source above them, and independent of them. She speaks with divine authority, and is in our midst a divine institution, which does not depend on the popular will, which the popular will cannot control, and which, though it leave that will free so long as it is just, and invades no right, resists it whenever it is opposed to the will of God, or seeks to play the tyrant. Such being the church, divine, catholic, independent, always asserting the divine law, and taking the side of justice, of right, of humanity, throwing her whole weight in favor of the wronged against the wrong-doer, she is just what we need to mediate between the state and the individual, and to maintain harmony between authority and liberty.

The church will tend to save our republic also by introducing an element of authority of which we stand in great need. In politics and in society, aside from the annoyances of philanthropists, reformers, and fanatics, we live and breathe in an atmosphere of freedom, and hardly feel that

we have a government. This is well, it is right, it is just. Man ought to be free,—free to be a man, to be himself, and what God and nature intended him to be. But, nevertheless, authority is a want of his nature, and to attain to his full growth as a man, it is necessary that he learn and practise obedience. You see this in the very fact, that, when God made man and placed him in the garden, he gave him a law, not for his evil, but for his good. He gave him a command that he might learn to obey, and acquire the virtue and the reward of obedience. That lesson is as necessary for us as it was for Adam, and will be as useful to us as it was to him. How, with our free institutions, and with our sects that disclaim all authority, and rest on mere individual opinion, are we to learn that lesson, and acquire the virtue of obedience? We cannot acquire it, unless there be for us some authority which we feel that we are bound to obey. Without such an authority some of the finest and noblest qualities of our nature can never be developed. Our civilization will want the charm of sweetness and modesty, and our society the virtues which render it noble, strong, and enduring. With the habits of freedom, without any submission to authority, we lose all respect for the rights, both of society and of individuals, and end in complete egotism. He who has never learned to obey has never become capable of disinterestedness, and is prepared to make no sacrifice for truth or justice, for country or humanity. And how, without disinterestedness, without sacrifice, are we to sustain our republic, and realize the great and glorious mission which it has pleased Almighty God to assign to the American people? This large political and social freedom which is so diffused amongst us, this almost unlimited individualism which widely prevails, and to which we owe the good qualities and the defects of our character, is extremely dangerous, if exclusive. If not tempered by loyalty to an authority above us, it renders us harsh, reckless, proud, conceited, selfish, and overbearing, as neglectful of the courtesies and amenities of civilized life as of civil and religious duties. The evil cannot be corrected by the government, for the government cannot take cognizance of it without destroying liberty altogether, and opening the door to every species of tyranny. Public opinion cannot cure it, for there is nothing to form a right public opinion on the subject; and public opinion, adopted as authority, only renders a man mean, cowardly, and servile. The only authority to which a free-

born American can bow without derogating from his dignity as a man is religion, and the state simply for the sake of religion, and so far as religion commands. Sectarian religion was the religion the original colonists brought with them, because, unhappily, that was all the religion they had; but sectarian religion has no authority; it is not and cannot be law for the freeman, and the American people feel and know it. They may adhere to it from habit, or they may profess it, because they wish to use it as a fig-leaf apron to cover their religious nakedness, but, to obey it as law, as the voice and will of God, does not enter into their thoughts. The church alone can introduce into our religion the element of authority, and foster those habits of obedience and those virtues and qualities which depend on it, and which are so necessary in a state where there is really nothing else to obey. This obedience does not degrade or debase; it ennobles and dignifies the soul; for it is not obedience to man or to a man-made church, but to the Highest, to God himself; and man is never so great or so honorable as, when asserting his freedom in face of all other authority, he prostrates himself, with filial love and unreserved submission, at the feet of his Maker.

II.—Thus far, I have endeavored to meet and refute the assertion that the church is hostile to civil liberty, and dangerous to our republican institutions, by showing that she is always and everywhere necessary to prevent the government, whatever its form, from either running into despotism or into anarchy. The condition of all true liberty is the maintenance of justice, or the divine authority, in the government of human affairs, and without the church, justice or the divine authority in the government of human affairs cannot be maintained.

In the further remarks I propose to make, my purpose is to vindicate the American government from the charge of being hostile to the church, by proving that, if honestly administered, according to its fundamental principles, as recognized by both the federal and state constitutions, it affords her all she needs, and all she can receive from civil government. I shall thus have proved that we may be fervent and devout Catholics without disloyalty to American republicanism, and loyal American republicans without infidelity to the Catholic religion.

As far as Catholics themselves are concerned, there is no occasion for proving either of these propositions. You and

I, my Catholic fellow-citizens, have no doubt on the subject. We are Catholics; we are Americans; we love our religion; we love our republicanism; and we know that there is no incompatibility of either with the other. We know the incompatibility asserted by the enemies alike of our religion and of our country, does not exist; and if we are able to restrain our indignation at those who assert it, it is because we recollect that they are—Know-Nothings.

But our personal knowledge does not suffice for our non-Catholic countrymen. They place no reliance on what we say or profess; for they judge us by themselves, and suppose we are governed by our views of policy rather than by our love of truth. They doubt, or pretend to doubt, the sincerity of our attachment to the religious liberty recognized and guarantied by our government, and allege that we merely put up with it because we are weak, and it is popular, and the best that we can at present obtain; but that we are at bottom opposed to it, and are only waiting till we are strong, in order to abolish it, and enact the Catholic religion as the exclusive religion of American citizens.

There is no denying that this is what our non-Catholic countrymen pretend, perhaps what some of them really believe. No matter what we say, no matter what we profess, they will not believe us, unless it corresponds to their preconceived theory concerning us. It becomes necessary, therefore, to meet their allegations, not by a simple denial, or by solemn professions, but by proofs, which they themselves cannot gainsay, that the government in its relation to religion does really accord with the spirit and the principles of the Catholic Church; that the religious liberty it recognizes and guaranties is far more in accordance with our principles as Catholics than with theirs as Protestants, and that neither we nor our church could have any motive for changing the present relation of the government to religion, in case we had the power.

Our government is a free government; this is its boast. It is so in fact; not precisely because it is a popular government, for the people may play the tyrant as well as kings and emperors, and the arbitrary will of a majority is as incompatible with true liberty as any other arbitrary will; but because it is founded on the principle that all men are equal before the state, and that every man has certain inalienable rights, called with us the "Rights of Man," which it is

bound by its very constitution to recognize and protect. These rights, in several of the states, are enumerated and specified in a bill of rights, which precedes the constitution,—of rights which the government is to hold sacred and inviolable. They are not derived from civil society, they are not grants from the state, and revocable at its will, but are held to precede civil society, to be anterior to its constitution, and to be its law or the limitation of its power. The state does not give them, and cannot take them away. Every legislative enactment which violates or infringes them is tyrannical, and would be set aside by our courts of law, as contrary to natural justice, as unconstitutional, and therefore null and void from the beginning. They are anterior and superior to the state, and its chief office is to recognize them, and guaranty their peaceable enjoyment to each and every citizen.

Among these rights is the right of conscience, or the right before the state of every citizen to choose his own religion, and to worship God as his own conscience dictates, so long as his conscience is not made a pretext for violating the equal rights of others, disturbing the peace, or outraging public decency. As all are held to be equal before the state, this right of conscience must be held by the government sacred and inviolable in the case of every citizen, or subject of the state. This right of conscience lies in the spiritual order, and the state acknowledges its incompetency in spirituals, and its duty to leave all spiritual questions to be settled by the private conscience of the citizen, or by the church or sect the private citizen sees proper to adopt.

The government makes and can make no law declaring what shall or shall not be the religion of its citizens, but not therefore is it free to disregard religion, and pursue a policy hostile to it. It makes no public profession of religion, I grant, but it is not an infidel government; for it must recognize the freedom of the religion of every one of its citizens, and protect it for all who profess it. My religion is my conscience; my conscience is my right, and included in that liberty which the state recognizes, and is instituted to protect. Every citizen can say as much of his religion. Therefore it is the freedom of religion, not the freedom of infidelity to enslave religion, that our government recognizes and guaranties. The right or religion of the citizen is the law of the government, and defines its duty and the limits of its power. The state does not abjure religion, and

hold itself free to act without regard to its freedom; but it is bound to protect its freedom, and forbidden to do any thing against it, in the case of any one of its citizens, whether Catholic or Protestant.

Such being the character of the government and its relation to religion, the question comes up,—Is it satisfactory to the Catholic Church? Is this freedom and protection all that she herself asks of civil government? I do not ask, Is it satisfactory to individual Catholics who, having been oppressed by Protestant governments for three hundred years, are but too happy to obtain so much, but does it satisfy the church herself? I am only a layman, and have no authority to answer for the church. I can answer the question only by referring to her constitution, the end for which she exists, her well-known principles, and her past history. But these will enable us, I think, to find an answer, which non-Catholics may accept as authentic.

The church is a spiritual kingdom in the world, but not of it,—existing on the earth, but deriving her principles and mission from heaven. As a spiritual kingdom, or organism for the spiritual direction and government of mankind, the church is complete in herself, and self-sufficing. She asks and can receive nothing from without. The end for which she is instituted is not secular or temporal, but spiritual,—the glory of God in the salvation of souls. Her mission is spiritual; and our Lord in instituting her, gave her all that is requisite for its accomplishment. She is independent of the state; and in relation to her own proper work, she has her own government, her own supreme governor, her legislature, judiciary, and executive,—her own laws, courts, and officers.

What, then, does the church need of civil government, or what, in the nature of the case, can she receive from civil society? I do not ask now what government or society needs or can receive from the church. That question I have already asked and answered. I simply ask what the church needs or can receive from secular government? Evidently only the recognition and guaranty of her independence; of her freedom to labor peaceably in the accomplishment of her spiritual mission. That is precisely what the American state professes to do for her, in professing to do it for the religion of all its citizens, whatever it may be. The civil government cannot perform any of her spiritual functions, for it has no spiritual faculties, and is confessedly

incompetent in spirituals. Its officious attempts, even when well disposed, to aid her in her spiritual work all history proves to have tended only to embarrass her, to impede her operations, and to throw upon her the responsibility of its own ineptness. The intermeddling of the state in her affairs has been in all ages one of the greatest obstacles to her success in gaining souls to God. All she wants, according to her own constitution and end, and all that she can receive from civil government, is its respect for her independence, and its protection of her freedom against material force or physical violence; and this is guarantied to her by our government with as sure a guaranty as any civil government can give.

To recognize and guaranty the freedom and independence of the church is to recognize her right to be here in all her integrity, with her dogma, her ritual, and her discipline unmutilated, in their entireness, and unimpeded in their peaceable operation. My church is my right, is included in my right as an American citizen; and she has the right to be here, because I have the right myself to be here, and to have my own religion. My right to have my own religion is my right to have that religion as I am bound by it in conscience to hold it. The liberty of the Catholic Church, is her liberty to be here as the Catholic Church, as herself, and to hold and to do all that she teaches belongs to her as the church of God. She must be free to be here with all that she teaches is everywhere binding on the consciences of the faithful. There may be things elsewhere, dependent on local usages, or special arrangements entered into with the civil power, which she makes binding on the consciences of the faithful there, which do not bind them here. Such things are not necessarily included in that liberty recognized and guarantied by our government, I freely concede. But all that she holds to be universal and unalterable in her discipline and ceremonial, as well as in her dogmas, and which she declares to be binding on the consciences of the faithful throughout the world, though, in themselves, not essential to her existence and functions as the church of God, *are* included in that liberty, and must be recognized and protected, or her liberty, that is, my liberty of conscience as a citizen, is not recognized and protected. But, if recognized and protected, she has all that she can receive from the government.

This liberty is recognized and guarantied to the Catholic Church, not indeed by a special concordat or agreement between the church and the state, as is the case in most European countries, but by what I will venture to call a general concordat, published by our government, proclaiming liberty to all its citizens to profess and peacefully enjoy what religion they please. The state with us makes no special concordat with the church or with any of the sects, but declares the terms at once on which it will deal with them all. It recognizes them all as independent, and says it will maintain that independence within its jurisdiction, for all and for each, against all material or physical violence. Guarantying this independence and protection to all, it, of course, guaranties it to the Catholic Church, and just as fully as if she were here alone, and there were no Protestant sects in the land. She, then, is free and independent here, and has the pledge of the whole force of the government in the United States to protect her in the peaceable prosecution, in her own way, of the mission she has received, with none but a moral or theological opposition to encounter. What more does she ask?

Will it be said that this general liberty and protection will not satisfy her, because here it is guarantied to her only in common with the sects? She has no exclusive favors, no exclusive privileges, for the sects are as free as she, and entitled to all the protection that she is. No doubt of it; but what then? My neighbor is as free as a citizen as I am. Am I, therefore, not a free citizen? Does his freedom detract from mine? Do I cease to be free to be a Catholic, because my neighbor is equally free to be a Presbyterian? Is my Catholicity less protected, because his Presbyterianism is equally protected? If I violate his right before the state, to profess freely and peaceably his religion,—a thing there is no danger of my doing,—the government will no doubt repress my violence; if he violate my right to profess freely and peaceably my religion,—a thing which he is not unlikely to attempt,—it will, at least it says it will, repress his violence and protect me. I do not see that I need any thing more. I feel more secure in my freedom as a Catholic, from the fact that he is free to be a Presbyterian. If my freedom excluded his, he would be even more strongly tempted than he is now to destroy mine. Where all are free, and none are specially

favored by the law, there is, at least, less motive for changing the law, and the natural sense of justice, which it satisfies, may be always invoked with effect to sustain it.

But it is said, the Catholic Church, if she had the power, would require the government, not only to protect her freedom and independence, but to suppress Presbyterianism and all other heresies. She undoubtodly would require the government to suppress their physical violence, or their attempts to fight against her with unspiritual weapons. If they should resort to physical force, to war and bloodshed, robbery and arson, as a means to check her progress, or to propagate themselves, she, no doubt, would call in the secular arm to her defence. If Presbyterians should, in their zeal against Catholics, and for their own heresy, break the peace, plot revolutions, take forcible possession of Catholic churches, rob the church of her property, disturb Catholic congregations assembled peaceably for religious worship, kidnap the children of Catholic parents, attack Catholics in their houses, or shoot them down in the streets, she would require the civil law to take cognizance of their offenses, and for such things they are punishable, though not always punished, by our laws now; for all such things are forbidden by the existing laws of the land, let them be done by whom they may. Our government professes to guaranty us against all physical violence, and it must so guaranty us, if it guaranty us liberty.

The church requires the secular arm to defend her against physical violence, because, being a spiritual kingdom, she has no armed force of her own with which to resist it. But she never calls in the government to suppress heretics who couple with their heresy no invasion of the rights of others. The church holds herself, without the aid of the state, able to cope with the moral power of those she condemns as heretics. It is not always nor even commonly, that she offers physical resistance to physical opposition. She usually meets the physical violence of her enemies with moral power alone, and vanquishes them by being slain, not by slaying. I claim to have read her history with some diligence and care; I have found several instances, in which she has called in the secular arm against heretics, but I have found no instance of her having called it in against heretics who opposed to her only moral power, or relied only on moral means to propagate their doctrines; and none in which our own government would

not be bound, as the protector of religious liberty, to come to her assistance.

Never, I repeat, has she employed the secular arm against sectaries who did not usurp Catholic property, interfere with the rights of Catholics, and who offered her only a theologian opposition. She, by her popes, councils, and doctors, teaches that faith is voluntary, and forbids any one to be compelled by force to receive it. No civil force was ever used against the Pelagians, or the semi-Pelagians. Rome, which from an early day possessed the temporal as well as the spiritual power in its plenitude, never compelled the unbelieving Jews to be baptized, and they never have been persecuted in the Eternal City.

I speak of the church, and of what she herself has done or authorized; I speak not of what kings and emperors or nominally Catholic governments have or have not done. Although, with the exception of our own, the only states in the world where religious liberty in the American sense is recognized and guarantied by law, are Catholic states, or states in which the overwhelming majority of the people are Catholics, such as France, Belgium, and Austria, I do not take upon myself the defence even of nominally Catholic governments in any period of Christian history. They have done too many uncatholic things; have been in their policy too independent of the church, and too little submissive to her orders or her counsels, to permit me, even if I were so disposed, to hold her responsible for what they have or have not done. The popes used all their endeavors for centuries to induce them to abolish torture in the examination of witnesses and prisoners, but in vain; and many of the things which they urged for ages upon European princes and statesman, without success, our government has been the first to adopt. She condemned the slave-trade in 1482, as soon as it commenced in modern Europe, and yet, not till within my own memory, has a single secular government been brought to prohibit it. England even fought with Spain, so late as the last century, for the privilege of supplying her colonies with slaves from Africa. Secular governments, as a rule, have pursued their own policy, without consulting the church, and she can be held responsible for their doings only in those cases where there is evidence that they acted by her orders, her advice, or her approbation.

I am not supposed to have any superfluous tenderness for

those who, in the judgment of my church, are heretics, and some of my Catholic friends amuse themselves by accusing me of an inclination to what they call "*superlative* orthodoxy;" but I hold myself at perfect liberty to condemn the revocation of the edict of Nantes, and the dragonades and exile of the Huguenots by Louis XIV., for they were done without the authorization or counsel of the church, at a time when Louis had brought the church in France to the very verge of schism, when all communications between the French court and Rome were interrupted, and when the king was far more pope in France than the pope himself. Blame the king; blame his ministers; blame his courtiers, whether laymen or churchmen, as much as you please. You will not touch me as a Catholic. I am a papist, not a royalist; an ultramontane, not a Gallican; and I look to Rome, not to Paris, to know what is or is not Catholicity.

Some may think they find in the Spanish Inquisition an exception to my assertion, for that tribunal was established with the express consent of the pope. But I have my answer, and a very plain one. The Inquisition was a mixed court, a politico-ecclesiastical tribunal, and as it was to take cognizance, among other things, of religious matters, the Spanish government could not establish it without the papal permission. But it was solicited and conceded, not as a tribunal against peaceable and inoffensive heretics, who appealed only to Scripture and reason, but, if there be any truth in history, for the purpose of ferreting out and bringing to light persons who were secretly conspiring against the throne and the altar, plotting in secret to overthrow both church and state, by a violent and bloody revolution,—persons whom our own laws would condemn and punish as criminals; for were persons in our own country to conspire against the government and seek by revolution or bloodshed to destroy even the Catholic Church, they would be answerable in our courts of justice. That the Inquisition was abused, and made the instrument of dark and cruel passions, especially under the reign of Philip II., I do not deny, but a king as absolute as Philip, who could make war on the pope, and lay waste the ecclesiastical states, cannot hold the church responsible for his administration. I do not defend, I condemn the cruelties of the tribunal of the Inquisition, although I believe there has been much falsehood and exaggeration in the case. They were, however, great enough, and more than one pope raised his voice and interposed his

authority against them, authorized appeals from its judgments to Rome, and even established a court of appeals in Spain herself, where its judgments, in questions touching religion, could be and were frequently reviewed, and set aside. The blame rests not with the pope, nor with the church, but with the secular government, and the individual inquisitors, who abused the tribunal, and perverted it from its legitimate purpose. I shall not undertake to defend these any more than I would undertake to defend Judas who betrayed our Lord. Even sincere and well-disposed men may sometimes do things which are in themselves reprehensible.

I well know that in the theological order the church is exclusive, and teaches that out of her communion salvation is impossible. She denies the doctrine that every man has the moral right, the right before God, to be of what religion he chooses, or of none, as he thinks fit. She condemns this modern indifferentism, so prevalent in our country, and which so many confound with religious liberty, and teaches that every man should be of the true religion, believe and hold fast the true Catholic faith, and that whoso will not, shall perish everlastingly. But this has nothing to do with the question I am discussing. The church denies the competency of the state in spirituals, and therefore its right to decide for its subjects what religion they shall or shall not profess. Necessarily, then, must she assert the right of every man before the state to choose his own religion, and to be secured in its peaceable and orderly profession. Because she regards heresy as a mortal sin, it by no means follows that she calls on the state to suppress it. She holds intemperance, drunkenness, to be a mortal sin, but who ever heard of her calling upon the state to pass a "Maine Liquor Law?"

I wish I could make my non-Catholic countrymen understand that there is a broad difference between the Catholic spirit and the Puritanic or Calvinistic spirit. The Calvinistic spirit has no confidence in moral power; and conscious of its lack of the grace of God, it places all its reliance on the secular government. When it sees something which is good or philanthrophic, it calls on the state to make a law enjoining it. When it sees a vice, an immorality, it calls upon the legislature to suppress it, by civil pains and penalties. Thus John Calvin, when he legislated for Geneva, descended to the minutest particulars, and imposed legal

pains and penalties on every act that he regarded as forbidden by the law of God. So the fathers of New England extended the penal code to the most venial sins. They prescribed the mode of cutting the hair, forbid the making of mince-pies and-plum pudding on Christmas and New Year's, and, as some say, the husband to kiss his wife, and the mother her babe on Sunday, before sunset. The law left nothing to individual conscience; and hence it is, I suppose, that so many of the descendants of the old Puritans fancy that they are in the way of sanctity so long as they do nothing the law forbids, or can reach and punish.

With Catholics all this is different. We ask few laws, and seldom have occasion to appeal to the secular power. The church teaches us to rely on moral power, the grace of God, and individual conscience. What Calvinism hopes to effect only by the civil magistrate, constable, tithing-man, or beadle, she leaves to conscience, to the pulpit, to the confessional, and the grace of the sacraments. She demands the intervention of government only in the material order, for the maintenance or vindication of justice; what lies entirely in the moral or spiritual order, and breaks not out in some form of physical violence, she regards as no proper subject of governmental suppression. So of great moral and philanthropic objects. She does not call upon the government to enact them, and make it a legal offence to neglect them. Hence she leaves the care of the poor, the provision for orphans, emancipation of slaves, and similar good works, to the charity of the faithful, without calling upon the government to exact them as a matter of justice; and it must be confessed even by her enemies, that she has found charity far more effectual both for exterminating evil and promoting good than Protestantism has its civil legislation. Following the Catholic spirit, we leave a large margin to personal liberty, to individual conscience, and to private charity. Hence our spirit does not groan and travail in bondage like the Calvinistic. We are not hampered by that minute penal code that leaves one no room for virtue, elongates his visage, sours his looks, irritates his temper, renders the world cheerless to his heart, silent to his ear, and drab-colored to his eye. Let the Calvinistic spirit have free scope, and the poor Calvinist would find life one eternal treadmill.

Heresy is, no doubt, a mortal sin, but when not coupled with physical violence, or when it does not invade a neigh-

bor's right, or plot a political or social revolution, to be effected by violence, we treat it as we do any other mortal sin. We do all we can by moral and religious means, all that our charity can suggest, to correct it, and to bring him who holds it back to the unity of the faith; but we never think of calling upon the civil government to undertake his conversion. We hold, indeed, that every one ought to embrace the Catholic faith; so we hold that every man should love God supremely and his neighbor as himself, and that he will assuredly be eternally damned who does not; but we should as soon think of asking the legislature to pass a law enjoining the latter under pain of being sent to the penitentiary for life, as a law under a like penalty commanding the former. Men cannot be forced into faith or love. Either, to be acceptable to God, must be a free-will offering. God himself forces no man to accept eternal life, and leaves every man the moral power to reject it, and to lose his own soul, if he chooses. All the civil government can do in the case is to maintain an open field and fair play for truth, and to repress every party that would break out in acts of injustice against it. With this view of the case, I may safely conclude that the church would and could, with her principles, have no motive to change the present relation of the government to religion, were she to gain the ascendency in our country, or were the great majority of our people to become Catholics. We, then, may conclude further that our government, honestly administered in accordance with its fundamental principles, meets the principles, the wants, and the wishes of the Catholic Church; and therefore, that we may be loyal American republicans, and assert the equality of all religions before the state, that profess to be Christian, without failing in our true-hearted devotion to that glorious old Catholic Church, which drew our ancestors from the darkness and barbarism of pagan superstition, tamed the wild heart of the savage, founded the modern states of Europe, nursed their infancy, and introduced and continues to sustain all that is true, noble, and humanizing in modern civilization.

I say not, I pretend not, that we have, or can have, under our American system, all the arrangements that we find in those ages and countries where the church and the state are in some sort mixed up one with the other, and no small portion of the proper work of the state is thrown as a burden on the church. That mixture of civil and ecclesiasti-

cal institutions and functions which sprung up under the Roman emperors after their conversion to Christianity, which obtained in a greater or less degree in all countries that adopted the Theodosian and Justinian codes, or the Roman civil law, as the basis of their jurisprudence, and which still obtains in theory in most European states, does not obtain here, and I think never will. But this no Catholic need regret, for that system was never more than an accident in the history of the church, and grew out of circumstances which do not exist here, and cannot, if our government continues to abide by its principles. That system was good in its time and place, because the civil government would not then grant that full freedom, independence, and protection to the spiritual order which our government recognizes and guaranties as its right. In losing that system, which is neither practicable nor necessary here, we lose nothing of Catholicity, nothing of its vigor and efficiency; we lose simply certain special favors of the government, and are relieved in turn from certain burdens at times almost too great for the church to bear, imposed by the government as the price of those favors. The loss is a great gain, and it is far better for the interests of the church to lose the favors and be freed from the burdens, than it is to retain the favors and bear the burdens.

I say not any more that Catholics have nothing to complain of in this country. The spirit of the people is not always in harmony with the principles of the government, and they have pushed a few of our state legislatures to acts, touching church property, which violate the constitution, and are incompatible with both that civil and that religious liberty which it was their duty to recognize and guaranty; we experience in many places social annoyances; the schools are often conducted in a spirit hostile to us, and pretended philanthropists lie in wait for our children, to take them from Catholic influence, and to provide for their being brought up to curse the mother that bore them. Something of the old Calvinistic bigotry and fanaticism lingers still in the country, and occasionally makes itself felt. It is to be regretted, but after all, our annoyances are fewer here than elsewhere. The people, no doubt, have their moments of vertigo, but not more frequent or more violent than kings and emperors, and sorry am I to add, than even nominally Catholic kings and emperors.

There is, as we well know, a portion of our countrymen

who are deadly hostile to Catholicity, and who think freedom to us is slavery to them, who have so ardent a love for freedom of conscience that they wish to keep it entirely to themselves, and to permit it to no others. These may annoy us, may kidnap not a few of the children of the poor and destitute, but they after all are by no means the majority of the American people, and the great principles of American liberty will prove too strong for them. They may get up now and then a riot against us, burn a few of our convents or churches, tar and feather now and then a holy priest, and shoot down a few peaceable Catholics in the street, but the great majority of the American people will disown them. They are false Americans, men

> "Who steal the livery of the court of heaven,
> To serve the devil in."

And the mischief they devise against us will recoil upon their own heads, and work their own confusion.

Our course, my Catholic fellow-citizens, is plain before us. Our country is threatened with many dangers. Evils of no small magnitude are daily gaining ground among us. Blows are struck at the fundamental institutions of the land, and the non-Catholic sects are impotent to prevent them; nay, are they who strike them. Our work, after saving our souls, perhaps as one of the conditions of saving them, is to do what we can to save our country. We have in our religion, if we will but understand it, and be loyal to its spirit, the conservative power to save the free institutions founded by the patriotism and blood of our heroic fathers. In the Old World we have not always been able to do what we can here, for there we had to conquer liberty, while here we have only to preserve it. There our powers have been crippled by kings and aristocracies, and vested rights, and old usages, and deadening routine. Here we are free to be ourselves, and to exert all the freedom and energy of our souls. We must rise to the level of our position. We must cherish an enlightened and generous American patriotism, and labor to consecrate this vast land and its millions of immortal souls to the love of God and our neighbor, so that the song of freedom mingling with the hymn of the sanctuary, and hallowed by divine love, may rise from the whole length and breadth of our vast continent in sweet strains of unbroken melody to heaven, and be listened to with joy by the angels of God.

BROWNSON ON THE CHURCH AND THE REPUBLIC.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1857.]

It is not often that the secular or the Protestant periodicals of the country make any formal attempts to refute our arguments or to show the inconclusiveness of our reasoning in behalf of the church; and when they do make some such attempt, they ordinarily do it with so much levity, violence, or ignorance of the subject, that we cannot without derogating from the dignity of our position, offer them any reply. The *Universalist Quarterly Review*, a respectable Protestant periodical published in Boston, and conducted with a fair share of learning and ability, offers, in its issue for last October, an exception to the general rule, and presents, upon the whole, an able and interesting criticism on our article, entitled *The Church and the Republic*. We know not the author, but, though not perfectly master of his subject, he writes with a certain degree of courtesy and candor, and apparently with an earnest love of truth and justice. He opens his essay with some remarks on the influence of our writings, which cannot fail to be gratifying to our friends, and which will prove to them that, notwithstanding many discouragements and unfavorable appearances, our *Review* is silently doing its work, and making its mark even on the mind of non-Catholic Americans. Our readers will pardon us for reproducing them.

"Few American readers need to be told who or what is O. A. Brownson. Perhaps no man in this country has, by the simple effort of the pen, made himself more conspicuous, or has more distinctly impressed the peculiarities of his mind. Other writers may have a larger number of readers, but no one has readers of such various character. He has the attention of intelligent men of all sects and parties—men who read him without particular regard to the themes on which he spends his energies, or the sectarian or partisan position of which he may avow himself the champion. The extraordinary ingenuity of his logic, the vigor

*Brownson on the Church and the Republic. Universalist Quarterly and General Review. Boston: October, 1856.

of his thought, and the clearness and directness of his style, will attract attention, regardless of the particular opinions which prove the occasion of bringing out these fascinating qualities."

This is generous; but the writer thinks there is, however, a grave defect in our mind.

"Mr. Brownson, however, is wanting in the highest characteristic of eloquence—he does not *convince*. He may puzzle and perplex those whose convictions differ from his own, but he will make few converts. His Protestant readers find in his productions a sort of intellectual gymnasium, for whatever may be the intrinsic merit of his argumentation, it will not be denied that it stimulates thought; but, of the many whom we know to be among his constant readers, we cannot name one who has been forced thereby into a change of conviction."

The author probably means that we fail to persuade. To convince is the province of logic, in which few even of our enemies regard us as deficient; to persuade is the province of eloquence, and to eloquence we lay no claim. A man may be persuaded by the eloquence of the writer or speaker without being logically convinced, and he may be convinced by reasoning without being persuaded. His understanding may be convinced, and yet his prejudices, mental habits, interests, feelings, passions, or affections may prevent him from following his convictions. His intellect is mastered, but his feelings and will are not persuaded. We may not have had great success in making converts, for converts are not made by human efforts alone; but there is a respectable number of persons, whose lives adorn their Catholic profession, who have assured us that they owe their conversion, under God, to our writings and lectures. The writer himself seems also to concede that we have not been wholly unsuccessful.

"The secret of his apparent success in maintaining the claims of the Catholic Church will, if we mistake not, be found in the unwarrantable readiness with which Protestant readers accede to the premises of his argumentation. Protestantism does not claim infallibility; and certainly, in the form in which it has thus far been most popular, most egregious error has gone under its name. Those who have been reared under its Calvinistic phase, are little aware of the mongrel character of their beliefs—the arbitrary mingling of truth and error, which to them has the force of pure doctrine. And even those who have reached what we must deem a higher form of faith, still retain the impressions of early education, and unconsciously accede to notions wholly incompatible with the convictions which they formally avow. From the mass of

men, thus unconsciously under the influence of principles which their awakened judgment would repudiate, an ingenious disputant can easily elicit premises of argument, the logical sequence of which is revolting to their sensibilities.

"We have long been convinced that Protestants are to blame for whatever is perplexing in the argument by which it is attempted to maintain the dogmas of Catholicism. Indeed, if we must admit the principles of which the Calvinistic interpretation of Protestantism is predicated, we see no way by which to resist the inference which the Catholic logician finds it easy to educe. Not one Protestant in ten will hesitate to admit the proposition, that *God has revealed to mankind a perfect and complete system of religious truth;* and the further proposition, *that men are morally obligated to receive, and practically act up to, this revelation of truth, will find an equally prompt admission.* Yet, out of these propositions, Mr. Brownson will construct an argument for the 'infallible interpreter,' which no skill of controversy can possibly resist. For, it will be asked, is it not preposterous to claim, that the just God has obligated his rational creatures to receive and practise a truth, without providing them with a sure means of ascertaining what that truth is? Would it not be to tantalize his children, to require their belief in the truth, and at the same time to leave them, even after their most conscientious efforts to find it, in a state of uncertainty as to whether they had attained it? If God has made it the duty of man to believe the truth, and nothing but the truth, he must, if justice is one of his attributes, have furnished them an 'infallible interpreter,' whereby they may know for a certainty what the truth is, and when they have received it. We must add, that the existence of an infallible interpreter admitted, the presumption that the Catholic Church is that interpreter, though not logical, is, nevertheless, unquestionable. It is certain, that the church or institution on which this marvellous gift has been bestowed will be aware of the fact that it possesses it, and will claim to exercise it; and as the Catholic Church is the only institution which professes to have such knowledge, and presumes to exercise such prerogative, it alone *can* be the infallible interpreter! And such, essentially, in various forms of statement and application, is the reasoning with which Mr. Brownson opposes Catholicism to Protestantism,—a method of argument which Calvinistic theologians find it no easy matter to confront."

We commend this explanation of our apparent success to the attention of our readers, which, as indicating the state of mind of a large class of our countrymen, is not without significance. It justifies the hopes for them we have so often expressed. Even the writer himself can hardly be prepared to maintain that Almighty God has *not* "revealed to mankind a perfect and complete system of truth," and

that men are *not* "morally obligated to receive and practically act up to this revelation of truth." If God has made us a revelation at all, he must have revealed perfect and complete truth, and all the truth on the points intended to be covered by the revelation; and if he has revealed this truth, he must require us to receive and practically conform to it, since he must reveal it for a purpose, and there is no other purpose conceivable for which he could have revealed it. If he requires it, we are morally obliged to obey, for certainly we are morally bound to comply with all the requirements of God. To deny either of these propositions is tantamount to the denial that God has made us a revelation at all; and hence we have always maintained that no man who admits revelation can stop short of the Catholic Church, save at the expense of his logic. We wish, however, to remind our author, in passing, that to be an infallible interpreter of the revelation is not the only office of the church, nor the only thing for which her existence is held by Catholics to be necessary in the order of salvation.

Our readers are aware that in our article on *The Church and the Republic*, we were not offering an argument for the church herself, or assigning a reason why men should become Catholics. We have never fallen into the absurdity of urging men to become Catholics for a temporal motive, or of urging that the church must be the church of God, because she is what is needed to sustain our republic. We have never identified her with any particular political theory, form of government, order of society, or earthly cause whatever. All we have aimed at has been to remove the prejudices of our non-Catholic countrymen, and to answer the objections of those who allege that she is incompatible with republicanism in the state. From the fact that abroad we see Catholicity, for the most part, apparently associated with monarchical forms of government, and from the further fact that eminent Catholic writers have opposed all movements in favor of republicanism, and defended monarchy on principle, there is in many minds, both out of the church and within her pale, an impression that she is unfavorable to popular governments. This impression is an obstacle to the spread of Catholicity among the middle and lower classes of the American people, who are all stanch republicans; and we have, therefore, deemed it not improper or useless to attempt to remove it, and to do it, not by showing that the church is compatible with republicanism,

or adapted to a republican state of society, but by showing that republican institutions, maintaining at once the just rights of society and the imprescriptible freedom of the individual, are impracticable without her. We do not conform our religion to our politics; we aim to conform our politics to our religion; that is, we do not set up any political theory or form of government as a test of religion; but we hold that any political theory of liberty or despotism repugnant to religion is for that reason false, and not to be maintained. Yet knowing that the church is not incompatible with republicanism, and that the republican, as every other form of legal government, has need of her to secure the common good of society, we have believed that it would be doing a service to religion as well as to politics, to make it evident.

The argument in our article, not for the church, but to prove the necessity of the church as an element in the social system, is what our Boston friend criticises and undertakes to prove incomplete. The proposition we defended is, Catholicity is essential to the maintenance of the republic according to the thought of its founders, by mediating between the authority of society and the freedom of the individual, and restraining each from encroaching on the just rights of the other; that is, the church is necessary to restrain authority from becoming social despotism, and individual freedom from becoming anarchy. In supporting this thesis, we maintained that it is only religion that can mediate between the two elements, and religion only as a power resting on its own basis,independent of both, higher than either, and strong enough to restrain. Up to this point the critic goes with us. "To all this," he says, "we readily accede, and we may add," he says, "that we have never met with a man stupid enough to aver the contrary."

But having proved this, we conclude that the religion which will answer our purpose must be the Christian church, or religion as an organization, that is, as we explained ourselves, religion organized, or as an organism. Here the reviewer refuses to go with us. He concedes, however, and our readers will bear the concession in mind, that if religion as an organization is necessary, Protestantism cannot, and Catholicity can answer our purpose. We let him speak for himself.

"Those who have been constant readers of Mr. Brownson's effusions in support of his present faith, must have noticed the circumstance, that

he usually passes hastily over the vital point of his argument. That part of his argument which is obvious, and really needs little more than a distinct statement, he amplifies and fortifies with the greatest patience and caution. The feature about which doubts will arise, if any where, and which demands the most labored treatment, he glides over or perhaps assumes, as if the point he would urge were too evident to justify proof! This eccentricity (to call it by no severer term) is singularly glaring in the article we have now under consideration. The points of his argument which we have already presented, and which, as we have seen, will be readily admitted as soon as distinctly stated, he labors, and amplifies, and illustrates through several solid pages of his periodical. We come, however, to the vital point—the point where the Protestant reader finds, for the first time, in the article, a necessity for great proof and ample illustration—the point where it is to be shown, that religion, the authoritative element in society, conceded by most every reader not to depend on the individual or the state, *is* dependent on the Catholic Church, and we find the whole matter disposed of in the following summary style:

"'This you will willingly concede me. Then you must concede that religion, to answer our purpose, must be the Christian church, or religion organized. Religion without the church, without an organization, is not a power, is only an idea, a simple opinion, and therefore nothing but individualism. Unorganized, existing not as a church, or as an organism, with no organs through which it can speak, it is nothing but the private conviction of the individual, and adds to the individual nothing beyond the strength of his conviction. If it be a church, an organism, and yet dependent on the individual for its organization, the individual can make or unmake it at his will, and though he may exercise power over it, it can exercise none over him. If it be a church, and dependent on the state, and under its control, as is the Russian church, the Prussian church, and the English church, it is simply a function of the state itself. It must be what the civil power chooses to make it; and its ministers, instead of being independent in face of the state, and free before the magistrate, will be simply a part of the constabulary. Religion must then be religion organized, and as religion organized, or as the church, it must be independent alike of the state and the individual, or it will not answer the purpose.'

"And this is all the proof we are furnished with in support of the only questionable point in the proposition which Mr. Brownson purposes to maintain! Following the paragraph which we have just quoted, we have a succession of pages to prove what no one disputes, that Protestantism does not comply with the conditions put forth in the paragraph—to prove what to many minds will be considered evident at a glance, that such conditions being assumed, Catholicism, and not Protestantism, is the authoritative medium in adjusting the rival claims of the state and the individual. Mr. Brownson gives us twenty solid pages to prove that the Catholic Church is necessary to the republic, in that it has the prerogative of restraining the element of individualism from rushing into anarchy, and the element of the state from becoming despotic—that it

has this prerogative, in that it is independent of both the individual and the state, and is the infallible interpreter of their respective duties and rights. Fourteen of these pages are employed in setting forth the several elements of a well-regulated society, and in explaining their several relations; and in these fourteen pages we find nothing to which we can materially object—what he states is obvious, and needs statement rather than proof. Five of these pages are also given to demonstrate, what *nobody will dispute, that Protestantism does not, and that Catholicism does, comply with certain conditions, and is in conformity with certain principles. The only question in the mind of a Protestant relates to the justness of those conditions and the soundness of those principles.* Here, and only here, we need to be convinced; here, and only here, we need argument, illustration, amplification. And here we have the paragraph last quoted, and this is all that we have! He gives page on page to convince us of that which we are prepared to believe without proof; he gives little over half a page on the point where alone proof is indispensable. Re-reading the article, we cannot restrain a smile as we pause over the paragraph alluded to. It is amusing to see our intellectual giant putting forth his herculean efforts where they are not needed; it is provoking to see with what complacency he disposes of the only particular where his exertions can be of some service to us. We must, however, presume that he has done the best he could do—we may add, the best that any one can do, in support of such a position; for, surely, the impression is not to be tolerated, that though argument exists, Mr. Brownson is not competent to find it. What we have to say, therefore, in confronting his reasoning is necessarily confined to the extract last made from his article.

"We have complained that Mr. Brownson's labors on indisputable points are out of all proportion to what he expends on the vital point in his argument—that he gives pages where a simple statement would be sufficient—that he gives a brief paragraph where the bulk of his efforts should be directed. We feel justified in another complaint—that what little he does give us on the essential point is not argument but assumption. He burdens us with proof where we really need no proof; where proof is needed, he gives naked assertion. Possibly, it is susceptible of proof, that religion, to be of any use, must be organized, and that, without organization, that is, without a visible church, it is nothing but individualism, and therefore powerless; but, what proof does our author give us? Here it is in his own words: 'You *must* concede' it! He does not even pretend to argue it. He does not put forth even a form of proof. He makes no show of trying to convince us. Nothing of the kind—we 'must *concede*' it. We come to the point where alone the whole controversy between Catholicism and Protestantism is virtually to be decided—the point, above all others, where we are curious to see what argument can be introduced, and we are complaisantly assured, that we 'must concede' the point! True, the words 'you must concede,' are grammatically related to the statement, that religion, to be of any use,

must be organized—must have a visible church; but the remainder of the paragraph is merely an explanation of what is meant by this, and it gives nothing in the form of argument in support of what we must concede."

The fault found with us is that we prove at great length what nobody doubts, and adroitly slip over the turning-point of the question, the only point in the controversy which Protestants want proved, without proving it, nay, without even offering so much as a show of proving it. This charge, if founded, would prove us no better than a logical trickster. We are glad, however, to learn that the point we are said to have so adroitly hustled in without even a show of proof, is all in the whole controversy that Protestants want proved. It narrows the controversy down within manageable limits, and presents a single issue not difficult to dispose of. We hope the author is right.

With the author's leave we must tell him that he is mistaken in saying that we leave this point without proof, or without offering any reason why it must be conceded. The point is given as a logical conclusion from what we had previously established, and which the author of the criticism himself concedes. It is proved in proving the premises, and the author should object, if he objects at all, not that it is a naked assertion left without a show of proof, but that it does not necessarily follow from these premises. In what immediately precedes, as he himself cites us, we say, "It—religion—must rest on a basis independent of both—the state and the individual,—and higher than that of either, and be a *power* which neither the national authority nor the individual authority can control, but strong enough to restrain them both. This you will willingly concede me. [The author does concede it.] *Then* you must concede that religion to answer our purpose must be the Christian church, or religion as an organization." Why so? Because, "religion without the church, without an organization, is not a *power*, is only an idea, a simple opinion, and therefore nothing but individualism. Unorganized, existing not as a church, or as an organism, with no organs through which it can speak, it is nothing but the private conviction of the individual, and can add to the individual nothing but the strength of his conviction." Surely this is not adroitly to slip over the point, and to leave it without even a show of proof. This is not simple naked assertion, as alleged, but argument, at least an attempt at argument, whether successful or unsuccessful.

If religion, in order to meet the wants of society, must be a *power* resting on a basis independent of the nation and the individual, and a power strong enough, as occasion demands, to restrain either from encroaching on the rights of the other, it must be the Christian church, religion organized, or religion as an organism, because religion without the church, religion unorganized, or which is not an organism, is only an idea, and therefore not a *power*. Here is in substance our argument, and it is a conclusive, an unanswerable argument, if, as we allege, it be true, that religion unorganized, religion without the church, is only an idea, and religion as an idea is not a power. That religion without the church, religion unorganized, is only an idea, our Universalist friend does not deny, nay concedes, as he must, if he speaks not merely of natural religion, or the law of nature, for it is impossible to conceive it to be any thing else. We do not say or imply that religion with non-Catholics or with no-churchmen is only an idea, for we hold that the church exists, that there is an organized religion actually existing in the world, from which even those who are not within her communion, and who even deny her to be the church of God, derive many truths and religious convictions to which they would be absolute strangers were it not for her presence and influence. There is in fact an objective religion actually existing in the world; and hence the actual notions or convictions of all men who live and are brought up in Christendom, are not purely subjective, are not pure ideas, or merely private convictions, for they have their source, and their objective basis in the actually existing church. What we say is, that religion, on the supposition that there were no church, no religious organism in existence, is only an idea, and this cannot be successfully denied.

Nobody denies that religious convictions derived indirectly from the church have a certain influence on the conduct even of non-Catholics; but experience proves them to be insufficient, because they are more or less subject to individual or popular passion and caprice, and are never strong enough to resist the despotism of either. We of course do not look upon Protestants, or reason with them, as we should, if there were no church in the world. The church is a city set upon a hill, that cannot be hid, and her light sends out its rays far and wide beyond her walls. The nations that reject her never do, and while she exists never can, sink so low as did ancient pagan nations, or find them-

selves enveloped in a moral darkness so thick as was theirs. We concede that the presence of the church in our country keeps alive the sense of religion in multitudes who are not within her pale, and exerts a conservative influence even on many who deny her claims, or war against her. But this proves nothing in favor of the efficiency of religion as a pure idea, or in favor of the position that religion unorganized, uninstituted, will serve the purpose of harmonizing authority and liberty; because religion even with these is not a pure idea, as it would be if there were no such thing as an actually existing church. It is this fact that deceives so many non-Catholics, and induces them to suppose that what of religion they have does not derive its efficacy, so far as efficacy it has, from the church or an actually existing religious organism, but that it is efficacious simply as an idea.

Religion to answer our purpose, it is conceded, must be a power, capable on the one hand of restraining or resisting authority when it tends to become despotic, and on the other of restraining or resisting individualism when it tends to anarchy. Then it must be a power distinct from both, and capable of a distinct and separate action of its own, now with, now against, one or the other, as the occasion demands. When the state would encroach on personal freedom, it throws itself on the side of the individual against the state; when individualism would encroach on the just prerogatives of authority and introduce anarchy, it throws itself on the side of authority, and upholds or defends it against individualism, or personal freedom pushed to license. It must, then, be a power resting on a basis independent of both the other social elements, and able to act not only without them, but even against them, and so act as to control them, and compel each to return to its own province, and keep within it. But religion as idea, opinion, or private conviction, cannot be such a power, for it is included in the individual taken in the concrete, and has no separate or distinct activity. When you deny religion all organic existence of its own, when you deny it to be a church or organism, you deny it all substantive existence, and make it a predicate either of the state or of the individual,—not a subject, but the attribute of a subject, subsisting only in the subject of which it is the attribute. If you predicate it of authority, the subject, agent, or power that acts is society, and you have nothing to interpose between society and the individual; if you predicate it of

the individual, the subject, agent, or power that acts is the individual, and you have no third element or power to interpose between the individual and the government. In either case you have only the two social elements, the state and the individual, while you concede that a third is essential. The religion you assert is not a third element, for it resolves itself into an attribute or function either of the state or of the individual, and as such answers not the purpose conceded. To be a power, distinct from the other two elements, and capable of mediating between them, religion must, in the necessity of the case, be a substantive existence, be an agent with a will and activity of its own, which can act irrespective of the activity of either of the others, as much so as one man can act irrespective of another man. It must act from its own centre, its own inherent life and energy, which it cannot do, if it is only an attribute or function of the individual or of the state,—if it is not an organic existence, as much so as the state or the individual,—if it is not an organism, that is to say the church, as we alleged in the article to which our Universalist friend takes exception.

The author seems not to have felt the force of the reason we assigned why religion, to answer the purpose assumed, must be the Christian church, or religion as an organism. That reason is, that religion without the church is only an idea, and, therefore, not a power. If he had remarked the sense in which we habitually use the word *idea*, or had consulted his philosophy, we think he could hardly have failed to perceive that what we really alleged was that religion, which is not an organism or church, which is only an idea, cannot answer our purpose, because such religion is not an actual, but only a possible religion. Ideas are not substantive existences, as Plato according to Aristotle taught, and can exist only in some intelligence, without which they are absolute nullities. They must be regarded as existing either in the divine mind, or as existing in the human mind. In the divine mind, ideas are the eternal types or possibilities of things, not things actually existing, but which God may create or cause to exist, if he chooses; in the human mind, ideas are the apprehension of actual or possible existences. In neither case are they the existence or the thing itself. Religion as a simple idea in the divine mind is merely possible religion, or the possibility of religion; in the human mind it is the intuition or apprehension of that possibility,

or the power of God to give us a religion, if he chooses. In neither case is it actual religion, or the intuition or apprehension of an actual religion. Nothing is apprehended or asserted, but the possibility of religion, or a possible religion, and we need not undertake to prove that what is merely possible is not a power. The possible is something which may but does not actually exist, and what does not actually exist is incapable of acting, or of producing any effect whatever. Had our Boston friend considered this, or allowed himself to reflect for a moment on the point, for he unquestionably knows all this well enough, we cannot doubt that he would have seen that the reason we assigned why religion to be a power must be the church or an organism was a solid reason, and very much to the purpose. He could not have failed to perceive that religion must be an organism, or the church, for if not, it is no actual religion at all, no actual existence, as we had explained in our article on *The Constitution of the Church**, which the author might have had under his eye, but which he appears not to have remarked.

Although the reviewer cannot be unacquainted with the teachings of philosophy with regard to ideas, he seems not to have grasped the Catholic conception of the church, and his own views of religion appear to have prevented him from clearly apprehending the reason why Catholics maintain that Christianity to be efficacious, must be the Christian church. We must let him speak once more for himself:

"We have said that the whole controversy between Protestantism and Catholicism finds its turning-point in the position so unceremoniously assumed by Mr. Brownson, that religion, to be of any use in adjusting the conflicting tendencies of the individual and the state, must be the Christian church, or religion organized. Unless it has a visible organization, it is nothing but individualism, and so subject to the caprice of the individual, altered at his will, and instead of ruling him, ruled by him. Now, as it seems to us, the first mistake—and we will show it to be an egregious one—in his argument, is in this unsupported assumption. Does religion get its efficacy from organization? The assertion is most preposterous, for the truth is precisely the contrary. Organization gets its efficiency from religion; religion by no means gets its efficiency from organization. We do indeed believe in organization. Truth, as it operates on the minds of men, brings them together; and

*Vol. VIII., p. 527.

systematic action is found to be natural and convenient. But the fountain of force is in the truth itself. In fact, organization is powerless except as held together by the adhesive force of the idea which calls it into being. That religion can do its work better through organization—that it finds in this an instrumentality, a convenience, will be conceded by most Protestants; but the notion, that the efficiency of religion is in the instrumentality—that it is powerless and useless except as it has this, is philosophically absurd.

"We take the ground, that a religious organization has power, and that it gets this power from religion itself. This we are safe in terming a Protestant position. But how does religion communicate its power to the organization? We are prepared to answer, through the individual. In a visible church there is just as much of power as the several members thereof bring into it. Religion manifests itself through the individual conscience and heart. It exerts its power as it enlightens the mind, warms the affections, and stimulates the sense of rectitude. All the religion there is or ever was in the world reached the world in this way. Mr. Brownson objects to this, and calls it individualism. We shall not quarrel with him about terms. We admit that, so far as regards the *method* whereby religion becomes a power among men, the Protestant view may be called individualism. But why object to individualism in this qualified application of the term? Mr. Brownson's objection involves the essential fallacy in his argument to prove that the Catholic Church is necessary to the republic."

This, unquestionably, would be very conclusive against us, if we held or were obliged to hold the view our learned friend supposes. He very quietly assumes that we do and must make Christianity depend for its efficacy on the church, or the organization; but in doing so he ascribes to us his views instead of taking ours. We derive neither the efficacy of Christianity from organization, nor the efficacy of the organization from Christianity, simply because we do not distinguish between them, and hold that Christianity and the church are identically one and the same thing. Christianity is efficacious as the church, because it is only as the church that it exists, or that there is any Christianity. This is the point in our argument which our learned author has been prevented by his own no-church views from distinctly apprehending, perhaps, even from suspecting, and by his supposing that we speak only of the outward or visible organization, when by the church we mean always the entire organism, external and internal, visible and invisible, which are no more separable than body and soul without death.

The able and philosophical writer supposes, what we deny, that there is an actual, living, efficacious Christianity prior to and independent of the church. He makes the church a secondary affair, and regards her as a simple voluntary or instinctive association of individuals, who are brought together by common sympathies, convictions, and purposes. She is not only a simple, but a very small matter, hardly worth troubling one's head about. She has no more mystery in her than a debating club, a literary or scientific institute, or a temperance society. He recognizes in her no mystic union of the members with Christ the head, and through him, with one another. If this were really the fact, it were indeed absurd to contend that Christianity is a power only as organized. The church, as the author maintains, would and could have only "so much of power as the several members thereof bring into it." But though this is all he sees in the church, is it safe to conclude, therefore, that it is all that there is to be seen? Has he the right to infer, because he understands no more, that there is nothing more to be understood? When sober-minded men in all nations and ages, men before whose genius, ability, and knowledge of the subject, even he may bow with reverence, tell him that his view falls short of the reality, that they see in the church something far deeper, higher, and more significant than he recognizes, something which tasks their minds, moves their will, and fills their hearts, why can it not occur to him that there really is something more in the church than he perceives or even dreams of, and that a refutation of the Catholics so easy as the one he offers, only betrays its author's want of depth or penetration? Can he, after all, really suppose that matters lying so plain and obvious on the very surface of things as those he alleges, escaped even our observation, especially since we were bred in his school and knew his doctrine as well as he can be presumed to know it, perhaps even before he was born? He alleges nothing against us of which we were ignorant, or which we had not ourselves alleged years and years ago. He must permit us to tell him that if he wishes to offer any thing to the purpose against even our reasoning, he must dive deeper, and rise higher. What we assert is not that Christianity depends on organization for its efficacy, but that unorganized, it is not actual religion, is no actual existence. God gave us Christianity as a living organism, and abstracted from the church, like all abstractions, it is a nullity. He gave us

Christianity not as an ideal entity, as a mere possibility, but as an actual living religion, therefore as an organism, as is and must be every living creature, whether of the natural or of the supernatural order.

This organism is the Christian church, and the church is identically Christianity itself. There is no Christianity outside of the church, before it, after it, above it, or below it. Christianity has not formed or organized the church, as the author supposes; it does not use the church as its organ or instrument, as he pretends; it is the church,—indissolubly and indistinguishably the church herself. Popes, cardinals, bishops, priests, do not, as he imagines, make or constitute the church, any more than the molecules of matter assimilated from the blood and converted into flesh make or constitute the human body, and which may be totally changed several times over without changing the body or in the least affecting its identity. They are officers, instruments, organs, servants of the living organism, performing their appointed functions; but though used by her are not the church. The church is a living body, as literally and as truly so as the human body itself,—a real, actual, living existence, as much so, at the least, as any other creature of God,—a mysterious existence, indeed, before which we may lose ourselves in wonder and admiration, but which in this life we shall never fully comprehend; for her type, as her fountain of life, is the mysterious union of God and man in our Lord—the hypostatic union of two distinct natures, the human and the divine, in the one divine person of Christ the Son. She is in some sense the continuation, or rather, a representation or copy of the Incarnation. It is not by a figure of speech merely that we call her the bride, the immaculate spouse of the Lamb. It is not by a mere figure of speech that we speak of her as a person, call her a mother, the joyful mother of all the faithful, our own dear and affectionate mother, on whose bosom we lay our head, and from whose breasts we draw our spiritual nourishment. We mean all we say, for she is in the spiritual order as truly and as literally our mother as she of whom we were born naturally is our mother in the natural order. The church lives, moves, and acts. Her life is the life of unity in variety, and her personality is the unity of person in the variety of individuals, each retaining his own personality. Whoever meditates profoundly her existence will find copied or imitated in her all the mystery of God and man,—all the ineffable mystery of

the ever-adorable Trinity, and the incarnation of the Word or second person of the Godhead. She is the most wonderful work of God, in which he, as it were, exhausts his wisdom, power, and goodness, and reveals his own ineffable essence. It is to this grand, sublime, and even awful as well as endearing conception, that our critic must rise before he can say any thing to the purpose against our view of the church; and when he does, he will wonder at the marvellous simplicity which led him to question our assertion that religion to be a power must be the Christian church.

The author fancied that we left the turning point of the question without proof or even an attempt at proof, simply because he did not permit himself to rise to the Catholic conception of the church, and because he recognizes no religion in the Catholic sense. He did not give to our terms the full meaning we gave them, and concluded that they have no deeper meaning than he himself had been in the habit of giving them. The mental position in which he is placed by his Protestantism, has prevented him from conceiving of Christianity as the new creation or supernatural order, lying above, but in some sense parallel to, the natural order. We do not suppose that he would formally deny that God has made a revelation of truth to mankind, but he does not admit that God has created and revealed to us a supernatural order. He may possibly believe that God has communicated, in an extraordinary manner, to the world a knowledge of Christianity, but *the* Christianity of which he holds a knowledge has been thus communicated is not a supernatural religion,—is simply the law of nature, or so-called natural religion. He believes in no order of existence above nature, save God himself. God and nature are for him all that is or exists. He has no conception of Christianity as a substantive existence or second cause. He does not view it as a supernatural order of existence, but simply as a republication of the law of nature. There is for him no spiritual humanity proceeding, by regeneration, from Christ, as there is a natural humanity, proceeding by natural generation from Adam,—no line of Christ, which is the church, as there is a line of Adam, which is natural society. He recognizes only the line of Adam, and no church, save as a form of natural society itself,—never the church as supernatural society under the supernatural providence of God. This is evident from the following reply to an objection which we urged against Protestantism as the religion needed:

"Mr. Brownson finds an apt illustration of the absence of uniformity and of independence on the part of Protestantism, in the sectional character of the Protestant denominations in this country:

"'We see this strikingly proved every day, especially in our own country. Public opinion acts on the sects, and the strongest and most numerous sects in the land are obliged to yield to it. Have we not Methodists South and Methodists North, Baptists North and Baptists South, and have we not come very near having Presbyterians South and Presbyterians North, that is, sects dividing geographically, according to public opinion, and holding on one side of an imaginary line, that to be a mortal sin, which, on the other, is almost counted a Christian virtue? What can a religion that divides in this way, that is pro-slavery in one section of the Union, because there public opinion is pro-slavery, and abolitionist in another, because there public opinion is against slavery,—what can such a religion do in those emergencies, when, to maintain the right, public opinion must be resisted, not followed?'

"To unreflecting minds, the argument implied in this complaint of the vacillating character of Protestant creeds, seems plausible, and no doubt operates with much effect. And we admit that Protestantism does vary with different individuals and with different communities. At the same time, we are confident, that its want of uniformity is not as essential and as marked as a superficial view would lead one to imagine. There is, in fact, but little difference of conviction with reference to what all must concede to be the fundamental principles of religion. *That there is a just and benevolent God, that human beings are subject to his government, and are imperatively required to deal justly, love mercy, and walk humbly before him, and that this accountability is sustained by rewards and punishments,—these things really comprise the essential principles in every form of Christian faith.* Difference of opinion concerns rather the relations and logical forms in which different individuals present these principles. We do indeed believe that it is important that men hold the essentials of religion in their true forms; but the essence is vastly more important than the form, for the essence of religion is the root of its regenerating power. And particularly, as regards the great rules of rectitude, individualism shows a degree of uniformity quite as emphatic as any thing Catholicism can boast. It is matter of fact, that any departure from these rules, on a great scale, is matter of wonderment. A nation of thieves, *conscientiously* taught to be such, is looked upon as a monstrous exception to the general character of mankind. Reverence is almost universally felt to be a religious duty; and a teacher whose avocation it has been to inculcate lessons of wanton cruelty, is the abhorrence of every civilized community. We are confident, that if regard is had to the fundamentals of religion and morality, Protestantism is as marked for its uniformity, as a truthful history of Catholicism will claim to present."

The essential or fundamental principles of the Christian faith here enumerated, and in regard to which the author

contends that Protestants are substantially agreed, contain nothing distinctively Christian, nothing but the law of nature, and in fact not the whole even of that, for the enumeration leaves out the immortality of the soul, a future state of existence, and rewards and punishments of some sort, in the life to come, for the deeds done in this,—an integral part of natural religion, and believed by the ancient pagans as well as by modern Christians. He recognizes no supernatural order of life, no supernatural end of man, and no more, even as amended by us, than can be and is admitted by men who deny the Christian revelation. Lord Herbert of Cherbury, Voltaire, Thomas Paine, and not a few of the deists of the last century admitted more than he holds to be essential. He includes in his essentials no distinctively Christian doctrine, and does not so much as mention the name of Christ, the author and finisher of the Christian's faith. Evidently then, his religion, his Christianity, does not rise above the law of nature or natural religion. It is the natural law, nothing more,—in his particular case something less,—and it is only by an abuse of terms that it can be called Christianity.

Undoubtedly Christianity presupposes and accepts the natural law. We recognize and assert natural religion as fully and as earnestly as any one can. It indeed is not Christianity, but it is its preamble, and the magazine from which we draw our arguments to remove the obstacles in the minds of unbelievers to yielding a rational assent to the revelation of the supernatural. Christianity accepts it, republishes it, and gives it a supernatural sanction, but is itself an order above it, and to which it can never rise. We do not say that this natural religion without the Christian church is a pure idea, an opinion, or mere private conviction. God has incorporated it into our very nature, made it integral in reason, and without it reason would not be reason, any more than is the rudimental intelligence manifested by animals. It is natural reason itself, the common sense of mankind, and has its organization in natural society and the individual. It operates not as a naked idea, but as a principle inherent in our natural organism. Its power is the power of natural reason itself, which is at once universal and individual, that which constitutes the individual a man, gives to the human race its unity, and founds natural society, which is in the natural order what the church is held by Catholics to be in the supernatural.

Natural religion, or the natural law, is the basis of all natural society, and if it were of itself sufficient to mediate between the state and the individual, and to preserve the just balance of liberty and authority, the author could easily make out his case against us. He thinks that it is, and so think many of our countrymen; so thought the men who made the French revolution, and so think Kossuth, Mazzini, and all our modern revolutionists who are seeking the melioration of society and the individual by the subversion of the church. But happily here we are not left to speculation. We have before us the instructive examples of history. The gentile nations for we know not how many years tried the experiment, and failed. Of course, since society is founded on the natural order, nothing more is needed to its perfection than the perfect observance and fulfilment of the natural law; but all history proves that the natural law with only its natural organization in society and the individual has never sufficed for itself. Except with the Jews, who had a gracious and divinely sustained organization of the natural law, you find in no ancient nation the recognition of personal freedom, what we call the rights of man, and no genuine respect for human life. The history of the whole gentile word, of its most polite, cultivated, and enlightened nations, is the history of unmitigated cruelty and oppression. No rights of man were known, no tenderness for life was cultivated or enjoined; the exposure of infants was allowed in them all, as it is in China in our own days. In Rome, in the most virtuous period of the republic, the paterfamilias had the power of life and death over his wife, his children, and his slaves. The new-born infant must wait his permission to live, and if refused must be consigned to death. But why recall the cruelty, inhumanity, and barbarism of the old gentile world? We gave a sketch of that world so far as necessary for our present purpose in the article our Boston friend is criticising, and he pronounces our sketch "admirable."

Yet the gentiles had the law of nature with its natural organization, all that our Protestant friend holds to be essential to religion, for all men and nations have it, and cannot be without it, since it is human nature itself. If any doubt could arise on the sufficiency of this law, we need but consult the nations even now lying outside of Christendom. These nations, without exception, are barbarian; and barbarism, which is the domination of passion, in opposition

to the dominion of reason, is only another name for violence, disorder, oppression, tyranny and slavery. If natural religion with its natural organization has sufficed for the maintenance of the just relations between liberty and authority, how happens it that we never find them maintained in non-Christian nations, and that the limits of Christendom are the limits of civilization? Will you tell me the cause is in the ignorance which these nations have of the law of nature? Whence that ignorance, when the law of nature is their own reason, and is to them all that it alone is to us? Will you refer me to their abominable superstitions, and tell me the cause is to be found in them? But whence these superstitions themselves? I concede them but they are terrible arguments against you. They obtain in all heathen lands, and were found in their worst forms in the ancient gentile nations, and that too when those nations were at the culminating point of their power, their greatness, their cultivation and refinement. They obtained in Rome, in the Augustan age. A Roman emperor sacrifices ten thousand slaves to the manes of a murdered friend. The gladiatorial shows, the courses of the circus, the prostitutions of the temples of Venus and Cybele, and the frightful orgies of those of Isis and Bacchus were all religious observances, parts of the solemn worship of the gods, even in the polite city of Rome, under the greatest and most enlightened pagan emperors. Yet the Romans had the law of nature. But passion obscured their understandings, hardened their hearts, and made them deaf to the voice of nature. If natural religion in its natural state is all we need, how explain the origin and persistence of those obscene, cruel, savage, and abominable superstitions, which we invariably find in heathen nations, and which, even in the Roman empire, slowly and reluctantly retire before the advancing light of the Gospel?

What has been may be again. If Egypt and Assyria, if Greece and Rome, if the whole ancient and modern world abandoned to natural religion with its natural organism alone, but never for one moment without it, have been able to fall so far below it, and to yield themselves up so completely to their passions and lusts, what can be more idle than to look to it alone for support, and to pretend that it can effectually mediate between the state and the individual? Something more is clearly necessary, and the reason why so many of our own countrymen do not see it, is that

they live in Christendom, where the natural law has a supernatural organization in the Catholic Church, and is not found in its purely natural state. They deceive themselves, and ascribe to nature more than belongs to her. The nature on which they rely is not nature abandoned to herself, but nature as she is after ages of Christian training,—nature, in some sort, christianized.

But our Boston friend is precluded by his own concessions from pleading the sufficiency of natural religion. He complains that we devote fourteen pages out of twenty to proving what he and all Protestants are prepared to admit without proof. He then must stand by what we labored so hard, and so unnecessarily as it seems, to prove. In those fourteen pages we labored to prove, and did prove, the necessity of the Christian religion as a third element in society to mediate between the state and the individual. We proved this historically by appeals to nations, who were assumed to have been without the religion conceded to be necessary. This could not have been simple natural religion with only its natural organization, for no nation has ever even for a moment been without that. We proved also that the dangerous tendencies which we need religion to protect us from, threaten the stability and orderly working even of our own republic. The author himself cites us with approbation :

"What then is indispensable ? The answer is, a third element, independent of the other two, having power over both, and competent to mediate between them and adjust their conflicting tendencies. *On this point, it strikes us that our author's words are as truthful as they are energetic :*

" 'Here, then, we are, exposed to two powerful and dangerous tendencies, rushing, on the one hand, into social despotism, and on the other, into anarchy. What, in this state of things, do we need in order to escape them ? We need, it is evident, a power alike independent of the state and of the individual, to step, as it were, in between them and harmonize them,—a power strong enough to restrain the state when it would become despotic, and the individual when he would become disloyal and rebellious. Without such a power we cannot save our republic, and have that security for individual and social liberty, it was instituted to protect and vindicate. With only the state and the individual we have, and can have, only antagonism. The two elements are, and will be, pitted one against the other, each struggling for the mastery. They cannot be made to move without collision one with the other unless there is between them a mediating term, the third element I mentioned as essential to the constitution of society. That term, power, or constituent element, is religion, and *I need not add, the Christian religion.*' "

As we were describing society as it had existed, and as it exists without the element of religion, we evidently must, unless an egregious blunderhead, have meant by that element, the Christian religion as we said, and by the Christian religion something more than the law of nature, with only its natural organism. As the author concedes all we were contending for in those "fourteen pages," and assures us very distinctly and emphatically that he and all Protestants are prepared to admit it all without proof, he is debarred from asserting now the sufficiency of the natural law alone. Perhaps, after all, we did not devote an undue proportion of our article to proving what needs no proof, for we suspect the real matter to be proved is not what he calls the turning-point of the question, but that the third element demanded must be the Christian religion; the other point follows as a matter of course, as we have seen, for the Christian religion has no existence without the church.

If we are right in our views of the gentile world and of the need of religion to mediate between the state and the individual, as it is conceded we are, this religion must be a power independent alike of the national authority and the individual authority, and therefore religion organized, or a religious organism above simple natural religion in its natural state. The Christian church is, as a fact, the only religious organism of the sort that is or can be alleged. The religious organism to which we must look is then the Christian church; and as the Protestant reviewer concedes, that if a religion organized or a church be necessary, Protestantism cannot serve our purpose, we must add that *the* Christian church to which we must look is the Catholic Church. Taking what our opponent concedes and what we have proved as our premises, this conclusion is logical and inevitable. It is, moroever, the conclusion to which all intelligent and reflecting minds amongst our countrymen are rapidly coming. They understand that the great danger to which we are exposed is that of lawless or irresponsible will, and that institutions which are based on simple will, whether that of the people collectively or individually, are no sure protection, because at every moment liable themselves to be swept away. They feel the want of some institution that rests on a solid and permanent basis, that can stand alike the shock of popular fury and of individual license. Such an institution they are beginning to recognize in the Catholic Church, and hence they relax a little in

their hostility to her, and become less and less indisposed to investigate her claims. They see that she is the only conservative institution in the country, the only one that is the same North and South, at the East and the West, that speaks with one and the same voice, and teaches one and the same morality throughout the whole extent of the Union. This commands their respect, and is fast winning their love. We have shown, we think, that as a conservative institution, she merits their support, for we have shown that she is alike conservative of liberty and of authority.

But while the arguments we have used prove the necessity of the Catholic Church to the maintenance of our republic, and therefore refute the popular charge that she is hostile to republican governments, they, of course, do not prove her to be the church of God, or the supernatural order we hold her to be. Because she is, as we have shown, conservative and answers the wants of our republic as a mediating power between authority and liberty, it by no means follows that she is supernatural in the Catholic sense, the supernatural order under the supernatural providence of God. To prove that a very different line of argument is necessary. But we have proved the necessity of some religious organization above the natural law even to secure the ends of the natural law, and as the Catholic Church is the only organization of the sort, that can be alleged since the abolition of Judaism, we may conclude not only that she is necessary to the preservation of the republic, but that she is the medium through which God makes provision for our higher social wants, if he makes any, and that we must look to her, or not find naturally or supernaturally that provision.

In our article we did not institute any formal argument to prove that the religion needed must be the Christian religion, for we were addressing those who profess to be Christians, and we took for granted that if we proved any religion to be necessary, all would concede that it must be the Christian religion. The Protestant reviewer raises no objection to our assumption that the religious element needed is the *Christian* religion ; he objects only to our assumption that it must be the *church*, or religion organized. If we have proved, as we think we have, that, if it is the Christian religion at all, it must be that religion organized, or the church, we have answered his objection, and said all that is necessary to reply to those who profess to be Christians.

If he chooses to shift his ground, and allege that some organization above the natural organism of the law of nature, and yet below the supernatural order which we have explained the church to be, would be sufficient for the special purpose agreed to, we shall not dispute him, but insist on his proving that there is, as a fact, some such organization, before proceeding to conclude against us. We know none such, and none such can be named. That God could, if he had pleased, have provided for society and the individual by such an organization, we concede, but that he has we deny; for Christianity, if it is any thing, is the supernatural order. The necessity for a religion above natural religion in its natural state for even natural society is not of God's but of man's creation. Man has no right to claim of God as his due any thing more than the natural law, and it is man's sin that has made any thing more than that necessary for the attainment of natural good. But God, having compassion on man, did not leave him to the natural consequences of his sin, but resolved to repair it, and to make it the occasion of a higher good than was lost by it. The grace is more abundant than the sin. Hence it is the Catholic belief that, in providing for the reparation of the damage done by sin, God does not stop with its simple reparation, but goes further, and repairs it by a supernatural order, and by lifting man out of the natural order under his natural providence into the supernatural order under his supernatural providence. Hence the extraordinary provision needed to save man from the consequences of his own sin is not to be found in natural religion, but in the supernatural, and the cause of past and present failures at social organization comes from the fact that we seek from the natural what is really supplied only by the supernatural providence of God.

Assuming now that the aid we need is furnished us only by a supernatural religion, which also furnishes us things of infinitely more value, the question raised by our Protestant critic deserves no more attention than we gave it. A supernatural religion once conceded as the medium through which God enables us to secure the good of society, as well as the supernatural end to which he in his supernatural providence destines us, very few will hesitate to say that that religion must be the Christian religion, and if the Christian religion, the Catholic Church. The question between Protestantism, when Protestantism is assumed to be a supernatural religion, and Catholicity, is not in the minds

of our countrymen generally a grave question. The real question with the great body of intelligent and reflecting Americans lies not between Protestantism and Catholicity, but between supernatural religion and the simple law or religion of nature. They adhere to Protestantism from habit, fashion, because it is decorous to do so, because they may think that a religion that splits up into a multitude of sects is less to be feared than a grand consolidated church strong enough to exclude all rivalry, but chiefly because it leaves them virtually to natural religion, and makes no demands on their faith or practise not made by the law of nature. But for Protestantism claiming to be really a supernatural religion, they have no respect. They ridicule its pretensions, and treat its ministers with a superb disdain. Once convinced that there is a supernatural order, a really supernatural religion, they cannot long be detained by Protestantism. If Christianity is to be taken in a supernatural sense, they have no difficulty in identifying it with Catholicity. So taken, Christianity and Catholicity are for them one and the same thing; and hence when any sect approaches any thing distinctively Christian in doctrine or practice they accuse it of "popery," or of "romanizing."

It may not be amiss, however, to remark in conclusion, that in contending for the necessity of Catholicity to preserve our free institutions, or asserting the power of Catholicity to protect them, we do not contend that to this end it is necessary that every man, woman, and child in the country should become Catholic, or that the Catholicity of the majority must be of that pure and sublime character which in no country is found except with the few. We indulge a hope that the American will ultimately become a Catholic people, and yet we are far from indulging those extravagant expectations as to their conversion which are sometimes ascribed to us. There never yet has been on earth a whole people thoroughly Catholic in faith and practice. In the best of times, in the most pious of nations, there has always been a large number of what are called "Hickory Catholics," that is, of men who will fight to the death for their faith, and die sooner than live it. We never expect the time when there will be none but Catholics in the land, or when all who are Catholics will be good Catholics. Nor is it necessary for the security of our institutions. To this end it is only necessary that the church should be here, with her faith, her morality, and the example of her

faithful children, and that she have a predominating influence on the ruling mind and heart of the country. She will affect it by diffusing Catholic life, and keeping fresh and living those old Catholic doctrines and traditions of authority and liberty which form the basis of modern civilization, and especially of the civil and political institutions of this country. These doctrines and traditions may and do operate in minds out of the church; they were vigorous in the minds of the founders of our republic; but without the church they become obscure and gradually lose their force, as we see now in all non-Catholic nations. Protestant nations brought them away from the church with them when they separated from her; but they have used them up, or lost sight of them. Hence the decay of patriotism, of public spirit, and personal and political integrity, the growing dishonesty, and increasing vice and profligacy in public and private life, which are everywhere now so threatening. They need to be revived and reinvigorated by fresh draughts from their source. But all we need for their revival in force, and to enable Catholicity to protect us, is that they be restored to their dominion, and become the public thought and conscience of the majority of the American people. We want them to form the governing mind of the country, and be acknowledged as the rule of our conduct, whether as individuals or as the state. This may be effected without everybody in the republic being converted, and without any direct intervention of the church in secular affairs, even while a very considerable portion of the people remain non-Catholic. In this way the church is doing a great deal even now to protect us from anarchy and despotism, and would, even with our present numbers, do a great deal more, if Catholics would exert the moral and intellectual influence of which they are capable.

In the remarks we have made we have aimed chiefly to answer the objection raised by our Protestant reviewer. The proofs that the Catholic Church is God's church, it has been no part of our purpose to adduce. We have simply vindicated our article on *The Church and the Republic*, and await now the response of our Boston reviewer.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE CHURCH IDENTICAL.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1857.]

Our Universalist friend, in his issue for April, offers a rejoinder to the reply in this *Review* for January last to his criticisms on our article on *The Church and the Republic*, published the previous July. We have nothing to object to the tone or temper of what he calls his response. It is respectful, in better taste even than his first article, and, we doubt not, intended to be perfectly fair and candid, although it is less full and less vigorous than we were prepared to meet.

The author thinks we made too much of his concessions, but we can assure him that we understood them precisely as he does himself.

"Before attempting to comply with Mr. Brownson's invitation to respond to his last article, we must ask him not to make too much of the concession we have made relative to the logical advantage which the Catholic has over the Calvinist. We write from the standpoint of a Universalist interpretation of Christianity; and we say, what we presume most of our Universalist brethren are also ready to say, that Calvinism concedes the premises out of which the necessity of an infallible interpreter is educed. But such a statement, coming from a Universalist, is no concession. We have not said, nor do we think, that Universalism gives the Catholic any such ground of deduction. We have only said, that Calvinism does this; but as the Calvinist will not permit us to speak for him, our statement cannot be viewed in the light of a concession."

We cited his concessions not as indications of his Catholic tendencies, nor as the concessions of one who would be recognized as authority by Calvinists, but as the concessions of an intelligent Protestant, who has as good a right to the name of Protestant as any one of those who pretend to believe more than he does, that there is no middle ground between Catholicity and rationalism; and as a testimony confirmatory of what we so often assert, that intelligent Protes-

A Response to O. A. Brownson. Universalist Quarterly Review. Boston: April, 1857.

tants very generally regard so-called orthodox Protestantism as an exploded humbug, and are very well satisfied that if Christianity is any thing more than a republication of the law of nature, if it be in fact a supernatural and authoritative religion, it is identically the Roman Catholic religion.

In our article on *The Church and the Republic*, we maintained that religion is necessary as a mediating power between the individual and the state, to save us, on the one hand, from anarchy, and the other, from despotism; and we further maintained, that to answer this purpose it must be religion organized as an organism, indeed, as the church, because otherwise it is not a power, but simply an idea. The reviewer accused us of taking the vital point, the only point in the argument which Protestants want proved, for granted, and leaving it without even a show of proof. We replied, and showed, as we thought, that the charge was unfounded. Our reply, it seems, has not satisfied him, and he reiterates and insists on his objection in his response. He says:—

"It is possible that our author, in the words here quoted from him, shows that he did not assume, that he really attempted to prove what we have termed the vital point in his argument. Possibly there is something in his words that we do not see. Candor, however, compels us to say, that we see in the extract nothing but an assumption of that 'vital point!' What does he give as argument, that religion to be authoritative in society, must be organized, must be be an organism? Why must religion be an organization, a church? The answer is, 'because religion without the church, without an organization, is not a *power*, is only an idea, a simple opinion, and therefore nothing but individualism.' Now it may seem an act of presumption to call in question Mr. Brownson's logic—the province, of all others, wherein he is deemed a master. But truly, the words which we have just quoted from him, look very much like what Whately calls a *petitio principii;* in common words, a begging of the question. The real question is, can religion be a power without being an organization, a church? The *conclusion* for Mr. Brownson to establish is, that religion is not a power, except as it is an organism. And one of the *premises* by which he seeks to establish this conclusion is the affirmation that religion without a church is not a power! This conclusion, so far from being educed from his premise, seems to us simply a re-statement of the very premise! He affirms that religion to be a power, must be an organism. We ask for proof. He replies: religion unorganized is not a power. We leave it with our intelligent readers to decide, whether there is any difference between his proposition and his proof. The only difference that we can see, is that

the one is stated in the affirmative form, and the other in the negative form.

"If, however, Mr. Brownson can show that the two propositions which we have deemed equivalents, have nevertheless a logical distinction of premise and conclusion,—and very likely he can show this,—we must still repeat our complaint, that he has assumed the turning point in the argument. If he can show that he has not done this in his conclusion, he will certainly admit that he has done so in his premise. Whether his proposition, that 'religion without the church, without an organization, is not a power,' be a re-statement, in different form, of the point which needs proof, or whether it may be considered as a prior and distinct proposition, authenticating that point, the proposition itself is an assumption. And the question arises, have we therefore a right to complain?

"Now with reference to this matter of assumption, we desire not to be irrational. We need not be told, that in all argument something must be assumed. Fundamental propositions are always to be taken for granted. No first truth can be proved. And so when two persons consent to argue, they go on the presumption that there are propositions to be assumed by both parties. Certainly, we shall not complain of Mr. Brownson for doing what we have done, what every body who reasons must do,—we shall not complain that he has assumed a proposition. If he has assumed that which is self-evident, which admits of no dispute, we have no right to demur. Our charge is not, that he has assumed a proposition, but that he has assumed the wrong one, one which is not self-evident, one which calls for proof, and which, if true, admits of proof. Every thing in our author's argument rests upon the proposition, that 'religion without the church, without an organization, is not a power,'—always meaning by the term church, or organization, a body of men existing, in certain organic relations, as the depositaries and authentic exponents of religion. And will our author claim that this is a self-evident proposition? He has a right to start with an assumption—this he must do; but will he affirm that this is the proposition to start with—to be assumed? We ask particular attention to the point now under notice, for the whole issue of the present controversy turns upon it. If we concede that religion without a church, or organism—always meaning by the word church a body of men existing in certain organic relations—is not a power, we concede every thing. We cheerfully grant, that if this point can be established, the argument is wholly with our author. *If it be true, that religion without a church is necessarily only an idea,—and we think we apprehend Mr. Brownson's use of the word idea,—then we must admit that the third and authoritative element in society must be an organization, a church.* And although we are reminded, that the question is not at present whether the Catholic Church is that authoritative organization, *we are prepared, in view of certain considerations not now under discussion, to go further than our author asks us to go, and admit the Catholic Church to be the power which may rightfully adjudicate*

upon the claims in dispute between the state and the individual. We do not say all this without premeditation. We have given the subject some reading and considerable reflection. We have long been assured, that the advantage which the Catholic seems to have over the Calvinist, is in the concession which the latter, sometimes formally and always virtually, makes with reference to the office of the *church.* Perhaps the Calvinist will admit, that religion without a church cannot be a power. Having made such an admission, we would like to see him grapple with Mr. Brownson! We can predict the result. Such an admission is fatal to Protestantism."

In our first article we stated, but did not develop the proof of the point in question; in our second article we developed it at length, and showed that we did offer proof, at least something in the form of proof. Our argument was, that to save society on the one hand from despotism, and from anarchy on the other, we must have a third element, namely, the Christian religion, to mediate between the individual and the state, and to restrain one or the other according to the exigencies of the case. To answer this purpose, religion must be a power resting on its own basis, independent alike of both the state and the individual, and able at need to restrain both. This much the author concedes, or evidently intends to concede. "We conceded," he says, "the proposition that there must be a power to mediate between the rival claims of the individual and the state, and that this power must be something independent of the parties on whose conflicting claims it pronounces authoritative judgment. We further conceded, that this third element, this authoritative power, is the Christian religion." This established, we proceed to say, then it must be religion organized, as an organism, as the church. Why so? Because religion not as an organism, as organized, as the church, is not a power. Why not a power? Because it is then merely an idea, and ideas are not powers. There is no proposition not conceded left without proof, except that an idea is not a power, which we proved at length in our second article on the subject. The reviewer has fallen into the mistake of supposing that we leave the point, that the religion needed must be the church, unproved, by confounding two propositions, which in our argument are given as distinct, and the one as the proof of the other. This is evident from the following extract:

"In our former article we must have been unfortunate in the choice of words, for it seems that Mr. Brownson regards us as admitting his fundamental proposition! And here we must quote from his article:

"'Here is in substance our argument, and it is a conclusive, an unanswerable argument, if, as we allege, it be true, that religion unorganized, religion without the church, is only an idea, and religion as an idea is not a power. That religion without the church, religion unorganized, is only AN IDEA, our Universalist friend does not deny, nay concedes, as he must, if he speaks not merely of natural religion, or the law of nature, for it is impossible to conceive it to be any thing else.'

"Mr. Brownson's 'Universalist friend does not deny' that religon in order *to be a power* must be a church? Indeed, he does deny, and this most emphatically, every thing of the kind! What we are supposed not to deny, we in fact look upon as a most fruitful source of religious error. We have no faith whatever in the common idea of a church. It does very well for the Catholic to laud the church, and to attribute to it supernatural gifts, for in doing this he is consistent with the necessities of his faith. But we cannot conceive that the Protestant has any right to imitate his example in this respect; and when he does this, he puts himself hopelessly in the power of his Catholic opponent."

Now it is clear from the words cited from us, that we do no such thing. What we say our Universalist friend does not deny, nay, concedes, is, that religion unorganized or without the church, is only an idea. We did not represent him as not denying or conceding that it is not a power, for that was precisely what he did deny. From his not denying or conceding that it is only an idea, we labored in our reply to force him by an argument *ex concessis*, to concede that it is not a power, because ideas are not powers. We can explain his mistake only by supposing that he regarded the two propositions used by us as formally identical, and overlooked the fact, that religion without the church is only an idea, was adduced as proof that religion without the church is not a power.

We understand him now to concede that ideas are not powers, and to deny that religion without the church, or unorganized, is only an idea. "If it be true," he says, in a passage already cited, "that religion without a church be necessarily only an idea—and we think we apprehend Mr. Brownson's use of the term idea—then we must admit that the third and authoritative element in society must be an organization, a church," and "we are prepared in view of certain considerations not now under discussion, to go further than our author asks us to go, and admit the Catholic Church to be the power that may rightfully adjudicate upon the claims in dispute between the state and the individual." The author knows that we used the word *organization* in our article only in the sense of *organism*. His concession

is, then, we take it, if religion without the church is only an idea, if to answer the purpose it must be an organism, it must be religion as the Catholic Church. This concedes all we contend for, except a single point, and leaves no dispute as to which is the organism or church, if any, that is necessary. This point is, that religion without the church is only an idea. In proof that it is only an idea, we allege the fact, that whatever in God's universe exists at all, exists as an organism, and cannot otherwise be conceived of as a real existence. This is conceded as to vegetables, animals, and human beings, and physicists have proved it to be true of minerals, and thus exploded the old notion of brute matter as well as the *materia prima* of the peripatetics. What we call matter does not consist of brute atoms as the old atomists contended, but of active elements, which Aristotle named *entelecheiai*, and which Leibnitz calls *monads*. Every thing in that it actually exists, exists as an active force, or *vis activa*, and has in itself its own centre and principle of action. Whatever lacks this internal principle, which, as we ascend in the scale of creation, is called life or the principle of vitality, or is incapable of acting from within outwards, is no real, no substantive existence, and is at best only an idea. Every real existence then exists as an organism, for an organism is characterized by the fact that it has in itself a principle of life or activity, and lives or acts from its own centre.

Now the question whether Christianity be an organism or not, is simply the question whether it really exists or not, that is, whether it is actual or only ideal existence. If not an organism, it is not an actual existence, and if not an actual existence, it can in the nature of the case, by the force of the terms themselves, be only an idea, or an ideal existence. Now here is a question which the reviewer has not duly considered. The question is this, is Christianity or is it not an actually existing order of life, a real creation, as real a creation in the supernatural order as the natural creation is in the natural order? If not, it has no distinct existence, and is identical either with God or with nature. There is then no distinctively Christian religion, no Christian *vis activa;* and what we call the Christian religion is either a human conviction or an idea in the divine mind, at least, if it be not a pure fiction. It is at best only a possible, not an actual religion. Precisely what we said when we said it was only an idea. Possible or ideal things may,

but do not exist. To exist they must be concreted, for nothing exists in the abstract, or as an abstraction, and to be concrete or to be concreted, is to be an organism. There is no escape from this conclusion. Either Christianity is no actual existence, or it is an organism; and if an organism, then, as the reviewer concedes, the Catholic Church, that sublime and mysterious existence, that life of unity in variety, which we presented to the meditation of our Universalist friend in our former reply.

The reviewer unconsciously proves this even in trying to escape it.

"In rejecting, as we do, in whole and in every part, the theory of a church so brilliantly stated in this extract—in denying the existence of any vital union between religion and a church, as an organization—in affirming that religion may have, does have, an existence and a power, apart from organization—in repeating our former statement, that a church in itself, as an organization, has no mystery, no power, no sanctity; but that it derives all mystery, all power, all sanctity, from the religion which its several members bring into it—bring into it, too, as individuals—in affirming all these things, Mr. Brownson will say, and say justly, that we are obligated to furnish something as having authority—a something which is not the individual, which is not the state, which is not an idea—a something that can speak to the individual, and to the state, and fearing neither, control both—a something, too, which can speak without liability to mistake, whose commands shall be irrevocable, and whose power cannot be resisted. Yes, we are obliged to furnish a power possessed of all these attributes. And are we asked, what is this power? We answer, reverently—God! We are of the number who believe that God not only was, but that he *is*—that he rules among the inhabitants of the earth—that he is ever present, actively present, and all-sufficient to mediate between the claims of the individual and the state. Mr. Brownson, himself, believes all this. The difference of conviction between him and us, relates only to the *medium* through which God, ruling among men, would restrain the licentiousness of the individual and the despotism of the state. He will say that God speaks through that mysterious body, so vividly portrayed in the extract last quoted from him. We say, that God speaks through the reason, the conscience, the soul of the individual man."

This is a plain and unequivocal rejection of Christianity as an actual religion. The power needed, the reviewer concedes, as we have seen, is the Christian religion. He now says it is God himself. "Are we asked, what is this power? We answer, reverently—God." This settles the question, and denies Christianity as an actually existing provision

made or instituted by our heavenly Father for our wants, since it asserts, and permits us to assert, only God and nature. We proved, and the reviewer concedes, that the power needed is the Christian religion, and therefore he must concede that the Christian religion is a power, something really existing, and capable of acting from its own central activity or life. But in the passage before us declaring the power to be God, he denies Christianity to be itself a power, and makes it merely the direct and immediate power of God, which, of course, he must do by denying Christianity as the church, but which he is not at liberty to do after his concessions. He has to maintain against us that the Christian religion, without the church, unorganized, as not an organism, is a power resting on its own basis, and capable of mediating between two other powers, or social elements. But here he shows that he cannot do it, for outside of the church the only Christian religion he can assert is the divine being himself; that is, Christianity without the church, as we told him, has no actual existence, and is only an idea either in the divine mind or in the human mind; for the Christian religion as an actually existing religion, though like all creation inseparable, must be distinguishable from God, as the creature from the Creator, the work from the workman.

The author here proves what we told him in our former reply, that he does not conceive of Christianity as the new creation or supernatural order lying above the natural order. "He believes in no order of existence above nature, save God himself; God and nature are for him all that is or exists. He has no conception of Christianity as a substantive existence or second cause." The passage we have last cited proves it. The question is not whether God is a power without the church, for such a question would be absurd; but is the Christian religion without the Christian church or Christian organism a power, a substantive existence, with an internal principle of activity, or its own central life, as in the case of every other actual existence or living thing. This is what we denied, and what the reviewer undertakes to prove, but what he does not succeed in proving.

We tell him again that there is a deeper significance in the Catholic view of the Christian religion objectively considered than he has suspected. He says all the difference between him and us is, that we hold that God speaks through that mysterious body we call the church, while he holds

that God speaks through the reason, the conscience, the soul of the individual; but he is quite out in his supposition that this is all or even the chief difference between us. We hold as firmly, and perhaps even more firmly than he does, that God speaks through the reason, the conscience, the soul of the individual. We hold in this respect all he holds, and we regard with even more reverence and docility the inspirations of the Almighty into the soul of each than he does. Our religion requires us to do so. The Catholic cherishes with the profoundest love and joy this internal communion with God, and seeks always, when faithful to his religion, the internal light and guidance of the Holy Ghost. Why else his prayer and meditation? Let the reviewer read the life of any Catholic saint, or any Catholic work designed for spiritual instruction and edification, and he will find that in this respect we believe all he believes, and even much more than he has ever dreamed of. He differs from us here, in that he falls short of us, not in that he goes beyond us.

On this point Protestants generally mistake Catholic teaching. Because we assert an external authority, they conclude, very rashly and illogically, that we deny spiritual communion with God; because we assert an external objective revelation deposited with the church, and authoritatively expounded by her, that we deny all interior illumination of the individual soul; because we assert the necessity of communion with the church, in order to render us acceptable to God, that we deny all individuality and all inward piety and devotion. Nothing is, or can be, more untrue, more unjust to the teachings of our religion, and the practices of Catholic saints. It is possible that our polemical writers have not always been careful in their controversial works to bring out this point, and that they have, by confining their defence to the external, had some influence in confirming the impression that we recognize only the external, and deny the proper internal relations of the pious soul to God. Protestants have not erred in asserting the interior operations of the Spirit; their error has been in asserting them to the exclusion of the external authority and communion of the church. One extreme begets another. The external being the point denied, the Catholic has had that to defend, and in confining himself almost exclusively to its defence, he has had the appearance of not esteeming, or rather, of not admitting the internal. But Protestants may be assured that

we maintain with equal earnestness both the internal and the external, and both as concurrent, not as antagonistic elements or authorities. Protestants have less than we; in no case have they more, or indeed so much.

The difference is not where or what our Universalist friend supposes. Certainly, we hold that God speaks through the church, but that is only a little of what we hold. Certainly, we believe that God has deposited the revelation he has made with the church, appointed her its guardian, teacher, and interpreter; but all this, though much, does not begin to exhaust our idea of the church. Nothing thus far does more than introduce us into her vestibule, nay, any more than bring us to her door. Our radical conception of Christianity is that of a new creation or the regeneration, the special work of the Word made flesh —an order of life which indeed presupposes our natural life, but lying above it, and bearing to the Word made flesh a relation analogous to that borne by natural creation to the unincarnate Divinity. There is by the incarnation of the Word introduced into the universe not only a new fact, but a new order of existence, which we call the new creation, the regeneration, or the supernatural order. Our Lord assumed flesh not merely to make expiation or satisfaction for our sins, not merely to deliver us from the power of Satan, and repair the damage caused by transgression, but also to elevate man above the natural order, to be the second Adam or Father of a regenerated humanity, appointed to a supernatural destiny, or a destiny far above that to which man in the natural order is able to aspire. This supernatural order, this regenerated humanity, deriving from the Word made flesh, is in its most general expression what the Catholic means by the church. The church in this sense is the grand central fact of the universe, to which all the providences of God converge, for which all historical events are ordered, and in which the whole natural order finds its significance and its explication. The church is not merely the church on earth or church militant, but it is the church suffering, including the souls suffering in purgatory, and the church triumphant, the church of the blest in heaven. In all three states it is one and the same living and immortal body, one and the same holy communion, one and the same regenerated human race united to God through sameness of nature with the human nature assumed by the Word. By natural generation or

birth no man enters into the church, becomes a member of regenerated humanity, is introduced into this supernatural order of life, or is placed on the plane of the supernatural beatitude promised to those who enter it and persevere to the end. The assertion of the church in this sense does not conflict with that natural communion with God which the reviewer contends for, and the value of which we should be sorry to underrate, but offers a higher, a supernatural communion with God, even a closer communion by faith here, as well as by the light of glory hereafter.

The reviewer will see that the office we assigned to the church, or the position she holds in our faith, is far higher, broader, and more intimate and comprehensive than he supposes. She is not merely a congregation of individuals holding certain relations to one another, but is to Christians what the natural human race is to natural men, and has the relation to them that the race or humanity has to individuals, and they live by its life as individual men and women in the natural order live by the life of humanity. You may know and assent to all Catholic doctrine, you may comprehend all mysteries, and in your life keep the whole law of nature, or practise with the most scrupulous fidelity all the natural virtues, and yet have no lot or part in the regeneration. You are a natural man, worthy of all respect in the natural order; but he that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than you. You must be born into the kingdom, into the regeneration, into the new or supernaturalized humanity, or you cannot live its life. Hence our Lord says, "Except a man be born again, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven." Hence the reason of the dogma, *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*, or, out of the communion of the church, no one can ever be saved, that is, no one can ever attain the supernatural destiny or beatitude of regenerated humanity. To maintain the contrary, would be as absurd as to pretend that a creature, never a man in the natural order, can share the natural beatitude of a human being. As to the punishment of those who die out of the communion of the church, it will be meted out according to their deserts, and will be neither greater nor less than in strict justice they by their deliberate acts have merited; but common sense repugns the idea of their sharing the rewards of a humanity of which they have never been members, and whose life they have never lived.

We cannot undertake to explain the whole mystery of

the regeneration, for it involves the whole mystery of the Incarnation,—a mystery which is the mystery of mysteries, and into which the angels desire to look in vain. God alone can adequately comprehend it, for its explication is in his own invisible and ineffable essence. But this much we know, its internal principle, its central life is divine grace, flowing from the Word made flesh, and binding it to him as his mystic body, in a living organism. It is not easy to grasp the conception of unity in variety, but we are obliged to concede it in natural as well as in regenerated humanity,—in the human race in the natural order, as well as in the church, or supernaturalized humanity. St. Paul says we are many members, but all members of Christ's body, and members one of another, so that when one of the members suffers all the members suffer. There is one spirit, and this one spirit unites all in one spiritual body, and is its informing principle, the centre and source of its life. The fact is certain, and if the mystery is great, it is not greater than that of the life of the human body itself, which is one, and remains one and identical, although one in variety of molecules, each one of which has distinct existence, and acts from its own central principle of activity.

Now Christianity in this sense, as the supernatural order, is what we assert as the church of God. Whether there be or be not the supernatural order in this sense, is not now the question ; but between the assertion of this order, and simply saying God speaks to us through it, we maintain there is a difference, and therefore that the difference between the reviewer and us is far greater and even of another kind than he supposes. We hold the church to be a new creation, the institution by the Word made flesh of a new, regenerated, or supernaturalized humanity, a humanity propagated by election as natural humanity is by generation, not merely the organ through which God speaks or declares his law, or his pleasure. Christianity is not simply a law, or simply a doctrine, it is a life, the life of Christ, the Word made flesh, lived by men. Faith is good and is the foundation and root of every Christian virtue, and without it we cannot enter into the Christian order, and be assimilated to regenerated humanity, but it alone does not suffice. Faith alone cannot save us, and is never in the New Testament given as the characteristic mark of discipleship. "A new commandment," says our Lord, "I give unto you, that ye love one another." "By this shall all men know that ye are my

disciples, if ye love one another." The characteristic badge of the disciple of Jesus Christ is love, or charity, not the simple natural sentiment of benevolence, though that is good in its own order, but the supernatural affection of the supernaturalized heart, the spontaneous sentiment of the heart elevated by grace to the supernatural order, the natural expression of regenerated humanity, the principle by which the regenerated commune with one another and with the Word made flesh, their Head, and the fountain of their life. Now the church is needed not simply to teach us what we are to believe, or what we are to do, but she is needed as the condition of our rebirth and of our living the supernatural Christian life. Man lives a natural life only by communion with his like and with his Maker as author of nature; he can live his supernatural life only by communion with those who live that life and with the Word made flesh, its author and source. The end is the regenerated life, and as this life is not out of the regenerated humanity or the church, it cannot be lived out of the church.

There are over and above what the reviewer supposes we ask of the church, the sacraments, by which our supernatural life is generated or begotten, recovered, sustained, strengthened, propagated. There is baptism, the sacrament of regeneration, by which we are born into the supernatural order, or enter into the church, and are made members of regenerated humanity, the mystical body of Christ. There is the sacrament of penance, by which we recover the supernatural life, when by mortal sin we have lost it, and the blessed Eucharist, by which our new life is fed, sustained, and invigorated. Now what is sometimes called the sacramental system is, after all, the great thing in the church, and that which renders her so indispensable to the Christian. Could we even know without the church with infallible certainty what we ought to believe and what we ought to do, we should still need the church, and be as unable to live the Christian life without her as we are now. Cut off a man in the natural order from communion with his kind, and he dies. Sects separated from the church become in relation to Christian humanity what savages are to natural humanity. They lose all power of progress, become stationary as to Christian life, or rather retrograde till they lose all traces of their supernatural life communicated in baptism, and fall back on the natural order alone, living only the natural life of humanity, as savages lose all traces of civilized life, lose

the arts and sciences, fail to manifest the higher elements of human nature, and almost degenerate into mere animals, only a grade above the ourang-outang or monkey. All history proves it. To live the Christian life you must live in the Christian order, and on the food appropriate to the sustentation of that order of life. The Christian belongs at once to two humanities, the natural and the supernatural (for grace does not annihilate nature, but presupposes it), and he can no more live the life of regenerated humanity without communion with that humanity, than he can his natural life without communion with natural humanity. We beg the reviewer, when attempting to point out what we demand of the church, to bear these important considerations in mind.

But we pass on. The reviewer says:—

"The only objection which Mr. Brownson has offered to our view of the subject under discussion, is that it does not give religion the means of becoming a *power*. It must have an existence and an authority distinct from the individual and from the state. It must not be a part of either of these, for in this case, it will be what the individual or the state makes it, and so may be altered at the will of the party that proclaims it. We can conceive of no objection more fallacious. Because God speaks to the guilty wretch through his own conscience—because the word torturing and distressing him is thus spoken—is the word of rebuke a part of that wretch, just what *he* makes it, to be altered at *his* will, to be silenced at *his* nod? We confess, it occasions us no little surprise to find our author representing every thing, spoken through the individual, as a part of the individual, and so subject to him. Certainly, there is no necessity for such a representation. God *can* speak the words of truth, warning, censure, despair, hope, through the individual soul. To affirm that he does so speak, is to involve no contradiction. The things so affirmed, are at all events possibilities. And if they are possibilities, the argument, so far as the present issue is concerned, is with us. Mr. Brownson has argued the necessity of the church, on the ground that any other authoritative element in society is an impossibility. We may not have shown that there actually is an authoritative power other than the church. We are not called upon to do this. Our sole obligation is to show that there may be such an element of power. This we are confident we have done. And so long as it is in the power of God to speak *to* man *through* man—to speak through this medium words which no human will can modify, no human cunning evade, and which no human strength can resist—we find no necessity for that more cumbrous and complex instrumentality, which is usually commended to us as the infallible church. This organization has been offered to us on the sole ground that it is a necessity. We have seen that no such necessity

exists; and until forced to accept it on other and more conclusive grounds, we feel compelled to trust in the individual soul as the medium of communication between God and his subject man."

That God could, if he had chosen, have made provision for the wants of natural society by other means than the supernatural order we call the church, we have not denied, but expressly asserted. What we have asserted and claimed to have proved, is that some graciously sustained provision in addition to the law of nature in its natural organism is needed, because that has never been found to suffice. This much the reviewer has in reality conceded, in conceding that the mediating power is the Christian religion. In his explications of Christianity he may, and no doubt does, reduce Christianity to the natural law, but it is idle for him to pretend that, in conceding the Christian religion to be the power we had proved to be necessary, and which we had shown must be a power that the ancient heathen world had not, he did not understand, and mean that his readers should understand by it something more than simply the natural law incorporated into the very nature of man. Nay, we cannot let him off even there. He has conceded that, if Christianity without the church is only an idea, or not a power, the third element needed is the Catholic Church, as held by us, for he has conceded that if the Christian religion is an organism or a church at all, or must be in order to be a power, it is that Catholic Church as set forth by us in our former reply. What we have to show on our side is what we have already shown; that Christianity without the church is only an idea, or not a power. What he has to show on his side is, not that there may be a power without the church adequate to the purpose, for that is not denied; but that there is, and that this power is the Christian religion. He is bound by his concessions to find this power in the Christian religion, without the church, and he is not at liberty to seek or to assert it elsewhere. But, while we have shown that the Christian religion without the church is not a power, being only an idea, he shows neither that it is nor that it can be a power, for he simply casts it aside. He shows, if you will, that God can mediate without the church between the state and the individual, a fact which nobody disputes; but this is nothing to his purpose, for God is not the Christian religion, though as the Word made flesh, he is its author and finisher. We beg the reviewer's special attention to this point in his next response.

The reviewer passing over the Christian religion, and forgetting that he had conceded that it was the power needed, asserts the power to be God speaking to and through individual reason and conscience, and contends that in his so speaking there is something not individual, or under the control of the individual, something which the individual can neither make nor unmake. He says this, in opposition to our remark that, if we leave religion to be determined by the individual, we make it, practically considered, as was obviously our meaning, dependent on the individual, who would determine it to suit himself. We have no doubt that God can inspire men as he did the prophets and apostles, and accompany his inspirations with sufficient evidence that it is he who inspires them or speaks to them; but the reviewer neither believes nor intends to assert that God so inspires all men. But were he so to speak to and through individual reason and conscience, he would thus only strengthen the individual in face of the state, not the state in face of the individual, and therefore, whatever power he gave to the individual, it would be only one half of the power needed. But though God may speak to the reason and conscience of the individual, there being on the reviewer's hypothesis no objective or external authority to which reason and conscience are bound to conform, or to which an appeal from them can be made, it would depend on the individual to determine that the voice he hears is the voice of God, and also the sense of what he hears, in both of which respects he may err, and mistake for the divine word his own ignorance, interest, passion, inclination, or hallucination, as the reviewer will be as ready as we to maintain against Calvinists or the various classes of Evangelicals.

No doubt a man's conscience often tortures him with remorse, and just as little doubt that a man has no absolute control over his convictions. But conscience is the judgment which a man passes on his own acts, performed or proposed, and is sound or unsound according to his intelligence or his ignorance. Conscience is never indeed to be violated, but it is never infallible. A man sins who deliberately acts against his conscience, but he may have a false conscience, and feel he must do what he ought not to do, and suffer the tortures of remorse for doing what in itself is not wrong. Certain it is that God does not speak immediately to conscience so as sufficiently to enlighten it, or to save the individual, without instruction from other sources,

from false judgments as to what is or is not his duty. Here is the difficulty. The individual, mistaking darkness for light, falsehood for truth, forms to himself a false conscience, and really believes that he has the right and is in duty bound to pursue a course of conduct, at war with the legitimate authority of the state. What, in such a case, is to be done? Remind him that God speaks to and through his reason and conscience? But that is only to aggravate the evil. Attempt to enlighten his reason and conscience? But does not God speak to his reason and conscience,—does not he himself enlighten them? Have you more light than God to impart? Is your human voice to be held paramount to the voice of God himself? Will you allow the state to disregard the individual's reason and conscience, and repress his destructive conduct? What, allow the state to trample on individual reason and conscience? That is tyranny, that is the grossest and most terrible despotism conceivable. If there is any thing sacred in the individual, it is his conscience, his intimate reason, for in that consists the elemental principle of all individual freedom. Over that the state has and can have no control; with it society has no right to intermeddle, for conscience is accountable to God alone.

Let us take a practical case, one which is not unlikely to create no little trouble yet, that of the Mormons. The Mormon reason and conscience are incompatible with the maintenance of the American state. Mormonism teaches that the dominion of the world belongs to the saints, and that the saints are the Mormons. The Mormons acknowledge, as we were instructed by two of their twelve apostles, no legitimate authority but that instituted by Joseph Smith amongst themselves, and hold that all the property of the gentiles is given to them for their inheritance, and that they have a divine right to take and appropriate it to their use when and where they please; and if they do not as yet do it, it is because they are restrained by prudential considerations, because they are not strong enough to make it prudent for them to attempt it. They hold also that they have a perfect right to slay and exterminate, in the name of the Lord, all who refuse to join their communion and submit to their authority. "You must exterminate us," said a Mormon elder to the writer, "or we, as we become strong enough, shall exterminate you," that is, the non-Mormon portion of the American people. Moreover, they hold to

polygamy, and permit each man to have an unlimited number of wives. Here is the Mormon reason and conscience. Here is what Mormons hold God says to them. What will you do with them? Suffer them to go on and live and act according to their individual reason and conscience? But that is incompatible with the safety of the state, the peace of society, and the morals of the community. Suppress them by the strong arm of power? But who gave the state authority to decide questions of conscience? What right has the state to trample on the Mormon conscience any more than it has on the Catholic conscience, the Presbyterian, the Episcopalian, the Baptist, the Methodist, or the Universalist conscience? The foundation of all civil liberty is religious liberty, and religious liberty denies the competency of the state, or of any human authority whatever, in matters of conscience. For the state to trample on conscience in the case of Mormons, is in principle as much a violation of religious liberty as to trample on it in the case of any other class of persons.

Or, leaving the Mormons, let us take the abolitionists. The abolitionist proper believes that he is bound in conscience to labor for the abolition of slavery, and in doing it to trample on all constitutions, all laws, all vested rights that are in his way. Here is individual reason and conscience opposed to the state. What will you do? Let the abolitionist go on, and trust to his individual reason and conscience to correct and restrain him? But his individual reason and conscience, supposing him sincere, are precisely what is in fault. To trust to them, would be like trusting the murderer to try, convict, sentence, and hang himself, or to recognize and execute the law which he has shown by the murder he despises. To let abolitionists proceed is anarchy. But to repress them by the state on its own authority alone is despotism, and the worst species of despotism, for it is the assumption, by the state, of power to determine questions of reason and conscience. How with only God speaking through individual reason and conscience are you to get over this difficulty? Do you say that the reason and conscience of the abolitionist is the voice of God? How do you know, and how will you prove it? Do you deny it? By what right do you step in between the abolitionist and his God? Here it is evident, whether we speak of the Mormons or of the abolitionists, the state cannot intervene in its own name, and by its own authority, without the denial

of individual liberty, which is civil despotism. And yet, if the state does not intervene, legitimate civil authority is subverted, and anarchy inevitably follows.

God speaking to the reason and conscience of the individual is practically only individual reason and conscience, and the reviewer in reality means no more by them. What he means is, that the reason and conscience of the individual are the voice of God in the soul, or God speaking in the nature of man, or as, perhaps, he would prefer to say, in and through our spiritual nature. There is no need of any words about it, this is without any doubt his meaning. What he really means is, that God lives in us and manifests himself in our reason and conscience. His doctrine is that the divine power manifested in the reason and conscience or soul of every individual man is the power that mediates between the individual and the state. Reason and conscience are a law unto the individual; they are not the individual, they are not subject to his will, but are imposed upon him by his ever present and active Creator. Practically, then, the mediating power asserted is the reason and conscience of the individual. But does not the reviewer see that these are all on the side of the individual, constitutive of the individual, and therefore are not and cannot be a mediating power between the individual and the state? What power can they give the state to repress them when they resist its authority? or what power do they add to the individual to resist the state when it would encroach on individual liberty? Does not the reviewer see, that whatever may be the power of God, and whatever God might do, if he saw proper, practically he asserts nothing at all but what is included in the state and in the individual, and therefore leaves society without the third element proved by us and conceded by him to be necessary? What he wants is an external and objective authority, to which both the state and the individual are amenable, which decides when the individual reason and conscience are really the voice of God, or in harmony with the law of God, and when not, and therefore when the state has the right to use force against them, and when not. A false conscience is not inviolable, when once decided by competent authority to be a false conscience. Let a competent authority condemn Mormonism or abolitionism, and the state may, as far as practicable, suppress either. But neither the state nor the individual is competent to decide what is or is not a false

conscience, or to declare Mormonism or abolitionism against the law of God. If the state decides, it is civil despotism; if the individual, it is anarchy. Moreover, the case demands not only a simple judicial power, competent to declare the divine law in the case, but an executive power capable of executing by spiritual pains and penalties, not always without temporal consequences, the sentence pronounced by the court, or of giving efficacy to the judgment rendered, for both the state and the individual may, and often do, act, the one tyrannically, the other rebelliously, against their sense of right and clear convictions of duty.

This power must be superior in dignity and authority to both the individual and the state. It must be a divine authority, not a human authority, otherwise it would be no higher than the state, would have no more right than the state to decide questions of conscience, and in asserting it, we should only change the despot, not the despotism. All sects, religious corporations, or religious establishments, that have no divine commission to teach and govern men in spirituals, are usurpations, and the worst of all possible despotisms, for they enslave the soul as well as the body. The church, if a human corporation, if instituted by men even acting from the purest and best of motives, and sustained by all the world, would have no spiritual authority whatever, and to compel individual reason and conscience or even the state to conform to its rulings would be the grossest tyranny. The state is the highest conceivable human authority, and its constitutional acts are laws, and binding on all its subjects, unless they conflict with the laws of God, and conscience is amenable to no human tribunal. But as both the state and the individual are amenable to the law of God, the "higher law," there is no encroachment on the prerogatives of the state or on the rights of conscience, by holding both subject to a tribunal expressly instituted and commissioned by God himself, and rendered infallible by his supernatural presence and assistance, to declare and administer his law for both.

The objection to Senator Seward's doctrine, concerning the "higher law," is not that he asserted that there is a higher law than the constitution of the United States, but that while holding his seat by virtue of the constitution he should assume the right to disregard it; and, furthermore, that he made the individual reason and conscience the court to declare the higher law. There is a law above the state,

and above the individual reason and conscience, and authority as distinguished from despotism, and liberty as distinguished from license depend on the strict observance of that law; but as that law is the law of God, no court not above the state and the individual, or not expressly instituted, commissioned, and assisted by God himself can be competent to declare, or enforce its observance. Evidently, then, God simply speaking through the individual reason and conscience is not the power needed, for if it were there never would have been either despotism or anarchy. The reviewer, then, has not shown what he acknowledges he was bound to show. He has not shown us the Christian religion is or can be a power without the church, far less a power adequate to our wants. We have on the contrary shown that Christianity without the church is not a power, because without the church it is no actual or concrete existence, and can exist only as an idea, either in the divine mind or in the human mind. The reviewer himself virtually proves this, also, in failing to recognize any Christian religion without the church distinguishable on the one hand from the divine, and on the other from human nature.

THE CHURCH AN ORGANISM.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1858.]

Our Universalist contemporary for last October continues the controversy on Christianity as an organization or organism, and replies to our last article on the subject with as much fairness, candor, and success as was to be expected. He feels, and frankly concedes, that if to be a power, a real existence, Christianity must be an organism, as we maintain, the question between Catholics and Protestants is ended, and that there is no alternative for a logical mind, but either to accept the church or to fall back on simple natural religion. In his mind, as in ours, the question lies between Catholicity and no supernatural religion, and as he is not

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*_Christianity as an Organization._ Universalist Quarterly and General Review. Boston: October, 1857.

prepared as yet to become a Catholic, he labors hard, and not without ability, to prove that Christianity without the church, Christianity as an idea, or as natural religion, is a power, and adequate to all the wants of individuals and of states.

Our contemporary labors under the disadvantage of not understanding the precise point he has to prove, and fails to perceive how much he can or cannot concede without conceding the whole matter in dispute. He is misled by the eclectic philosophy, and by his unauthorized supposition that we accept that philosophy and hold M. Cousin's doctrine of ideas. He says:

"We still adhere to our admission, that if Christianity is any thing, and is necessarily an authoritative organization,—'always meaning by the word organization a body of men existing in certain organic relations,'—it must be the Catholic Church; it *must* be this because there is no one to contest its claim. And the issue now forced upon us is, to show that Christianity may be something, and still not be an organization in the sense which we have taken particular pains to define. Our Catholic author thinks that we have not duly considered the question, whether Christianity has a distinct existence—an existence separate from nature and from God. In this, however, he is mistaken; for this very question has been forced upon us by the eclectic philosophy, which we make no doubt has found considerable favor with Mr. Brownson as well as with ourselves. The reduction of all ideas to the three categories, God, Man, and Nature, naturally suggests the question, Under which must religion, must Christianity be classified? How we have answered the question, or whether we have answered it satisfactorily, does not now concern us. We refer to the subject to assure Mr. Brownson that we have at least attempted to meet a question which he presumes we had not duly considered. And further, one so familiar as he with the process of thought which the subject involves, ought certainly to admit, that the supposition that the three categories named are exhaustive and complete, leaves ample room to affirm that Christianity may have a real existence. We do not admit that Christianity has an existence distinct from God, man, and nature, but we claim that it is *something* nevertheless. Our author's words are somewhat ambiguous. By the words that, on a certain supposition, 'Christianity has no distinct existence, and is identical either with God or with nature,' does he mean that it must have an *elementary* existence—that God, man, and nature do not include it? Or does he merely mean, what in another connection he says, that, Christianity 'must be distinguishable from God, as the creature from the creator, the work from the workman?' If the latter is his whole meaning, which seems probable, we think he has no occasion to charge us with denying Christianity to have an actual existence.

True, he quotes from us the passage in which, admitting that there must be a power to mediate between the state and the individual, a power which is not liable to mistake, and whose commands are irrevocable, we aver this power to be God."

We must remind our Universalist reviewer, that the question does not turn on the sense in which he understands the term *organization*, but on the sense in which we used it in our essay on *The Church and the Republic*, to which he objected ; and in that essay we used it, as he must concede, in the sense of an organism, or real existence, living and acting from its own central principle of life and action. We proved that Christianity must be a power, and maintained that if it must be a power, it must be an organism,—the church,—for otherwise it can be only an idea, and ideas are not powers. By religion *organized* we evidently meant, as we have proved to him over and over again, religion as an *organism*, religion as a real concrete existence, and it is religion in this sense that he has to prove to be unnecessary, in order to prove any thing against our position. To prove that it is not necessary that religion should be organized in his sense of the term organization, is nothing to the purpose, because we happen never to have maintained the contrary.

We told the reviewer that we suspected he had not duly considered the question, whether Christianity has a distinct existence,—an existence distinct [not separate] from nature and from God. In this, he maintains we are mistaken, "for," he says, "this very question has been forced upon us by the eclectic philosophy, which we make no doubt has found considerable favor with Mr. Brownson as well as with ourselves." Mr. Brownson does not follow the eclectic philosophy, or regard it with much favor. Moreover, we do not see how the eclectic philosophy has forced the question we raised upon the attention of our contemporary, since the question lies altogether out of the range of that philosophy. "The reduction of all ideas to the three categories, God, Man, and Nature, naturally suggests the question, Under which must Christianity be classified?" But this is not the question we raised. We did not ask under which of these three categories Christianity must be placed, but whether he recognizes any religion which has a distinct, a real existence, distinguished from God on the one hand, and from man or nature on the other, and therefore a religion which cannot be brought within any one of the three categories he names. We called his attention to the fact

that he recognized no Christianity that could not be brought into one or another of these categories. Is there such a Christianity or is there not? This is the question we told him he had not duly considered, and he proves that we were right by the very answer he gives, for he says he has been forced to consider under which category, God or man, Christianity must be classified; whereas, the question he should have considered was, Can Christianity be brought within either of these categories? or does it not pertain to another and a distinct category? This question, we repeat, he has "not even attempted to meet"!

The reviewer evidently, as we told him in other terms, recognizes only two categories, God and nature, for man does not form an original category distinct from nature, and consequently he admits no existence but God and nature. He says, "We do not admit that Christianity has an existence distinct from God, man, and nature." That is precisely what we told him, and therefore we told him he did not recognize Christianity as the supernatural order, or as a distinct order of supernatural life. In his theology there is nothing above man and nature, but God himself. One so familiar as we, he says, "with the processes of thought which the subject involves ought certainly to admit that the supposition that the three categories are exhaustive and complete, leaves ample room to affirm Christianity may have a real existence." A real existence, as God, as man, or as nature, conceded; but as a supernatural order of existence, distinct, though not separate from God, man, or nature, certainly not; and this is precisely what we alleged against him. He denies, as we told him, Christianity, as such, is a distinct order of existence.

The reviewer is misled by his assumption that the Christian religion lies within the range of philosophy. The three categories he names are "exhaustive" of the matter of philosophy, we grant; but are they exhaustive of all orders of actual existence or of life? Philosophy does not rise by its own light above nature, and God as the author of nature. It can "look through nature up to nature's God," but not up to the Christian's God, the ever-blessed Trinity —to God-made man, from whom proceeds the whole Christian order, called otherwise the order of grace, and on whom all in it depends. Here is the point which our contemporary, and many beside him, overlook. He does not find the idea of the supernatural in his philosophy, and therefore

concludes that it does not exist. Denying a supernatural order of life for creatures, he can assert Christianity only as a philosophy, and as another name for simple natural religion and morality. Hence, as we told him, Christianity has for him no distinct existence, and is identical either with God or nature. This follows necessarily from the attempt to rise from simple philosophical *data* to Christianity, because from those *data* it is not possible to conclude any thing supernatural.

The reviewer, we maintained, by denying Christianity as an organism, is able to assert only natural religion, or the natural law which has its organic existence in the natural human organism, which we proved, and he virtually conceded, is insufficient for the purpose we both agreed to be necessary. We labored to prove to him that he must either accept Christianity as the church, or deny the supernatural order of life, and fall back on nature and nature's God alone. This, if he understands himself, he fully concedes.

"Mr. Brownson has several times complained that we do not recognize Christianity as a supernatural order—as something distinct from natural religion, and above it. In his first reply, he complained that our enumeration of the contents of Christianity stated nothing but what belongs to natural religion. We do not, however, consider these points at all involved in the present dispute. We are at present only obligated to show that Christianity may at least be *supposed* to have an actual existence, without being a church or organization (in the sense defined)—that it may be supposed not to have an elementary existence distinct from God and man, and still not be identical with God or man. We may be wrong in the position—which, however, we hold to with great confidence—*that the distinction between natural and revealed religion is not essential, but only one of form and degree.* Astronomy, since Lord Rosse's telescope, is precisely the same in *kind* with that which existed before that instrument. The only difference is, that the later astronomy is the more comprehensive and accurate. Possibly it would be more appropriate to compare the difference between natural and revealed religion, not to the difference between astronomy in its crude state and astronomy in the more advanced state into which improved telescopes brought it, but to the difference between astrology and astronomy. Possibly the God, the soul, the truth which natural religion really discloses, are a totally different kind of God, soul, and truth from what revealed religion brings to view. The difference between the two religions may be one of essence and not of degree. But these several points are not now in controversy. It is enough for our present purpose, that the position which we hold is *supposable.* We understand Mr. Brownson to deny that the position which we should defend, did the occasion require us to do so, is suppos-

able. His words are: 'There is no escape from this conclusion. Either Christianity is not an actual existence, or it is an organism.' The meaning intended by this word we need not again state. Possibly, agriculture and astronomy—neither of which is an organism—are unworthy comparisons. Possibly they would in no way serve as illustrations of genuine Christianity. It is enough, however, that they have some points of analogy with a *supposable* Christianity. And hence, by parity of reasoning, Mr. Brownson says: 'There is no escape from this conclusion. Either agriculture is no actual existence, or it is an organism—either astronomy is no actual existence, or it is an organism.' We submit, however that neither of these is an organism, nor yet a nonentity."

Here the reviewer affirms that the difference between revealed religion and natural religion is not essential,—not in kind, but simply in degree. Natural religion and revealed are essentially the same, and the only difference is that revelation gives us a higher or fuller knowledge of the natural than we have by simple unassisted reason. This is what we told him he held. We told him in our first reply, that revelation for him revealed nothing supernatural, and at best was supernatural not as to the matter made known, but only as to the mode of making it known. The reviewer is quite mistaken, however, in supposing the question we raised as to the supernatural character of Christianity is of no importance in discussing the original question in dispute. We proved, and he conceded, the necessity of religion in a sense in which the gentile world did not possess it, and therefore a religion superior to as well as distinct from natural religion, since natural religion the gentile world possessed as well as we, for being natural to man, all men and nations in all ages have and cannot but have it. The necessity of supernatural religion was therefore asserted and conceded in the outset, and the issue was joined on the fact whether this supernatural religion, which we both agreed is the Christian religion, can be asserted as a power without the church, or an organism. The reviewer cannot now fall back and assert that it is a matter of no importance to the question between us, whether Christianity does or does not differ essentially from natural religion. To identify the Christianity without the church, which he asserts, with natural religion, is to refute him, and to maintain our own position. By his conceding, in the extract we have made, the identity of his Christianity and natural religion, he in fact abandons the whole question, and concedes that he cannot assert Christianity as a power distinct from natural religion.

without asserting it as an organism, that is, as the Catholic church.

The reviewer says, he does not admit that Christianity has any existence distinct from God, man, and nature, and yet he holds that it is *something*. Something distinct? No. Then it is God, man, or nature, for where there is no distinction there is identity. If it is not distinguishable from God, it is God; if not distinct from man, it is man; and if not distinct from nature, it is nature. We have never denied even ideas to be real in the mind or intelligence to which they pertain; we have only denied them, unless concreted, to be any thing as distinguished from that mind or intelligence, whether the divine or the human. We have not denied natural religion to be *something;* we have admitted it to be something in man, because it has its organism in the human organism itself.

The analogies the reviewer draws from astronomy, geology, and other natural sciences, are not to the purpose. These are human sciences, and depend on the mind creating them, and on the real objects about which they are conversant. But if there were no earth, no stars, could there be any geology or astronomy? Science has no distinct existence, and is something only in the scientific mind, and in the objects it studies and explains. Christian theology may be a science, but if there were no Christianity there could be no Christian theology, and to identify Christian theology with Christianity itself would be as absurd as to identify geology with the earth, or astronomy with the planets and stars. Christian theology is the science of the facts, principles, doctrines, and morals of Christianity. But it is not itself Christianity. Christianity is the reality or real existence of which theology is the science. Suppose an analogy between the physical sciences and theology, that would imply no analogy between them and Christianity itself. The question still remains open, whether Christianity is a power, unless an organism, a concrete existence, the church.

The reviewer forgets that we have never denied natural religion to be a reality without the church, or a church organization. Otherwise he would see that what he is intent on supposing would not serve his purpose:

"Were we called upon to answer the question, What is Christianity? —we should answer,—without, however, attempting an exhaustive statement, or a very logical arrangement of particulars,—that it is a communication of divine truth, having for its end the awakening in the hu-

man soul the sense of sin and of alienation from God, the guidance of man to holiness, his support in weakness, his encouragement amid difficulties, his consolation in sorrow and bereavement; that withal it is an attractive power winning men to God; that it is all this, not particularly through verbal statements, but through the person of Jesus of Nazareth, in whom the word of wisdom, of power, and love was made flesh and dwelt among men; that consistently with this, Christianity is, not *identically* God, but God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself—in Christ, not as very God, but as the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person, the light of God's glory being manifested through the face of Jesus; and that the truth, thus revealed, is recorded by the evangelists, is elucidated by the apostles, and is sanctioned by the experience of every regenerated soul.

"For the purpose of our present discussion, we do not care to defend what we have thus, crudely and imperfectly, it may be, stated to be the Christian religion. Possibly Mr. Brownson may be able to fault it in every particular; but this would be nothing to the purpose. Here is the important point. True or false, crude or elaborate, the statement we have made of the contents of Christianity is *supposable;* consistently with this statement, it may be a power, an actual existence; and yet the statement does not make it an organization, as we have agreed to use the word. The objection is put in strong terms: 'There is no escape from this conclusion. Either Christianity is no actual existence, or it is an organism.' We have shown, not, it may be, that Christianity actually has, but that it *may* have, an actual existence, and that, consistently with such a possibility, it is not necessarily an organization. At least, we think we have shown this. Before leaving this part of the general subject, we cannot forbear remarking, that in two particulars, Mr. Brownson appears to have conceded all that we contend for. For instance, he recognizes a natural religion; and this—whatever he may deem its contents—he does not aver to be an organization, that is to say, a church. It would surprise us, should he say that he recognizes it only as an idea; as yet he has not so termed it. Now if we correctly presume him to recognize natural religion as a real thing, and still not a church, does not he thereby admit that it is at least supposable that revealed religion, that Christianity, is also a reality and yet not a church?

"Again: Mr. Brownson gives utterance to the following, which, in this connection, we must deem remarkable. He is speaking of the office of the church:

"'She is not merely a congregation of individuals holding certain relations to one another, but is to Christians what the natural human race is to natural men, and has the relation to them that the race of humanity has to individuals, and they live by its life as individual men and women in the natural order live by the life of humanity.'

"The church is the same to Christians, that the natural human race is to individuals in the natural state! But how, let us ask, can this be?

The natural human race, as distinguished from its individuals, is not an organization, and *therefore* is only an idea. It has no actual existence—is only what may be, not what is. And can a mere idea bear the same relation to individual natural man, that a church, a reality, bears to individual Christian man? It is possible that our author has inadvertently used words which do not express his real thought; but if he means what his words properly mean, he has certainly, in the case of the natural human race, recognized a real existence where he will not assert an organization—at least not in that literal sense of the term in which he asserts it of Christianity."

We never pretended that it was impossible to suppose something short of Christianity as we set it forth, and to call it the Christian religion; what we denied was that what could be thus supposed would be above natural religion, and in reality distinguishable from it. The statement of the contents of Christianity the reviewer makes is, no doubt, *supposable*, but is it supposable as a statement of Christianity as a power, and *the* power conceded to be necessary to mediate between the individual and the state? "Consistently with this statement, it may be a power, an actual existence." In God, in man, or in nature, but not as distinct from them,—the point to be shown. The reviewer does not show what he thinks he does. It is true we recognize natural religion, and we do not contend that it cannot exist without the church, but we do not concede that it does or can exist without an organism. The reviewer will find that in our first reply to him we anticipated his objection, and assigned natural religion its organism in the natural human organism. It does not exist distinctly from man, but in him, and is identically his own reason, or moral and intellectual nature.

The church "is the same to Christians that the natural human race is to natural men, and has the relation to them that the race or humanity has to individuals, and they live by its life as individual men and women in the natural order live by the life of humanity." The analogy is here to be taken in the sense and for the purpose we alleged, not for another. Humanity distinguished from individual men is only an idea, an idea in the divine mind, we concede, and the church distinguished in like manner would be also only an idea; but we spoke of neither as thus distinguished, and in neither case did we make an abstraction of the individual. The point we illustrated by the analogy was that as individual men and women derive their human life from the

race, not the race its life from them, so Christians derive their Christian life from the church, not she her life from theirs. If there had been no Adam, there would, of course have been no actual humanity; but when there was an Adam there was a living concrete humanity. So if there had been no Christ, that is, no God made man, no actual incarnation, no actual assumption of the flesh, there would have been only an ideal Christ, no actual Father of the faithful, no actual regenerated humanity, no church; but when Christ had actually assumed flesh, and raised human nature to be substantially the nature of God, there was the actual second Adam, the church already constituted in him; for the church as it now exists is nothing but the visible extension of the Incarnation, and its life is the life of the incarnate God, or the Word made flesh. The church as the regeneration was concrete in him at the moment of his assumption of flesh, as natural humanity was concrete in the first Adam the moment he was created and made a living soul. As Adam stands to natural humanity, so stands Christ to the church or supernaturalized humanity, and as stands natural humanity to individual men and women, as to the source of their human life, so stands the church to Christians as to the source of their regenerated or supernatural life. This is the doctrine we asserted, the point we wished to illustrate by the analogy we took from St. Paul, between the first Adam and the second, and against this the supposed objection of the reviewer has no relevancy or force.

We have no intention of entering anew into the discussion of matters which we have heretofore disposed of, but the reviewer's several articles written either in reply to us or in vindication of himself afford, taken together, a most excellent proof that the denial of the church is virtually the denial of the supernatural order, and the denial of the supernatural order throws practically darkness and doubt over the natural order. Luther and Calvin knew well that when they denied grace as an "infused habit," they struck a blow at the whole papal or Catholic doctrine, and at the church as the supernatural order, that they discarded the whole order of thought on which the Catholic system was founded, and got rid of all existence, all life distinguishable from nature on the one hand and from God on the other; but they, perhaps, did not know, or did not consider that in so doing, they resolved the supernatural into the divine essence

alone, and grace into a transient act of the Divinity, and therefore in reality denied Christianity itself as a supernatural order of life, leaving in fact for the Christian, as for the non-Christian, only God and nature. Any man who is able to analyze Protestantism as set forth by the reformers may easily discover that its starting-point involves a real denial of the Incarnation, the Word made flesh, and therefore the existence of the new or regenerated humanity. What Protestants call their "doctrines of grace," and profess to oppose to what they call formalism, are really repugnant to the order of grace. According to Protestant principles, justification is forensic, purely external, and the believer remains intrinsically what he was before being justified. There is a transient supernatural work performed on him, if you will, but there is really no elevation of his nature, by an indwelling or habitual grace, to the supernatural order, so that he acts from a supernatural principle to a supernatural end. Protestants may assert in name the Incarnation, but they assert nothing which demands it, and there is no purpose in their scheme answered by it, which could not, if God had so chosen, have been just as well answered without it.

One of the ablest and most logical writers Protestantism has ever produced in this country is Dr. J. W. Nevin, of the *Mercersburg Review*. Dr. Nevin several years ago became convinced that the Incarnation is a fact, and the central fact of Christianity, from which all that is distinctively Christian radiates. Believing this he began to detect a significance in the sacraments, and to regard them as the *media* of grace, or the means by which we are brought into living union with the life of the Word made flesh. Following out this with rare erudition and an invincible logic, he found himself forced, as is well known, to accept the Catholic theory, so to speak, of the church. He found that if he must accept the Incarnation, he must accept what our Puseyite friends call the sacramental system, and if he must accept the sacramental system, he must accept the priesthood and the church; and his masterly articles in the *Mercersburg Review* on *Primitive Christianity* and on *St. Cyprian* contain one of the ablest vindications of Catholicity that has ever been written in our country. It is true, he has not as yet entered the church, that he still lingers on the threshold, being deterred from taking the final step by timidity, by old mental habits and associations, or perhaps

by not finding Catholics in their practice coming up to what he, still no doubt affected by reminiscences of the Calvinistic doctrine of irresistible grace, regards as the standard below which a Catholic, if his church is true, can never fall. But however this may be, he is in his writings a brilliant proof of the fact that the Incarnation can have no practicable significance without the church, and that he who accepts the one is logically bound to accept the other.

On no scheme of Protestantism can I see any purpose supposed to be answered by Christianity that might not be answered as well without as with the Incarnation. It is true, without it condign satisfaction for sin could not have been made, but to effect all that any form of Protestantism proposes such satisfaction was not necessary; for nothing ever hindered God, had such been his will, from forgiving the sinner on simple repentance. Sin is a violation of the rights of God alone, an offence against his majesty, and, if he chooses, he has a perfect right to forgive it, and must have, or else there could be no forgiveness at all, and Christianity would be no dispensation of mercy. Calvinists assert grace, I grant, but as it is not a grace that elevates human nature, raises it to membership of regenerated humanity and to union with the sacred flesh of Christ, so that God in the flesh becomes his Father, I do not see why it might not be imparted by God in his divine nature as well as in his human nature, or be simply *gratia Dei* without being distinctively *gratia Christi*. There is grace according to Calvinism, but no order of grace, and the Word made flesh does not found a new order, and become the Father of a new and supernatural order of life, the Father of a regenerated humanity, united to him, and partaking even of his divine nature.

Our Universalist contemporary sees clearly enough that in the Protestant scheme of Christianity, Christ in his humanity has really no part or office assigned him, for whatever he does that is necessary to the end proposed, he does as God in his divine nature, not as God in his human nature, or God made man. By the Incarnation God becomes man, that man may become God, so that by the elevation of his human nature to be truly and literally the nature of God, the believer may be made, as St. Peter says, a partaker of his divine nature. All in Christianity depends upon and grows out of the fact of the Incarnation, and is in order to its realization and completion in the salvation of

souls,—to make us truly sons of God and brothers of Christ. But this elevation of human nature assumed by the Word, and effected in Christians by the Holy Ghost, who infuses the elevating grace into us as a habit, not as a simple transient act, being overlooked, the Incarnation loses with Protestants its real significance, and is practically of no importance in their scheme. Our reviewer, therefore, with all Universalists and Unitarians, rejects it, falls back on nature's God, or natural religion, and regards Christ only as a providential man, connected with our salvation, here or hereafter, only in the respect that he proves himself a teacher, by word and example, of truth and righteousness. Having done this, he can accept no church, and can conceive of a church only as a school grouped around a master, or as a voluntary association for the mutual convenience and improvement of the individuals associated. The church, as the mystic body of Christ, or as regenerated humanity, holding from the Word made flesh as natural humanity or simple generated humanity holds from Adam, has and can have for him no place. He cannot accept the church in this sense because he does not accept the Incarnation, and he does not accept the Incarnation because he does not see or conceive of any end to be effected by it.

In this the reviewer is a consistent Protestant, and only draws the conclusion authorized by the original denial by the reformers of the infused habits of grace, which requires the denial of the church, save as a purely external body, association, or school, having no real or vital relation to the internal life of the Christian. This denial of habitual grace, and, therefore, of the church as the supernatural order created by the Word made flesh, necessarily involves the practical denial of the Incarnation, or of the stupendous fact that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh, therefore of every thing distinctively Christian. In Protestantism, the Incarnation, even when asserted, stands as an isolated fact. The "Our Father" of the Protestant is God in his divinity, or divine nature alone, not God in his human nature, God in the flesh, God made man. In justification, sanctification, and beatification Christ is practically dissolved, and God in the flesh is made of no account, performs no office; and hence, when stript of its verbiage, relieved of its inconsistencies, and reduced to its essential elements, Protestantism in all its forms virtually rejects the Incarnation, and therefore Christ as the Son of Man. We may see this in its re-

fusal to call Mary the mother of God, in its horror of the worship of the sacred humanity, of the devotion we pay to the Blessed Virgin and the saints, and especially of our veneration of sacred images, pictures, and relics. This refusal and this horror prove that in the Protestant mind the sacred humanity, the flesh assumed by the Word, is practically unconnected with the work of our salvation. The Son of God, it may concede, does something, but the Son of Man does nothing. It has no conception of the great purpose of Christianity, that God through man would redeem man, and elevate him to union with himself, and make him a partaker of his own divine nature. Christianity, according to its conception, is a very small affair, and contains nothing to excite joy in heaven, hope on earth, or fear in hell; for its profound and startling mysteries, so full of significance for Catholics, though retained in name by some Protestants, have no meaning in the Protestant system, and are only excrescences on its face, which mar its beauty and symmetry, and which the bolder and more logical of the children of the reformation hasten to remove.

To our mind it is clear that the real heresy of the Protestant world to-day is, in plain terms, the denial of the Incarnation, or dissolving our Lord, and excluding his sacred humanity from all part in our salvation. They have been led to this by their denial in the outset of the church in the Catholic sense, for without the church in that sense salvation by the Word made flesh, or by the Son of Man cannot be consistently asserted, or even conceived as possible; and we are sure that we shall not be able to win back in any great numbers, those who have gone astray, till we revive in them the belief and understanding of the mystery of God made man. Without the church that mystery can be asserted only as an isolated and sterile fact, and without that fact as the origin and life of the church, the church can be asserted only as a school or an association that has and can have no real, no vital connection with our Christian life and salvation. The church grows out of the Incarnation, has its origin, its reason, and its mission in that wonderful fact, and is, in some sense, its complement and continuation, the medium through which our Lord operates, and by which, as in founding it he became man, he raises us from men to be gods, to be partakers of the divine nature. This is the great fact to which we have labored to call the attention of our Universalist friend. We have wished to show

him the Catholicity which he rejects as a small and an unnecessary thing is far below and in fact different from that Catholicity for which we deserted Protestantism, and which every Catholic believes and loves, in which he lives, and for which he would joyously die. It is not because he sees more than we do, takes in a broader horizon of truth, that he rejects the church, but because he sees less, and moves in a sphere infinitely more contracted. He confines himself to the few ideas and facts he knows of the natural order, and not finding among them our church, he concludes that she is nothing. But we tell him, and we have been anxious to show him, that she does not lie in that order. She accepts nature, and honors it as the work of her God, but in her distinctive character she infinitely transcends it, is a far greater, richer, and nobler world above it. Certainly he finds her not in his philosophy. She is attained to by no unassisted human philosophy, for all human philosophy is limited to our natural ideas; but we do not propose her as something he can discover and know by philosophy. Natural reason, aided by the most creative imagination, could never have conceived of her existence, or of the stupendous mystery of God made man. Her existence can be known only as revealed to reason by God himself. Revelation, in most cases, is needed even for our intellectual and moral guidance in the natural order, but that is only a small argument in its favor, and would never of itself warrant the conclusion that a revelation has been given us. The real value to us of revelation can be appreciated only when the revelation has been made to us, and only from itself. Without revelation we should never have known the fact of the Incarnation, or the importance, nay, the necessity of revelation, for we should have had no conception of the world it brings to light. We tell you the revelation has been made, and that we have it. We tell you that by it is revealed to us the blessed Trinity, the Incarnation, the church as the spouse of Christ, a supernatual order, a regenerated humanity, a humanity living a supernaturalized life—the life of the Son of Man—who also is the Son of God, and through whom we have received the precious promise, that if we are faithful, we shall not only be called, but shall be the sons of God, seeing God as he is, and partaking of his divine nature. Here is what we tell you has been revealed to us by our Lord through his church, and this, if it has been revealed, is true, and assuredly worth knowing

and believing. We do not ask you to believe it on our word; we do not ask you to believe without good and sufficient reasons; but we do ask you as you love your own soul, as you love your own flesh even, to inquire, If God has not really and truly revealed what we say to his church, and made the promised good accessible to every one who has a free and willing mind, a loving and obedient heart?

But unhappily our contemporary, not believing in the Incarnation, cannot believe in the church or any supernatural order, and falls avowedly back on natural religion. Yet he cannot rest even there. Having no revelation to enlighten and strengthen reason, he is led to distrust even reason itself. He contends that certainty, even on the most important points of natural theology and morals, we not only have not, but cannot have. To a practical difficulty we suggested in regard to the Mormons and the abolitionists, he replies:

"We are frank to say, that the difficulty which Mr. Brownson thus urges is a real one. We have felt it and have been perplexed by it. And had we acted upon the principle that nothing should be accepted as truth till every difficulty in the way of its belief had been fully removed, we could never have assented to the proposition, that God speaks to man through conscience and reason. But we have acted upon a different principle. When there is a great preponderance of proof in favor of a doctrine, we have felt that we might accept it, even though obnoxious to objections which we are not wholly able to remove. There are several points in theology, the reception of which is attended with real difficulty, but are at the same time supported by such a weight of argument as to force the assent of the mind, in spite of the difficulty. Such, for example, is the doctrine of the personality of God. We have never met with an intelligent person who would not confess that the reception of this great and fundamental truth is attended with difficulties; yet its denial virtually amounts to atheism. It is difficult to believe that God is a person; it is ten times more difficult not to believe him to be a person; and while such is the preponderance of argument, we do not permit ourselves to hesitate in the matter of belief. We have never read the Christian author who claims that the external or historical argument for Christianity is equal to a demonstration. From the nature of the case, historical testimony must have a degree of uncertainty."

In matters of mere prudence, where no vital principle of duty is involved, the degree of certainty, that of an overbalancing probability, with which the reviewer is disposed to put up, may answer. But only think of its being a matter of opinion whether the *personality of God* be a

truth or an error, that is, whether there be a God or not, since a non-personal God is simply no God at all. If there be a God he must have every perfection, the last complement of rational nature; but how can he have that, if he wants personality? Uncertainty as to the personality of God is uncertainty as to the existence of God, and uncertainty as to the existence of God is uncertainty as to all things, for God is alike the first principle in being and in science. The historical argument for Christianity leaves no reasonable doubt, but what must we think of the Christian minister, who has only a high, a preponderating probability in favor of the religion he professes? As long as he has not absolute certainty, he doubts, and must say that it is possible and not absolutely improbable that he is deceived, and Christianity may turn out to be a cunningly devised fable. If a faith in Christianity that is absolutely certain be not possible, then all faith is out of the question, and no man should presume to call himself a believer. I know it is impossible for God to lie, and as certain as it is that he cannot lie, so certain I know it is that my religion is true. I can say with sober truth, "If I am deceived, O God, thou hast deceived me." I know there is certainty, whether the historical argument gives it or not.

But the reviewer pushes his argument still further:

"We are prepared to show, that the principle on which Mr. Brownson predicates the necessity of an infallible organization or church, is false. That principle we take to be this: In moral and religious things, in matters of moral and religious truth and practice, there must be *certainty*. It is indispensable that there be an instrumentality which can assure man what is true and right without the possibility of mistake. The whole notion of an infallible interpreter grows out of this presumed necessity. There would be no objection to the position—which, however, we do not intend to take—that the state should decide when its claims come in contact with the claims of the individual, provided it were certain that its decision would be just. But this certainty is not affirmed, either of the state or the individual, and hence there must be some other power of which certainty can be affirmed. Such, we make no doubt Mr. Brownson will say, is the Catholic position.

"Now we affirm, not only that this certainty is unnecessary—not only that it does not exist, but that in the nature of things it *cannot* exist. We are aware that the individual whose argument we have been calling in question, is versed in the whole range of speculative philosophy—perhaps no man in this country is more so. He knows intimately the chronological and philosophical relations of Locke, Berkeley, Hume,

Kant, and Reid ; and as he reads this, the tack-and-tack process of thought which these eminent names represent, is distinctly in his mind's eye. He knows with what severity of logic Berkeley, reasoning from the principles of Locke, annihilated the material world, and with what still more remorseless logic, Hume threw uncertainty upon all kinds and degrees of knowledge. He knows the necessity, which the scepticism of Hume exposed, of laying a new foundation for knowledge, and how this foundation being laid by Kant, the superstructure of the Common Sense school—which may be said to have begun with Reid and to end with Hamilton—was reared. Aware of our author's familiarity with these things, we assure our readers, calmly and deliberately, that Mr. Brownson will not, in the *strict* sense of the term, claim certainty for any doctrine or precept of the Catholic Church. On the contrary, we think he will say, that beyond the simple phenomena of consciousness—of which certainty, if the word is allowed to have any meaning, must be affirmed—there is no such thing as strict certainty. And we further assert, that should our author some day take a notion to the Berkeleian theory, he will demonstrate the non-existence of matter with quite as much of conclusiveness as he now argues for the infallible church.

"It is often complained that speculative philosophy has developed so little that is positive and satisfactory. It should be set down to its credit, that it has exposed so much that is unsatisfactory ; and by making clear the conditions and limitations of human knowedge, has put a check upon that too confident dogmatism in which the human spirit so loves to indulge. It would give us surprise should our Catholic author not prove among the most prompt to acknowedge its benefits in this particular. Now if philosophy has made any thing clear, it is that strict certainty can be affirmed only of those phenomena, including of course their subjects, which are attested by consciousness. A shade of doubt rests upon the objective validity of these phenomena. There is a *theoretical* uncertainty touching all objectivity. Sensible reality cannot be demonstrated ; and the more remote alleged facts are from consciousness, the greater the doubt that is necessarily involved. The great distance which divides all historical and most logical matter from the seat of cognition, necessarily gives a degree—sometimes a very great degree—of uncertainty to all that is predicated of outward testimony, or that is reached by a process of reasoning. Now, much of the pretensions of the Catholic Church depends on historical evidence ; how Mr. Brownson can affirm certainty of what is sustained by such evidence, and still claim to be philosophically consistent, is more than we can understand. Farther, even admitting that the decisions of the church are infallible, most of the processes whereby its communications are *published*, cannot also be infallible. How many things must be trusted, before a decision, made in Rome, can be assumed to be known in Boston,—things, too, which no intelligent Catholic will aver to be without the liability of

mistake. And liability to mistake in the matter of communicating a truth, extinguishes the whole doctrine of infallibility, All that can be said is, that a degree of certainty can be had sufficient for practical purposes. It is not demonstrably certain, for instance, that there is an external world. Neverthless, as the mass of men find it convenient to trust their senses,—as it would be awkward to act on the supposition that all that is seen, felt, and heard, is only ideal,—it may be assumed that there is certainty enough to answer every useful purpose. It is indeed matter of history, that Berkeley, after he demonstrated the existence of matter to be theoretically uncertain, bought a farm in Rhode Island. At best, Mr. Brownson can establish no more than a practical certainty for the decisions of his church; and we can get enough of this for our purpose through reason and conscience. Practically, then, we see not how we could be gainers by substituting his medium of truth for our own. The claims of his church do really seem to us any thing but philosophical. These claims presuppose a certainty which in the nature of things is impossible."

Here the reviewer takes boldly the sceptical ground, and expressly maintains that in moral and religious matters certainty is not only unnecessary, but absolutely impossible. Will he tell us, then, whence it is *certain* that certainty is unnecessary and impossible? If we have and can have no certainty, it must be *uncertain* that certainty is either impossible or unnecessary, and, it may be, that it is both necessary and possible, which, we take it, is very much like a contradiction in terms. If there be no certainty for man, no man can be certain that he is uncertain. He must even doubt that he doubts, which is absurd, for no man can doubt that he doubts. Certainly we hold, that in matters of moral and religious truth and practice there needs to be certainty. Surely in those matters certainty is necessary, if anywhere. "Now, we affirm," says the reviewer, "that this certainty is unnecessary, not only that it does not exist, but that in the nature of things it cannot exist." How does he know that it is not necessary? How, furthermore, does he know that in the nature of things it *cannot* exist? His theology and philosophy do not give it, but that only proves that he cannot obtain it from them, as we have told him, over and over again, not that it is unnecessary or impossible. The systems of speculative philosophy, he argues, cannot supply it, therefore, we should argue, do not seek it in those systems. What have we all along been endeavoring to prove to our reviewer, but that the certainty needed is not derivable from philosophy? This is our thunder, which we will beg him

not to steal. And, because speculative philosophy cannot give the needed certainty, we have argued the insufficiency of philosophy, and the necessity of a higher and more competent teacher, to wit, the church. That certainty in matters of moral and religious truth cannot be obtained from speculative philosophy is a good reason for not seeking it in speculative philosophy, but we submit that it is no reason at all for pronouncing it unnecessary or impossible.

> "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
> Than are dreamed of in your philosophy."

The certainty we seek comes through revelation and grace, not speculative philosophy.

"Aware of our author's familiarity with these things, we assure our readers, calmly and deliberately, that Mr. Brownson will not, in the *strict* sense of the term, claim certainty for any doctrine or precept of the Catholic Church." Familiar as he is with these things, Mr. Brownson, we assure *our* readers, not only will, but does claim, in the strict, nay strictest sense of the term, certainty for every dogma and precept of the Catholic Church. The reviewer, had he done us the honor to read our philosophical essays, would never have been so rash as to write, "We think that he too [Mr. Brownson] will say, that beyond the simple phenomena of consciousness—of which certainty, if the word is allowed to have any meaning, must be affirmed—there is no such thing as certainty." We have written pages on pages to prove the contrary, to prove that we can be and are just as certain of the existence of the object as we are of the subject, of external reality as of the internal "phenomena of consciousness." If we have done nothing else, we have refuted Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, and vindicated the reality of human science,—redeemed philosophy from the charge of scepticism. In its own sphere, in relation to its own proper objects, reason is a certain light, for its light is the light of God, the true light, which lighteneth every man coming into this world. In the name of philosophy we protest against the reviewer's disparagement of human reason. Reason can prove with certainty the existence of God, the immateriality and immortality of the soul, and the freedom and moral accountability of man,—all those great truths which constitute natural theology, and which serve as the preamble to Christian faith or revelation, and hence we throw no doubt on what is called natural religion. But

the certainty we claim for every doctrine and precept of the church we derive not from speculative philosophy, and it is a certainty which the humblest believer has in as high a degree as the profoundest philosopher, for it comes to us by grace through the medium of revelation, and rests, in the last analysis, on the veracity of God. We are not certain because we have demonstrated the truth of the dogma or the precept by speculative philosophy, but because we have the highest authority reason can have for asserting that God himself has revealed the dogma and enjoined the precept.

"Much of the pretensions of the Catholic Church rests on historical evidence." That is news to us. If the Catholic undertakes to prove to the unbeliever the claims of his church, he must, indeed, to a considerable extent, rely on historical evidence, but not on that evidence does the church herself and for herself rest her claims. She knows as well from her own internal consciousness, from her own interior life, that she is God's church, and is what she claims to be, as our reviewer knows that he is a man. The church is a living body, informed by the Holy Ghost, and is a real person, having her personality in the Word made flesh. Christ lives in her, and teaches at all moments in and through her, infusing his knowledge and grace into her, in some sense, as the Word infused knowledge and grace into the humanity he assumed when he became incarnate. For herself, she has the witness in her ever present, and has no occasion to go beyond her own consciousness, if we may so speak, to know the validity of her claims, or the dogmas or precepts revealed by our Lord. If she consults historical documents, if she appeals to records, to the teaching of fathers and doctors, it is not because she needs to learn for herself the tradition of faith and morals, but because she operates *more humano*, and because she wishes to enlighten and convince those who need to be set right. The historical evidence she adduces is never adduced as the reason why her dogmas are to be believed or her precepts obeyed, but as reasons for not refusing to hear her voice and to obey her authority, in the case of those who would question her claims. The reasoning, whether historical or philosophical, removes the obstacles to assent, but is never the ground of the assent itself.

But "even admitting the decisions of the church are infallible, most of the processes whereby its communications are *published*, cannot also be infallible." We give the re-

viewer credit here for saying the best thing he could. "How many things must be trusted before a decision, made in Rome, can be assumed to be known in Boston—things, too, which no intelligent Catholic will aver to be without liability of mistake?" Well, how many things? "Liability to mistake in communicating a truth extinguishes the whole doctrine of infallibility." A liability to mistake, on the part of the church, certainly extinguishes her infallibility, but not a liability to mistake on the part of some one else. If the church can render infallible decisions her infallibility is secured. We have an infallible teacher and judge, though we may not have infallible hearers or recipients. But we never heard of any one pushing the infallibility of the church so far as to imply the infallibility of every individual Catholic. If the church renders in faith or morals an infallible decision, all that is necessary for the Catholic in Boston to have an infallible faith, is that the decision she has rendered be duly authenticated; and does the reviewer mean to maintain that this cannot be done with strict certainty? There is not the least practical difficulty, when the church makes a decision, in communicating it without mistake, by human means, any more than there is by the church through her doctors teaching the world what is her faith. It may be I cannot demonstrate the fact, for no fact is demonstrable; but I can prove it with as high a degree of certainty as demonstration itself gives, and that is all the case demands.

But the point to which I wish to direct attention, is the fact, that to escape the force of our reasoning, the reviewer not only falls back on natural religion, but even on scepticism. He feels that his only refuge is in throwing doubt on human reason, and falling back on what he calls *practical* certainty; that is to say, no certainty at all, but simple probability. What stronger evidence could he give that he feels that, outside of the church, he has no solid ground on which to stand? Yet we cannot go with him in his scepticism. We do not admit that human reason is worthless, or that even in the act of divine faith, it performs no part. Faith is an act of reason, of reason elevated and assisted by grace indeed, but reason still, with all its native rights and capacity, and reason performing all its proper functions. The most fatal doubt is the doubt of reason, because it is only to us, as reasonable beings, revelation is addressed. Yet it is a remarkable fact that they who assert the sufficiency of

reason, are the first to declare its insufficiency, and to fall into scepticism. Why is this so? Reason is a natural light, adequate to the wants of man in the natural order. How is it, then, that they who deny the supernatural and seek to confine themselves to the natural, invariably find natural reason insufficient for them? It is because men are not, as a matter of fact, in a state of pure nature; it is that they are under a supernatural Providence, and have everywhere reminiscences of a supernatural revelation which surpasses the strength of natural reason. Every man bears about with him, whether he knows it or not, the evidence that God has revealed to the world an order of life above our natural life. The revelation has been made, and man is nowhere, not even in the savage state, what he would have been if left to the simple lights of natural reason. The sound of the Gospel has gone out into all the earth, and reverberates in all hearts from first to last, as a prophecy or a tradition. The intimation of a God-man, of the fact of the Incarnation, as a fact that is to take place, or that has taken place, has in some form reached all the sons and daughters of Adam, and man is nowhere what he else would have been. It, with the universal strivings of grace, excites hopes and fears, and develops wants in all hearts to which neither natural reason nor natural strength suffices. Our Lord has a witness in all hearts, and in all hearts there are cravings, there are hopes which only the great fact of the Incarnation, the elevation of human nature to be the nature of God, can satisfy. Here is the grand fact; man has, universally, glimpses, though brief and dim they may be, of something more than nature, and which render him too large for the natural order. He has an ideal which natural reason has never given him, and which by natural reason alone he can never realize. He finds, when he falls back on nature alone, natural reason too small for his wants, and feels the necessity of another, and a higher, and a clearer light. Not finding reason equal to demands which she never originated, he denies her dignity and worth even in her own proper sphere.

In this fact, that man universally has an aspiration to the supernatural, generated by the revelation God has made to the world, and some rays of which have reached all men, is to be found the explanation of that other fact that nowhere is man able to confine himself to pure natural religion. A nation of pure deists has never existed. Men will have more or less than deism, and when they cannot have Cath-

olicity they will have dæmonism. In all the worships of which we have any record, we find a reminiscence of the Incarnation as a fact of prophecy or of history, corrupted or travestied, no doubt, but in some form borne witness to. Even dæmonism is but a travesty of Catholicity, Christianity perverted and burlesqued, the devil trying to divert to himself the worship due to the Son of Man, God incarnate; for it is against our Lord in that he is Son of Man, rather than against him in that he is Son of God, that Satan makes war. His spite is against the Son of Mary, the Man-God, whose place and office he is ambitious to usurp.

But it is time to bring this discussion to a close. The reviewer intimates that it is closed on his part. It is now closed on ours, unless he rejoins. He has shown courtesy, candor and ability in his several articles, and if he had had a good cause, his success would have been unquestionable. In our answers to him we have aimed not at obtaining a victory over an opponent, but at bringing out and elucidating the truth on the subject under discussion. We have aimed to show what in the Catholic sense is the church, and to direct the minds of our rationalizing friends to her living beauty and grandeur, to her origin in the Incarnation, and her place and office in the providence of God. We have wished not to prove to them that reason is worthless, or what they hold on her authority is bad, but that what we have is infinitely superior to what they have, infinitely higher and better. We have not asked them to fall lower, but to rise higher; not to take narrower, but broader views; not to give up the liberty they have, but to burst into a higher and a truer liberty; not to give up any good they have, but to aspire to a good infinitely above their loftiest dreams. Whether we have succeeded or not it is for them and our readers generally to decide. Whether our labors will bear fruit is for the disposition of him in whose service and for whose glory we have endeavored to perform them.

THE DAY-STAR OF FREEDOM.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1856.]

This long title very accurately describes the purpose and character of the very interesting volume before us,—a volume marked by much patient research, minute information, and kindly feeling. It is a monument erected to state pride, and is well calculated to keep alive the flame of patriotic feeling in the breast of the Marylander. Each of the older states has a history of its own, which ought not to be lost in the history of the Union,—a local history, full of incident not unmingled with romance, which it is well to rescue from oblivion, and which must be studied by every one who would become acquainted with the scenes and events, the acts and the influences that have formed the peculiar, though diversified character of the American people. We smile at some of the pretensions put forth by Mr. Davis in behalf of his native state, but we thank him, nevertheless, for his contribution to early colonial history, and assure him that we appreciate and respect his motives, while we are pleased with his good-natured gossip about the "Pilgrims" of Maryland, both as an American and as a Catholic.

The assumption that the Maryland colony was "the Day-star of American Freedom," enables the author to give a poetical title to his volume, but it has very little historical foundation. We should not make that assumption exclusively for any one of the colonies, and, least of all, for a colony which, however respectable in itself, exerted no leading influence on its sister colonies. Never in our colonial days was Maryland the heart and soul of the Anglo-American colonies. We have a high esteem for the first settlers of Maryland, and in elevation of character, nobility

**The Day-star of American Freedom, or the Early Growth of Toleration in the Province of Maryland; with a Sketch of the Colonization upon the Chesapeake and its Tributaries, preceding the Removal of the Government from St. Mary's to Annapolis; and a Glimpse of the Numbers and General State of Society, of Religion and Legislation, of Life and Manners of the Men who worshipped in the Wilderness at the First Rude Altar of Liberty.* By G. L. L. Davis, of the Baltimore Bar. New York: 1855.

of sentiment, and private and domestic virtue, they were unsurpassed, if not unrivalled, by the first settlers of any other colony; but we cannot learn from history that they were propagandists, that they sent out missionaries and teachers to the other colonies, or that these were induced by their efforts or example to adopt the free institutions they founded. Even if Maryland had the advantage of priority of time, we could not award her the claim Mr. Davis sets up in her behalf. The leading colonies—those which exerted the greatest influence in moulding others, and determining the character of American institutions—were unquestionably Virginia and Massachusetts. Maryland, in her general colonial action, followed Virginia, and even now belongs to the Virginia family of states. We say not this in disparagement of Maryland, to which we are attached by the strongest of ties, but in vindication of simple historical truth.

But the first government of Maryland was not founded on the distinctive principles of American freedom. It was a feudal government; and the charter instituting it provided for a colonial aristocracy by subinfeudation. It recognized religious toleration; but toleration is not a principle of American freedom. The American principle is religious liberty, not religious toleration. The charter secured to the freemen of the colony a voice in the government, and so far it was democratic; but the general spirit and tendency of the colonial constitution were to an aristocracy, into which it would have developed, if a political aristocracy could have taken root in our New World, colonized by English commoners. But without underrating the popular character of the Maryland charter government, it certainly was not so democratic as the government of the Plymouth colony, or that of Massachusetts Bay, the northern source of American freedom, as Virginia was the southern. We, however, are not disposed to enter further into this question. Comparisons, as Dogberry says, are odorous. Few of the colonists, we apprehend, except those of New England and New Netherlands, were, in our present American sense, republicans when leaving the mother country, but nearly all gradually became so; and when the struggle came for national independence, none were more patriotic or more ready to devote themselves to the cause of American liberty than those of Maryland. She holds an honorable place in the Union, and has contributed her full share to the glory and prosperity of the republic.

Mr. Davis shows very clearly and conclusively that the act of the colonial assembly authorizing religious toleration was passed by Catholics, and that its merit, be it more or be it less, belongs to members of our church. It was the first instance of religious toleration by legislative enactment on this continent. He shows, also, that it was faithfully observed so long as the Catholics remained in the ascendency, and was violated, or repealed, as soon as the Protestants became predominant. We think this fact highly creditable to the Catholic colonists of Maryland; but we think too much has been made of it by our Catholic friends in arguing against those who accuse the church of being unfavorable to religious liberty. Nothing is more fallacious than to argue from the conduct of individual Catholics to the Catholic Church. In treating of Protestantism we must argue from the conduct of individuals; for it has no authoritative standards, and recognizes the right of private judgment. Protestantism varies with each individual Protestant, and is for each what he holds it to be. We have really no means of ascertaining what it is, but the profession and conduct of individual Protestants. With Catholics, however, the case is widely different, since Catholicity is of catholic, not private interpretation. It is authoritatively and publicly defined, and individuals are to be tried by it, not it by them. Till we have determined the church's authorized teaching on the subject, we can no more infer, from the acts of Lord Baltimore and his colonial assembly, that she favors, than from the severities of Louis XIV. against the Hugnenots that she opposes, religious toleration. As an historical fact, and as illustrative of their personal views and character, the conduct on this delicate question of the Catholic settlers of Maryland, is interesting, and worthy of commemoration; but as touching the question of the tolerant or intolerant principles of the church, we consider it, with all deference to our Maryland friends, as quite unimportant.

But, passing over this, we must beg leave to remark, that toleration is not liberty, and the act of the Maryland assembly does not assert religious liberty. It tolerates all Christian denominations holding the divinity of our Lord, and belief in the ever adorable Trinity; but it does not recognize this liberty as a right prior to, and independent of, the civil power. The civil power grants or confers the right; it does not recognize it as an existent right which

the state cannot take away, and which it is bound to respect and protect for each one and all of its citizens. In this respect, the Puritans of Massachusetts really went further in the assertion of religious liberty than the Catholics of Maryland. Maryland was not founded exclusively by Catholics, or for Catholic purposes. It seems pretty evident that the majority, a very large majority, of the first settlers were Catholics; but there certainly were several Protestant settlers who came over in the Ark and Dove. It was no part of the plan of the first or the second Lord Baltimore to found a Catholic colony. His plan was to found a colony in which Catholics, then oppressed and persecuted in England, might profess their religion in peace, and enjoy equal rights and privileges with any other class of citizens. Neither aimed at any thing more; and, whatever might have been their abstract convictions as Catholics, it is evident that, as founders of a colony, they could claim no exclusive privileges for the church, and must concede to Protestants of the so-called orthodox sects what they attempted to secure to the followers of their own religion. Intolerance, or exclusion, would have been in direct violation of their plan, directly opposed to the very idea of such a colony as they contemplated. But the case was different with the Puritans. They had no intention of founding a general colony, open to settlers from all creeds and nations. They had their peculiar notions of Christianity. Right or wrong, true or false, they were theirs; and they fled to the wilderness in order to found a community in which they could enjoy them in peace and tranquillity. They did not invite those who differed from them to join with them in their enterprise; they professedly excluded them. They sought not to enforce their pecular views upon others; but they thought they had, as against others, the right to hold them for themselves, and to found a state for themselves and their children in accordance with them, and from which all others should be excluded. They were not persecutors in principle. They did not deny to others the liberty they claimed for themselves; they only denied to those who differed from them the right to come and settle in their community. What they did when persons of different notions came among them, was, to warn them off. If they did not go, they sent them out of the colony; if they returned, they punished them, not for their heresies, but for being found in a colony from which they had been banished.

Their right to do so depends on their right to be Puritans. If they had a right to be Puritans, they had the right to found in the wilderness a Puritan commonwealth, and to exclude from it all not Puritans. You may or you may not approve their policy, but you cannot say that they were persecutors, any more than you are a persecutor for turning out of doors a troublesome fellow that you do not choose to have in your house. Their condemnation is, that they were Puritans; not that, being Puritans, they did as they did.

But aside from this notion of founding an exclusive Puritan commonwealth, the New England Puritans asserted, what the Catholics of Maryland in their Toleration Act did not assert, the absolute independence of the church, and the incompetency of the state in spirituals, the foundation of all true religious freedom. In the Puritan commonwealth the magistrates had no authority in any spiritual matter, and whenever they had to act on a matter which involved a spiritual question, they were bound to take the decision of that question from the ministers, the alleged expounders of the word of God. The incompetency of the state in spirituals was a fundamental principle with the old Puritans; and this is the fundamental principle of that religious freedom, not granted, but recognized, by the American people in their institutions. It is the Puritan doctrine of the spiritual incompetency of the state and the freedom and independence of the church, rather than the doctrine of toleration of the Maryland assembly, that has prevailed, and become incorporated into the fundamental institutions of the country.

We are quite willing to concede this, Catholic as we are, because the Puritan doctrine thus far, save in its application, was borrowed from the church and is unquestionably that of the Holy Scriptures. The pretence that religious liberty was first understood and applied by Lord Baltimore and his colonists, we look upon as ridiculous, notwithstanding it is supported by names we cannot but respect. We believe there was an emperor of Rome, named Constantine, sometimes, Constantine the Great, usually reckoned as the first Christian emperor. Well, this Constantine issued an edict, giving liberty to Christians, and allowing at the same time the free exercise of the old worship to the pagans. Constantine, if we mistake not, lived some time before Lord Baltimore. There is a very strong assertion of religious

liberty in its true sense earlier still, which it is not well to overlook. Certain magistrates commanded Peter and John, apostles of our Lord, to teach no more in the name of Jesus. These refused to obey, and answering, said: "If it be just in the sight of God to harken unto you rather than unto God, judge ye." We have a profound respect for Lord Baltimore and the Maryland colonists, and cherish in many respects the memory of our Puritan ancestors, but both came quite too late into the world to be regarded as the inventors either of religious liberty or of religious toleration.

The question of religious liberty, though always asserted by the church, has, we concede, been more fully recognized by our government than by any that had preceded it. The modern political world holds as to most of its principles from the ancient Roman world. In that old world, under paganism, the civil power and the spiritual were united and vested in the same hands. Cæsar was imperator, or supreme civil ruler, and *pontifex maximus*, or supreme pontiff, and the temporal government has always, down to the American revolution, had a tendency to perpetuate the union of the two powers in the person of Cæsar, and has warred almost constantly against the separation and independence of the spiritual authority. It has struggled almost without interruption to rule men's souls as well as men's bodies, and to be supreme in spirituals as well as in temporals. It has never willingly recognized the freedom of religion, and has seldom been forced to do more than to concede it as a favor, as a franchise, not as a right, anterior to the state, and which it is bound to recognize and protect. It would never unequivocally confess its own incompetency in spirituals, and leave all spiritual questions to be settled by the church or individual conscience. Hence it has seldom left conscience free, and accountable to God alone. It has sometimes left it free as to some points, but seldom, if ever, free throughout. This has caused the existence of religious tyranny and oppression. When the church existed alone as the only religion, she was oppressed by the state, and when there were various sects existing along with her, then she, or some one of them, was favored by the state and the others were tyrannized over by it, though in general she far more than they.

Among the American colonists the first to protest energetically and practically against this assumption of spiritual

authority on the part of the state, were the first settlers of New England, the rigid old Puritans. They left England and her church to get rid of the tyranny exercised by the state over conscience. So far were they from suffering the state to oppress conscience, they, not having the true religion, ran to the opposite extreme, and tyrannized through their associated churches over the state. Lord Baltimore and his colonists, without disavowing the right of the state to exercise spiritual authority, did, as a fact, in the name of the state, grant freedom to Catholics and trinitarian Protestants. The American revolution came in time, and with it American independence. In organizing the government and founding the republic, or rather a confederacy of republics, the principle of the incompetency of the state in spirituals was recognized, and frankly conceded. This is the case with the federal government, and with all the state governments, except that of New Hampshire, which is officially Protestant, and only tolerates the Catholic religion. Here for the first time, we will not say, has religious liberty been asserted, or toleration conceded; but has the state frankly, fully, and unequivocally abandoned the reminiscences of pagan Rome, and acknowledged its own spiritual incompetency. In doing this it leaves religion perfectly free, and therefore fully and distinctly recognizes religious liberty as a right of American citizens, and its duty to protect it.

The practical question which it has been attempted to solve by an appeal to the early colonial history of Maryland is, Does the church approve this religious liberty, and is she satisfied in her own case with its simple protection by the state? That she approves it is evident from the fact that she has always asserted it, demanded it, and never ceased by all the means in her power to struggle for it, as her whole history shows, and as her enemies allege even as a fact against her. That she asks no more of the state than the simple protection of this liberty, is evident again from the fact that she allows no conscience to be forced, claims to be a kingdom complete in herself, and to possess, without going out of herself, all the positive means necessary to fulfil her mission, and forbids through her doctors and councils the forcing of any one, by other than moral means, to receive the faith. All she asks is her freedom to be herself, and protection against material violence, which is more than she has ever had, except in a particular locality for a brief time.

The church has just concluded a concordat with the emperor of Austria, with which she seems quite content; but a careful analysis of that concordat will show that she has less from Austria than is promised to her by the fundamental law of the American state. If she has in Austria certain advantages that she has not here, they are more than compensated by certain concessions made to the government.

What can the church want that our fundamental law, if observed, does not secure her? In the first place she exists here by right, and not by sufferance; and in the second place, the government is bound to protect her in the free and full enjoyment of that right. But the sects exist here by the same right so far as the state can take cognizance of it. Be it so. The recognition and protection of their right does not interfere with her enjoyment of her right. If she employ violence against them, the state is no doubt bound to protect them against her; but that does not disturb her, because she has no disposition to use violence against them. But must not she ask the state to suppress them? If they deny her equal right, and by their physical violence seek to prevent her from peaceably enjoying that right, she undoubtedly will ask the government to protect her; and it already acknowledges its obligation to do so. Beyond, she asks nothing of the government against sects, here or anywhere; for, if they oppose her only by moral or spiritual weapons, she holds that she is perfectly competent to defend herself. Against the moral action or moral influence of heretics the church has never appealed to the secular arm, and she has appealed to it only against their violence, their spoliation, usurpation of her property, desecration of her churches and altars, and riotous or murderous attacks on Catholics. We venture to say then, without fear of contradiction, that if our government will recognize and protect the religious liberty it asserts, she will ask nothing more of it, although it do precisely as much for the sects as it does for her. If then the principle held by the American people, and incorporated into our institutions be the principle of religious liberty, there can be no question that the church approves religious liberty and asks nothing more.

In this reasoning we assume that the government in recognizing religious liberty, declares simply its incompetency in spirituals, not its hostility to religion. The American state is not an infidel or a godless state, nor is it indif-

ferent to religion. It does not, indeed, as the state, profess any particular form of Christianity, but it recognizes the importance and necessity of religion, and its obligation to respect and protect the religion of its citizens. It does not assume that it has the right to ignore their religion, and pursue a policy of its own, regardless of its effect on the forms of religion they profess. In all spiritual questions the teachings of the church, in dealing with Catholics, and of each sect in dealing with its members, is its law in so far as protecting the claims of one is compatible with those of the others. The state must recognize and protect the doctrine and discipline of the church in all cases where they exact of it nothing inconsistent with the equal rights of the sects. This obligation to protect the religion of the citizen, in so far as it demands nothing against the equal rights of others, rests on the principle that all citizens are equal before the state. Our government is founded on the principle that all men have certain inalienable rights, which they do not hold as grants from civil society, and revocable by it, but from a source above and anterior to it. These rights are, in some cases, enumerated and prefixed to the constitution of the state in what is called a "bill of rights," which the government is bound to recognize, to protect, and, when occasion demands, to vindicate against the domestic or the foreign aggressor. These rights, again, are equal, equally the rights of all citizens; and among them is the right of each citizen to choose his own religion, and to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, providing he does nothing, under plea of conscience, *contra bonos mores*, and to interfere with the same right in others. Hence my religion is my right, my property as a citizen, not dependent on the will of the state, but, so far as I am concerned, my liberty and its law. The state is bound to protect me in the free, full, and peaceable enjoyment of my religion, because it is bound to protect me in the free, full, and peaceable enjoyment of all my rights, held independently of its concessions, and not subject to its will. For this reason, it must recognize the entire freedom, and afford full protection to my church according to her own constitution, doctrine, and discipline. It is my right, an element of my liberty, and, therefore, of its duty. As the Catholic Church, it can claim nothing from the state; but as the church of American citizens, it can claim full freedom and protection. The principle is my equal rights as a

citizen. If my church is not protected, or if not placed on a footing of perfect equality with the sects, my equal rights as a citizen are denied me, and the boasted equality, recognized as the American principle, is outraged. My equality is denied in the denial of the equality of my church. I have the right, within the limits already mentioned, to have whatever I hold sacred respected and protected by the state. The same, undoubtedly, may be said by any Protestant citizen in regard to his peculiar form of Protestantism. Though a Protestant, he has the same rights before the American state that I have as a Catholic, because he is equally with me a citizen, with the same rights with mine, and may demand protection for his religion to the same extent, and on the same ground. He can demand nothing on the ground that he is a Protestant, but can demand perfect equality for his Protestantism on the ground that his right as an American citizen is equal to that of any other American citizen. If he asks a special favor for his Protestantism, or the aid of the state to use it against my equal rights as a Catholic, the state cannot conform to his wishes; but so long as he keeps within the limits of equality, asking only what is equal, he has the right, as well as I, to the respect and protection of the government.

This conceded, it is not correct to say, that our government has no religion, or is free to treat all religions with indifference; for it is bound by the religion of the citizen, which it must recognize and protect; and against which it has no right to perform any act, whether that religion be Catholic or Protestant. Some of our friends, very few of them, indeed, misinterpreting the relations of the state to religion in former times, and not finding our government making a formal profession of religion, have joined with the enemies of religion in representing our government, whether state or national, as an infidel, an irreligious, or a godless government. This is not true, if we look either to its principles, or to the intentions of its founders. According to its principles, the religion of the citizen is its religion, in so far as the religion of one citizen does not exclude that of another; and according to the intentions of its founders, it is bound to maintain the freedom of all religions, and defend each in all its peculiarities for those who embrace it, against all physical, material, or legal violence. That it always does so in practice, we do not allege. It departs from the principle on which it is founded, and violates

its duty, when it refuses in the case of Catholics to protect the Catholic law concerning matrimony and divorce; and when it refuses to allow the Catholic Church to hold and manage her own temporalities according to her own laws and discipline. But in these matters it falls into a practical error, which may be corrected without any change in the constitution of the state, and without professing a peculiar state religion. The aberrations of some of our state governments on this subject, as unconstitutional as they are unequal, are the result of false and unjust suspicions, borrowed from the jealous and arbitrary governments of the Old World, and of the strong anti-Catholic sentiment of the majority of the American people, which at times gets the better of their sense of justice, and their fidelity to equal rights. They are to be lamented, no doubt; but who expects perfection from human frailty? The church knows how to wait, and she knows that she is never in this world to expect that even her own children will never place any obstacle in her way, or refuse her the freedom which she has the right to demand.

The doctrine of the obligation of the government to avoid doing any thing against the religion of the citizen, and to protect every one in the free and full enjoyment of his religion, whether Catholic or Protestant, is widely different from the doctrine, that the state ignores all religion, recognizes no religious rights, and is free to pursue its own policy in utter contempt of the consciences of its citizens; which, unhappily, not a few among us are beginning to regard as the American doctrine of religious liberty. The government has never adopted this tyrannical doctrine, and it is to be devoutly hoped that it never will, for it is the denial, not the assertion, of religious liberty. It is the doctrine of the old French Jacobins, of Sardinian and Spanish spoliators of the church, of European red-republicans, and of American Know-Nothings. It is the liberty of infidelity and the slavery of religion, as repugnant to the principles formerly avowed by the American Protestants, as to those always insisted on by the Catholic Church. It emancipates the state from all moral law, from all obligation to maintain individual rights, and is neither more nor less than political atheism. It is our frequent and earnest protest against this immoral and damnable doctrine, that has led some of our readers to infer that we are opposed to religious liberty, and are claiming for our church a state sanc-

tion, and which has in certain quarters created such an outcry against us. Unhappily, there are comparatively few who have any clear, profound, and just understanding of the real significance of religious liberty. The phrase *religious liberty* is popular, and men use it and hear it, without attaching to it any precise meaning. Few, moreover, in this *fast* age will stop to listen to any explanations of its real import. Religious liberty means that religion has rights; and rights, if we have a government, which government is bound to respect and vindicate against all gainsayers. But so little is this considered, that our Know-Nothings have the impudence to profess themselves the defenders of religious liberty in the same breath that they avow their intention to exclude Catholics from office, and to deny them, on account of their Catholicity, equal rights as citizens: what can better prove, that they know not or heed not the meaning of the words they use, and that religious liberty with them, means, if any thing, the denial of religious liberty, and the absolute right of the state to trample on the conscience of the citizen? They have the still greater impudence, too, to call themselves Americans, and *par excellence*, the American party. The great boast of Americans is, that their government is founded on the equal right of all men, and that it protects the equal rights of all its citizens. But what dearer or more sacred right than the right of conscience? And can a government be said to protect our rights, when it denies us the right to profess and freely enjoy our own religion? The assertion of the independence and supremacy of the church as the representative of the spiritual order, is nothing more nor less than the assertion of religious liberty, and the obligation of the government to respect and maintain that liberty. When we say we have a right before the state to chose and practise our own religion, and that our freedom is not a grant or concession of the state, and revocable by it; what is it we say but that it is a right held independently of the state, of which it cannot deprive us, and which limits its authority over us, and which, by its own constitution, it is bound to maintain for us? It is then higher than the state, the supreme law for it. The supreme law for the American state,—not a law which it has enacted, but a law imposed upon it by a supreme Lawgiver, by eternal justice itself,—is the obligation to recognize and maintain all the rights of the citizen as a man. The supremacy we claim for religion,

is the supremacy included in this law,—the supremacy of right. It does not affect the independence and supremacy of the state in the temporal order; it only asserts for it a subordination to the spiritual order, which it itself acknowledges, and must acknowledge, if it proclaims religious freedom as distinguished from religious toleration, or acknowledges any original and inalienable right in the citizen. If those who have raised the outcry to which we have referred, had understood the meaning of religious liberty, and had had the least regard for it, they would have seen that we went no further than the American people themselves go in their fundamental law.

We are no alarmists, but we think the doctrine which floats in the popular mind under the name of religious liberty bodes danger to religious liberty itself. Protestantism is combining with itself so many other *isms*, and proving itself so impotent to preserve a high moral and religious sense in the people, that it is fast bringing all religion and all morality into disrepute. Men are becoming so disgusted with the fanaticisms into which it degenerates, that they are in danger of forgetting the rights of conscience, of looking upon religion as a nuisance, and of coming to the conclusion that it has no rights, and is worthy of no protection. Public men are growing tired of keeping up the show of outward respect where they have no internal respect, and are longing to be free, and to think and speak as they feel. The course of the Protestant parsons for a few years past has lost them the respect of high-minded and honorable statesmen, and made them feel that they must look solely to the state, and in one of the slang phrases of the day—"let religion slide." This feeling is becoming very general, and Protestantism, and for the moment, all religion with it, is falling into contempt. It ceases to be regarded as respectable, and a few more Hiss Legislatures will give it its *coup de grâce*. It is powerless, save as it inflames popular passion and prejudice against Catholics and Catholicity. The number who have lost all traditional respect for religion is so large, that we fear lest public sentiment should re-assert the absolute independence and supremacy of the civil order, and deny all religious liberty as a right. We hope it will not be so, both for the sake of the interests of religion and of the country. But it can be prevented only by frequent discussions of the real ground and significance of religious liberty.

Mr. Davis has said many things which may tend to soften

the hostility just now manifested towards our religion, but he does not go deep enough into the subject, nor put the defence of religious liberty on the right ground. Many of our own friends do not much better, and seem to confound religious liberty with religious indifference. The people are all in a hurry, and have no time to study, no time to think. They are following blindly their instincts, some good, some bad; and few look forward beyond to-morrow. We see little human help on which we can rely. The good are passive, the bad alone are active; the wise are silent, and the foolish alone speak. Crime is spreading at a fearful rate, and confidence of man in man is everywhere shaken. What the upshot will be, no man can foresee. If the conservative spirit of the country does not revive, and if our citizens cannot be induced to rally to the support of our institutions, to the defence of the great American principles of government, it will be bad enough.

But we will not despair. When things are at worst they sometimes mend. The church and two or three millions of Catholics are here, and it cannot be in vain. Thoughtful men, alarmed for the country, and tired of *isms*, are struck with the generally conservative spirit and sound public judgments of Catholics, and are beginning to inquire the cause. "You are right," said to us the other day the chief justice of one of our southwestern states, himself a Protestant. "Nothing but the Catholic Church can save the country. Protestantism cannot do it, because it is not an institution, and is itself carried away by the wild radical spirit of the times. Your church can do it, for she is an institution, and an institution that does not rest on popular opinion." The church can do it, we add, if listened to, not only because she is an institution, but a divine institution, upheld by God himself as the medium through which he dispenses his grace, his divine assistance, to individuals and nations. Here is the ground of our hope. After all, the opinion on public matters of Catholics, though apparently unheeded, does make itself felt, and gradually, but surely, becomes that of the country. It makes its way through much opposition and contempt, no doubt, but make its way it does. We must then, as Catholics, redouble our exertions to correct the false doctrines which have already gained too much currency, and to form on all public matters a sound and just public judgment. The hearts of all true patriots will second our efforts, and God, we may humbly hope, will give them success.

THE CHURCH AND MODERN CIVILIZATION.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1856.]

M. Ozanam was born in 1813 at Echallens in Switzerland, of French parents originally of Lyons, but for some years settled in Milan, whence they were driven by the misfortunes of the empire and the successes of Austria. He appears to have been brought up with his parents at Lyons, and to have been devoted by them to the study of the law. At the age of eighteen he went to Paris, where in 1836 he received the title of *docteur en droit*, and very nearly at the same time, an equal honor in the *Faculté des Lettres*. He was for a short time professor of *Droit Commercial* at Lyons, and in 1840, at the age of twenty-seven he was aggregated to the *Faculté des Lettres*, and became a professor in the *Collège de France*, but under what title we do not know, and are unable to determine from Father Lacordaire's notice, which unhappily deals much more in rhetoric than in facts, and is a panegyric rather than a biography. He died on his return from Italy to Paris, September 8, 1853, but at what place, whether at Marseilles or Lyons, the provoking panegyrist does not, as far as we have discovered, condescend to tell us.

M. Ozanam's life appears to have been one of singular purity and moral beauty. He never wholly lost his faith, but for a time, like most educated French youth, he partially forgot it, and was more or less affected by the indifference of French literary society under the last days of the restoration. But he soon recollected himself, and became distinguished by his ardent piety and enlightened zeal among that noble band of young men who did so much for religion under the monarchy of July. He was one of the founders of the Society of St. Vincent de Paul,—that noble charity, now doing so much for the protection of Catholic childhood and youth throughout the Catholic world. His whole active life seems to have been devoted without reserve, with singular assiduity and disinterestedness, to the cause of religion

Œuvres complètes de A. F. Ozanam *avec une Notice par le* R. P. Lacordaire, *et une Préface par* M. Ampère. Paris: 1855.

and Christian civilization; and though but just turned of forty when he died, few of our contemporaries have left, or will leave, behind them nobler monuments of their labors and success. His faculties were early developed, and in his remarkable precocity might, perhaps, have been detected the seeds of his early decay. His early development, his intense application, and his constant labors wore out his frame, and brought him to the tomb before reaching what with others is the prime of life. He was beloved by the greatest and best men of his time, and died lamented by the friends of religion, erudition, and Christian civilization throughout Europe.

We cannot at present attempt an adequate appreciation of the works M. Ozanam has left behind him, for we have but recently received them, and have not as yet been able to study them as such works should be studied. The edition before us is a beautiful monument erected by his friends to his memory. They have made it as complete and as accurate as the state in which he left his notes and manuscripts would permit. They have spared no pains in preserving every piece from his pen of any significance, in verifying his dates, collating his authorities, and elucidating his statements. From his aggregation to the Faculty of Letters, his lectures appear to have been devoted to the History of Civilization in the barbarous ages, and he is the best and most trustworthy guide we are acquainted with, to the history of the efforts made for three hundred years by pagan Rome to subdue and civilize the Germans who finally overthrew her power, and seated themselves on the ruins of the western empire; the resistances offered by these Germans to the old Roman civilization; and the struggles of the church with the Roman and the barbarian paganisms which from the close of the fourth century were fused into one, down through the barbarous ages to the eleventh century. The first two volumes of the edition contain a very full history of civilization in the fifth century, introductory to a complete history of civilization in all its departments down to the close of the fourteenth, which the author designed, but which his premature death prevented him from completing. Volumes III. and IV., entitled *Études Germaniques*, are complete on the Germanic branch of his general subject; and volumes V. and VI., two detached works, the one on the Franciscan poets of Italy, and the other on Dante and Catholic philosophy in the middle ages, supply in part the

gaps left in the author's great work, and give us some consolation for our loss. Volumes VII. and VIII. consist of Miscellanies published at different epochs on a great variety of topics, which we have as yet only glanced at.

M. Ozanam was evidently a conscientious scholar, an honest student, and solidly learned. There appears to have been in him a rare union of genuine erudition and true eloquence. His erudition did not damp the warmth of his heart or check the play of his imagination, and his warmth of feeling and imagination never dispensed him from the most patient and laborious research. With a rich genius not unadapted to the study of speculative science, in which however he had not made great progress, he is singularly free from the rage for theorizing, and remarkable for sobriety of judgment and practical good sense. Perhaps the careful reader will detect in his brilliant and erudite pages traces of the philosophical school founded by Cousin, and of the historical school founded or at least rendered illustrious by Guizot, which he will regret, but which after all are too slight and evanescent to be made the subject of grave complaint. The author has pleased us much by identifying the Getæ or Getes with the Goths, but in tracing the character and history of the Germanic family, we are disposed to think that he has made too much use of the old Norse traditions. We are hardly prepared to believe that the focus of Germanic life, manners, and traditions, was in the extreme north of Europe, when the nation occupied southeastern Russia, and all central Europe from the Euxine to the Northern Ocean, touching on the south the Rhætian Alps and Celtic Gaul. Their great centres were on the Tanaïs, the Danube, the Vistula, the Elbe, and the Rhine, and not in the frozen North. The Norse traditions, the sagas of the Edda, were collected by a Christian hand too long after Christianity had conquered the civilized world, and after they might have been modified by some faint gleams of Christian truth, penetrating the heathen darkness, to be perfectly trustworthy for the history of the Germanic nation in times long before the Christian era. They are, it seems to us, too local in their coloring to be applicable without important reserves, to the whole Germanic or Teutonic family. We do not think lightly of the traditions of a people with regard to their origin and migrations, but whoever has studied them knows that they are singularly deficient in dates, and that they bring together distant epochs, mould into one traditions

which in themselves are diverse, and ascribe to a favorite hero adventures which preceded or followed him not seldom at the distance of centuries. The new gods borrowed from neighboring nations are gradually placed among the old national gods, and the new notions of religion, law, or jurisprudence, picked up in intercourse with surrounding nations, are thrown back to their great national hero, prophet, or divinity. It is therefore hardly possible to found any thing like authentic history on popular or national traditions, when they are supported by no written documents or contemporary monuments. M. Ozanam has used the old Norse traditions with much sobriety and judgment indeed, but still his conclusions must frequently be taken as simply conjectures more or less plausible.

The general subject to which the learned author devoted his life is one of great interest and importance ; and notwithstanding the attention bestowed on it of late years by the first scholars of Europe, is still enveloped in darkness, and Gibbon, we are sorry to say, is still our best authority in English. Some light, during the last sixty years, has been thrown on the middle ages, that is, on the period from the ninth century, when St. Leo III. revived the imperial dignity in the person of Charlemagne, king of the Franks, to the middle of the fifteenth century, when opens the era of modern history ; but of the three or four centuries previous, the dark ages proper, when were laid, chiefly by the monastic orders, the foundations of our modern civilization, in so far as it is in advance of the ancient, we have hitherto known little or nothing, and still less have we known of the origins of the barbarians, their pre-Roman history, and their long struggle with the empire till they seated one of their chiefs on the throne of the Cæsars, put an end to majestic Rome, and avenged on her the evils she had for so many ages inflicted with remorseless cruelty on a hundred nations. Yet without some knowledge of these origins, struggles, and ages, it is impossible to explain modern history, to comprehend modern civilization, or to appreciate the action of the church on society since the fall of the empire. A thorough evangelical demonstration to the modern mind, demands the full study and appreciation of the barbarians and the barbarous ages, as well as of the old Roman civilization itself. The great merit of M. Ozanam is that he understood this fact, and devoted his life with singular energy and success to supplying the deplorable defects in our historical literature.

Catholic writers have illustrated the dogmatic history of the church; they have admirably defended her dogmas, and in what relates immediately to faith and morals have forever silenced all serious controversy; but unhappily without making much progress in converting the non-Catholic world. The adversaries of the church,—we mean those who do not simply repeat old objections a thousand times refuted,—have shifted their ground of attack. They no longer attack the church under the relation of doctrine or ritual, they attack her now under the relation of civilization. They see clearly enough that the mediæval civilization, sometimes called Catholic civilization, was imperfect, and that in those ages when the church is supposed to have been supreme, and the popes the dictators of Europe, society was filled with barbarous elements and usages, and was far less advanced, under various not unimportant relations, than it is now even in some non-Catholic countries. The pious and excellent Digby thought in his *Mores Catholici* to evade the objection by collecting all the good things which undoubtedly existed in the middle ages, and passing lightly over mediæval barbarism, brutal passions, violence, and superstition. The learned and philosophic Balmes has written an admirable book to prove that the civilization of the Catholic nations of modern Europe is superior to that of the Protestant nations. He has in this done much, but even supposing him completely successful, he has not met the precise difficulty. The Catholic nations of Europe are those which were the earliest civilized, and which were in the sixteenth century in advance of those that became Protestants. Have they maintained their relative superiority? Have they continued to advance, and the Protestant nations to decline? It can hardly be pretended. Under some not unimportant relations the Protestant nations of Europe are in advance of the Catholic, as in the fifth century the barbarians, either Arians or pagans, were in many respects superior to the Catholic population of the empire. No man can honestly deny that there are many signs of decay in the populations of southern Europe, or that they seem to be falling into a condition analogous to that into which they had fallen at the epoch of the Germanic conquest. How are we to explain this fact? Are we to attribute it to the church, and thus concede the Protestant objection that the church is unfavorable to civilization and the growth and prosperity of nations? Or are we not rather to attribute it

to causes outside of her, and operating independently of her control?

It will not do to accept as Catholic all we find in mediæval society or in modern Catholic nations even at the present. Our adversaries are not wholly in error in their objections to either, for neither comes up to the Christian ideal of civilization. We protest, indeed, against the exaggerations of non-Catholics, and those of their objections suggested by pride, worldly-mindedness, and pagan views of man and society; but we should find it difficult to defend the church, if her defence involved the universal defence of so-called Catholic states in any period of history. We should be loath to maintain that under every point of view Sicily and Naples, Spain and Portugal, Mexico and South America, are superior in civilization to Great Britain and Holland, Sweden and the United States. It is lawful and even necessary to distinguish between the church and the civilization of states professing the Catholic religion. The church is responsible only for what she teaches, does, inspires, expressly or tacitly approves, or for the evil she might have prevented but has not. We are as free to condemn the civilization of Catholic as we are that of Protestant states; and for ourselves, we hold that the mediæval civilization and that of all modern Catholic as well as of all Protestant states, is very imperfect, and needs to be supplanted by a new and less imperfect civilization. We accept many of the criticisms of non-Catholics, even of modern socialists and red-republicans, when urged not against the church, but against mediæval and modern society. Looking at society in Christendom from the fifth to the nineteenth century, and abstracting all religious considerations, we have no serious quarrel with them as to its imperfect and abnormal character. Their chief error is not in the fault they find with modern civilization, but in not giving the church credit for what she has really done, and in holding her responsible for things which she condemns, always struggles against, but has not as yet been able entirely to prevent or to overcome. The defence of the church is not in denying the grave defects of the civilization that has grown up in Christian states, but in showing that they are due not to her, but to the vices and barbarism of the old pagan society which she had to commence with and transform, and in showing how much we are indebted to her by showing what there was to be done in reaching even

our present imperfect state, and what powerful enemies of all sorts she from the first has had to contend with, and has in a measure subdued.

But this is a work we cannot do without going back and studying the history of civilization in the barbarous ages, taking a survey of the good and the evil there were in the Roman and Germanic worlds at the close of the fourth century; what the church has retained from the old societies; what she has labored to eliminate; and what she has added from her own resources. This is the work needed to complete our vindication of the church, and silence her adversaries, under the point of view of civilization. This work M. Ozanam undertook with a noble zeal, and prosecuted with an energy, an erudition, an eloquence, a candor, and an ability which we have rarely found surpassed. He did not live to complete it; he fell a martyr to his zeal in defence of the religion which his life adorned. But he lived long enough to open the route, and to smooth away its chief difficulties. He has made the task comparatively easy to his successors; and if a friend of ours who has devoted years of patient study to the same subject, even on a larger scale, with a genius, erudition, and eloquence which need not pale before his, would reduce to order the materials he has collected, and publish them to the world, the evangelical demonstration for this age would be substantially completed. The adversaries of the church would be driven from their last covert, and be obliged to surrender at discretion. But be this as it may, it is certain that for the advanced minds of the nineteenth century, the battle-ground between Catholics and non-Catholics is that of civilization, and not that of dogma and ritual. To win the final victory, and put an end to the war, we must not stop with the history of Europe in the middle ages, but must explore the preceding barbarous ages, study modern civilization in its beginnings, and, to use a Gallicism, *assist* at the transformation of the ancient into the modern social edifice. The transition from one social order to another, of which we are witnesses, and in which we are forced to take part, will give us the key to what were mysteries to our fathers, and enable us to do for our age what they could not, and indeed were not called upon to do for theirs. They had their work, and they did it; we have ours and must do it, and in doing it, we shall find few rendering us more important assistance than the lamented Ozanam.

After reading M. Ozanam we find it necessary to modify to some extent the opinion of the Græco-Roman civilization which we expressed in an article on the *Church in the Dark Ages.** We did not deceive ourselves as to the actual character of those ages, or represent them in any respect as more defective under the point of view of civilization than they really were. In fact, in proportion as we plunge deeper into mediæval society and recover from that excessive admiration of every thing mediæval which was the fashion a few years ago with a large class of English, French, and German writers, the more defective do we find that society, and the less are we disposed to wish, even if it were possible, its reproduction. But we attributed the barbarous and superstitious elements, the violence and oppression we everywhere encountered in it too exclusively to the barbarians who overthrew the Roman empire of the West, and formed too high an estimate of the Roman civilization itself. Doubtless, we find in that civilization many noble elements, much that has not perished, and ought not to perish, and it would be difficult to overrate the importance of the Roman system of jurisprudence, which, with some modifications, has become that of the modern world; but M. Ozanam, we think, has proved that the worst elements of mediæval society already existed, in a still more offensive form, in pagan Rome, and that the gravest objection to the barbarians was not that they retained too little, but too much, of the old Roman civilization.

The Germanic tribes that supplanted the Roman empire of the West, added little of their own, and they labored rather to continue the Roman civilization than to destroy it. They were neither so ignorant nor so destitute even of the Roman culture, as is sometimes imagined. Rome had labored for three hundred years not entirely without success to subdue them by her arms and her arts, and they were at the epoch of the invasion more than half romanized. They fought against the Romans as Romans, and in the pay, if not in the service, of the emperors. During the hundred years that the agony of the conquest lasted, they mingled with the population of the empire, and became still more romanized. Their chiefs held commissions from the emperor, and were his auxiliaries, his allies, and had he kept his faith with them they would in all probability have sus-

* Vol. X., p. 239.

tained his authority, and preserved imperial Rome, of which they seemed to stand in awe even when turning their arms against her. They retained, no doubt, some peculiar customs and usages of their own, but in most respects they labored to conform to the Roman order, and romanized themselves far more than they de-romanized the empire. They retained in their jurisdiction and vigor the Roman courts, the Roman laws and jurisprudence, the Roman political and fiscal systems, the Roman municipalities, the Roman internal organization of the state, Roman schools and letters, and to a great extent the Roman military organization and discipline. There was no abrupt transition from the Roman to the barbarian or Germanic world, and it is impossible to say where the one ends and the other begins.

There is scarcely an objectionable feature in mediæval society that cannot be traced to a Roman origin, or that at least had not its counterpart in pagan Rome. The feudal system, so beautiful in romance, but so terrible in real life, grew out of the imperial system which made the emperor the sole proprietor of the land, and was really an advance, because it placed the lease or grant under the safeguard of law, and made it irrevocable except by legal forfeiture. The laws, reproached to the Christians of the middle ages, against magicians, sorcerers, astrologers, and cultivators in general of the occult sciences, were enacted by pagan Rome and often enforced by the pagan emperors with great severity. The superstitions we encounter in modern times were all rife in pagan Rome, and obtained in a grosser and more revolting form among the polite and refined Romans than ever they did among the rude and uncultivated Germans. Indeed, the pagan Germans, at the epoch of the invasion, were far less superstitious, and far less cruel, inhuman, and immoral and obscene in their idolatry than the most cultivated class of pagan Rome at any period from Augustus to Augustulus. Roman manners were softened and elevated rather than rendered gross and barbarous by the infusion of the Germanic races.

In the genius of organization, of construction, of government, of jurisprudence, the Romans certainly excelled every other people in antiquity, and are without a rival in the modern world, though in some degree approached by the English and Americans; but in every thing else, saving literary culture, they were equalled if not surpassed by their

German conquerors. The Romans called the Germans barbarians, and this fact often misleads us as to their real character; but Ozanam shows that the Germanic nations retained traces of a very high civilization. Old Jornandes, the Goth, scouts the idea, that his nation was uncivilized, and he proves that they were a civilized people, only they had borrowed their civilization from Greece and the East, not from Rome. The Germans, among whom we must include the White Scythians of Herodotus, the Massagetes, the Assagetes, the Getes, the Asi, whence the name Asia, were divided, from our earliest notices of them, into two classes, the one living in fixed dwellings, cities and towns, and pursuing agriculture, industry, and trade; the other swarming around them, mingling with them in their wars and expeditions, nomadic, wanderers, adventurers,—in the East pasturing their flocks and herds, and living on their produce, and on war and plunder, and in the West or rather North, vikings, skimmers of the sea, sustaining themselves by piracy, and by plundering the river and sea coasts of the rich states of the South,—corresponding, allowance made for difference of time and circumstances, to our own filibusters and border ruffians, yet as it regarded themselves having an internal organization, laws, religion, customs, usages, which prove that they had the elements at least of a civilization not in all respects inferior to the Roman. Their religion was simpler than the Roman, and less removed from the primitive traditions. It was less elaborate and at the same time less corrupt or corrupting. Their manners were purer than those of the Romans. Their chastity and respect for woman were greater. They had less refinement of manners, less scientific and literary culture, but nobler feelings, and less inhumanity. They were honest, and observed the faith of treaties. They disdained the subtle policy and treacherous arts of the Romans. For three hundred years and over before the conquest they had constituted the chief strength of the Roman armies, and the legions with which Julius Cæsar overthrew Pompey, and placed himself at the head of the Roman world, were Germans, recruited from Germanic Gaul. If in some respects they were less civilized, they were in all respects less corrupted and enfeebled than the degenerate Romans of the empire, and their conquest was a victory rather than a defeat for civilization. It would be difficult to find among them a false principle, a vice, a superstition, an immoral, cruel, or an inhuman prac-

tice that did not exist in a still greater degree in pagan Rome, whether republican or imperial.

No doubt, as I have conceded, there were good elements in the Roman civilization, but I do not find that one of these was lost or even weakened by the conquest. The Germans respected and retained them, and they were developed and consecrated by the church. The real charge against the barbarians is not that they destroyed or corrupted the Roman civilization, but that they suffered themselves, especially in Gaul, to be corrupted by it. Celtic, as distinguished from Germanic Gaul was, perhaps, the most completely romanized province of the empire out of Italy. It was, too, that portion of the empire which suffered the least from the barbarian invasion, and in which the old Gallo-Roman population remained in the largest numbers and the greatest social force. Yet it was in that province, the principal seat of the Neustrian kingdom, that the conquerors soonest became corrupt and sunk to the lowest level. The court of the Neustrian Franks, governed by Gallo-Roman ministers, anticipated the despotism, the luxury, the vices, the intrigues, the crimes, and the debasement of the Byzantine court in its worst days. Clovis, or Louis, whom it was long the fashion with historians to call the first king of the French, possessed some noble and heroic qualities, but his descendants, when not absolutely imbecile, were as corrupt and as infamous a set of crowned tyrants as we encounter in history. The Frank kingdom begins to command our esteem only as it is transferred from the Merovingian to the Carlovingian dynasty, and from Neustria to Austrasia, where the Germanic population largely predominated over the Gallo-Roman.

We do not, however, undertake the defence of the mediæval society. It was, we both concede and maintain, grossly imperfect, though superior at worst to the old Roman society at best. All that we as Catholics have to defend is the church in her action on society and civilization. To do this it is necessary to distinguish her from society, and what is properly from and by her from what is due to causes operating outside of her, independent of her, and frequently in direct hostility to her. It is a great mistake to suppose that the middle ages were, as a whole, the creation of the church, or that they met her approbation. It is a great mistake, whether made by Catholics or non-Catholics, to suppose that the church had the forming from the

beginning of any of the states which have succeeded to the Roman empire. The state in the constitution of which she had the greatest influence was England, and England has always been in her constitution the freest state in Christendom. For this the English owe their principal thanks to Pope Adrian I., after St. Gregory the Great. The states which succeeded to the Roman empire are to be regarded as its continuation rather than as absolutely new states formed by a new people. They inherited the Roman constitution; each in its own territory continued the laws of the empire, and adopted its forms, its traditions, its maxims, and its policy. They were all founded, constituted, and in operation as pagan or heretical states, long before they had any friendly relations with the church. The Frank kingdom, Neustria, and Austrasia were founded by pagans; and Germany proper was not converted from paganism till the eighth or ninth century; the Burgundians and Goths in south-eastern Gaul were Arians or pagans; the Goths in Italy were Arians; the Goths and Vandals in Spain and Africa were partly Arian and partly pagan; and the Anglo-Saxons in England were pagans. I am not aware of a single state that arose amid the ruins of the empire that was when it arose a Catholic state. The Neustrian Franks were the first of the Germanic states that embraced the Catholic faith, but their kings followed the example of the Roman emperors, and were more disposed to govern the church than to be governed by her. The first Frank monarch who showed himself really willing to serve the church and to be directed by her was Charlemagne, raised to the imperial dignity by St. Leo III. in the last year of the eighth century. It is undeniable, then, that the church had not the founding, constituting, or exclusive moulding of the states of Christendom, as has too often been pretended by both friends and enemies.

The church is a spiritual kingdom, instituted and sustained only for a spiritual end, and governs men and nations only under the relations of conscience. She has no favorite theory or form of government, or of social or temporal organization. She leaves the people, as to the temporal order, free to organize the state as they judge best. All she does is to insist that the government, however constituted, shall be administered on the principles of natural justice and equity. But Catholics, like non-Catholics, are formed by education, and adhere to the political and social order to

which they have been trained. The Catholic population of the states into which the empire was divided and subdivided, had grown up under the Roman system, and in all, save religion, were Romans, as much so as the pagans of the empire themselves. The Roman state was their model; the imperial system and policy were those which struck them as the wisest and best, and they naturally labored to perpetuate them, and to continue in force the civil and ecclesiastical legislation of the emperors, and this equally, whether we speak of churchmen or laymen. The ideas and tendencies of ecclesiastics for centuries favored, where religion was not immediately at stake, Roman imperialism. And the Catholic scholars, poets, orators, and statesmen in the fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries, were thoroughly Roman in all save the classical purity, elegance, and dignity of their language. Most men, even of the educated classes, are men of routine, run on in the ruts of their forefathers, and identify the civil and social order they have grown up under and are accustomed to with their religion, and suppose any alteration in it would be an alteration in their church. They who can distinguish between their religion and the civilization of their country, are at best only a few, and they, if they venture to speak, are usually condemned in the name of both religion and patriotism. The old French Legitimist exclaimed, *Mon Roi et Mon Dieu!* The church, let her abstract rights be what they may, cannot in temporal matters, when there is no direct question of conscience, go against the public sentiment of the age or country; but must recognize it in her practical conduct, and make the best of it she can.

The church not only had not the original creation or exclusive moulding of the states of modern Europe, but her action on them and on civilization could in the nature of the case be only a limited and indirect action. Both the Catholic population and the non-Catholic, but especially the Catholic, from the first dawnings of peace, labored to repair the disasters of the conquest, and to restore things, as far as possible, to the order which existed prior to the invasion, and which it had interrupted. There was no new state to receive *de novo* its constitution and policy from her, and no people whose civilization she could begin. The states were already formed when she first came into relation with them, with a constitution, laws, principles, maxims, and a policy of their own, which were not derived from her, which she

had not prescribed, which she could not always approve, and which were often in direct hostility to her. She had to deal with them very much as she had dealt with the empire, —undergo at times their persecutions, accept the best terms they offered her, and submit, where she could without infidelity to her trust, to the burdens and restrictions they imposed upon her. She could not by external force, or by the direct exertion of her powers, mould the temporal society to her liking, but was obliged to mitigate by her charity the evils which existed, and trust to the silent but energetic working of her principles and sacraments slowly though surely in the process of time to remove them. Never even under the most Christian emperors had she been perfectly free in her relations with Cæsar, and if her prelates had great powers, and were allowed a splendid equipage and retinue, it was as civil rather than as ecclesiastical officers. The emperors made them civil magistrates, or gave them jurisdiction in a variety of civil causes, and sustained them as such; but this was giving no freedom or independence to the church, or increased facilities for accomplishing her own proper work. The Emperors Constantine, Theodosius, and Justinian gave to the church some advantages by providing her considerable revenues, recognizing her ecclesiastical courts, and giving civil effect to her canons; but they made her pay a high price for them, and took good care to have it understood that she held them from the imperial liberality, and at the imperial pleasure. The states that grew out of the empire took no less care to make the church feel that she depended on their liberality, that they held the *summum dominium* even of ecclesiastical goods, and she at best only the usufruct during their pleasure. Hence they claimed supreme legislation in regard to the temporalities of the church, and the right of investiture. Such being the facts in the case, it would be manifestly wrong to claim all in mediæval society as the creation of the church, or to hold her responsible for every thing we encounter in it. Some Catholics in their zeal have unquestionably gone too far in their laudation of the middle ages, and imposed too heavy a burden upon the defenders of the church. The adversaries of the church are unjust and unhistorical also in holding her responsible for every thing they find in them incompatible with true Christian civilization. The church was in those ages with her superhuman energy; but her action was always beneficent, and nothing to which even an intelligent

non-Catholic objects can with any justice be ascribed to her. Whatever we encounter that is really objectionable, a careful study of the documents in the case will prove was due to causes outside of the church, and independent of her,—to the perversity of fallen nature, to the temporal powers, to secular society, and to pagan elements retained in spite of the church from Rome and her German conquerors.

It is a grave mistake, but sometimes committed, to suppose that the fall of paganism before Christianity, after Constantine, was sudden and complete. Constantine, in 312, published an edict giving liberty to the Christians, but without affecting the liberty of the old religion. Constantius and some of his Arian successors, always ready to encroach on the rights of conscience, published edicts against certain superstitions, but paganism retained its liberty and its privileges, its temples, revenues, and sacrifices down to the end of the fourth century. It was strong enough to resume the diadem in Julian the Apostate, the nephew of Constantine. The majority of the population of the empire, especially in the West, were idolaters at the beginning of the fifth century. Two laws of Theodosius, and four of Honorius close the temples, by suppressing their revenues and prohibiting the sacrifices, but idolatry continued, and even survived the emperors themselves. St. Augustine tells us that the idolaters were strong enough in Africa to burn a church and massacre sixty Christians. Rome, notwithstanding it contained the chair of Peter, was a pagan city down to its sack by the Goths and Vandals. The Roman senate remained pagan as to the majority of its members down to the last. At the opening of the fifth century, the pagan party did not despair of regaining the empire, and suppressing the grovelling Christian superstition as they called it. In spite of the edicts of the emperors the horrid gladiatorial shows continued and were fed by prisoners taken in war by Theodosius the Great, and were only suppressed in the city of Rome by Honorius in the year 404. But the image of the gladiatorial combats long remained, and a reminiscence of them is retained in the jousts and tournaments of the mediæval knights, condemned by the church, yet celebrated by a multitude of ignorant historians and romancers as one of the glories of mediæval Christianity, as indeed a Christian "institution."

Roman paganism was reinforced by the German. "At first," says Ozanam, "the old religion hoped to preserve

itself all entire, and to leap the invasions, as Æneas passed through the flames of Troy, in saving its gods. Its partisans counted with joy a great number of pagans among those Goths, Franks, and Longobards who covered the West. Roman polytheism, faithful to its maxims, gave its hand to the polytheism of the barbarians. Since Jupiter Capitolinus had permitted the strange gods of Asia to take their seats beside him, how should he take umbrage at Woden and Thor, who were likened to Mercury and Vulcan? They were, it was said, the same celestial powers honored under different names, and the two worships should combine to sustain each other against the jealous God of the Christians. Thus the flood of invasion appears to have deposited a slime in which the germs of paganism revived. In the middle of the sixth century, after Rome had been forty years under the power of the Goths, the idolaters were so bold that they attempted to reopen the temple of Janus and to restore the Palladium. In the beginning of the seventh century St. Gregory the Great calls upon the bishops of Terracina, Sardinia, and Corsica to direct their solicitude to the pagans of their dioceses. St. Romanus and St. Eligius had hardly finished about the same time the conversion of Neustria; and, in the eighth century, troubled by the corruptions of the clergy, and the violence of the nobility, multitudes in Austrasia abandoned the Gospel and restored the idols. In fact, the two paganisms were fused into one, and the struggle of three hundred years, which the church had sustained against the false gods of Rome, was only an apprenticeship to a still longer struggle against those of the Germans."

The great question, which religion, the pagan or the Christian, should triumph, and wield the political power of Europe, was not decided till the final defeat of the Saxons by Charlemagne, and the conversion of their duke, Wittikind, in the ninth century. The war between the Franks and the Saxons, which lasted thirty years, was really a war between paganism and Christianity, and in it was debated and solved the most momentous question for civilization ever raised. The Saxon duke was sustained by the whole pagan world north of Persia and the Roman empire of the East, from the western boundaries of India and China to the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, including the Tartars, the principal Slavonic nations, the Prussians, the Danes, the Swedes, and Norwegians. Charlemagne triumphed, and with him the cause of the church and civilization; and

well does he deserve the title of Great, which posterity makes a part of his proper name. But this victory, though it procured the church a triumph, did not procure her repose.

Paganism died hard, and did not yield the empire of the world without a long and obstinate struggle. By the side of the Christian doctrines and virtues of what Digby calls the Ages of Faith, because he sees in them only the labors and fruits of Catholic faith and piety, we find the old pagan religion prolonging itself, in spite of the constant vigilance and most strenuous exertions of the church, and often more than rivalling her in its influence on the courts of sovereigns and the action of secular society. Indeed, the war with paganism is not yet ended, and will not be so long as men can be moved by terror and voluptuousness. Europe in the sixth and seventh centuries was far from being Christian, and the Catholics were relatively hardly more numerous or more powerful than they are in the United States at the present moment. The church not only had to struggle against the pagan reminiscences of her own children, but against armed paganism without. The subjection in the ninth century of the Saxons by Charlemagne did not free her from all external dangers. In that same century the Huns from Asia, still pagans, swept over and devastated all central Europe from the Black Sea to Paris, and menaced even the plains of northern Italy. In the same and the following century the Norsemen with their old Scandinavian superstition and demoniac fury ravaged England and Ireland, the two most devotedly Catholic nations at that time of Christendom; they sailed up the rivers of France, pillaged the churches and convents, and even sacked the city of Paris. The Germans in the regions which had not been subjugated by the Roman arms were converted only in the eighth and ninth centuries, the Muscovites not till the tenth century. Norway, Sweden, and Denmark were completely subdued to the Gospel only in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and the Prussians not till the thirteenth. In the seventh century arose the Mahometan power in the East, and in less than a hundred years had absorbed the greater part of Christian Asia and Africa, and founded an empire which extended from Cathay through the finest regions of the globe to the western coast of Spain, menacing Byzantium, Italy, and France, and was checked in its advance only by Charles Martel in the celebrated battle of Châlons. Europe had to

defend herself against the crescent by the immense wars of the crusades, and could not count on being freed from its danger till its power was broken at the battle of Lepanto in the sixteenth century. This long struggle against paganism on the one hand, and Islamism on the other, which the church has had to maintain, has not been sufficiently considered either by the defenders or the adversaries of Catholicity.

Now if we take into account that all the states of Europe, without a single exception, were of pagan or heretical origin, that they started with a constitution, principles, and maxims of their own, which the church did not prescribe, and which she could modify or control only through the faith and conscience of princes and their subjects,—when we also take into the account the obstinacy with which both princes and people, even after accepting Christianity, clung to heathen notions, usages, and superstitions, in spite of doctors and councils, in spite of all appeals to reason and conscience, to faith and charity, we can, we think, very easily explain what we find amiss in mediæval civilization without reproaching the church, and demand a purer and less imperfect political and social order without falling under her censure. If on the other hand, we turn from what we as well as our adversaries condemn in the middle ages, to what the church introduced, to a great extent through the labors and devotion of the monastic orders, that was good, to the superiority of the middle ages over pagan Rome in its palmiest days,—to the purity of sentiments and manners the church always insisted upon, to the new value she set upon human life, to the heroic contempt of the world she inspired, the tenderness for the poor, the lowly, and the afflicted she cherished, and the provision she made for their wants,—to those elements in modern civilization, in short, which prove its advance on the most advanced pagan civilization, and which constitute our real progress, we shall find enough to satisfy us that the church had right views of civilization, the right spirit, and was moved and assisted by the supernatural presence of God, for no institution, not so moved and assisted, could ever have effected what it must be conceded on all hands she has effected for the modern world, however imperfect that world may still remain.

We have no time or space at present to develop this argument; we have only indicated it. Our readers will find M. Ozanam's works giving them nearly all the aid they will

need in developing it for themselves,—although we would not have them accept all his opinions without examination. He is learned, honest, but not infallible, and makes generally too light of demoniacal influences on nature in its abnormal state. In order to get rid of superstition it is no more necessary to deny the presence of Satan in false religion than it is the presence of God in the true religion. In applying the principles of a sound philosophy to the explanation of the phenomena of history, and in attempting to explain on natural principles the facts of civilization, it is necessary to be on our guard against losing sight of the supernatural, without which the natural is practically inexplicable. This caution we feel is needed by the class of scholars to which M. Ozanam belonged, and we are quite willing to take it to ourselves. Our province in the present age is to complete the labors of our predecessors, not to underrate what they did, or to break the chain which binds us to them. They left work for us, but that is not saying they did nothing themselves.

In conclusion, we must say that we do not and cannot read the history of the church in her relations with the ages through which she has passed, without finding our conviction confirmed that, all things considered, she has never had so fair a field, so free a scope, and so few formidable obstacles as she has with us in these United States, or without feeling that we Catholic Americans do not sufficiently appreciate the advantages secured to us, and are too slow in availing ourselves of them in the interest of religion and civilization. Our republic, rightly considered, retains only what was good and ought to be retained in the old Græco-Roman civilization, and has, as to the natural order, appropriated all the new and advanced elements introduced and developed by the church in modern society. Only one thing is wanting to the American people, namely, the Catholic faith. And that faith, we will believe, they are ready to accept and obey the moment they are shown that it consecrates all they most love in the American order, and is not responsible for the vices and imperfections of mediæval and modern civilization which have hitherto been associated with it, sometimes even in the minds of its friends. It is of the last importance that we Catholics should study with more care than we usually do the history of civilization, and learn to distinguish what in so-called Christian society is of divine revelation and authority, from what pertains to the

natural order and is by no means inseparably bound up with it, so that in transferring the Catholic religion hither from the Old World, we may not impede its salutary operation by transferring that Old World itself, whose civilization in its principles is far below ours.

PRESENT CATHOLIC DANGERS.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1857.]

It would not become us to mingle as a partisan in the controversy, if controversy it can be called, between *The Rambler* and *The Dublin Review*, the two leading Catholic periodicals in the English-speaking world; but as we were ourselves the occasion of its breaking out, we cannot in justice to either side pass it by in total silence. A year ago we took occasion, from an outcry raised against *The Rambler* for some theological articles which were very far from pleasing us, to commend the general character of the periodical, and to offer it some words of sympathy and encouragement. We spoke of it as a periodical very much after our own heart, and expressed our admiration of its fresh and vigorous thought, its free, bold, and manly utterance. But lest our admiration should raise it up new enemies among those who look upon every departure from routine as threatening a departure from the communion of the church, we intimated that, though it took the right direction, it did not go far enough for us, and in some respects lacked breadth and comprehensiveness. Understanding, or not understanding, our motive, the editors replied with great frankness, admitting the alleged defect, and excusing it, not on the ground of want of conviction, but of the necessities of their position, which prevented them from seeing their way clearly to follow the course we recommended. We cite their reply:

"Whatever is the fault of our published views, their lack of 'breadth and comprehension' is rather a consequence of our want of ability to say

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**Present Catholic Dangers.* The Dublin Review. London: January, 1857.

what we mean in a masterly manner, and of the necessity that encompasses us to observe silence on many things, than of our want of perfect and intimate conviction of the truth which Dr. Brownson so well unfolds. England, and especially the little remnant of Catholic England, lives very much on tradition—lives by the past. We cannot criticise the past without breaking with that on which our editorial existence depends. We have to write for those who consider that a periodical appearing three times in the quarter, has no business to enter into serious questions, which must be reserved for the more measured roll of the Quarterly. Our part, it seems, is to provide milk and water, and sugar, insipid 'amusement and instruction,' from which all that might suggest and excite real thoughts has been carefully weeded. These are the conditions sometimes proposed to us, as those on which our publication will be encouraged. We may, indeed, be as severe as we like in showing that there is not a jot or scrap of truth in any of the enemies of Catholics; that all who oppose us, or contend with us, are both morally reprobate and intellectually impotent. We have perfect liberty to make out, by a selection of garbled quotations, how all the sciences of the nineteenth century are ministering to their divine queen; how geologians and physical philosophers are proving the order of creation as related by Moses; physiologists the descent of mankind from one couple; philologists the original unity and subsequent disrupture in human language; ethnographers in their progress are testifying more and more to that primeval division of mankind into three great races, as recorded by Moses; while any serious investigation of these sciences, made independently of the unauthoritative interpretations of Scripture, by which they have hitherto been controlled and confined in the Catholic schools, would be discouraged as tending to infuse doubts into the minds of innocent Catholics, and to suggest speculation where faith now reigns. People, forsooth, to whom the pages of the *Times*, the *Athenæum*, and the *Weekly Dispatch*, with all their masterly infidelity, lie open, will be exposed to the danger of losing their faith if a Catholic speculates a little on questions of moral, intellectual, social, or physical philosophy,—if he directs his mind to any thing above writing nice stories, in illustration of the pleasantness and peace of the Catholic religion, and the naughty and disagreeable ends to which all non-Catholics arrive in this world and the next,—to any thing more honest than defending through thick and thin the governments of all tyrants that profess our religion, and proving by 'geometric scale,' that the interior of a Neapolitan prison is rather preferable to that of an English gaol. We only wish we saw our way clearly to be safe in speaking out in a manner still more after Dr. Brownson's heart."

There can be no doubt that this reply is keenly sarcastic, and in some measure contains its own refutation. We are not, however, surprised that it should have given offence to those, if such there were, against whom it was pointed. The

editors did not intend their remarks to apply, and they could not justly apply, to the great body of Catholics in the United Kingdom; but we presume, there as well as here, there are some to whom they are not inapplicable,—very good people too in their way, very devout, and much more likely to save their souls than we are ours, who suppose that all the traditions of Catholics are traditions of faith, or at least no less sacred, and that to introduce any novelty in our modes or methods of presenting or defending Catholic doctrine is to introduce novelty in doctrine itself. In the view of these good people to question the traditional replies to popular objections, or the historical, scientific, or philosophical statements of popular apologists, is to betray a proud, arrogant, innovating, and indeed an heretical spirit and tendency. These must have been deeply wounded by the sarcasms of *The Rambler*. *The Dublin Review*, not usually on the side of those who are unduly wedded to the past, seems to have been stung by some of *The Rambler's* remarks, and seizing upon the unlucky allusion to "the little remnant of Catholic England," and coupling it with the fact that the editors of the offending periodical are converts of not many years' standing, takes occasion to retort sarcasm for sarcasm, and to read them and converts in general, a severe, and even if a merited, certainly not a very palatable lesson. It rebukes them for their arrogance, exhorts them to humility, and reminds them of their very great inferiority in Catholic things to those who have sucked in Catholicity with their mother's milk. It accuses them of drawing a line between old Catholics and new converts, of disparaging the worth and services of those who have toiled from early morning and "borne the burden and heat of the day," and of seeking to form a convert party. It even goes further, and accuses the editors of *The Rambler* and their friends of standing aloof from the Catholic body, of refusing to throw themselves into the great current of Catholic action, and of conducting themselves as critics or speculators, instead of hearty, loyal, and self-forgetting coöperators. All this is done with rare polish, unction, and suavity of manner; but we are forced to add that, however polished or unctuous, it has given pain to not a few old Catholics, and awakened a feeling of wrong in the bosom of more than one convert.

Our readers know that we ourselves have taken great liberties with converts who have attempted to fly before they were fledged, and that we have gone as far as the ex-

treme limits of truth and justice in our efforts to avoid exciting the slightest jealousy or distrust in the minds of those who have been Catholics from their infancy; but with all respect for the writer in *The Dublin Review*, with whom in much he says we cordially sympathize, we must be permitted to say, in all sincerity and loyalty, that he has in our poor judgment borne too hard upon a class of men who have the right to meet with encouragement rather than discouragement from those of their brethren who have never wandered into "a far country," and who have the happiness of owing their Catholicity, under God, to the faith and piety of their parents. We converts were indeed born and brought up in heresy and schism, but through the grace of God we have abjured heresy and schism, and followed our convictions into the church, who has received us to her bosom as a true mother, and deigned to own us as her children. We see not wherein our merit is less than that of those who have had only to persevere in the way they were trained to go, or what greater right they have to boast over us than we have to boast over them. Neither of us, indeed, have any right to boast; for in both cases the glory is due solely to Him who became man and died on the cross, that he might redeem us, purify us, and elevate us to union with God. We do not believe that it ever occurs to converts to place themselves in their own estimation above old Catholics. We look upon ourselves rather as the prodigal who has returned to his father's house, and has been unexpectedly and undeservedly received as a son. We are aware of the superiority of those who have welcomed us among them, and readily acknowledge it, in all that which can come only from long training and familiar habit. They are, as it were, native-born citizens; we are only aliens recently naturalized, and we are far more likely to feel our inferiority, than to claim superiority, in Catholic things, to those who are "to the manner born."

It is but natural that converts should be inferior in that nice Catholic tact, and that quick and instinctive appreciation of Catholic things, which belong to those who have been reared in the church, but, perhaps, they have, after all, some compensating advantages. They have a more intimate knowledge of the inner life of non-Catholics, and in general are better able to appreciate the obstacles which they find in the way of accepting the church and submitting to her authority. Coming to Catholicity free from all

the old secular traditions, habits, and associations of Catholics, they can more easily discriminate between what is of religion and what pertains only to the social life, nationality, or secular habits, customs, and usages of Catholics. In the concrete life of Catholics in all ages and nations there is much inherited from their ancestors, which, if not anti-Catholic, yet is no part of Catholicity, but which they do not always distinguish from their religion itself, and sometimes half confound with it. The Catholics of Great Britain and the United States are hardly more widely separated from their non-Catholic countrymen by their faith and worship, than they are by their associations, habits, customs, affections, and modes of thought and action, which are no necessary part of their religion, and are only accidentally connected with it. The convert, trained in a different world, is not wedded to these forms of secular life, and is able to distinguish them without effort from Catholicity. He can embrace Catholicity, so far as regards these, with less admixture of foreign elements, and attach himself more easily to it in its essential and universal character, free from the local habits, manners, and usages of an old Catholic population. This is some compensation, and places converts more nearly on a level with old Catholics than is sometimes supposed, though it, no doubt, leaves them still far inferior.

The convert, on being admitted into the church and beginning to associate with his Catholic brethren, does not always find them in all respects what he in his fervor and inexperience had expected. He finds the church altogether more than he promised himself, or had conceived it possible for her to be, but he finds, also, that, though in all which is strictly of religion, his sympathy with his Catholic brethren is full and entire, in other matters it is far from being perfect,—through his fault it may be as well as through theirs. He finds that they are wedded to many things to which he is a stranger, and must remain a stranger; that, in all save religion, he and they belong to different worlds, and have different habits, associations, and sympathies. Outside of religion he belongs to the modern world, speaks its language, thinks and reasons as a man of the nineteenth century, while they appear to live in what is to him a past age, have recollections, traditions, associations, which though dear to them, have and can have no hold on him. If he allows himself to dwell on these, he is apt to form an undue esti-

mate of the real sentiment and worth of the body into which he has been admitted. There is, with equal faith and piety on both sides, in matters not of religion, a real divergence between them, which not unfrequently leads to much misunderstanding and distrust on both sides. Each is more or less tenacious of his own world, each clings to his old habits, associations, traditions. The old Catholic feels that there is a difference, though he may not be able, in all cases, to explain its cause or its exact nature, and is disposed to think that something is lacking in the convert's faith or piety. To satisfy him, the convert must sympathize with him in what he has that is not of Catholicity, as well as in what is, fall back with him into that old world inherited from his Catholic ancestors, and thus become separated in all things in which he is separated from the actual world of to-day. He naturally wishes the convert to embrace not only the Catholic religion, but all the traditions of Catholics, and defend the civilization of Catholic ages and nations, and the conduct of Catholics in relation to religion and secular politics, with as much zeal and resoluteness as he defends Catholicity itself, although, in point of fact, to do so would require him to defend much that the church has never approved, and much that she has never ceased to struggle against. The convert, if a full-grown man, cannot do this. He cheerfully takes the old faith, submits unreservedly to the old church, but in what is not repugnant to faith or morals he sees not why he should change, or cease to be a man of his own times or of his own country. He is, unless of a very philosophical turn of mind, even offended by the old Catholic's unnecessary and in his view unreasonable attachment to the past, which was no better than the present, if indeed so good, to old methods, to old usages, no longer in harmony with the living thought of the age and country, and feels a vocation to emancipate his Catholic brethren from a bondage the church does not impose, and which seems to him to crush out their manhood, and deprive them of all ability to serve effectively their church, in the presence of non-Catholics.

Certainly, there is here much misapprehension and exaggeration on both sides, and neither side is strictly just to the other. All old Catholics do not cling to the past; many of them are fully up with the times, and are men of their own age and nation; and converts are not always deficient in sympathy with mediævalism; indeed, some of them

are too much attached to it, and far more than old Catholics hold that what is mediæval is Catholic, and what is not mediæval is not Catholic. Still, the principle that underlies the convert's thought is sound. It is the principle on which the church herself always acts in dealing with the world. Herself unalterable and immovable, she takes the world as she finds it, and deals with it as it is. She found the world in the beginning imperial; she accepted imperialism, and labored to christianize it. At a later epoch she found the world barbarian; and she took the barbarians as they were and christianized and civilized them. At a still later period she found it feudal. She never introduced or approved feudalism itself, yet she conformed her secular relations to it, and addressed feudal society in language it could understand and profit by. In the same way she deals with our proud, self-reliant, republican Anglo-Saxon world. She concedes it frankly in the outset whatever it is or has that is not repugnant to the essential nature and prerogatives of our religion, and labors to aid its progress. She leaves it its own habits, manners, customs, institutions, laws, associations, in so far as they do not repugn eternal truth and justice, speaks to it in its own tongue, to its own understanding, in such forms of speech and such modes of address as are best fitted to convince its reason and win its love, and that too without casting a single longing, lingering look to the past she leaves behind.

But all Catholics are not up to the level of the church, and not a few of them never study her history, investigate the principles on which she acts, or catch even a glimpse of her sublime wisdom or her celestial prudence. Many of them are merely men of routine, creatures of the traditions and associations inherited from their ancestors, and which they seldom even dream of distinguishing from their religion itself. These cannot sympathize with the convert who comes among them, bringing with him the active and fearless, not to say reckless, spirit of the nineteenth century. He is a phenomenon they do not fully understand, and they find him both strange and offensive. He breaks their rest, rouses them from their sleep, disturbs their fondly-cherished prejudices, even forces them to think, to reason, to seek to know something of the world passing around them, to take broader and more comprehensive views of men and things; in a word, to come out from the cloister and be active, living, energetic men in their own day and generation; and

they not unreasonably look upon him as a rash innovator, a restless spirit, a disturber of the peace and repose of the church, because the things he wars against are regarded, by those who cherish them, not as hindrances, but as helps to religion. Indeed, they are at a loss to conceive what it is he wants or is driving at, and they suspect that he is really seeking to protestantize, secularize, or, at least, modernize the church, and they conclude that they may justly resist him, and inculcate doubts as to the reality of his conversion, or, at least, as to his perseverance in the faith. This is natural, and is to be expected by every one, convert, or no convert, who attempts to effect a reform in any department of human activity.

The convert again, on his side, convinced of the soundness of the principle on which he proceeds, and the justice and purity of his aims, and not in all cases meeting that clear understanding among Catholics of principle or that firm and uniform adhesion to it he had expected, feels, at first, a sad disappointment, and though he abates nothing in his faith or his devotion to the church, is tempted to form too low an estimate of the spirit, understanding, and energy of the mass of his new brethren, and to take what is really true of a small number only, as characteristic of the whole body. He thus not unfrequently does great injustice to men who, in those very qualities he most admires, are far his superiors. He forgets, too, for the moment, though he is freer than old Catholics from one order of old habits and associations, that he is less free from another, that as pure and as complete as he may regard his Catholic faith, it is nevertheless possible that he retains some of the old Protestant leaven, and unconsciously cherishes a spirit and tendency that the delicate Catholic instinct repels. It is possible that we who are converts have in us a slight touch of Puritanism, and forget that not all who are *in* the church are *of* the church; that we make too much depend on human wisdom, virtue, and sagacity. God's ways are not our ways, and it is very possible that brought up as we have been in Protestantism, and accustomed to rely almost solely on human agencies, and to feel that it is we who sustain the church, not the church that sustains us, we may be urging in our zeal and enthusiasm, or in our impatience, methods of proceeding which God cannot bless, because they would rob him of his glory and transfer it to man. In dealing with principles no compromise is admissible, but in their practi-

cal application compromises are allowable, are almost always necessary, and we often endanger success as much by going too far ahead of those with whom we must act, as by lagging too far behind them; we must deal with men as we find them, not only with men outside of the church, but also with men inside of the church. What we want may be just and desirable, and yet it may be our duty not to urge it, or not to insist on it, because, in the actual state of things, the Catholic body is not prepared to receive it, or to coöperate with us in obtaining it. There is never wisdom in urging what is impracticable. Never are we able to do all the good we would; we must content ourselves with doing all that we can, and preparing the way for our successors to do more. Catholics must work with the Catholic body, and none of us must suppose that we are the only ones in that body who have right views, true zeal, and effective courage. To some extent the writer in *The Dublin Review* may have only administered us a well-merited rebuke, for it may well be that we have not rightly judged this old Catholic body into which we have been incorporated, and that we have formed too low an estimate of the *active* virtues of its members.

Nevertheless, we agree this far with *The Rambler*, with many of our fellow-converts, and a much larger number not converts, but Catholics from infancy, that the English-speaking Catholic world, to say nothing of Catholics who speak other tongues, are too timid and servile in their spirit, too narrow and hidebound in their views, too tame and feeble in asserting the truth, beauty, and majesty of their church; that a freer, more manly, and energetic spirit is demanded by the temper and wants of our times; and that to act favorably on the modern world we should take more pains to place ourselves in closer relation with its intellect, and accept with more frankness and cordiality its historical, scientifical, and philosophical labors in so far as they have obtained solid and durable results. In matters of religion we are and must be exclusive, for truth cannot tolerate so much as the semblance of error; but dogma saved, we must not manifest intolerance towards either Catholics or non-Catholics, or feel that we have nothing to do or say in the great intellectual movements going on around us. It will not do for us to stand aloof from these movements, or to deny that any thing true has been discovered, or any thing valuable has been obtained by men out of our communion. Out of the church as well as in the church men have nature and nat-

ural reason, and in what pertains to the natural order may make valuable discoveries and important acquisitions. We can, in the times in which we live, be neither just to them nor to our church herself, if we remain ignorant of their labors, or refuse to acknowledge what of real merit they have. The whole non-Catholic world is not anti-Catholic. The church found much in Græco-Roman civilization to retain, and the influence of the Roman jurists may be detected even in our works of casuistry. The modern non-Catholic world is not further removed from Catholicity than was the ancient gentile world. The civilization which obtains now in non-Catholic civilized nations is less repugnant in principle and in spirit to our holy religion than was the old Græco-Roman civilization. As compared with that it is Christian. There is more in the labors of modern non-Catholic scholars, physicists, historians, poets, philosophers, that we can advantageously appropriate, than the fathers found in the labors of the great men of classic antiquity; for in the order of civilization the church has never ceased to exert an influence on men even outside of her communion. Undoubtedly, we can save our own souls without any knowledge of the learning and science cultivated by non-Catholics; undoubtedly the intrinsic value of their learning and science is far less than they imagine; but we have in our age to seek the salvation of our neighbor as well as of ourselves, and to cultivate not merely our own personal piety, but those active and disinterested virtues which render us instrumental in saving others; and to do this we must know thoroughly this non-Catholic world, master it on its own ground, and prove ourselves its superior in every department of thought and life.

We are not disposed to deny or to disguise our defects. We frankly concede them; but they are easily explained and excused by the circumstances in which we have hitherto been placed. It is true, we do to some extent lack spirit, independence, energy, and courage; we do not assert and maintain our rightful position; we do not lead, as we should, the intellect of the age; and not a few of the finest minds, the ripest scholars, and most brilliant geniuses of the modern world are not in our communion, are indifferent or hostile to the church. But how long have we had our freedom? For three hundred years English-speaking Catholics have been an oppressed, down-trodden, and persecuted class. England boasts of her free constitution, and we admit that

the English have always been the freest people in Europe. But till quite recently, Catholic Englishmen, with one or two brief intervals, have, since the reformation, had no share in English freedom. They have been regarded as outside of the constitution, deprived of the native-born rights of Englishmen. Protestant England despoiled our Catholic ancestors of their rights, confiscated their goods, robbed them of their churches, schools, colleges, and universities, and did all that power aided by satanic malice could do to force them into apostasy, or, failing in that, to reduce them to the most abject poverty and ignorance, and to crush out their manhood. They were able to hold fast their faith only at the sacrifice of all else, only in bonds, confiscations, fines, imprisonments, exile, and death. All England and all Ireland have been drenched with the blood of Catholic martyrs, and made hallowed ground. The Catholic religion was proscribed by law, and the most terrible penalties annexed to its practice, and no Catholic could, for ages, in free England, practise it save by stealth. The clergy were proscribed and forbidden to enter the kingdom, and if they did enter it, and were convicted of performing any sacerdotal function, they were hung, drawn, and quartered as traitors; they were obliged to resort to all manner of disguises, to live in secret, to conceal their character, and take all possible precautions against capture, as criminals hiding from the officers of justice, in order to minister for a short time to the spiritual wants of the faithful. With all their precautions they were caught and executed by hundreds. The history of Catholics in England during the reign of Elizabeth Tudor, and to some extent under James I., repeats that of the early Christians of the martyr ages. How were the Catholics, despoiled, persecuted, oppressed, surrounded by spies, treated as outlaws, and every day dragged to slaughter, to retain the bold, energetic, independent bearing of a ruling class? How should they not, when they had to resort to every expedient, make every shift, not forbidden by Catholic faith and morals, in order to save their lives, become in manner tame, feeble, suspicious, and evasive? They needed all their firmness and heroism when called before the magistrate, when subjected to torture, or led to execution, and on those occasions their firmness and heroism rarely failed them. How, when stripped of their goods, deprived of their schools, excluded from the universities, and resisted at every point by authority alike

vigilant and ferocious, were they to keep up their scholastic tradition, and to preserve the lead of literature and science?

During these centuries of persecution, Catholics could be expected to do no more than study to practise their religion in as quiet and as inoffensive a way as possible. They were thrown upon the defensive, and naturally adopted an apologetic tone. However firm they might be in the faith, or courageous to suffer for it, their position in the state, or rather out of the state, the disguise, the secrecy, the evasion they were obliged to study in order not unnecessarily to compromise themselves or their friends, the perpetual danger in which they lived of having their goods confiscated or their throats cut, naturally told on their characters, and made them in the world, amongst their enemies, cautious in their language and timid in their conduct; nor is it to be thought strange if, at times, the iron entered into their souls, if they felt that they were, in a worldly point of view, an inferior class, and lost the hope of seeing better days. Assailed on all sides, their religion everywhere misrepresented, grossly belied, and calumniated, what more natural or more excusable than that they should study, as far as possible, to apologize for it, to divest it of its more offensive features, that they should pass lightly over those passages of history or science apparently against them, and to the explanation of which they could not expect their enemies to listen, or that they should seek and dwell only on such things as would tell most in their favor? We see in the ages of persecution, in the oppression to which Catholics were sujected, in England and Ireland from the accession of Elizabeth, and in Scotland, from the accession of James VI. down to the passing of the Catholic Relief Bill in 1829, enough to account for all the defects to be detected in the great body of English-speaking Catholics at the present time, and that, too, without casting the slightest blame on our Catholic ancestors.

We think it undeniable that Protestants in the United Kingdom and in the United States, have a more thorough, a more comprehensive, and a more finished education than Catholics generally have in the same countries. In England, the Protestants not only deprived Catholics of their schools, colleges, and universities, but took them and their ample endowments, derived from Catholic sources, for themselves. They enriched themselves with our spoils, as was

the case wherever the government became Protestant, a fact never to be forgotten when speaking of the greatness, power, or civilization of the Protestant nations of Europe. The Protestants entered into the possessions of their Catholic ancestors, and took as their outfit the accumulations of ages of Catholic faith, zeal, liberality, and labor. Despoiled of the provisions they had made for education, forbidden both by their poverty and by law to make new provisions, Catholics had, for a long time, no resource but that of sending their children abroad to be educated in some continental school, which few of them could do, and which the government prevented all from doing as far as it was able. Catholics were excluded from the public schools and universities which their own Catholic ancestors had founded and endowed, and in Ireland at least, the Catholic father was prohibited by law, under severe penalties, from teaching his own child even letters, from sending him out of the kingdom to be educated, as well as from transmitting to him money to pay his expenses. Under these spoliations, these terrible penal laws, and with all the wealth, power, and patronage of the state against them, without means, without civil protection, proscribed and treated as outlaws, how were Catholics without a miracle to compete successfully with their Protestant enemies in the several branches of a finished liberal education? History tells us of the consternation with which the early Christians received the cowardly edict of Julian the Apostate, closing to them the schools of the empire, and yet the schools he closed to them had been founded, not by them or their Christian ancestors, but by non-Christian emperors, and they were supported from the imperial treasury. The British government under Protestant influence carried its injustice, its cruelty, its cunning, and its cowardice to an extent which Julian, astute and malignant as he was towards Christians, appears never to have dreamed of. He closed to the Christians the public schools of the empire, and forbid them the study of heathen literature, but he did not forbid them to found schools of their own, or to teach in them their own religion, philosophy, literature, and science. What should astonish us, therefore, is not that there is a disparity in education, in literary and scientific culture, between English-speaking Catholics and English-speaking Protestants, but that the actual disparity is no greater.

Nevertheless, we must not conclude because our ances-

tors did well, did nobly under their circumstances, that we are to be content, under the far more favorable circumstances in which we are placed, with doing no more than they did; we must do for our epoch as well, as nobly as they did for theirs. We are now in the English-speaking world comparatively free and untrammelled in our action, and we must learn to use our freedom,—without misusing it, of course,—and do our best to obliterate from our hearts, and from our manners, all traces of our former servitude. We must feel that we are free men, and refuse for a moment to regard ourselves as an inferior or as an oppressed class. We must study not to appeal to men's pity, but study to command their respect and admiration. To effect what we should aim at, and to acquire the commanding position in the modern world which is our right, we must undoubtedly adapt our system of education, our schools, colleges, and seminaries, more to the wants of the times and the country, and seek more carefully to prepare our youth for the work they have to perform in our new and altered circumstances. Our university must be founded on a larger and more liberal plan, embrace a larger circle of studies, and aim more at intellectual development, at encouraging free, vigorous, and original thought, and at rearing up a class of scholars, well versed not only in our own doctrines and traditions, but like Moses in "all the learning of Egypt," who will be able to compete successfully with the non-Catholic scholars of the age, in their own peculiar province. When the world was Catholic, when the civil authority guarded, or professed to guard, the flock against the wolves from without, and the work of education was simply to promote the personal virtues, and to keep things quiet and as they were, it was, perhaps, not unwise to bring up children in ignorance of error, and to exclude them from all intercourse or acquaintance with its adherents. There was little call in the case of the many for secular learning and science, and the chief thing needed was moral and ascetic discipline. But in our times and country, we English-speaking Catholics are placed in a non-Catholic world, and the faithful should understand that to keep our children out of harm's way, by keeping them in ignorance of the world around them, is impracticable. We cannot do it, except to a very feeble extent, if we would. Neither parental nor sacerdotal authority will suffice for that. We cannot fly danger, and as we cannot fly it, our only safety is in boldly confronting it. We must

arm our children against it, not by ignorance, but by knowledge, by permitting them to learn under our own guidance and direction all that the non-Catholic philosophy, literature, and science are likely to teach them. The graduate of a Catholic college must be not merely an acute and subtile scholastic disputant, not merely an humble, pious, and devout Christian, but he must be also a man, a learned, an intellectually-cultivated man, master, as far as at his years can be expected, of all the learning and science of the age, whom no man out of the church can take by surprise, on any subject. We think, therefore, while our schools, colleges, and universities abate nothing in their ascetic discipline, or their religious training, that they should pay more attention to the secular learning and science of the day. To this end the circle of studies must be enlarged, and the university course prolonged. More attention should be devoted to the development, to the encouragement of free, bold, vigorous thought, and to individuality, and even originality of character. We must give full scope to the reason of the scholar, and not be afraid now and then of a little intellectual eccentricity. Better in our age sometimes to err, providing it is not from an heretical spirit or inclination, than never to think. Nothing is worse for the mind than mere routine, nothing more fatal to all true greatness and intellectual progress than to attempt to mould all minds after one and the same model, and to maintain a certain dead level of intelligence. There is nothing in our religion itself that demands it. Catholicity does not fear, nay, she challenges free thought, and gives to reason full and entire freedom, all the freedom it can have without ceasing to be reason. In the world in which we live it is no less important that our young men should feel their freedom, and be encouraged to use it, than it is that they should feel and discharge their obligations to authority. To suffer them to grow up with the impression that they are as Catholics in mental bondage, that what are to them the most inviting fields of literature and science are prohibited, and that they are doomed to forego the nobler part, so to speak, of their natural manhood, is the worst policy possible, and tends only to drive from our ranks a large proportion of those who by their natural talents are the best fitted to extend and adorn Catholic literature and science.

In these remarks we are not aware that we do more than repeat the convictions of the good fathers who have

the principal charge of our higher schools and colleges, nay, what we are urging seems to us to be only the application to our age and country of the very principle on which the system of education adopted by the Society of Jesus was originally founded. That society arose at a time when the old scholastic system was losing, or had lost its hold on the age, and had found a powerful rival, if not a conqueror, in the humanism of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; and in organizing its schools its aim was, while it retained all that was good and applicable to the age in scholasticism, to surpass the humanists in their own peculiar line. The society did it, rolled back the tide of heresy, gave new life and energy to Catholic learning, and took and kept the lead of European education and of European thought for nearly a century and a half. Since then a new humanism has been developed, and we ask for to-day, only what the Society of Jesus did in the sixteenth century, and what we believe it is doing or preparing to do now as fast as its means and circumstances will permit.*

Closely connected with this subject is another defect of Catholics in this country, less easy to explain and excuse than those we have referred to. *The Rambler* seems to think that a portion of the Catholics in the United Kingdom are less disposed to tolerate free thought and free speech in open questions than they are in the United States, at least this is the construction that *The Dublin Review* puts upon its language; but we are inclined to think the reverse is the fact. In matters of faith or orthodoxy the Catholics in this country are by no means too rigid or too

*It is not our intention in these remarks to cast any reflection on the learning, science, views, or ability of those who have charge of what after the French we may call secondary education. The defective education of our youth is not precisely their fault. It is far more, if not altogether the fault of Catholic parents, who are too insensible, with a few honorable exceptions, to the necessity of that higher education we contend for. The college faculties have to a great extent to educate the children of uneducated parents, and these parents will not leave their sons long enough in the college for them to become scholars in any worthy sense of the word. Boys leave college at an average age of eighteen, at the age they should enter the university, and commence a new course of four or six years. Till parents become more aware of the importance of giving, when they have the means, a more thorough and a more liberal education to their sons, and cease to think they must close their studies at sixteen, eighteen, or even twenty, no modifications of our systems of education, or of the educational staff, will give us the educated and highly-cultivated body of young men the interests of our religion and of our Catholic population demand.

exacting, and saving certain Jansenistic tendencies now and then encountered, we are far enough from being too intolerant; we are liberal enough towards heresy, and none too strenuous in our maintenance of the form of sound words; but in the sphere of opinion, within the sphere where we are all free to hold the opinion we prefer, and to follow our own private judgment, we seem hardly to understand what toleration means; we practise very little of that mutual forbearance, that wise liberality, and that mutual respect and good will which our religion enjoins. Let an honest, upright, sincere Catholic, whose piety and whose orthodoxy are above suspicion, defend in open questions an allowable opinion not in accordance with the opinion of a portion of his brethren, and they open upon him with a hundred mouths, denounce him, misrepresent his opinion or his arguments, appeal to popular prejudice against him, and do their best to ruin him in the estimation of the Catholic public. We suffer ourselves now and then in this respect to run even to shameful lengths; we need specify no instances, for several will readily occur to our readers. Many of us seem not to be aware that we are bound to respect in others that freedom of thought and utterance which we claim for ourselves, or that freedom of opinion is as sacred in them as it is in us. There is nothing more uncatholic than to tyrannize over others in matters of opinion. So long as a man saves orthodoxy, says nothing to weaken dogma, or against morals and discipline, so long as he is within the limits of free discussion allowed by authority, and manifests no heretical spirit or inclination, his honest opinions, honestly uttered as opinions, not as dogmas, are free, and no man has the right to censure him for them, let them be what they may, to denounce them, to seek to render them odious, or to bring popular opinion in any respect to bear against them. They may be controverted, disproved, shown to be unsound, or even dangerous, if they can be, but only by fair discussion on their merits, and by legitimate argument.

Unhappily, this rule is far from being always observed. Judging from what we have seen and experienced since we became a Catholic, this rule is reserved only for special occasions, and in the discussion of matters in which we take no interest. If we have to deal with a strong man, who is to be presumed to understand himself, and to have some skill in fence, not a few of us make it a rule never to dis-

cuss the real question or never to discuss it on its merits. We make up a collateral issue, evade the real point in question, give our readers a false and mutilated view of the opinion advanced, detach a few sentences from their context, and give them a sense wholly unintended and wholly unwarranted, attack a conclusion without hinting at the principle from which it is obtained, and then proceed to refute the opinion we do not like, and which we have shaped in our own way, by arguments addressed not to the reason, but to the ignorance, the prejudice, or the passion of our readers. It would seem that the study is, through the unfair mode of treating the opinion, to damage in the estimation of the public we address, the author, and then through the author, the opinion. We hardly recollect in the nearly thirteen years of our Catholic life an instance in which an able and intelligent Catholic writer has been met by his Catholic opponents with fairness and candor, or his opinion discussed on its merits with courtesy or common civility. Our domestic controversies speak but ill for our civilization, our liberality, and our conscientiousness. Our so-called Catholic press, in regard to our disputes among ourselves, where differences are allowable, stands far below that of any other country, and indicates a lower moral tone, and an inferior intellectual culture. For the honor of American Catholic journalism, and, we must add, for the honor of American converts, several of whom are editors, and those who display the most intolerance, and the least fairness and candor towards their opponents,—we must labor to elevate the character of our journals, demand of them a higher and a more dignified tone, and insist that their conductors devote more time and thought to their preparation, take larger and more comprehensive views of men and things, exhibit more mental cultivation, more liberality of thought and feeling, and give some evidence of the ability of Catholics to lead and advance the civilization of the country. We want the men who conduct our Catholic press to be living men, highly cultivated men, up to the highest level of their age,—men who are filled with the spirit of our holy religion, and will take their rule from the morality, gentleness, courtesy, and chivalry of the Gospel, not from their petty passions, envyings, and jealousies, or from a low and corrupt secular press, that disregards principle, mocks at conscience, seeks only success, and counts success lawful by whatever means obtained.

Our readers will not misunderstand us. We are advocating no tame, weak, or sickly style of Catholic journalism. We ourselves like plain dealing, if honest, and severity even, if it is the severity of reason, not the severity of passion. We respect an honest, downright, earnest style, which tells clearly, energetically, its author's meaning without circumlocution or reticence. We have writers who in their language observe sufficiently the outward forms of politeness, and as far as mere words go are not discourteous, but who yet are highly reprehensible for their intellectual unfairness, for their want of candor and strict honesty in reproducing the doctrine, the real thought, and the arguments of their opponents, and replying to them as they stand in the mind of the author. No smoothness of language, no polish of style, can atone for substantial unfairness of representation or mutilation of an opponent's meaning or argument. The mere manner is a small matter; the substance is the thing to be considered. The American people do not need to be addressed in baby tones; they are not, taken in mass, a refined people, but they are an earnest people, and like plain dealing, and demand of those who would gain their hearts, or their ears, sincerity, truthfulness, honesty, and courage. They cannot endure persiflage, or what they regard as unfairness, evasion, or cowardice on the part of a Catholic writer. Be manly, be true, be brave, be open, be just, and then be as strong, as cogent in your reasoning as you can. We complain of nothing of that sort; but we do complain of the uncandid, unfair, and intolerant manner in which the views and arguments, and even persons of respectable and highly-deserving Catholics, are treated by those of their own brethren who are placed in a position to have more or less influence on the public opinion of the Catholic community.

The intolerance which we complain of, and which seeks to crush an opponent by bringing extrinsic forces to bear against him, and which refuses to discuss the points in dispute on their merits, is the greatest discouragement and hinderance to free, original, and manly thought that can be conceived. It introduces a false standard of judgment, and subjects the thinker or the writer to a test which neither the church nor the state imposes. It tends to make authors and journalists the slaves of popular opinion, to erect popular opinion, which may be only popular ignorance, prejudice, or caprice, into a papacy, or to substitute it for the pope and councils, for the church and her pastors and teachers. It

dwarfs the intellect; it freezes up the well-springs of thought; it prevents one from ever rising above commonplace, and renders him tame and feeble. Every man should always be free to ask, What is true? what is just? what needs to be said? not forced to ask in self-defence, What will be popular? what will people say? or what will gain me a momentary reputation? Great practical questions every day come up which deeply concern the state, and even religion, and in the discussion of which the Catholic publicist must take part if he is to be a man of his age and country, a living man and not a fossil. He must be free to take part and adhere to principle, without any fear of the popular opinion of the North or the South, of the East or the West, of this party or of that. Truth knows no geographical boundaries, and is not determined by sectional lines, nor is it to be subordinated to the petty passions and interests of office-holders or office-seekers.

We have the right to expect Catholics to have a conscience, to be wedded to principle, and prepared to stand by it to the death. When they understand themselves and appreciate the liberty of thought and expression their religion allows, they are never intolerant; and never seek to excite public opinion or bring the force of popular or party prejudice to bear against an honest and intelligent writer, who happens to advance, within the limits of free opinion, something not in accordance with their own convictions. They feel and know that it is their duty to stand by the Catholic publicist, who boldly defends the cause of truth and justice, of religion and humanity, in a straightforward, earnest manner, although he may incidentally suggest thoughts or opinions which they are not as yet prepared to receive. They feel and know that it is theirs to sustain him in the exercise of his lawful freedom, and to shield his reputation from the attacks of ignorance or malice. They may frankly controvert his opinions, if they deem them unsound, but they will do it with argument, with fairness, and candor, without seeking to lessen him in the public estimation, or detract any from his merits as a man and as an author. They must do so, or we shall have few men appear in our ranks with sufficient force of character and strength of mind to serve us in our hour of need, to meet on equal terms the enemies of our cause; or to give a free and healthy development to Catholic literature and science. We must place in our publicists, who prove themselves true men, a generous confidence, and treat them with justice and liberality.

The Rambler has very justly remarked in one of its numbers that in the English-speaking world there is a very general, deep-seated impression that we Catholics, when our religion is in question, lack frankness and courage, and that we are indeed disingenuous, untruthful, and cowardly. That such is the impression is undeniable. We are never supposed to be open and frank; and it is believed that we trim, evade, use mental reservation, in a word practise what they express by the word jesuitry, whenever our religion is in question. No doubt, to some extent, this impression was originated by the cautions and shifts, disguises and reserve to which our ancestors were obliged to resort in the time of persecution in order to escape the terrible penal laws enacted by the Protestant government; but however that may be, or whatever may have been the origin of the impression, it certainly exists, and operates more than any one thing else, to our disadvantage. It prevents us from obtaining a hearing, or if we obtain a hearing, it prevents our expositions and defences of our religion from being received with respect. We are regarded as impeached witnesses, as unworthy of the slightest credit when we speak of our religion. Nothing is more important to us than to remove this damaging impression. We cannot remove it by exclaiming against it, by denying its justice, and asserting by words our own truthfulness and courage. Our words are precisely what is not believed. We can remove it only by deeds, only in showing by our acts that we are frank and truthful, open and courageous; that we shrink from the frank avowal and defence of nothing really pertaining to our religion, or from recognizing and meeting no historical or scientific difficulties alleged against the claims of our church; that there is nothing in history or science, in Catholic ages, nations, or practices, that we would conceal, or are not prepared openly to avow, and so far as Catholic, boldly defend.

Now, we think it cannot be denied that we have not taken, in general, sufficient pains to do this and to clear ourselves of this damning accusation. We have naturally thought that our indignant denial of it should suffice, that we have the right to throw ourselves on the maxim, "Every man is to be accounted innocent till proved guilty." This may do very well for us, but we cannot expect it to satisfy our enemies, who think they have proved us guilty. It must be admitted that there are appearances against us, and that some of us have occasionally indulged in what

The Rambler terms "literary cookery." Some of our writers have notoriously trimmed, like the late Charles Butler, and pared off the features of our religion supposed to be the most offensive to Protestants; that we have in our popular controversies from ignorance or policy passed over historical passages difficult to explain, and by carefully-selected extracts from scientific writers made the scientific tendencies or the results of the scientific investigations of the age, appear more in our favor than they really are. Our popular apologists have, when they could, evaded, or when they could not evade, have met unfairly, and not frankly, the facts in the delicate questions of religious liberty, the inquisition, burning of heretics, and the papal supremacy. No doubt our popular writers have been governed by considerations of prudence, but they forget at times, at least it seems so to us, that what at one time may be truly prudent, at another may be grossly imprudent. In the beginning, the church adopted and for some centuries preserved more or less strictly the *disciplina arcani*, but in our days the discipline of the secret, whether desirable or not, is impracticable. The church has been too long in the world and played too conspicuous a part on its theatre for that. She is a public body, and her history is as open to her enemies as it is to us, and they can read history as well as we. There is no historical fact that can by any effort of ingenuity or malice be twisted to her discredit that is not already known to them, and made the most of against her. When we consider this fact in connection with the impression so widely and damagingly prevalent, that, when we speak of our religion, we are no better than tricksters, liars, and cowards, it seems to us that the only prudent course is that of entire openness, and frankness, which conceals and attempts to conceal nothing. No special pleading we can resort to, no historical cookery possible, no subtile distinctions, and ingenious explanations conceivable, will ever convince the non-Catholic English-speaking world that Gallicanism truly represents the Catholic doctrine as to the power of the pope and the relations between the spiritual and the temporal orders; that the church does not teach, and Catholics are not required to believe, that out of the church there is no salvation; or that the modern doctrine of religious liberty professed by the non-Catholic world, and which is tantamount to religious indifferentism, is Catholic doctrine, or that it has not been condemned by

popes and councils and the practice of the church in all ages. All efforts to this end are so much labor lost, nay, worse than lost; for they tend only to confirm the impression already so strong of our cowardice and unscrupulousness in explaining or defending our religion and its history. The rebukes we received a few years since for our alleged imprudence in publishing our essays on the papacy has persuaded nobody out of the church that we were unorthodox, and has had the effect only of confirming the non-Catholic world in their belief in the lack of frankness, honesty, and courage on the part of Catholics. Mr. Chandler's famous speech in congress on the temporal power of the pope, may have seemed to Catholics an admirable reply to the charges brought by the Know-Nothings against us, but to the non-Catholic world it has seemed only an ingenious perversion of evident historical truth, and a transparent evasion of the real difficulty. The non-Catholic world believe us, not him, for they know that we are truer to the common sense view of history than he is.

We agree precisely with our friends as to the duty of observing prudence, but we differ from some of them as to what in our age and country is prudence. We believe that a bold, fearless, manly, and truthful avowal and defence of our religion in its offensive as well as inoffensive features, is the only legitimate prudence in the world we have to deal with. We believe the only prudent course is to throw ourselves upon the truth, and leave the truth to sustain us. If the facts of history or of science are really against us, we cannot maintain the claims of our church, if we would; and if, though not really against us, they present difficulties that in the present stage of historical and scientific progress we are unable satisfactorily to explain, we lose nothing by frankly avowing the fact. In history we know no such difficulties. In science, in philology, ethnology, and geology, we do find difficulties that we are not ourselves able to explain, on any principles we are acquainted with so that they shall harmonize with Catholic dogmas. These difficulties, however, do not disturb our faith, for it would be extremely illogical to argue against the church from our own ignorance. But they exist in the present state of science, and we gain nothing but a new confirmation of the damaging impression against us by refusing to acknowledge them. We here and everywhere shall do best to be open and courageous, to confide in truth, and to have no fear but the God of truth will sustain us, and give success to his own cause.

The old nursing and safeguard system has ceased to be practicable. We cannot keep from the faithful a knowledge of these difficulties and what our enemies allege against us, if we would. We disguise not from ourselves or from others the dangers to which our children and youth are exposed in this proud, self-reliant, and conceited Anglo-Saxon world. But we must face the danger with brave hearts and manly confidence. The church is comparatively free, and is no longer crippled by having the temporal power for her dry nurse; but she is left without any external support from the state. She is forced, from the nature of the case, to fall back on her own resources as a spiritual kingdom, and make her appeal to reason and will. She can subsist or make progress in this Anglo-Saxon world only as she can convince the reason and win the heart. The only obedience she can count on is a free, intelligent, voluntary obedience, yielded from conviction and love. Such is undeniably the fact, and we should none of us by our reminiscences of a different past be prevented from frankly and loyally accepting it. Our sole reliance under God is in the ability of our church to meet all the demands of intelligence, and to command by her intrinsic excellence the intellect of the age. This being the case, we must give to intellect its free development, and treat it with respect even in its aberrations, though not the aberrations themselves when incompatible with faith or sound doctrine.

We have acknowledged and commented on certain defects which converts, like ourselves, seem to detect in the Catholic population of Great Britain and the United States. And yet these are, after all, not defects that can be predicated of any considerable portion of that population, at least at the present moment. They are defects, moreover, shared by many converts, to as great a degree as by our old Catholics, if not even in a greater degree. They are, however, every day disappearing, and with freedom and the opportunity to give full scope to their Catholic life, the great majority of our Catholic population are assuming that high, manly tone, that open, frank, ingenuous manner, that sense of equality, which becomes them in the presence of their enemies. We would not be understood as having written in a querulous tone, or in a censorious spirit. We have merely wished to give our views on several questions which have been raised in England, with the desire not of finding fault with the past, or of denying that a great improvement has

taken place, but of vindicating for Catholic publicists their rightful position, and of stimulating our brethren to greater improvement hereafter. We have defended converts from what what we have regarded as unjust insinuations, and intended to rebuke the taunts to which they are sometimes subjected; but it has not entered into our thought to place them above old Catholics, or to favor in the remotest degree here or elsewhere a convert party. For ourselves, personally, it is only by an effort that we can bring home to our own mind that we spent upwards of forty years outside of the Catholic communion. We think, feel, and act, according to our knowledge and virtue, as a Catholic, and as nothing else. We find it difficult to draw a line between ourselves and those who have been Catholics from their infancy. Our interests, our affections, and our lot in life are all bound up with this old Catholic body into which, through the grace of God, we have been admitted as one born out of due season. Their faith is our faith, their hopes are our hopes, their God is our God. Whither they go, thither we go with them; where they dwell, there will we dwell. We will recognize no schism between them and us, and it is on them under God we place our reliance for the future of our religion in the English-speaking world. In our own country our hopes rest mainly on the young Catholic generation growing up. We find much in them to deplore, but in every city and considerable town throughout the Union, we find a noble band of Catholic young men, some born here, some born abroad, who seem to us filled with the right spirit, who love their religion, who are not ashamed of it, who are willing to live it, and live for it, and who are able to recommend it to the non-Catholic world, by their high-toned virtues, their simple, unaffected piety, their intelligence, their high sense of honor, and their manly bearing and conduct. May God bless them.

THE ENGLISH SCHISM.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1858.]

This able and interesting historical novel is reprinted from the English edition, and has been ascribed, we know not whether justly or not, to the distinguished author of *Sunday in London*—a convert from Anglicanism, who deserves the thanks of every English-speaking Catholic for the valuable contributions he has made since his conversion, and is still making, to English Catholic literature. But by whomsoever written, *Alice Sherwin* is, so far as we know, the most successful attempt at the genuine historical novel by a Catholic author yet made in our language, and gives goodly promise that in due time, we shall take our proper rank in this department of literature, rendered so popular by the historical romances of Sir Walter Scott. The author has a cultivated mind, a generous and loving spirit, and more than usual knowledge of the play of the passions and the workings of the human heart. He has studied with care and discernment the epoch of Sir Thomas More, or, as we prefer to say, of Henry VIII., and has successfully seized its principal features, its costume and manners, and its general spirit, and paints them in vivid colors, and with a bold and free pencil, though after all with more talent and skill than genius in its highest sense. We miss in him that half unexpressed poetry, that magic of romance, which gives to the Waverly Novels their fascination for readers of all ages, renders each character introduced, not life-like, but living, and fixes in the heart as well as in the memory, each river, lake, burn, hill, or glen, described, and makes it an object of romantic interest and literary pilgrimage. Scott has won the affections of all his readers for his native land, and made every spot touched by his genius hallowed ground. No writer that we are aware of, has done as much for England, and none for Ireland, more abundant than England, one would think, in poetic materials and poetic associations. Gerald Griffin, a true poet, and worthy of Ireland's love

**Alice Sherwin; A Tale of the Days of Sir Thomas More.* By C. J. M. New York: 1858.

and veneration, has indeed spread a halo around the Irish peasant, but he does not, to the stranger, consecrate and render dear and sacred for the affections the soil and scenery of Ireland. We have never been in Scotland; it is the land neither of our ancestors nor of our religion; yet Scott has made us feel towards it almost as we do towards our own native land, and turn fondly to her hills and glens as we do to those with which we were so familiar in our childhood's home, and which we carry with us however far from that home we may travel. No English writer makes us feel the same towards England, though it was the land of our ancestors, and through them we share in her old chivalry, brave deeds, and glorious achievements. Her language and literature are ours, and we are not without admiration for her bold and adventurous spirit, her brave and energetic character, and the many noble and generous qualities of her heart; and yet to us she is, after all, prosaic, matter-of-fact, and her poets with their nearly idolatrous worship of nature and natural scenery fail to render her soil poetic, classic ground. The only spots that are so to us, are those consecrated by her naïve old ballads, or those touched by the wand of "the wizard of the North."

Alice Sherwin, true, beautiful, and rich as it is, is to us more of a prose composition than a poem, and is to be judged in the main as a work of talent, learning, and industry; not that the author lacks either fancy or imagination; not that his work has no true poetic interest; but the thought and the imagination, the history and the fiction, are rather placed in juxtaposition or mixed up together, than chemically amalgamated. The work in the mind of the reader is not a uniform whole, and lacks, at least for us, unity of interest. It contains a beautiful and well-developed love story, but they who read, as we did, for that, are likely to skip the history and the graver matters introduced, and they who read for the history and the graver matters are likely to skip the love story. We very soon became interested in the destined lovers Aubrey and Alice, and we felt that whatever was not immediately related to them and their fortunes was impertinent, an intrusion, however true, just, or important in itself. Instead of our interest in them preparing us to take an interest in the graver matters described or discussed, it made us regard these matters as the entrance of a stranger to disturb the delicious *tête-à-tête* of two young lovers in the first flush of their love. What to them, all absorbed in

their fresh young love, all in all to each other, and what to us who are not ashamed to sympathize with them, are the cardinal, the king, Sir Thomas More, priests and friars, the affairs of state, or of the church, the upheavings of the world itself? The monk who is welcome is Father Houghton, who wrests the upraised dagger from the false knight, and saves Aubrey from an inopportune death. That was a good monk, a brave heart and a stalwart arm had he. We love Aubrey and Alice from the first. They are two noble and beautiful creations, and make us half qualify the remark, that the author writes with talent rather than with genius, and prove that he is, at least, not without genius. But he concentrates the interest which readers like us feel too strongly in them, or rather does not sufficiently blend it with the interest we know we ought to take in the grave historical characters and events introduced, and which raise the work above a mere tale of domestic affection, and give it its high character and importance. The two interests are distinct, do not grow one out of the other, or run one into the other, but sometimes interfere with each other—an objection, by the way, we make also to *The Last of the Barons*, and which proves that its distinguished author, with all his versatile talent and genius, is not perfectly at home in the historical novel. It is one thing to mix up a love story with grave historical, political, or religious events, and another to make the interest of the one blend in with and enhance the interest of the other. They who cannot make the two interests one in effect should subordinate one of them to the other. Yet though *Alice Sherwin*, judging from the effect its perusal produced on us, is faulty in this respect, it is not peculiarly so, or so much so as most historical novels.

But leaving *Alice Sherwin* as a romance, and turning to it as a grave work, for such it is, on the scenes, events, personages, and passions most noteworthy in England at the epoch of the schism, or rather just preceding its full consummation, we cannot easily speak of it in too high terms. It is deeply interesting, and possesses rare historical value. There is no work in our language, that we have seen, which within so brief a compass gives the general reader so clear an insight into the characters, passions, and events of the religious revolution which then took place in England, or which, upon the whole, offers so just an appreciation of the principal actors who favored it, and of the noble-minded and leal-hearted men and women who

willingly sacrificed themselves on the altar of truth and virtue to avert it. The real history of the so-called Protestant reformation has never yet been written, and we have no expectation that it ever will be. Its causes were many and often widely divergent, and its chief promoters acted from mixed motives, and from very different motives at different stages in their career. The author has to a certain extent introduced us behind the scenes, and given us partial glimpses of the state of society in which it took place, and of the secret passions and motives which produced it. He has read much on the subject, and knows better than most writers its real history, but we think there are deeper views than he takes, that need to be taken, if we would really comprehend the movement. Our Catholic writers generally, as well as our author, ascribe, in our judgment, too much influence to Henry's divorce case. We look upon that, as we have often stated, as the occasion rather than the cause of the schism with the Holy See. We certainly have no sympathy with Henry, but we cannot deny that he was the most intellectual, cultivated, and theologically learned temporal sovereign of his time; he had a clear mind, strong convictions, and an indomitable will, combined with qualities that made him loved as a man by such men as Cardinal Wolsey and Sir Thomas More; and however absorbing his love of pleasure or violent and stormy his passions, we do not believe he was a man to take so important a step as separating his kingdom from Rome, unless it had the approval of his cooler judgment and maturer deliberation. They might hasten or retard the execution of his resolution, but could not have been the governing motives of its formation.

That Henry had become weary of Katherine, grown old and infirm, and wished to be released from her, so that he might marry another, especially after having felt the fascination of the wit and beauty of Anne Boleyn, we do not deny; but we have no sufficient reason to assert that the conscientious scruples he alleged as to his marriage with his brother's widow were all a hypocritical pretext. There was for him, a king, who allowed himself great latitude, no cogent reason for having his marriage with Katherine annulled in order to solace his unlawful passion for his mistress, any thing but remarkable for her cold and rigid virtue, and whom he himself sent after a brief period to the block for her infidelity. Henry's marriage with Katherine,

Arthur's widow, was unlawful and invalid without the papal dispensation, by the laws of the church and of the state. Both before and after the schism, Henry professed to believe in the Catholic Church, and was in faith, sincerely, we doubt not, as much of a Catholic as one can be who rejects the papacy and refuses to obey the pope. Undoubtedly not to hold the pope to be the vicar of Christ, and visible head, by divine institution, of the church on earth, is to have no Catholic faith at all; but so it would seem held not and never had held Henry, and so held not his courtiers, the parliament, and the chief men of his kingdom. Undoubtedly in his book against Luther, in defence of the seven sacraments, for which the pope conceded him the title of Defender of the Faith, he uses strong expressions, too strong for Sir Thomas More, in favor of the papacy; but he takes very good care not to commit himself to the essentially papal constitution of the church, or to the doctrine that the pope holds his authority by divine right. He recognizes the pope as head of the church, but most probably held that he was so only by human right, and therefore might be displaced by a sovereign in his own realm, without breaking the integrity of the church or impairing her faculties. In such case a papal dispensation could have no force, save when a dispensation from a mere papal regulation, in *foro conscientiæ*. It would not, then, be sufficient to authorize his marriage with Katherine, supposing her previous marriage with his brother Arthur had been consummated.

Henry comprehended better than most of his contemporaries, the reach of the great movements then in progress on the continent, and not unfelt in his own kingdom. To him, without firm faith in its divine institution, the papacy must have appeared as on the eve of being abolished throughout Christendom. The age was profoundly anti-papal. The sovereigns, princes, and nobility of the time hardly believed in God, far less in the papacy. As far as directed solely against the pope, they even favored Luther's movement. The Emperor Maximilian had written to the elector of Saxony, to take heed that no harm came to Luther, for they might have occasion to use him against Rome. Charles V. respected the papacy only so far as he could make it subserve his political interests, and Francis I., who brought the Turks against the emperor in Hungary, Italy, and Spain, was ready to support the pope against

Charles, or to league himself with Henry against the papacy. All the states of Europe seem to have lost sight of the spiritual character of the pope, and to have looked upon him only as a temporal prince in possession of vast ecclesiastical power which he could bring to bear in their favor or against them, as he pleased. Henry might well believe the anti-papal policy would prevail in the conflict of nations and of parties, and papal dispensations come to be counted for nothing. In such case, the legitimacy of his daughter Mary, which the French ambassador had already affected to doubt, might be questioned, and grave disputes arise as to the succession, accompanied by a civil war perhaps as disastrous as that which was hardly closed between York and Lancaster. It is not necessary then, if we take Henry's point of view, to maintain absolutely that his alleged scruples and reasons were simply hypocritical, suggested solely by his unlawful passion for Anne Boleyn. There is no need of painting the devil blacker than he is, and Henry should have the benefit of every reasonable doubt. Even bad men may on some subjects have honest scruples, and we should remember that the Catholic cause gains nothing by representing its enemies as worse than they really were. Henry was surrounded by men far his inferiors, and whether friends or enemies, though they might state facts, they were quite inadequate to interpret his motives or his character, and we confess we have little respect for their opinions.

The common theory on the subject is, that Henry till drawn away from his faith and his God, by that "strange woman," Anne Boleyn, was a firm papist, and a loyal servant of the pope. This theory makes the English schism a very pretty romance, and one which may be read without the trouble of thinking. We do not deny the fiery and passionate nature of Henry, we do not deny the influence of an unlawful passion,—all the more powerful because unlawful in a man of his temperament, but we cannot accept the romance for history. Politics, when France was seeking to possess herself of Italy, had made Henry the ally of the pope, as they have his successors even in our own day, and continued to make him so, till the moves on the political chess-board had changed the position of parties, and placed him on the side of France, in opposition to the emperor, whose aunt he had espoused. When France was at war with the pope, for Italy, Henry joined the league

against the French king, and invaded his kingdom, evidently hoping to make himself its real as well as its titular king. This was his ambition, and as long as he had any prospect of gratifying it, he remained the ally of the pope. But this ambition was viewed with no favor by Charles V., into whose hands by the fortune of war the French king had fallen. Charles defeated Henry's ambition by liberating, on comparatively moderate terms, his prisoner, and permitting him to return and defend his kingdom. This made Henry, stirred on no doubt by Wolsey, who had his own private grievances against Charles, the enemy of the emperor, and the ally of Francis, against him. When the emperor and the pope became reconciled and agreed in the same line of policy, it made him the enemy of the pope. But this alliance with the pope was one of political, not religious interests; and we have no reason to suppose that Henry in forming it was governed by other motives than his successors have been in their alliances with the Grand Turk. In the wars growing out of the French revolution, we saw England and Russia on the side of the pope, and it was by the aid of England and Russia, against the nominally Catholic powers of France and Austria, that Consalvi, in the Congress of Vienna, succeeded in obtaining the restoration and guaranty of the temporal estates of the pope. Yet these are the two great anti-papal states of the modern world. Nothing can, therefore, be concluded from the fact that Henry supported at one time the papal politics, while they coincided with his own, in favor of his attachment to the papacy, or in favor of his belief in the essentially papal constitution of the church. The alterations made by his own hand in his coronation oath immediately after having taken it, explanatory of the sense in which he had taken it, afford conclusive evidence that on his ascending the throne he was no papist, and that his convictions were in substance the same that he avowed after the schism. Even then he placed the royal dignity above the papal, and subordinated the exercise of the papal prerogatives to the civil laws and customs of his kingdom. Our view of the matter is that Henry's convictions, although they may have been more fully developed in process of time and by the course of events, underwent no substantial change from his coronation to the day of his death, that neither before nor after the schism was he a true, loyal papist. We place no reliance on what is told us of the new views opened up to him

by Cranmer and Cromwell. Henry had scarcely his superior in theological knowledge in his kingdom, and he was vain of that knowledge and fond of showing it. He may have flattered as well as used Cranmer and Cromwell as his instruments, but he would never have suffered them to be his masters or his teachers. With this view of his case, the pretty romance disappears, and the divorce question is important only in its bearings on his relation with the emperor and his alliance with Francis I. There is no reason to suppose that had Clement VII. without any hesitation declared the dispensation obtained from Julius II. insufficient in consequence of some informality or a false assumption of facts, annulled his marriage with Katherine, and granted him full permission to marry again, whether Anne Boleyn or any other lady he preferred, that it would have retained Henry in his obedience, that it would have materially changed the result, or even delayed the march of events.

While Henry was the ally of the pope and had favors to ask of him, he no doubt did not contemplate breaking with the papal authority. He then could and did address the Holy Father in respectful and suitable terms, and we presume, if there had been no change in his politics, and if it had not been for the strong anti-papal movements going on especially in Germany, he might have lived and died as good a Catholic as his unamiable and miserly father, Henry Tudor. These things directed his attention to the subject, and afforded him the opportunity of declaring formally his kingdom independent of the see of Rome, and of withdrawing his clergy from the papal jurisdiction. In fact, Henry in doing this did far less than is commonly supposed. He in reality only followed out what long had been the policy of the English government, of the lords and commons, as well as the monarch. The civil authority had long before Henry, virtually, if not indeed formally, rejected the papacy, and separated the church in England from the chair of Peter. When Henry ascended the English throne, as a writer of a series of masterly articles in the *Dublin Review* seems to us to have fully proved, the pope could not, as far as the civil law went, exercise one particle even of ecclesiastical power in the realm without the royal license. No papal legate could be received or exercise his functions, no appeals could be made to the papal courts, no communication by bishop or priest could be held with Rome

without the license of the king. The constitutions of Clarendon, held always to be in force by the government and crown lawyers, and the terrible statute of *præmunire*, made the church in England virtually as independent of the papal authority and as dependent on the temporal power as is the present Anglican establishment. Henry really did nothing, so far as we have been able to discover, that transcended the constitution and laws of his kingdom, as he found them on his accession to the throne. In substance, all he did was to withhold the royal license where he had a legal right to withhold it, and to embody in a declaratory act what was already and long had been the civil law of England as understood by England herself; he claimed or exercised no power, at least in principle, that had not been claimed and exercised by his predecessors, with comparatively few exceptions from the Norman conquest, and from Edward III. with the consent or acquiescence of all orders in the state. It would be well for those who pretend that the church in the middle ages held all civil governments in tutelage, and had every thing her own way, to study with a little more care the civil legislation of the period. They will find that as modern nations were formed and developed themselves, their constant struggle was to destroy the legal rights and independence of the church in their respective dominions, and to make the exercise of the papal power dependent on the royal or imperial license. Legislation, wherever there was a legislature, was profoundly anti-papal, and the most so in the states which were freest, or in which the power of the monarch was the most restricted,—a fact which no doubt is the reason why so many European Catholics are still so favorable to monarchy, and so opposed to parliamentary government. We have no right therefore to throw the whole blame of the English schism on Henry, who only carried out the policy of his predecessors and the English parliament, at least from Edward III. Though of Welsh and therefore Celtic descent, Henry was the best type of the modern English character we have found, and say what we will, "bluff King Harry" is still a special favorite with the genuine Englishman. His insisting on observing the forms of law in divorcing, condemning, and executing one wife before marrying another, is in strict accordance with the English respect for legal order. Not improperly has he been called "Henry the Wife-Slayer," but he took good care always to slay his wives by the hand of the public

executioner. It is the English custom to do, through courts of justice and under form of law, what in other countries, if done at all, is usually done by open violence, secret poisonings, or private assassins. England seldom fails to find, or to make, a law to her purpose, or to obtain a court and jury prepared to rid her of an individual whose removal she desires. It is the advantage of self-government.

The dispute occasioned by the demand of his divorce from Katherine, the political complications of the time, and the anti-papal movements in progress on the continent brought matters to a crisis, and afforded Henry the opportunity to give the *coup de grâce* to the anti-papal policy long adopted and steadily pursued by the English government; but they did not, in our judgment, change his convictions, or convert him from a sound papist to a devout Anglican. Our theory is that he simply seized upon the occasion to carry out his convictions, and to place himself and his kingdom openly and avowedly, in the attitude demanded by the civil constitution and laws of England as they already existed. The success with which he did it, with which he openly excluded the pope from England and appropriated the functions of the papacy to the crown, proves his great personal popularity and influence; but it proves still more strikingly the low state to which the papacy had fallen in the convictions and affections of the English people. The usual theory among English and even continental Catholic writers is, that the English schism—we say schism, because during Henry's lifetime, the movement went hardly beyond—was effected by the king and court against the convictions and wishes of the great body of the nation. We have found no evidence of this. The parliament, lords and commons, the more active, energetic, and influential portion of the people supported the king with alacrity, and would, apparently, have gone much further than he was willing to go, had he not restrained them. Left to themselves, the great mass of the people, no doubt, would have vegetated, as their fathers had done, in nominal communion with Rome, for the mass of the people usually, when left to their own course, pursue the old beaten track, rumble on in the old ruts, from generation to generation. We have ourselves seen among the *habitants* in Canada, oxen at work, with the yoke placed in front of the head, and fastened to the horns. It is only recently that the mass of the population of any country has begun to live an intellectual life, or to have any thoughts or

aspirations of their own. The great body of the thinking, active, representative people of England went with Henry, and the English nation, as a nation, not he alone, must be held responsible for the schism and consequent heresy. The movement, as far as Henry carried it, was a national movement, if ever a national movement there was; no order or representative body in the state or kingdom offered it any serious opposition. The primate, Wareham, archbishop of Canterbury, and even Fisher, bishop of Rochester, as far as we can discover, assented in convocation to the declaration of the royal supremacy, which Henry obtained from the clergy, with the cowardly and practically unmeaning salvo, "as far as the laws of Christ allow." The only voice we hear in convocation protesting against declaring with that salvo the king the supreme visible head of the church within the realm, was that of Tunstall, bishop of Durham. We hope Fisher was not present in convocation. If he was, and made no protest, his death a short time afterwards, by order of the king, must be regarded as an expiation, as well as a martyrdom. The conduct of the great body of the bishops and clergy during the whole struggle, is fearfully instructive as to the profoundly anti-papal character of England at the time, and bears unimpeachable testimony to the false, or defective theological teaching which must have for a long time been current in the kingdom. Neither king, nor parliament, neither lords nor commons, neither the clergy nor the people, regarded themselves in separating from the pope as separating from the Catholic Church, or as abandoning any substantive portion of the Catholic faith. Give all the play you will to the base passions of individuals, to pride, ambition, covetousness, bribery, corruption, there remains still the fact of a whole nation separating from the pope, and yet believing itself not separated from unity, or ceasing to be Catholic, to be accounted for, and which you can account for only by assuming that the faithful did not generally believe in the essentially papal constitution of the church. A thousand Cranmers and Cromwells, armed with all the force of law, and power of the state, could never have separated a nation from the papal authority without the people believing they had separated from the Catholic Church, if they had been taught to hold that the church and the papacy are inseparable and indistinguishable. All the clergy who adhered to Henry were not cowards, cringing slaves, base time-servers, ready to dis-

avow their honest convictions, at the summons of the king and parliament. There were in England, as well as elsewhere, brave men, men of learning, strong convictions, and honorable character, who adhered to the so-called reformation, and gave it a prestige in the eyes of the world. We gain nothing by painting them all as moral monsters, for we must remember that they had all been baptized and brought up, nominally at least, in the Catholic communion.

The Protestant movement in Germany, and with which Henry's schismatical movement coalesced in the succeeding reign, owes its origin, as we have more than once endeavored to prove, not solely to the personal depravity of the actors, not to the abuses prevalent in the church, not to the general relaxation of manners and morals, or even the scandalous lives of ecclesiastics, whether dignified or undignified —for these were nowhere worse than in Italy, and Italy remained papal—but to the growing influence of monarchical centralism, to the development of distinct nationalities, and their reaction against the cosmopolitan tendency of the papal unity, and to the fact that public opinion at the opening of the sixteenth century was profoundly anti-papal. It is evident to the student of history, that for whatever reason, the guardians of the faith had failed, for more than one generation, to instruct the faithful, as they should be instructed, with regard to the true place, office, and position of the papacy in the kingdom of Christ, and had suffered them to grow up with the error,—not reduced to a formula, and only vaguely floating in the mind, we grant,—that the church in her essential constitution is episcopal, or presbyterian, rather than papal. No doubt they taught coldly and formally, that the pope is the visible head of the church, and to be obeyed as such; but they failed to make them see and understand that the church is *essentially* papal, and that without the papacy the church as Christ founded it is inconceivable. The people saw and understood little of the papacy, save in its political relations with their princes, who generally held it to be constituted only by human right. They saw their princes almost always in quarrel with the pope, when not waging open war against him, and heard them constantly complaining of his bad faith, his ambition, his arrogance, and his usurpations. How were the people, though coldly and formally taught that the pope is the visible head of the church, to have a proper appreciation of the papacy, or to preserve for the Holy Father the love and reverence due to

his character, when they continually heard him denounced by their princes, and were much more carefully taught to be loyal to the prince than they were to be obedient to the sovereign pontiff; or when they saw, as they usually did, their own bishops and clergy sustaining their temporal prince, blessing the arms of his soldiers, and offering up prayers for his success in open war against the pope? When they saw their own bishops and clergy bearing all the arms their state admitted against the sovereign pontiff, how could they regard him, as under God, the source of all ecclesiastical authority, and essential not only to the order, but to the very being of the church?

Incalculable as have been the evils of the Protestant movement, this good has resulted from it, that the pope has, in a measure, been liberated from those political relations and complications which, for so long a time, made the faithful almost lose sight of his sacred character as the head of the spiritual society founded by our Lord, and that the faithful have been brought nearer the Holy Father, and more explicitly taught that to be Catholics they must be papists, that our Lord founded his church on Peter, and that Peter lives, teaches, and governs in his successors in the see of Rome. The early popes nearly all suffered martyrdom, and in every age the papacy is the first and the last object of attack by the enemies of the church. Unhappily, too, the papacy is precisely the point on which weak, timid, and worldly-minded Catholics, wise, prudent, and safe men as they esteem themselves, are the most yielding, and the most ready to make concessions which only embarrass the Holy See, and weaken our lines of defence. Without the pope there is no Catholic Church, without the Catholic Church there is no Christian religion, and without the Christian religion there is no redemption, no remission of sins, no salvation, no eternal beatitude. All rests on Peter, and Peter rests on Christ, the alpha and the omega, the beginning and the end, perfect God and perfect man. What greater folly or madness then, than to suffer the very foundation to be undermined, and to busy ourselves, while the sappers and miners are at work, with simply protecting the ornaments and decorations of the temple? Defend successfully the pope, and you successfully defend all; lose the pope, and you lose all. The whole history of the church proves that the only effectual way to defend truth and unity against heresy and schism is, to guard and defend the chair of

Peter. The life-seat of the church is there. There is the heart which receives and circulates the life-current through even the extremities. That once broken, that once hindered from performing its functions, death follows, the church is a lifeless mass, a putrid corpse, and the sooner it is buried from the sight, the better. *Ubi Petrus, ibi Ecclesia*, is not a mere rhetorical flourish, but simple, sober truth. How, then, is it possible to have patience, if we may so speak, with those episcopalian, presbyterian, or Erastian Catholics, who shriek out with alarm whenever the prerogatives of Peter are strongly and boldly asserted, who shrink aghast at the appellation of ultramontane, as if to agree with Rome were to upset Christ's kingdom, and who seek in every conceivable way, and by all manner of subtile distinctions, without absolutely denying the faith, to explain away the rights of the Holy See, and to thwart the pope in the just exercise of his legitimate powers? On the papacy, if anywhere, there should be true firmness, heroic courage, no compromise, no concession, no hesitation, no quailing, even though opposed by all the craft of politicians, all the wrath of kings, and all the rage of hell.

Yet it is on this point that the instruction of the faithful seems to us the most defective, and the most striking want we detect among them is a hearty, unswerving love and devotion to the Holy Father. We find many who can throw up their caps and shout *Evviva Pio Nono!* who can never be induced to shout *Evviva il Santo Padre!* We know not Pio Nono, but we do know, love, honor, venerate, and, we hope, are prepared to die for *il Santo Padre*. In his voice we hear the voice of God speaking to us through his vicar on earth. We may highly esteem the man for his personal virtues, but it is the pope, not the man, we venerate and obey. To us it seems the only effectual way to guard against heresy and schism is to have the great body of the faithful believe and understand that the church is essentially papal, that to teach and govern in Christ's kingdom are apostolic functions, that the apostolate remains in the successor of Peter alone, and that all who have authority to do either derive it from God though him. Louis XIV. said *L'état, c'est moi;* in a far higher and truer sense, when he speaks as the vicar of Christ, may the pope without pride or arrogance, say *L'église, c'est moi*, for the church is the body of Christ, even in some sense, Christ himself. Once thoroughly instructed on this point, no Catholic can be se-

duced into schism through ignorance, and whoever becomes a schismatic, must become one with his eyes open, deliberately, from malice aforethought, and till prepared for schism, no one can ever become a formal heretic. This is wherefore, in season and out of season, we so earnestly insist on the papal constitution of the church.

The author of *Alice Sherwin* takes, upon the whole, a favorable view of Henry's minister, Cardinal Wolsey, and, for the most part, defends him. There may have been worse men than Wolsey, who have worn the purple, but we think the church could hardly have had a worse representative in England at the time. We reject the infamous charges preferred against him after his disgrace, though subscribed by Sir Thomas More, and we think not unfavorably of his deportment and sentiments after his fall, though we should respect him more, if he had felt the loss of the king's favor less keenly, and had more distinctly remembered that he was still archbishop of York, and a cardinal of the holy Roman church. Wolsey was a vain, ambitious worldly-minded, unscrupulous man, precisely one of those men who bring discredit on churchmen, and tend to alienate the affections of serious and simple minds from the church. He was magnificent, a lover of the arts, and a liberal patron of learning and the learned. He was a skilful and in general a successful diplomatist, an able minister, and a passable lord high chancellor; but he was a crafty politican rather than a great statesman, and carried out in all its perfection the policy set forth and commended by Machiavelli in his *Il Principe*, and which the moral sense of the world repudiates. As a churchman, and as the papal legate, he forgot the interests of religion, subordinated the interests of the church to those of the kingdom, and used her revenues to aggrandize himself and his prince. He did more to shake the stability of the church in England than the worst of his contemporaries. Katherine believed to the last, that it was he who first suggested to Henry the project of a divorce, and it is certain that he favored Henry's divorce from Katherine, though not his marriage with the giddy daughter of a Norfolk squire. It coincided with his policy of detaching Henry from his alliance with the emperor, and forming an alliance with the French king. It is precisely at this period, when the French ambassador raises a doubt as to the legitimacy of the princess Mary, moved thereto not improbably by Wolsey, that we first hear of Henry's scruples.

The political complications, as they are now called in diplomatic language, which led to the open rupture of Henry with the pope, were of Wolsey's formation, though whether of his own motion, or under the instructions of Henry, we are not able to decide.

However skilful as a diplomatist, able as a politician, or great as an administrator, Wolsey was not a great man, and is but a dwarf by the side of the great Spaniard, Cardinal Ximenes, archbishop of Toledo and regent of Spain, the only prelate and statesman of the time who seems to have appreciated the significance of the Protestant movement, and taken effective measures to counteract it. Wolsey comprehended nothing of that movement, and intrigued, by means that proved him wholly unfit for the elevation he aspired to, to be raised to the papal throne, when, if he had been a great man, he would have seen that the papacy was already engaged in the most terrible struggle that it had ever encountered, and that the most fearful revolution of the modern world was already in progress. Till he lost the king's favor, he was devoted to the king, and though a prince of the church, studied only to advance the interests of his temporal sovereign, and through him his own. He was for the king against the pope, unless he could be made pope himself. Henry he regarded as his master, and was ready to serve him in any thing, if, at the same time, he could serve himself. That he never really lost his faith, his conduct after his fall sufficiently proves, but though aspiring to the tiara, he evidently was but a sorry papist, and regarded the pope, though wielding immense ecclesiastical power and patronage, very much in the light of a temporal sovereign. Even after his fall and repentance, even in his dying confession, we have no expression of filial love and reverence for the Holy Father, and so far as the papacy is concerned, we recollect no word that might not have entered into the dying confession of any Protestant archbishop of York, or of Canterbury.

The author calls his book a *Tale of the days of Sir Thomas More*, and of course regards that eminent man as his hero. Sir Thomas More enjoyed during his lifetime a great reputation, both in England and on the continent, as a scholar, a poet, a wit, and a humorist, and he is generally held in high esteem by Catholics and Protestants. The author appears to regard him as a model statesman, a model man and a model Christian. We are sorry not to be able

in all respects to agree with him, for Sir Thomas More's death was that of a true Christian hero, since he suffered by order of the king his master because he would not violate his faith and conscience by taking an oath in which was asserted the royal supremacy. He was not ignorant of Catholic doctrine, but though he lacked not the light of faith, his conduct was not always in accordance with Christian morals. He was, as Cesare Cantù has well said, "a mixed man; full of light in his writings, but not so moral in his practice, sacrificing his probity to his greed of honors and emolument, and approving arbitrary acts, till his conscience was alarmed by attacks on his faith." He appears to have held by the constitutions of Clarendon and to have offered no opposition to the statute of *præmunire*, as he was willing to accept and retain office when the king was enforcing it. He had been brought forward and protected by the cardinal, yet he intrigued against him, accepted his place, and subscribed the charges against him, knowing them to be false and malicious. He accepted the office of lord high chancellor, knowing the relation of the king with Anne Boleyn, and having a full knowledge of the designs as well as of the temper and character of Henry. He held his place not long indeed, but till he saw he would be permitted to hold it no longer, and then resigned it on a false pretence. He was the intimate friend of Erasmus, and without intending harm to religion, was associated with that band of wits, humanists, as they were called, who by their raillery of the monks and the schools and preceding ages, did not a little to prepare the way for the religious revolution which followed. His *Utopia* is as little Christian as the *Republic* of Plato, and runs religious liberty into religious indifference, and indicates that when it was written the author thought little of his faith and less of his church. Up to the last, whatever may have been his conversations with "Son Roper," or his sad forebodings, he was far from comprehending the revolution in progress, and understood little of its real causes, and less of the means of arresting it. However, it is hardly fair, save when he is held up as the ideal of a Catholic and a statesman, to make it a fault in him that he was not wiser than his contemporaries, or to condemn him severely for having shared the faults of his age.

Sir Thomas More and Cardinal Fisher were both beheaded, really, whatever the pretences may have been,

for refusing to recognize, unqualifiedly, the king under God as supreme within his realm in all matters spiritual as well as temporal, and for that we must hold their memories in lasting honor. Whether Fisher was present in convocation and assented to the qualified declaration of the royal supremacy obtained from the bishops and clergy under the terrors of *præmunire*, the historians we have consulted do not tell us. We would believe he was not, for we should like to regard him as a martyr. But we cannot, after all, regard Sir Thomas More as having been a true papist. It is said that when Henry read him his book against Luther, he objected to its strong language in favor of the papacy, and pointed out to Henry the inconvenience that might arise from it in case they should ever be at war with the pope as temporal prince. We have no reason to believe that he disapproved of the anti-papal constitution and laws of England, and his conscience seems to have taken alarm less at the restriction on the papal authority than at the assertion of the supremacy of the king, for he was a parliament man rather than a king's man. Yet his death was for the truth; if in part expiatory of past laxness, it nevertheless was glorious, and sufficient to redeem a far worse life than any one can pretend his was.

We are struck in reading the lives of those who under Henry's daughter Elizabeth, and later sovereigns, suffered for their religion in England, to see how few, unloving, and cold were their expressions of devotion to the Holy Father. They were executed, murdered, we should like to say martyred, for their adhesion to the pope against the king, and yet their expressions of loyalty are warmer and more frequent than their expressions of affection for the papacy. Even to this day English Catholics seem to regard the church as episcopal rather than papal, and to concede with a sort of reluctance the papal supremacy. To admit the papal prerogatives seems to cost them a severe struggle with their pride and personal independence as Englishmen, and it would seem that they rarely yield the Holy Father a loving and ungrudging submission. High-toned papal doctrines are rarely palatable to English Catholics. Nevertheless, we are not aware that they need in this respect to be singled out from the Catholics of other countries, while in many other respects they deserve at the present day to be regarded as a model Catholic people. We only wish that we on this side of the water were equal to them. Let them,

however, never forget that they owe their conversion from heathenism and their civilization to the intervention of the pope in their behalf, and that it is only by their open and manly avowal of papal doctrines, and their affectionate devotion to the Holy Father, that their non-Catholic countrymen can be recalled to unity, and England once more rejoice in that faith which before the Norman conquest made her glory, and gave her the title of "Island of Saints."

In studying the history of the Protestant movement, we are well-nigh startled by the profound indifference to it or gross misconception of its magnitude and importance shown even by the highest chiefs of the spiritual society, and by the most eminent statesmen, diplomatists, scholars and philosophers, who remained, after all, faithful to the Catholic Church. It seems to have been comprehended by nobody, neither by its projectors, nor by its Catholic opponents. Leo X. regarded it in its origin as a local and temporary quarrel between some German monks, and rather admired the genius, the wit, and the spirit displayed by Luther in his writings. This fact proves how completely the creatures of routine the best of us are, how few in any age think or reason out of the grooves prepared for thought, how little in any sudden emergency what we learn in schools and from books can serve us, and how little we can profit by any experience but our own. All education presupposes and prepares us only for a fixed state of things, a regular and uniform order. The best professors can educate only for what is, never for what, though it may be, has not yet come. The new must prepare its own chiefs. The winds rise, the waves roll, the tempest rages. Our Lord is asleep in Peter's bark, and no one can rebuke the tempest, and say to the winds and the waves, "Peace, be still," and be obeyed. Nothing better proves the divine origin and support of the church than her living through the storms of the Protestant reformation. Human foresight, human wisdom, human sagacity, human strength, human energy, human courage, failed; the bark is tempest-tossed, and the sea opens to ingulf it. The pilot for the moment forgets himself; the crew are mutinous, or paralyzed with fear. The Lord awakes, calls to him that wounded Spanish soldier, Ignatius Loyola, and prepares him and his associates for the new work to be done. Then, but not till then, do we see real, living men, such men as it

gladdens and encourages us to see, step forth and take their stand on the side of truth, and offer its enemies the challenge of battle. Till then truth had for her champions only cunning diplomatists, wily politicians, subtle schoolmen, imbecile scholars in worn-out and cumbrous armor, who were practically, before the energetic captains of the new movement, as chaff before the wind. But then the hosts of error were confronted with bold and determined men; their advance was stayed, and they were compelled to recoil in confusion upon themselves. The tempest was rebuked, the winds and the waves were stilled, and with the Council of Trent "there came a great calm." It is not in human wisdom to prepare fully beforehand men who can effectually serve us in the beginning of such a movement.

It is far from our thought that in these remarks we are offering any thing in opposition to the author, or suggesting any thing that he will not accept. We do not suppose that we differ from him unless it be in extending our views a little further than those he expresses. Our purpose is not to show that we have a better understanding of the Protestant movement than he has, but to draw from it a great practical lesson, the importance of which it is impossible to overrate. We have our theory of the movement,—inadequate not unlikely,—and we ascribe the real cause of that movement to the failure of the pastors of the church, very extensively, to insist in their primary instructions to their flocks, on the *essentially* papal constitution of the church. They may have taught with sufficient distinctness that the pope is at the summit of the hierarchy, but they did not with sufficient distinctness that he is also at its basis, is its foundation, the rock on which the whole church rests. The theories in regard to the papacy of Marsilius of Padua and John of Jandun, as well as others, very generally held by the princes, courtiers, and jurisconsults, were suffered to prevail, not in the schools, not in the formal teaching of the church, but in the popular mind, and to become to a fearful extent the public opinion of the Christian world. These theories still float in the minds of many Catholics, in a vague and unfixed form, indeed, but still float there, the germs of schism, ready to be developed when the occasion comes. Our aim has been to assert against them, and enforce by the terrible example of the reformation, the real papal doctrine of the church.

The faithful priests, monks, and nuns who suffered for their faith, the author introduces, are historical, and their characters and acts are described with a graphic pen and a loving spirit. The portions of the volume devoted to these, though perhaps a little episodical, are its brightest gems, and those which do the author the most credit, and will endear his work to the heart of every Catholic. The author has shown in this as well as in other parts of his work, not only great power, but much discrimination and taste. He has introduced us to a most painful period of history; but we regard it as a great merit in him that he has known how to relieve its horrors, and to give us now and then a bright spot on which we can rest, and recover our breath. The only part we have found too painful is the picture of the wrongs and sufferings, the piety and resignation of the saintly Queen Katherine, the true heroine of the story. In her case, we find no relief, no consolation, save in looking beyond the grave, to the eternal recompense that awaited her where the wicked cease to trouble and the weary are at rest.

Although we have opinions on the characters and movements the author sketches, which he may not in all cases accept, we assure him we highly esteem his book, and believe it will do great good in the direction he wishes. It may not be precisely perfect as a work of art, but it has a manly tone, and breathes a true Catholic spirit; and is the most valuable contribution yet made in our language to a class of works we have repeatedly urged our Catholic authors to attempt, and of which Mr. McCabe in his *Bertha*, *Florine*, and *Adelaide*, and Mr. McSherry, a countryman of our own, in his *Willitoft*, and *Père Jean*, have given us favorable specimens. The whole field of history is open to the Catholic novelist, and there is no good reason why we should not have authors who will cultivate it, and do for the church what Scott has done for Scottish history, and spread the charm of romance over Catholics in their various struggles for faith and freedom, which he has spread over Scottish Jacobites and English cavaliers. Let the historical novelist seize upon the introduction of Lutheranism by Gustavus Wasa into Sweden, and immortalize the massacre of the noble peasants who resisted the innovation, and died *en masse* in defence of the faith that had abolished the inhuman worship of Woden, and closed his temple at Upsala, the last stronghold of paganism in Europe. Let him pass

to Helvetia, and paint the persecution of Catholics in Berne, Zurich, Geneva, and other Swiss cantons; let him signalize the labors of the zealous missionaries in the sixteenth century, after the Protestant rebellion broke out, to save the faith in Ireland, to recover it in Poland, Hungary, Austria, and central Germany, and to convert the infidels in the East and the West, the North and the South. Here is a wide and rich field, here are topics that abound in touching and romantic interest, wanting only the wand of genius to bring it out. Let genius do it, and it will afford amusement, and serve at once the cause of literature and religion. We ought to make the historical novel our own, for through it we may reach and favorably affect the non-Catholic world, too prejudiced, too indifferent, too frivolous, or too engrossed with material interests, in this age of Mormonism and lightning-telegraphs, to read our graver productions. We have talent and genius enough in our ranks, if excited to activity, to revolutionize the whole literary world. There are thousands of richly-endowed minds and noble hearts among us, that are preying upon themselves, and consuming their own energy in doing nothing, because they find no outlet, no work. We live in a fast age, and we must keep up with it, nay, we must run ahead of it, not stand aghast at it, or remaining fixed, cry out at the top of our lungs to it, "Stop, stop, good Age, run not so swiftly by us." It is for Catholic genius to throw itself into the current, and direct its course.

PÈRE FÉLIX ON PROGRESS.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1859.]

Père Félix, we are told, is one of the most popular and effective preachers now in France. His *Conférences*, or sermons, preached during the season of Lent, in the great church of Notre-Dame, at Paris, draw crowds of men to hear them, and produce an impression on the lively Paris-

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**Le Progrès par le Christianisme. Conférences de Notre Dame de Paris. 1856 et 1857.* Par le R. P. Félix, de la Compagnie de Jésus. Paris:

ians hardly less profound than that formerly produced by the eloquent Lacordaire, or afterwards, by the earnest, gifted, and devoted Ravignan, whose loss to the French pulpit is still so deeply regretted. They are written with great vivacity and force, with freedom and originality, in pure and beautiful French, and may be read with interest, instruction, and edification even by an Englishman or an American, which is more than can be said of most French sermons, written as they are to be spoken in public, not to be read in the closet.

When we consider how familiar the topics the preacher has to discuss, how little of extrinsic interest he can bring to his aid from time, place, and circumstance, it is remarkable that we have so many good preachers; but when we consider the number of preachers there are, the variety, greatness, and sublimity of the themes presented by religion, the magnitude and pressing nature of the interests addressed, it is no less remarkable that we have so few. A really great preacher is a rare phenomenon. It is seldom we find even our most eloquent and learned divines making the most of the text or the Gospel for the day, or that we find them reasoning to us of sin, of justice, of judgment in the way that arrests the soul, convinces the mind, alarms the conscience, and makes the hardened sinner tremble, as did Felix before St. Paul, and cry out in tones of deep anguish and firm resolve, "What shall I do to be saved?" Why is this? Not ordinarily for lack of learning, zeal, intellect, imagination, or sensibility. A far larger number of preachers have all the essential gifts of the highest-class pulpit orator, than succeed in reaching even a moderate eminence. Why is it, then, that of the immense number of preachers throughout the world, in all ages since the inauguration of the church, so few attain to the highest summit of excellence in their profession?

Indolence and indifference do something, but cannot be regarded as the principal causes of failure, or as having much influence in preventing success. We think a primary cause of ill success in our day, is owing to the training our young men receive—a training which, on the one hand, cramps and represses the natural genius of the man, and on the other sends him to learn what other men have thought and said, instead of forcing him to think for himself, and speak from his own mind and heart. The student thinks, indeed, but what St. John the Golden Mouth, St. Augus-

tine, St. Bernard, Bossuet, Fénelon, Bourdaloue, or Massillon have thought and said, instead of thinking out his subject itself. The great fathers and great preachers he studies and cites—not simply authorities for doctrine or facts, but for their thoughts and language—became great by letting their own minds operate freely on the subjects they treated, by meditating the subject itself, not by contenting themselves with learning and repeating what those who had gone before them had thought and said, and by speaking out in their full tones, from their own full minds and hearts the free, warm, fresh, gushing thoughts and sentiments that came to them in their communion with nature and with God. We mean not by this to underrate learning, or to speak disparagingly of various and laboriously acquired erudition. No man can know too many things, or have too much learning, and few men will attain to real eminence unless they have a large fund of knowledge acquired from books. But it matters little how many or how good books a man reads, unless he digests them, and assimilates their contents to his own mental life. They will otherwise overload his stomach, produce flatuleney, and impair or impede his vital functions. Not seldom the most erudite are the most wanting in judgment, in living and original thought. They rely on their memory or their library, and forget that to think is the essential function of a rational soul. A man who knows his theology well, so that he is always sure of his principles and never in danger of running against faith or morals, has in his own thoughts and observations, in his own life and experience, all the materials he wants; and he needs only to exercise his own mind freely on these materials, to give his own understanding, imagination, and sensibility, his own zeal and affection, fair play, in order to place himself on a level with the great fathers and preachers of past ages. He has all they had; and if he will only permit himself to do as they did, and accustom himself, as they accustomed themselves, to read and meditate the Holy Scriptures daily, and to spend hours every day in meditating the mysteries of life, and especially the mysteries of our religion, he may rival them, be what they were, and effect what they effected. No man comes too late into the world, or finds it foreclosed. Always is there new work to be done; always is there a new field to be opened and cultivated; always is there a path to eminence; always a place and a demand for the highest order of thought and action.

There is no reason in the world, out of themselves, why men to-day should not equal Fénelon or Bossuet, St. Francis of Sales or St. Bernard, St. Leo or St. Ambrose, St. Basil or St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. John Chrysostom or St. Augustine. Nature has not exhausted her powers or grown old; grace is not worn out, nor have the inspirations of the Holy Spirit spent their force. Men to-day, if they will, may live as near to nature and to God, the author of both nature and grace, as lived the great fathers, doctors, and preachers of the church in the primitive ages.

Too much thought is wasted in learning without assimilating the thoughts of others, and too little respect is paid to the intellect and reason with which the Creator creates every human soul. God makes man to his own image. We are taught to respect that image in others; we should learn to respect it equally in ourselves. Reason is not a special gift to certain men or certain ages, but a gift common to all men, and to all ages. The creative act of God, which gives us simultaneously existence and reason, is an ever-present and never-ceasing act. God is the same yesterday, to-day and for ever. If the fathers lived, moved, and had their being in him, so do we live, move, and have our being in him, and his being illumines our reason as it illuminated theirs. What, then, had they that is denied us, or what means had they of attaining in their respective paths to excellence, that we have not?

The world is rendered sickly, infirm, and feeble, by the Protestant error of substituting a dead book, which speaks only as the reader gives it voice, for a living and ever-present teaching church. Faith, indeed, was revealed in the beginning, and was finished when the promises made to the patriarchs were fulfilled; but though the revelation of faith was made, in what to us, as individuals, is the past, it is made to us equally in the present, and is at all times a present and living revelation. Faith is in the supernatural order what reason is in the natural; as the unchangeable essence and the ever-present and unceasing creative act of God creates reason always the same, and makes it an ever-present reason, so our Lord through his ever-abiding presence in his church, which is his body, makes faith unchangeable and always a present faith, or a present revelation. Revelation is as present to-day as it was two thousand years ago, and save the individuals who actually saw our Lord in the flesh, we have all that had the contemporaries of the apostles. The church

which subsists and bears witness to the faith was their contemporary. Peter, through his successor, teaches me to-day with as present, as living, and as authoritative a voice as that with which he spoke under the power of the Holy Ghost, who descended upon him in a cloven tongue of fire, to the representatives of all the nations gathered together at Jerusalem on the day of Pentacost. The church heard the angels sing their *Gloria in Excelsis* at the birth of our Lord; she saw the infant Redeemer lying in the manger, and Mary his mother, and prostrated herself with the kings from the East, and worshipped him. She was the eye-witness and the ear-witness of the great facts and events she narrates, and which embody the great mysteries of our faith. Though born in time, not in time does she live. Her existence is a present existence, catholic in time as in space, and spans the whole distance from the manger-cradle to the final consummation of the world. She never falls into the past, living only as a thing of memory. Individuals may be born and die, generations may pass on and pass off, but she persists through all changes of individuals and generations, and survives them unchanging and unchangeable. She grows not old with individuals, becomes not hoary with length of days, and what she relates, and what she teaches, is not simply what she once saw and heard, but what she sees and hears now with as clear a sense, with as young and fresh a life, as when she went forth from that upper room in Jerusalem to subdue the world to her divine Lord. To all individuals and to all ages and nations she is alike present, the one same living, teaching, governing church, creating by her actual presence a real, living faith, as the creative act of the ever-present God creates an ever-living, an ever-present natural reason. If then in the natural order we of to-day have all the reason, all the advantages men in past ages had, so by means of the church, the representative on earth of the incarnate God, we have all the faith and all the advantages in the supernatural order the fathers, doctors, and preachers had, and there is no good reason why we should fail to equal them, if not even surpass them.

We fall, in fact, far below them, but it is because we do not as they did, and because we suffer ourselves to be oppressed by them, crushed under their weight, instead of using them to instruct, to inspire, and to elevate us. We have too little reliance on our own resources. We have too little confidence in the native and inherent logic of the human mind,

and still less in the real logic of things, to which we so rarely penetrate. We dare not abandon ourselves to the natural operations of our own understandings, and lose all self-consciousness, as the Germans say, in the subject we are treating. The preacher dares not throw himself on as well as into his subject, and let it unfold itself according to its own nature and laws. He holds himself back, and hinders the word, instead of giving it free course, and permitting it to run and be glorified. He can neither trust it to itself nor himself to it. He has the fear of the professor of rhetoric before his eyes, and is afraid he shall not preserve his "points," or maintain a just proportion of parts in the several divisions of his sermon. He is thinking more of producing a great sermon than of unfolding his subject, and sending its lessons home to the minds and the hearts of his hearers. He forgets that the end of preaching is neither to produce a sermon nor to prove himself a great sermonizer; but to convince his hearers of some great truth, or to persuade them by the sweet motives of heaven or the startling horrors of sin and judgment to the practice of some duty, to enlighten the ignorant, to arouse the slothful, to quicken the dilatory, to strengthen the weak of purpose, and awaken the spiritually dead to newness of life—in a word, to win souls to his divine Master. The rhetoricians are of no account; the rules of art can render little assistance, and the grace and excellency of human speech, as of human wisdom, are as often a hinderance as a help. He must know only Christ and him crucified, and preach Christ, to the Jews a stumblingblock, to the Greeks foolishness, but to them that believe, the wisdom of God, and the power of God. He must know, he must think only of the honor of his Master in the salvation of souls.

Preaching is always addressed to the people, and therefore must be popular, in tone, style, and manner. We mean not that it must be superficial, light, and flashy. We have had in this city few abler or more popular preachers than the late Father John Larkin, in whom, let it be permitted us to say, we personally grieve the loss of a long-tried and very dear friend, a wise director, and a judicious adviser, whose place can never be supplied to us in this world—and he, as we all know, was remarkable for the learning, the solidity, depth, and originality of his sermons, which were replete with the profoundest theology and the deepest philosophy of life. But he knew how to make obscure things

plain, difficult things easy, and trite things grand and original. But as preaching must be popular, it must address itself to the popular taste and manners, and deal with the actual habits and living interests of the people as they are, not simply as they once may have been. The style of pulpit oratory that comports well with one age, or one country, may comport ill with another. The French style would produce little effect on an English congregation, and the English style just as little on a French congregation. To be effective it must be living, it must be real, it must be actual; and to be so, it must adapt itself to the people as they are, and speak to them in what are to them the tones and terms of the life they are actually living. Much of our pulpit oratory loses its effectiveness by its stiff, strained, and artificial tones. It fails to break through the wall of self-complacency, propriety, or indifference, with which almost every congregation surrounds itself when the preacher ascends the pulpit; it fails to penetrate at once to the citadel, and carry it before the garrison have had time to seize their arms, and rush to its defence. The first words of a preacher should give him the command of his audience, establish a magnetic chain of communication between him and them, so that he may speak with the combined force of their inspiration and his own. He must give them no opportunity to think, while he is speaking, whether he speaks well or ill; but must hold them captive, prevent them from once thinking of him, and fix their minds and their hearts on the mysteries he is unfolding, the sublime truths he is uttering, or the awful lessons he is enforcing. If he himself feels his subject, has his heart and soul saturated with it, forgets himself, and speaks in the strength and majesty of his theme, his tones, manners, and gestures will be natural, as are always those of a child till the masters have destroyed his simplicity, and attempted to make him live an artificial life, and his words and expressions will be the best that could be chosen. The strained and artificial, the stiff and formal manner, too often found in the pulpit, destroys the effect, and leaves any impression but that the preacher is a live man speaking to live men and women. The only really effective preachers we have, whether in the Catholic or non-Catholic pulpit, are those who abandon that manner, break through the artificial rules with which the professors have embarrassed them, and in which they can no more do battle for the Lord, than young David could fight the giant Goliath in Saul's armor,

and have ventured to speak out from their own full minds and hearts in their own simple, earnest, and natural tones, the thoughts that came to them, and in the words in which they spontaneously clothe themselves.

Of the style and manner of Père Félix as a pulpit orator, we cannot speak; but we presume they are French, as they should be in a French preacher addressing a French audience. As a writer he thinks with clearness and force, and expresses himself with vigor, elegance, and grace. Perhaps his style would bear condensation, but it is as easy, natural, and unaffected as is permissible in a modern French author. To us Americans the French always seem a little artificial and theatrical, and Père Félix is unmistakably French. He, however, shows that he has thought and meditated on the subjects themselves that he discusses, and has not merely inquired what others have said respecting them, and his two volumes of *Conférences* before us constitute one of the best and most original works touching the living problems of the age that we have recently seen from the French press. They are not so erudite, so philosophical, so striking, or so original as the *Conférences* of Padre Ventura, reviewed by us a few years since; but they are sounder and more practical. They are adapted more especially to the temper, taste, and thought of the French than of the English or Americans, and yet he who should make them accessible to the English speaking public would render a valuable service to the cause of religion and morality.

The adherents of the doctrine of progress, combated in these volumes, will recognize a candid, sincere, and conscientious opponent in Père Félix, but they will most likely feel that he was not trained in their school, and has never been one of their number. He has not the secret of the craft,—the password of the fraternity, and is unable to reproduce their doctrines from his own life and experience. He is obliged in regard to them, to rely on speculation, not on experimental knowledge, and we must confess that his discourses are better fitted to guard the faithful against the seductions of the false doctrine than to convert its adherents to the true doctrine of progress. He has seen that false doctrine only from the point of view of Catholic truth, not from the point of view of the party of its defenders. He reproduces it for the Catholic mind, not for the non-Catholic mind. So far as it is reducible to formal or logical propositions, he is exact enough, but he fails to reproduce it

with the sentiments and affections with which it is associated in the minds of its adherents, and in the sharp and well-defined logical propositions in which he presents and refutes it, they will hardly recognize it. He may have seized their doctrine under its purely logical aspects, but they feel that he has not seized—what is far more dear to them—the sentiments and affections which lead them to adopt it, and which, to their own minds and hearts, warrant their holding and defending it.

This, we apprehend, is very generally felt by non-Catholics to be the case with our Catholic controversialists, and is one reason why our arguments produce so little effect on them. They feel that in our reasoning against them, we combat by rigid logic what is not purely logical in its nature or origin. Our logic may strike them as conclusive, as unanswerable indeed, but they, nevertheless, feel that they are not refuted, that there is something they have which justifies them in adhering to their opinions and insisting on them, which we have not recognized, and which our reasoning does not touch. Hence, though we silence their logic, we do not convince them; we convict without convincing them. It will not do, at least in all cases, or even generally, to attribute our ill success to their love of vice, to the corruption of their hearts, to their satanic pride, or to the depravity or obstinacy of their wills. No man embraces error for its own sake. In most men there is something besides logic; there is prejudice, passion, sentiment, affection; and these being different in Catholics and non-Catholics, the logic we use, though, as logic, the same in both, does not meet them. Mankind are far more generally governed by their sentiments and affections than by their logic, and in comparatively few do the sentiments and affections and the logic coincide, or move in concert. Sometimes they are good, and it is bad; sometimes it is good, and they are bad. In our controversies, it is necessary to address both, and to prove that we know the sentiments and affections, as well as the logic, of those we oppose. In refuting them it will rarely be enough, although that must be done, to reduce their doctrines to strict logical propositions. We must reproduce or develop their sentiments and affections, or the non-logical phenomena which accompany their doctrines and are taken as integral in them. While we develop and refute their doctrine from our standpoint, we must develop and refute it from theirs. To be able to do this,

when we have not lived ourselves their life, we must count ourselves ignorant of their errors till we understand thoroughly the ignorance that leads them to adopt it. That is, we must, in the first instance, study their errors not to detect their falsehood, but the truth they contain, or to see them in a light in which, as far as they go, they really are not false, but true. The human mind constituted for truth, and never able to operate without truth as its object, never does and never can embrace the absolutely false, or the absolutely absurd. It can embrace it only under an aspect which is neither false nor absurd. We never fairly and fully comprehend the erroneous doctrines or opinions of others, till we have seen them in the light in which they see them, and detect the truth mingled in them, and which is that which really consecrates them in the minds of their adherents. It is an easy thing for us, who are Catholics, and have the truth in its unity, universality, and integrity, to detect the errors or heresies of others, and to give them a logical refutation from our point of view; but the difficult thing is to understand how or whence men who have minds constructed like our own come to embrace these errors or heresies and to adhere to them apparently in good faith, even after we have demonstrated by strict logic their untenableness. The fact is, we refute them from the point of view of the Catholic, but not from the point of view of the non-Catholic, or fail to show the non-Catholic that the truth he sees in them we also see and retain, and that what he is sure is just and good in his sentiments and affections, we also recognize as just and good in its proper place, and are as anxious to preserve as he is or can be. Father Hecker, in his books, the *Questions of the Soul* and the *Aspirations of Nature*, has attempted to do this, and to some extent at least has done it, for a class of non-Catholics, and herein lies the great merit of his publications.

Father Félix, however, must forgive us, if we say we think he has not done this, except to a very limited extent. He has shown admirably, and conclusively refuted the errors of the modern advocates of progress, but he has not recognized, disengaged, and presented in its true place and light the truth of that doctrine. The older we grow, the less inclined we are to wholesale condemnation, or to indiscriminate censure, and the more disposed we are to detect the truth which those who fall into error misapprehend, misinterpret, or misapply, and the just sentiments and hon-

orable motives, which lead them to adhere to their errors, and which comport far better with Catholic than with non-Catholic doctrine. We grow no less intolerant of error, but more ready to extenuate the fault of its adherents. We feel that we have some right to be heard on the modern doctrine of progress, for we once held it, and were, if not among its ablest, at least among its most earnest and resolute defenders. Father Félix has refuted it from the point of view of Catholic faith and theology, but he gives no evidence that he has ever seen it in the light that seduces this age, and makes it the great word for the nineteenth century, as liberty was the great word for the eighteenth, and we may add, as reform was for the sixteenth century. In the sixteenth century, reform had its true and false advocates, in the eighteenth, liberty had its true and false partisans, but nobody can deny that reform in the former period was rightfully the great word of the day, or that liberty was rightfully the great word in the latter. The error in the sixteenth century was not in demanding reform, but in attempting it where it was not needed, or by means that would render the reform a greater evil than those it sought to redress. So was it with liberty in the eighteenth century. That century opened with the general triumph of the old Roman cæsarism in nearly every continental state of Europe, and it was still doubtful whether it would not succeed with a restoration of the Stuarts in Great Britain. It was not Catholicity that drove the Stuarts from the British throne, or that prevented them from recovering it, but their cæsarism, their adherence to the doctrines of absolute monarchy, and their inability to govern as constitutional sovereigns, as the first magistrate, not as the sovereign proprietor of the nation. The English warred against the Stuarts in defence of their national liberties, as they had previously warred against Philip II. in defence of their national independence, and in both cases against Catholicity, only so far as it accidentally presented itself as the ally of the enemy.

It was a great misfortune that the English Catholics were in some sense obliged to link their cause with that of the unhappy Stuarts. Catholics still suffer both in Great Britain and in our own country from the prejudice it exerted against them. In both countries they suffer because their ancestors supported princes who sought to destroy English liberty and the rights of Englishmen, not for their Catho-

licity, or any attachment they may have to the pope. The prejudices the American people have against Spain to-day date back to Philip II. and the Grand Armada, and it is precisely the support the popes are said to have given to Spain in her attempts to get possession of England, and to the Stuarts in their attempts to recover the English throne, that makes it so difficult for us to-day to convince our countrymen that the papacy is not hostile to the independence of nations, and the liberty of the people. To a Catholic it is easy to explain all the facts in the case without implicating our religion or the papacy, but it is not easy, and while there was danger, it was not possible, to explain them to non-Catholics. It needed the noble movements of Pius IX., our present glorious pontiff, to disabuse the public, and to demonstrate that if some popes have appeared to oppose the independence of nations or liberal institutions, it has been only because in the complication of civil and ecclesiastical affairs, growing out of a state of things which has ceased to exist, they could not defend the paramount interests of religion without appearing to do so; and that the papacy itself is never hostile to national independence or to the national liberties, when kept within the bounds of justice, and not made pretexts for denying the liberty of conscience and warring on the church of God. The popes could not, in the state of things then existing, have done less than they did, without incurring the guilt of gross neglect of the interests of religion. They did what their duty compelled them to do, but they failed, not because they were wrong, but because they on whom alone they could rely to carry out their policy had so linked their own cause of cæsarism with Catholicity, that they could not protect the faith without advancing that of civil despotism, and because the English people were more firmly wedded to their national independence and their national liberties than they were to the church of God. Still the policy has created a deep prejudice in the English and American mind against the papacy.

But civil and political despotism at the beginning of the eighteenth century having everywhere triumphed on the continent, if we except Switzerland and San Marino, and still having a chance of triumphing in the British Isles, humanity would have been false to herself, and looking to the future, even false to the church, if she had not, with all the voice left her, demanded liberty. That demand was not

made only by Jansenists, Huguenots, and infidels, by men of debauched manners and lawless passions, but was made, as had been made in the sixteenth century the demand for reform, by many of the purest, the noblest, the loyalest, and the most enlightened and saintly men of the age. The movement for liberty in the assembling of the states-general in France, and the disposition shown by Louis XVI. to extend the freedom of his people, were hailed with approbation at Rome, as they were greeted with joy throughout the world, and the clergy were the first to join the *tiers état* in the effort to recover the lost liberties of the nation,—liberties lost by the Bourbons, aided by the Frenchman Richelieu, and the supple and astute Italian Mazarin. The word liberty was a good word; its cause was a good, a noble, a just cause; but it was abused by an ultra-party, just as reform had been by the Protestant party. So in the nineteenth century, progress is a good word, combining in itself the full significance of those two other great words, liberty and reform; its cause is a good, a holy, a sacred cause, which religion and humanity alike consecrate. But, as in each of the former cases, it has its true and its false friends.

Père Félix does not deny, he even concedes this, and accepting progress, he attempts to distinguish between the true doctrine of progress by Christianity, and the false doctrine of progress by the inherent law of growth or natural development asserted by the age outside of the church. But it is precisely here where he seems to us to fail. He makes believe in his eloquent and masterly preliminary discourse, that he accepts the progress itself asserted by the age, and that he is about to dissent only as to the means, influences, and agencies, by which progress has been, and is to be effected; but as he proceeds he restricts progress wholly to the interior of man, and identifies it with the growth of grace in the soul, or with what is usually denominated Christian perfection. That there is the progress he asserts, that it is the highest and most important progress that can be conceived, no Christian can for a moment doubt. No progress that excludes this, or that does not in some sense subserve it, is worth the slightest effort. But to restrict all progress to this interior Christian perfection is to sport with the age, is to play tricks on words, and to give the age a series of homilies on the four cardinal virtues and the seven deadly sins, when and where it looked for a Christian, phil-

osophical, and practical discussion of the popular doctrine of progress. Does the preacher mean to deny all other progress? Does he mean that this progress is what the age is really demanding, and what would meet its real wants if it understood them? or does he mean to have us conclude that, if we secure this progress, all other progress that can be really desired will be secured as a matter of course? Let him mean which he will he does not meet the question as it is in the mind of this age, and therefore, though he has produced a very pious and valuable book, he has not produced precisely the book needed, or which his title, *Le Progrès par le Christianisme*, Progress by Christianity, led us, perhaps through our fault, to expect.

There certainly has been in modern society, out of the interior of the individual, or the spiritual life, unmistakable progress. There has been progress in the science of politics, in the physical sciences, in industry and commerce. There has been progress in legislation, political economy; in the construction of prisons, in prison discipline, in the diffusion of education, in the treatment of paupers, criminals, and the vicious. There has been a large development of benevolence, and of the sentiment of humanity, whether always wisely directed or not. There has been a marvellous progress in exploring, reducing, and utilizing the forces of nature. Great changes have been effected among civilized nations as to the rights of peace and war, and men think to-day of slavery and the rights of man very differently from what they did a few generations or even a single generation back. The world cries out with horror to-day against laws and practices, which almost since our own personal recollection excited no remark, and if thought of at all, were thought to be unavoidable and irremediable. These are facts which nobody can deny. It may be argued, with more or less of truth, that these ameliorations have not been unaccompanied by facts of a contrary character, and that, though good in themselves, they have been brought about by means which have left man and society upon the whole, in a worse condition then formerly; so that, looking to the whole, to all the interests of man and society, there has been a deterioration rather than a progress. We have ourselves sometimes argued in the same way; but we have never been disposed to deny that there has been a real progress in the respects named. Is it not possible in other respects to effect a corresponding progress?

The eloquent preacher seems to us to overlook the fact that the pantheistic and socialistic doctrines on which the false doctrine of progress seems to be based, are with the advocates of progress only an after-thought, invented not for their own sake, but to justify them in asserting progress outside of the individual growth in grace to which he would confine it, and independently of the influences and agencies he admits. Men did not become pantheists and then assert a pantheistic progress, or a progress in man and society by an inherent and natural law of development and growth like that of the embryon in the animal, or the seed in the vegetable. They adopted belief in progress first, and then adopted the anti-Christian and pantheistic ground of defending it, because they were opposed, or imagined themselves opposed, by Christianity, and forbidden by the Christian religion to labor for it. They are not refuted by refuting their pantheism, naturalism, or Pelagianism. Indeed, the great body of the party care nothing for these absurdities, errors, or heresies, any more than, in the sixteenth century, the mass of the reform party out of the church cared for Luther's doctrine of imputed righteousness or justification by faith alone, or the mass of the advocates of liberty, in the eighteenth, cared for the oratory of Anacharsis Clootz, the dreams of Condorcet, the materialism of D'Holbach, the atheism of the Hebertists, the communistic reveries of Barbeuf, or the theophilanthropy of Revellière-Lepaux. The mass of the reform party wanted reform, and they adopted Luther's doctrine, not because they believed it or cared for it, but because it was inscribed on the banner under which they fought, and was to them the symbol of the reform they demanded. The eighteenth century demanded liberty, was terribly in earnest to gain it, but it never demanded liberty for the sake of holding and propagating the infidelity of its chiefs. The party of progress to-day want freedom to labor for progress, and to effect it as a practical fact, but the mass of them never heard of Hegel, Leroux, Enfantin, or the pantheistic nonsense Père Félix so triumphantly, and at the same time so pleasantly and wittily refutes in the volumes before us. Great parties, great movements, do not begin in philosophy, in doctrine, but in instinct, sentiment, feeling, impelled by a practical motive, and seeking a practical end. The only way to arrest them, when they take a wrong direction, is to head them off, is to take what they are driving at that is

practicable and not repugnant to faith and morals, separate it from the false philosophy and absurd speculations with which it is connected, and make ourselves its defenders, although it is not precisely what we should ourselves have proposed, as the church authorized her missionaries to accept in heathen lands even the festivals of the heathen, in so far as not idolatrous, and to give them a Christian significance, or as she consecrates to Mary, to Christian devotion, the month of May, once sacred to a heathen goddess, after whom the month itself is named. The question is not now what would have been the best way of dealing with the party of progress in the abstract, or before it had acquired strength, but how shall we deal with it to-day, when in one form or another it includes the greater part of the civilized world. It is the practical, not the theoretical question, we must meet, and we must meet it not by seeking to recall the age to simple individual progress in Christian perfection, but by showing that, while the church is a supernatural kingdom, and has for her direct mission only the glory of God in the salvation of souls, she indirectly favors progress in the natural order by the Christian virtues she cultivates, and allows free efforts for all progress in natural society and institutions that is possible without coming in conflict with revealed truth and the moral law.

Father Félix may be very right in saying man aspires to the infinite, the perfect, but he must remember that we aspire only as we are inspired. We certainly can attain to the infinite, the perfect in the supernatural order, only by means of Christianity, of union with Christ, in whom the human nature he assumed is elevated to be the nature of God. But if, as he maintains, man naturally aspires to the infinite, to the perfect, how maintain that the perfect, the infinite, in the natural order, is attainable only by Christianity? Where do we learn that the supernatural is needed as the complement of the natural? We do not believe that man can attain to the infinite or the perfect, in the natural order, for we do not believe man naturally aspires to either, and what are so often spoken of as his natural aspirations, we believe are the effect of supernatural inspirations. The natural cannot go out of the natural, and can no more aspire to the perfect than it can attain to it. We cannot, therefore, with the preacher, resolve the movement for progress into the natural aspiration of man to the perfect. It grows simply out of man's natural aspiration to the better. We

cannot any more accept the doctrine that the desire for progress, as it manifests itself in this age, meets or can meet its full gratification in individual progress in Christian perfection, as the good father contends. The church neither destroys nor supersedes natural society. She does not even make natural society her special charge, or provide, or pretend to provide, for all its necessities and interests. Even if all individuals should become saints, as eminent as any placed in the calendar, natural society would remain imperfect, governments would blunder, institutions might be oppressive, and though all would be done that could be done to solace the sufferer, yet the evils would not be removed. The church has received a supernatural revelation, and is divinely assisted in all things pertaining to salvation. She proclaims infallibly the law of God, whether revealed or natural; she can apply the infallible principle to the solution of any question of conscience that may arise between sovereign and sovereign, or between sovereign and subject; but she has not received any supernatural instructions as to the mode of constituting or administering temporal government, as such. Place saints at the head of the government, and you have no guaranty for any thing but the purity of their motives. Cardinal Ximenes, archbishop of Toledo, was a great and good man, but he did as much as any man Spain ever had to destroy Spanish liberties, to centralize power, and to prepare the way for modern cæsarism. Men equally wise, equally learned, equally upright, pious, and conscientious, differ, and honestly differ, in their views on all governmental and most social questions. We must be on our guard, lest we throw on the church a responsibility that is not hers, and hold her accountable for all the evils in natural society in professedly Catholic states—evils which she never received the mission or the power to remove. Natural society is responsible for itself, and must redress its evils by the natural virtues, whether the religion be Catholic or non-Catholic.

The church aids natural society, but she does it by creating and sustaining the virtues which secure heaven. She promotes indirectly its interests in promoting the interests of the supernatural society. Highly important, then, is it that the supernatural virtues of which Père Félix treats should be cultivated in the highest degree and as universally as possible. We need them to sustain our republic, because without them we cannot for a long time sustain the natural

virtues in the mass of the people without which no republic can be permanent. But they cannot alone suffice for all the progress we need, and it is the pretence that progress in these is the only allowable progress that drives so many active and energetic minds in our age into the ranks of the enemies of religion.

The growth of individuals in Christian perfection, or in the distinctively Christian virtues, is, and always must be, the progress sought by the church; for her mission is the conversion and salvation of the soul—to fit men for attaining their destiny in the world to come; and we shall not, we trust, be understood to complain of Père Félix for insisting on this progress, fixing its point of departure, and its point of arrival, showing its lofty and sublime character, and pointing out the aids the soul finds and the obstacles she encounters in advancing to union in Christ with God. We hope we estimate this progress, whatever may be our practical short-comings, as highly as he does, and we have no fear that he will get people too much in love with it, or too much engrossed with the means of advancing in it. What we complain of is his overlooking the fact and the necessity of progress in natural society—not precisely for the sake of the world to come, but for the sake of that society itself to which we all belong, and in the bosom of which we after all must live, so long as we remain in the flesh. We do not ask the church to labor for this progress, or to turn aside from her own divine mission, but we do want Catholics to feel that it is lawful for them, keeping a good conscience, and working in none but lawful ways, and using none but lawful means, to labor, not precisely as members of the supernatural society, but in their capacity of members of natural society for progress in science, art, literature, government, legislation, political and civil liberty, agriculture, industry, and commerce, so as to make society as perfect as, with the imperfection of humanity, it may be. The age attaches, no doubt, too much importance to what is called the progress of society or the progress of civilization, which, to the man whose eye is fixed on God and eternity, can appear of no great value. But we must take our age as we find it, and accept as far as we lawfully can, respect even its prejudices where they are not sinful, in the hope of winning its regard for that higher progress proposed by the church, and possible only in her communion. We do not seek to withdraw natural society from the spiritual control

of the church, but we do want those who belong to natural society only to be aware that Catholicity does not make war on the natural virtues, or require us to withhold our sympathy from them in any respect in which they are really advancing the interests of humanity, though only for this life—we want them to understand that we are not indifferent to those interests, and are ready to coöperate even with non-Catholics in promoting them, in so far as we are not required to neglect our duties or to do aught against our faith as Catholics.

PUBLIC AND PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1859.]

Pastoral letters are privileged documents, and not open to the animadversion of the government or the criticisms of the press. In them the pastor speaks with the plenitude of his authority to his own flock, and what he says must be received with due reverence and submission. We have not, therefore, introduced this important pastoral by the venerable and illustrious archbishop of Cincinnati, for the purpose of reviewing it, far less for the purpose of controverting any proposition we may find in it. We call the attention of our readers to it, because it uses very energetic and decided language on the subject of public schools,—a subject on which we have some remarks and explanations which we deem it proper to offer, in order to prevent, if possible, our views from being misapprehended or misrepresented, and with which we hope to close the further discussion on our part of the subject in these pages.

It would not be dignity, but silly affectation, for us to pretend not to be aware that our *Review* is accused of assuming a position on this subject of education in opposition to that taked by the venerable and illustrious American hierarchy. It is accused of having taken "a non-Catholic

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**Pastoral Letter on the Decrees of the Second Provincial Council of Cincinnati.* By the Most Reverend J. B. Purcell, D. D., Archbishop of Cincinnati. Cincinnati: 1859.

ground," and is represented as having once been, but as being no longer "a Catholic Review." Indeed, some Catholics even have gone so far as to warn its editor of the fate of La Mennais and Gioberti, and to hint that he is probably on the point of renouncing his Catholic faith, and of returning to some form of Protestantism, or of no-religion. There appears in certain quarters a determination, if we insist on exercising the freedom of thought and expression which the church allows us, either to reduce us to silence or to force us out of the church. We look upon all this as pitiable, and can see in it only a proof that men may profess to be Catholics, and yet be as bigoted, as narrow-minded, and as intolerant as the ordinary run of Protestants.

We assure our readers that, personally, things of this sort do not disturb us, but we regret them for the sake of the Catholic cause in our English-speaking world. There is with some Catholics, especially in this country, a narrow-minded bigotry, an illiberality of speech, if not of feeling, an intolerance in matters of opinion where differences are permissible, that is not creditable to their Catholic character, and which must be got rid of if we are ever to have a broad and generous Catholic literature, or are ever to attain to the position and moral weight in the community to which we are entitled by our numbers, our wealth, our intelligence, and our scholarship. Where authority ends liberty begins, and in matters outside of faith and morals we must learn to respect the full freedom of thought and expression, even where unanimity is desirable. We must arraign no man's character, we must labor to damage no man's standing or influence as a Catholic because he differs from us in opinion, or even runs athwart our prejudices. In matters outside of faith and morals the public opinion of Catholics in this or any other country is simply public opinion, and can never be adduced as authority either for reason or conscience, for it has no guaranty of infallibility, and may be only a mass of prejudices or superannuated traditions, which no honest and intelligent man devoted to truth and virtue can consent to follow. Public opinion in Athens condemned Socrates to drink hemlock; public opinion in Judea condemned our Lord to be crucified between two thieves. Public opinion, even in Catholic countries, is to a fearful extent intensely hostile and bitter towards the clergy, and is far from being as reverential and as affectionate towards them, even among Catholics in this country, as is desirable. Whoever writes

with a laudable aim, writes to correct the errors of public opinion, and to aid in forming a just and enlightened public opinion, not simply to echo the public opinion he finds already formed. If he so writes he must necessarily run more or less counter to the opinions of the public he addresses, and of course find himself more or less opposed by it. You must not take it for granted that he is therefore wrong. It may turn out that it is public opinion itself that is wrong, and he that is right. Controvert him by fair and solid argument, if you believe him wrong; reason with all your intelligence against him, refute him if you can, and refuse to believe him if he fails to convince you that he is right, or that what he defends is just and good; but so long as he advances nothing incompatible with the doctrine, the rights, and authority of the church, you must judge what he puts forth on its merits, and never attempt to bring public opinion against him and to crush him.

No Catholic periodical in the world has more uniformly, more loyally, or more earnestly defended the rights of authority than this *Review*. Indeed, it has been accused of going too far, and at times even gravely censured by a portion of the so-called Catholic press, for claiming too much authority for the church. We assert for ourselves no rights against the church. She is the supreme judge for us of her own powers, and of the extent and the limits of our obedience. But with the same earnestness that we assert her authority, we deny the authority of public opinion, whether the public opinion of Catholics or of non-Catholics, and vindicate for ourselves and for our brethren the freedom of thought and action she leaves us. When the authority of the church is questioned, we defend it; when the freedom of the individual Catholic is invaded, we defend that, and resist the best way we can the invasion. We will no more surrender the freedom and independence Catholicity allows us, than we will call in question the authority with which our Lord invests his spouse. Where the church speaks, we are silent and obedient; but where she is silent, we recognize in no man the right to command or to censure us.

We recognize in the church all the authority over the subject of education she claims, that is, plenary authority in respect to all that pertains to the moral and religious training of the young. Faith and morals saved, I have the right, in purely secular education, to educate my children as I judge best; but I am not free, even in secular education, to send

my children to schools which she interdicts, or to which the prelates the Holy Ghost has placed over me declare I cannot send them without gravely imperilling their faith or morals. On this point we see not how there can be any question among Catholics. The church has the full and supreme control of the moral instruction and religious education of the young, as included in her divine mission, and she has full and supreme authority to say what secular schools are or are not imminently dangerous to faith and morals, and to those she declares to be thus dangerous no Catholic parent can lawfully send his child. Now, how stands the case with the public schools, or, as we usually say, the district schools? Have our prelates interdicted them? If so, we are ignorant of the fact. The pastoral before us does not go that length, and it goes as far as any thing we have seen. Have our prelates officially declared that the district schools are so dangerous to faith and morals that it is unlawful to use them, even when and where we have not, and cannot at present have, good schools of our own? Not to our knowledge. In this city, and elsewhere, Catholic children certainly go to the district schools, and good, devout, earnest Catholic teachers are employed in them. Is this unlawful, anti-Catholic? Authority never speaks with an uncertain voice. It is, and must be explicit. From all that we have been able to learn, our prelates have not declared this to be unlawful. We know clergymen who have discontinued their parochial schools, which at great labor and expense they had sustained for years, and permitted the children of their charge to go to the district schools, and we have not heard that these clergymen have been placed under interdict, suspended, or even admonished. Wherein, then, have we by any thing we have ever said or done placed ourselves in opposition to the American hierarchy?

We know our pastors are not satisfied with the district schools as they are, and we know that many of them are doing all they can to establish separate Catholic schools for our Catholic children. Have we ever taken ground against them, pretended the district schools as they are satisfy even ourselves? Or have we in any way whatever opposed their movement to establish separate Catholic schools? We assuredly have done no such thing. We have never felt that we were free to oppose, and, moreover, have never wished to oppose or take ground against them. Whence, then, the tremendous outcry against us? Whence comes it that we are

charged with taking a non-Catholic ground, and that our *Review* is referred to as being no longer a Catholic periodical, in consequence of its views on the subject of the district schools? It comes not from any opposition we have offered to our prelates, to Catholic education, or to Catholic schools; but it comes, if the truth must be told, from the source whence has come the greater part of the opposition to us for the last five years,—that is, from our steady and determined opposition to any and every movement the direct tendency of which is to denationalize the American Catholic, and to keep Catholics a foreign colony in the United States, or Catholicity here in this New World linked with that old effete Europeanism which has always, wherever it has existed, been a drag on it, and which all that is true, good, generous, and noble in our American political and social order repudiates. We adopt as our line of policy conformity to American life, manners, and institutions, in all respects in which they are not incompatible with Catholic faith and morals. We adopt this line of policy not, as some pretend and labor to make the public believe, from narrow-minded national prejudice, or from hostility to any class of foreigners settled here, but because we believe it the only sensible policy, because it is the policy the church always recommends to her missionaries when sent to a non-Catholic country, and because we are thoroughly persuaded that it is the only policy compatible with the spread and permanent prosperity of our religion in the Union. Will any man have the hardihood to pretend that in adopting and supporting this line of policy we are opposing the venerable and illustrious American hierarchy? Rightly or wrongly, we believe that the best safeguard, aside from purely Catholic instruction and the sacraments, of the faith and morals of our children, is not in building up a wall of separation, not required by Catholic doctrine, between them and the non-Catholic community, but in training them to feel, from the earliest possible moment, that the American nationality is their nationality, that Catholics are really and truly an integral portion of the great American people, and that we can be, whatever the Know-Nothings may say to the contrary, without the slightest difficulty, at once good Catholics and loyal Americans, and the enlightened and earnest defenders of political, civil, and religious liberty.

We are, and always have been, decidedly in favor of really *Catholic* schools, that is, schools in which our children

are sure to be taught, and well taught, their religion, and we cannot understand how any Catholic at all worthy of the name can be otherwise than earnestly in favor of such schools; but we have not favored, and, till further advised, we cannot favor, under pretext of providing for Catholic education, a system of schools which will train up our children to be foreigners in the land of their birth, for such schools cannot fail, in the long run, to do more injury than good to the interests of religion. We quarrel with no man for being a foreigner, but we recognize the moral right in no class of American citizens to train up their children to be foreigners, and then to claim for them all the rights, franchises, and immunities of American citizens. We have no unfriendly or unbrotherly feeling towards any class of foreigners, but we do not want that miserable Europeanism, by which we mean despotism, in some or all of its ramifications, which oppresses the people, trammels the freedom of the church, and cripples the energy of the clergy in continental Europe, brought here to eviscerate Catholics of their manhood, and to keep up a perpetual war, in which faith has no interest, between them and the great body of the American people. In this we only express the general sentiment of our Catholic population, whether born and brought up here or in the "Old Country." Leave out the Europeanism, and let the movement be really for Catholic schools and Catholic education, as no doubt it is in the intention of our prelates, and we are with it heart and soul, and it shall never fail for the lack of our feeble support. The men who began the clamor against us were precisely such as either never distinguish between their foreign traditions and their faith, or prefer those traditions to their religion. They felt from the first instinctively that in us they could find no sympathy, and that to effect their purposes they must cry us down, and turn the Catholic public against us. This they attempted by crying out that we were anti-Irish, and finding that would not do, they now attempt it by crying out that we are anti-Catholic. Time will most likely teach them that neither is a good cry against us, and prove that though we have no blarney for the Irish, we love and respect the Irish settled here as men, as citizens, and as Catholics who have adhered to their faith through centuries of martyrdom; and furthermore, that however short we may fall of Christian perfection we love both Catholics and the church too well, and are too anxious to secure our own salvation to turn anti-Catholic in

a hurry, and make our damnation sure. "Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou only hast the words of eternal life."

This, we apprehend, is the first and chief cause of the outcry against us. Another cause is in the fact that we have steadily refused to oppose the district school system established in the majority of the states on the ground assumed, or for the reasons alleged by some of our Catholic journals, or to concede that, even as faulty as they undoubtedly are, they are as corrupt or corrupting as some of our over-zealous friends represent them. We do not, as our readers well know, recognize in the state any right to interfere in spiritual matters, but we do recognize its right, if it judges proper, to establish a system of district schools for all the children of the land, whether rich or poor, and to appropriate funds or to impose a public tax for their support, providing it excludes from them every thing that can reasonably offend the conscience of any class of its citizens, and does not make education in them a prerequisite to the enjoyment of any right or franchise, to public office or employment, or to a diploma in any of the learned professions, and leaves parents and guardians free either to use them, or to establish private schools for their children at their own expense and option. Such schools do not fall under the condemnation of the state schools in Europe, and are improperly called state schools. They are simply public schools, and the state only authorizes and supports them, keeping education up to a certain standard, and protecting the respective rights of parents, children, and teachers. We certainly approve the principle and the policy of the system, and we think its establishment and support highly honorable to the intelligence, the wisdom, and the philanthropy of our countrymen. It pertains to what we regard as wise and liberal statesmanship, and though it secures not all the positive virtues needed by the state, it seems to us a necessary concomitant of that political equality on which our republic is founded, and to tend directly to prevent the growth, and even existence, of that ignorant, brutal, and uncivilized mass of human beings, hardly a degree above wild beasts, which till lately was to be found in the heart of the most enlightened and polished nations of Europe. Nothing outside of religion itself could be more serviceable to us as Catholics than this very system of district schools if the whole American people were Catholics. It would be the very thing we should want. We cannot, therefore,

condemn the system itself. We do not deny that it has its evils, but they are simply abuses which may be corrected, or the results of its workings in a mixed community, where the people are partly Catholic, partly Protestant, and partly of no religion.

Although we do not pretend, and never have pretended, that the district schools are all that Catholics need for their children, we yet cannot approve the wholesale condemnation of them in which some of our friends indulge. Much of that condemnation is, we think, dictated by European notions and habits, and proceeds from not considering that many things which in the Old World have a good and desirable tendency would have a contrary tendency here, and that many things which could not there be tolerated for a moment without the gravest consequences resulting, are wholly innocuous here, because in harmony with the general spirit and constitution of our society. Immorality and irreligion are, no doubt, on the increase in the Union, but it is wrong to attribute the fact to the influence of our common school system. These schools do not, indeed, wholly prevent it; but we think there would be much more immorality and irreligion among us if we were without these schools. Even Catholic schools have not always proved effectual in preventing immorality and irreligion in Catholic states. Education is not omnipotent, and can never be a substitute for the sacraments. No system of schools ever devised, or that ever will be devised, can be completely successful in making or keeping a people moral and religious. Experience has disappointed the too sanguine expectations of the philanthropists. Too much is, perhaps, still expected from education. Our friends, also, make too much of individual cases of immorality in our public schools, and which are only rare exceptions to the general rule. We ourselves were educated in a district school, and as teacher or as committeeman, we have since been connected with the common schools in New York, Michigan, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts for over twenty years of our life; we have had eight children partly educated in them, and we claim to have some personal knowledge of them, and although we do not consider them by any means faultless, we are very far from recognizing as just the description of them which we usually meet in our Catholic journals. No schools, not even our Catholic schools, are perfect.

We do not advocate secular education without adequate religious education, and it has never entered our head that any Catholic could be so insane as to do it. We are in favor of giving a good secular education to all the children of the land, but if we can have but one, we, of course, should say, let us have religious education. The spiritual is above the temporal, and there is no proportion between the religious and the secular. We have not dwelt at length on the importance of religious education, for we have supposed Catholics sufficiently instructed on that point, and in no need of lessons from us; but we have never for one moment contemplated secular education without an adequate provision being made in some form for religious education; only we have not believed, and we cannot say we now believe, that it is absolutely necessary that it should be given along with secular education in the same school-room, at the same hours and by the same teachers. The first duty of parents and pastors in regard to children, as soon as intellect begins to dawn, is to look after their spiritual welfare, and to see that their moral and religious instruction and education is properly attended to; but whether the moral and religious instruction and education, if given, and thoroughly given, be given at home or in the Sunday-school, in the district school or the parochial school, we have supposed could be a matter of no real importance. But be this as it may, we are prepared to accept with all our heart the assertion in the pastoral before us: "Education without religion is not at all, or only a questionable boon," for after all, "What doth it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" We know no way in which a man can save his soul without religion.

We do not pretend to know or judge the motives or policy of our prelates, but we would respectfully suggest to our friends of the press, that any movement, whatever may be the rights of the church, or however desirable in itself, designed to secure to the clergy the whole management and control of education outside of faith and morals, must fail. Neither non-Catholic nor Catholic secular society will consent or can be forced to place the whole business of secular education in their hands, and give up public for parochial schools. The clergy may retain, as within their special mission, the moral and religious instruction and education of the young, but to struggle for more will ultimately be to get less. We say not that this is not an evil and much to

be deplored, but we look upon it as a "fixed fact." The old union between church and state is dissolved in this country, most likely never to be restored, and sooner or later, struggle as we may, we shall be forced to accept all the logical and legitimate consequences of that dissolution. The sooner we foresee and make up our minds to accept those consequences and conform to them, the better we believe it will be for us and for our religion. It is always worse than idle to contend for the impracticable, or to war against the inevitable. Throughout the whole modern world there is a settled conviction, false assuredly, that the clergy, whether Catholic or non-Catholic, are greedy of power, and constantly laboring to concentrate all power in themselves, and hence a determination on the part of secular society to yield them as little as possible. Whoever looks at the modern world as it is, and studies its temper, and the tendency of its thought and sentiment, must, it seems to us, be convinced that in all human probability, the most the church can hope to recover and retain is freedom to watch over and provide for the moral and religious instruction and education of the young. This is the most, we are convinced, that she will be able to obtain, although it may be not all that is her right. She, in her modes of acting in relation to secular society, is forced to consult the exigencies of space and time, and to follow the mutations of human affairs, though she herself remains unchanged and unchangeable. She has no power to restore a political and social order that has passed away, or to establish in natural society an order of things resisted by the dominant ideas, sentiments, and passions of the age, when not absolutely required by Catholic faith and morals. She is immutable in her doctrine, her universal discipline, and her divine constitution; but she is free, and Catholics must regard her as free, to act according to the ever-changing circumstances of time and space. The very worst service we can render her is to attempt to chain her up to a dead past, or to bind her free limbs with the cords of obsolete precedents. We have not, therefore, joined with those of our friends who are striving to place the whole business of education, outside of faith and morals, in the hands of the clergy, simply because we have not believed it practicable, and because we have believed that by so doing we should injure, instead of serving, the sacred cause of religion, and betray the confidence that invited us to conduct a Catholic Review. If in this we

have erred, if we have exceeded or abused the liberty the church concedes us, let the proper authorities distinctly and in some authentic way—not simply by anonymous leaders in irresponsible journals—tell us so, and they will find us neither deaf nor disobedient. We are and will be a submissive son of the church.

In what we have written on the public schools we have had no intention of opposing the hierarchy, or of discouraging or interfering with their efforts to provide for Catholic education, which seems to us to have been greatly and even culpably neglected. We have written with a far different purpose. The district school system is an American pet; it is the pride of the American people, their boast, and really their glory. It is dear to their hearts, and we cannot strike them in a tenderer point than in striking this system, or do any thing more effectual in stirring up their wrath against us, or in confirming their prejudices against our religion,—a system devised and adopted for themselves without any view favorable or unfavorable to Catholics, for it was devised and adopted when there were scarcely any Catholics in the country. Common prudence, if nothing else, should prevent us from exaggerating its defects, and shutting our eyes to its good points. We do not pretend, we never have pretended, that the public schools can satisfy all our wants as Catholics, and we have never pretended that we could use them, save where we have not and are not able to have good schools of our own, in which the positive doctrines of our religion can be taught. But we have believed that some of our Catholic friends have assailed them unjustly, with a zeal, a vehemence, and a bitterness alike impolitic and unwarranted, and we have wished to say something to neutralize their undue severity, and by frankly acknowledging the merits of the system to allay the wrath unnecessarily excited against us and our church. We have also felt on this subject as an American as well as a Catholic, and have wished to vindicate the honor of our country against the unjust aspersions cast on it by men who are indebted to her free institutions and the protection of her just laws for the very liberty they use in insulting and abusing her. In order to do this we have felt it necessary to bring up the side usually overlooked by our journalists, and to remind our Catholic friends that something may be said for as well as against our countrymen in relation to the public schools.

We have not dwelt on the defects of the public schools, because we know the American people are aware of them and are constantly laboring to remedy them, and also because we have found our friends even exaggerating them. We have not said much of the gross injustice of taxing any class of citizens for the support of schools which they cannot in conscience use, because it is patent to every American, because the law organizing our district schools requires every thing sectarian to be excluded from them, and because this injustice has been pointed out by our so-called Catholic journals with a vehemence, a warmth, and an energy to which we cannot aspire. We have not, we confess, joined in the agitation for separate schools for Catholics, because agitation is the business of the journals rather than of a review, and because it has not seemed to us that agitation was needed, or likely to do any good. We have not supposed it needed for Catholics, for they, it is to be presumed, will listen to the voice of their pastors, and it is far more likely to do harm than good to non-Catholics. We cannot, if we would, break up the district school system, and we can just as little induce the state to divide the schools and the school money, and establish separate schools for the children of Catholics. All that we can do is to have the law organizing these schools practically enforced, and get excluded from them all text-books and all teaching insulting to Catholics and offensive to Catholic conscience. This much we might do, for we have the law on our side, if it was understood that in case it was done we would use them. But when it is contended that even then we could not, or would not, use them, how are we to persuade those who have no great fondness for us, and who neither believe nor respect our religion, to exert themselves to do so much, since assured in advance that it will not conciliate us in the least? If it were clearly announced by the pastors of the church that they would use, as others, these common schools in case whatever is repugnant to the Catholic conscience be excluded from them, we could, in time, far sooner than we can build up schools of our own, get it excluded, for no new law is needed for that purpose. But we have been denounced as non-Catholic, because we have defended in such case the use of them when and where we have not and cannot have separate schools of our own. Do our pastors approve that denunciation? Would they authorize the free use of these schools in case all sectarianism were

excluded from them? If not, what is to be gained by agitation from non-Catholics? They will not, we repeat, give up the system, nor will they furnish us at the public expense with the means of establishing schools for the children of Catholics under the exclusive management and control of our bishops and clergy. It is idle to expect it. We may say, we only ask to be permitted to use our own money in our own way; but the money once collected in the form of taxes is not our money, but public money, and besides our contribution to the tax would go but a small way towards establishing and supporting schools for all our children. Under no point of view, then, can we see any good to come from public agitation of the question by the Catholic press. We have believed the true way is to leave the question in the hands of the bishops and clergy, to take such measures for the moral and religious training of the young of their flocks as they think practicable or expedient, without any outside pressure or interference, and without making any war on the public school system of the country, or unnecessarily provoking the hostility of our non-Catholic countrymen. We have gained nothing, but we have lost much, by the course that has been adopted. We have only made the great body of the American people still more firmly attached to their common schools, still more determined to maintain them, and still less disposed to modify them so as to meet our conscientious objections, while we have rendered our own position in the country, as Catholics, more unpleasant and embarrassing. We ought to learn some practical lessons from the late Know-Nothing movement, and correct the errors on our part which provoked it.

We cannot hope what we have said will be acceptable to those of our friends who judge that the true policy for Catholics here is to make war on every thing highly esteemed by non-Catholic Americans, or to those who would abolish the American system of public schools, and leave the whole matter of education to parents and the religious bodies to which the parents belong. We favor in principle a system of public schools, and are not prepared to maintain that the state should withdraw entirely from the whole matter of schools and education. We assert its right and its duty to see, as far as in its power, that all its children receive at least a good common-school education, though we deny most energetically its right to interfere with the conscience of any class of its citizens, and we maintain with equal energy the

plenary authority of the church in all that pertains to the moral and religious instruction and education of the children of Catholic parents.

We cannot hope any more to satisfy those who look upon intelligence and independence as guilty tendencies, and make war, in religion, in morals, in science, in philosophy, in politics, on the whole natural order, and think we can be good Catholics only by denouncing all the works of unbelievers as sins. We are not among those who fancy that Catholicity can flourish here only by rooting out every thing American, and completely revolutionizing American society and institutions. We believe American society, as natural society, is better organized, and organized more in accordance with the needs of Catholic society, than is any other society on the face of the globe, and we are anxious to preserve and perfect it according to its original type. We are disposed, also, to remember that the people who, under the providence of God, organized American society, in which Catholics enjoy a freedom they have nowhere else in the world, were themselves almost to a man non-Catholics, and at the time they organized it, there was probably no Catholic nation in existence that could have sent out a colony capable of organizing a society so much in accordance with the natural rights of man and the freedom and independence of religion. Certainly no Catholic colonies did do it, or by the mother country were permitted to do it. It does not become Catholics, who have subsequently, by virtue of its own free constitution, been received into this society on a footing of perfect equality, to forget this fact, or to show themselves ungrateful to the memory of its founders by constantly holding them up to ridicule, and seeking to undo their work, as the so-called Catholic press frequently does our Puritan ancestors. The late Know-Nothing movement, unjustifiable as we regard it, should be turned to profit, and instead of exciting our hostility to Americans and every thing American, and making us sigh for a *régime* like that introduced into France by the Nephew of his Uncle, should induce us to reëxamine our conduct, and inquire if we have not been pursuing a line of policy admirably fitted to provoke such a movement. It would do us no harm to inquire if there have not been faults on our side, and if there have been to seek to avoid them in future.

That there are differences between us and some of our Catholic friends on the subject of education, as well as on

several other subjects—and differences of considerable magnitude, where unanimity is desirable—we pretend not to deny or to disguise; but these differences, we believe, are all on questions that lie outside of faith, and such, even if regrettable, as are allowable among Catholics. At any rate, we have honestly and frankly expressed the views we have entertained on this subject of education, and the general line of policy we have pursued in our efforts to serve Catholic interests in our own country. We have spoken honestly, from our earnest convictions. If we are wrong let us be refuted, and let those who differ from us meet the question, if it is a question of opinion, on its merits, and cease to cry out that we are anti-Irish or that we are anti-Catholic. All we have said is respectfully submitted to the proper authorities. If they tell us that our views are incompatible with our faith or duty as a Catholic, we shall renounce them as false and erroneous; or, if they assure us that our views are such, though it is not forbidden to hold them, as we cannot urge here and now without detriment to the interests of religion, of which they, not we, are judges, we shall forbear to urge them. More cannot well be asked of us as a loyal Catholic, since if we have exceeded or abused our liberty, we have done it ignorantly, not wantonly. With these remarks we dismiss the subject from our pages and leave its further discussion to others. We cannot close, however, without thanking *The Catholic*, published at Pittsburg, for its candor in expressing its conviction that, after the explanations of Father John in the *Conversations of Our Club*,* we have not placed ourselves on the school question in opposition to our prelates. If all our Catholic journals had shown themselves equally candid and just, this article would not have been needed. Catholic editors should be liberal and candid, considerate and just, and if all, as well as some of them, would be so, there would be much more harmony between us, and Catholic journalism would soon rise to the level of its mission and prove of great service to the Catholic cause in the Union.†

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*Vol. XI., pp. 473—475.

†This article has somewhat of a personal bearing, and is designed as an explanation and defence of the course latterly taken by this *Review*, and which seems to have displeased some of our Catholic friends. We have deemed the remarks we have made and the explanations we have offered as due alike to those who agree with us and to those who differ from us. We have not wished to defend or to apologize for any thing

we have said, nor have we written to deprecate censure, if we deserve it, or to stop the denunciation of our views which we expect to receive regularly once every three months from a portion of the so-called Catholic press. We are, as O'Connell said of himself, "the best abused man" in the country, and have little reason to fear the woe pronounced against those of whom all men speak well. We leave to those journals that make it a point to give, on the appearance of each successive number, half a column or a column of conceit, nonsense, and abuse concerning it, to settle the matter with their readers and their own consciences the best way they can; all we ask is, that whether approved or condemned, it shall be with a correct understanding of what are our real views. Of course we are not partial to vituperation and abuse, and we have no great respect for the method of our journalists of refuting a man from whose views they dissent by the weight of popular prejudice, rather than by the weight of their arguments. The method does not strike us as very reasonable, nor as precisely in harmony with the true Catholic spirit; but if the journalists choose to adopt it, this is a free country, and they can do so. To fair and manly discussion, however, we have no objection; no man is obliged to agree with us any further than we agree with the truth, and they who do not believe we agree with the truth have, so far as we are concerned, a perfect right to differ from us, and refute us if they can, by fair and solid arguments. Of any thing in the shape of reason urged against us we do not complain; but we think, after all, that Catholic journals should, for their own sake, be sure they understand the intrinsic merits of the case better than we do, before presuming to denounce us on their own authority, and that they should be sure of our meaning before arraigning it.

There is one practice very common with a certain class of editors, who have more imagination than reason, and more words than arguments, which we cannot approve, that of assuming that they express the sentiments of our venerable bishops and clergy, and therefore that what they say against us is said by authority. This assumption is one they have no right to make, and neither they nor we have any right to drag the bishops and clergy into our controversies. Journalists, in their capacity of journalists, do not and cannot speak by authority; and no one, no matter who he is, has any right to speak for anybody but himself. If we have that respect for the clergy we all ought to have, we shall shrink from attempting to make them responsible for our opinions or the policy we advocate. We venerate the church too much to try to make her responsible for any thing we do or say, and we have too little respect for what is called public opinion, which is usually only popular prejudice, to urge it against others, or to hold it a solid argument when urged against ourselves. We see a great and glorious work to be done for religion in this country even by laymen of talent, learning, and piety, and we regret that the moment we attempt to do what we can in its direction, some half-a-dozen editors who have not the slightest conception of the work, of the real character and wants of the country, should have the disposition, without rhyme or reason, to place themselves in opposition to us, and the bad taste to pretend to do it in the name of the clergy. We neither pretend to speak in their name, nor do we wish by any outside pressure to force them to acquiesce in our views. We wish to use without abusing our own liberty, and to leave the clergy theirs, unembarrassed by any thing we do or say.

We regret the divergence between us and a portion of the so-called Catholic press, for united the press is none too strong. We cannot expect the divergence to be less, but we have said in this number all we choose to say respecting it, and can foresee no event that will cause us to allude to it again. If there is to be fighting hereafter, it must be all

on one side; we shall take no part in it, but pursue the even tenor of our way, simply holding ourselves responsible, as we are bound, to the proper authorities. We have no time to waste in encounters with windmills or wind-bags. The times demand earnestness, and the best efforts of every friend of religion, for scenes of trial and of peril are before us. The war is raging, and there is no saying what will be its extent, or what shape it will assume before its end. But be it longer or shorter, extended or confined, or let it take what shape it will, the cause of religion and of humanity can only suffer during its continuance, and our study should be to gain for both here what they are losing in the Old World.

LA MENNAIS AND GREGORY XVI.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1859.]

A LEARNED theologian and a highly esteemed correspondent, has sent us a copy of this work, published many years ago, and called our attention specially to the encyclical letter, *Mirari*, of Gregory XVI., dated August 15, 1832, inserted among the *pièces justificatives*, and setting forth the Catholic doctrine on the main points in which it had been departed from by La Mennais and his disciples in their manner of defending religious and political liberty in France. Our correspondent tells us that he has his misgivings, although he does not feel quite certain, that we have failed to keep our *Review* in strict harmony with the doctrine of the encyclical, and he wishes us to examine the question and see if such be really the fact. He writes us in no captious or censorious spirit, but as a real friend, and as a priest earnestly devoted to Catholic truth. We thank him for his kindness, and we have endeavored to follow out his suggestion.

We have been engaged with pretty much the same questions which were raised and discussed by La Mennais and his associates in France, some thirty years ago, and have no doubt had the same general end in view, and we can well understand that we may have seemed to many at first sight

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**Censure de Cinquante-six Propositions Extraites de divers Écrits de M. de la Mennais, et de ses Disciples, par* PLUSIEURS EVÊQUES *de France, et la Lettre des mêmes Evêques au Souverain Pontife* GRÉGOIRE XVI.; *le tout précédé d'une Préface où l'on donne une Notice historique de cette Censure, et suivi des Pièces justificatives.* Toulouse: 1835.

to be defending the same general doctrine on liberty and the relations of the church to the state. We have had, at times, we confess, our own misgivings on some points, and our fears that we might not be steering clear of all the errors branded by the encyclical of the pope. To err is human, and truth and error on some points run so close together, and look so nearly the same, that the wisest and best of men are not, without supernatural assistance, always sure of not mistaking the one for the other. We may have fallen into error on some points, we may have used language which is too strong or inexact, but this much we are certain, we have aimed to be orthodox, and we shall never persist in an error when once it is pointed out to us. Truth is the only reality, the only good, and we cannot understand why any one should wish something else than truth, or that truth should be something else than it is. As St. Augustine says, err we may, a heretic we will never be. But we studied carefully this encyclical when it was first published, before we ever dreamed of becoming a Catholic, and we have since constantly had it before our eyes in all we have written on the subject on which it sets forth the Catholic doctrine. We have examined and reëxamined again and again our views in the light of its teaching, and we are unable to discover any instance in which we have really departed from it, or fallen into an error it condemns.

The fall of the unhappy La Mennais may well be held up as a warning to all over-zealous and headstrong individuals who have theories or crotchets of their own for advancing Catholic interests; but, though wholly inexcusable on his part, it may, perhaps, be urged with no less propriety as a warning to those who are more ready to pounce upon a writer for his errors than to help him to discover the truth that would correct them. We cannot help thinking, that, if they who with so much zeal denounced the unhappy abbé, had taken, in a spirit of charity and candor, half as much pains to help him understand the truth he had in view, but which he saw only dimly or fitfully, as they did to prove him in the wrong and the advocate of monstrous errors, he might have been saved. Certainly, his philosophical system was unsound, but his opponents in France combated it with a system about equally unsound. His doctrine that Christianity is the only religion there is, or ever has been, and that it is the universal belief of the race, has its side of truth, which it will not do to overlook, and can no more be un-

reservedly condemned than it can be unreservedly accepted. In opposing it his adversaries did not take the requisite pains to recognize its side of truth, and distinguish it from its side of error. God revealed to man the truth in the beginning, and in that primitive revelation, the tradition of which has never been wholly lost with any nation or tribe, however obscured, mutilated, corrupted, or travestied it may have become, is the type of all the religions which have ever obtained,—the type realized, aimed at, or departed from. All error has, in a certain sense, its origin in the truth, which it misconceives, misinterprets, or misapplies. The grossest and most abominable superstitions of the heathen started from a true principle, and rightly considered bear testimony to the primitive revelation. The greater the truth perverted, the greater and more destructive the error that results; the holier the principle, the grosser and more abominable is its corruption, or the superstition generated by its corruption. That the gods of the heathen were devils or fallen angels, no Christian can doubt, and yet we have just as little doubt that the tradition of the true God was never absolutely lost among any people, or that the worship of devils grew out of the perversion of the true doctrine of good and bad angels, and of the true worship of saints, though not without satanic aid. Did La Mennais mean any thing more than this? Could he have meant that men continued to worship the true God while they worshipped idols? or that the worship they gave to their false gods was really the worship of saints and angels, the Catholic *cultus sanctorum?* We believe no such thing.

The gravest error of La Mennais was in identifying Christianity with the general or universal reason, and making the common consent of the race the authority for doctrine and faith. But even this has a side of truth. The tradition of the primitive revelation is, in some form, universal, and enters into the common reason of the race. With Christians this is still more true, and this internal tradition, if we may so call it, common to all men, and especially to all Christians, is, in some sense, authority for doctrine and faith, and, perhaps, an authority not always duly respected. The error is not in recognizing it, but in substituting it for the positive teaching authority of the church. All the church teaches is not, save in germ, in that common reason, and it is only her positive teaching that brings out what is in it and supplies its deficiencies. In dealing with

La Mennais, his adversaries should have begun by first of all recognizing the side of truth he had and distinguishing it from the error, so as to enable him to see how he could reject the error without at the same time rejecting the truth. Perhaps one of the most fatal errors we can commit, is to assume that a man we see advocating an error has set out deliberately to defend a false doctrine, and that he defends it for the sake of the error. It is never for the sake of the error, but always for the sake of the truth mingled with it and in his mind not distinguished from it, that he defends it. How else can St. Thomas be right when he says, truth is the object of the intellect, and that the intellect can never be false? A man may persist in an error, after it has been pointed out to him, because he may have that false pride which forbids him to own that he has been in the wrong; but ordinarily he persists only because he does not see how he can reject the error without rejecting the truth he has associated with it. This, we think, was the case with La Mennais. There were certain true things and good, which he saw and insisted upon, and which it seemed to him his French adversaries required him to reject, and finding, as he imagined, that they were sustained by the pope, he came, after a severe struggle, to the conclusion that there is no infallible guide for mortals, and no church but the people. This was a conclusion of despair, not of reason. We have no disposition to excuse or to palliate it; but it is, perhaps, permitted us to believe, that, if his French adversaries had themselves had more light and more charity, and had opposed him with more judgment and less passion, he might have escaped the complete shipwreck of his faith. It is hard to believe that when such a man as La Mennais is driven to despair and through despair to arrange himself on the side of the enemies of religion, all the error is on his side, or that his case is less instructive to his violent opponents than to his headstrong followers. There may be a lack of charity and humility on the side of the defenders of orthodoxy, as well as pride and arrogance on the side of those who depart from it.

These remarks, of course, apply in no sense whatever to the encyclical of Gregory XVI., which sets forth the Catholic doctrine on the several matters touched upon. The pope does not name La Mennais and his disciples, and nowhere formally confirms the censure pronounced by the French bishops; in fact, makes no allusion to it whatever. That

censure deserves respectful consideration, but it can by no means be regarded as the judgment of the church, and it is not improbable that, if La Mennais had been more moderate in his language towards the episcopacy, and had agreed with the French bishops in his politics, they would have been less keenly alive to his philosophical and theological errors. French bishops, or a certain number of them affecting to speak for the body, have too frequently been affected by panics, and too often proved themselves ready to sink the bishop in the courtier, to be able to give their censure that weight it might otherwise possess. We should have no special misgivings, though falling under their condemnation, if properly assured that we were in harmony with Catholic doctrine, as declared by the sovereign pontiff. We hold the encyclical to be an infallible exposition of Catholic doctrine in relation to the errors it censures, and we accept it purely and simply, whether the matter censured is theological or political; for though we maintain the freedom and independence of the secular in its own order, we do not recognize in it any rights against the spiritual.

La Mennais and his disciples avowed that they aimed at a thorough restoration or regeneration of Catholicity, and were usually called by those outside neo-Catholics. If they meant what they said, they were simply absurd. "Since, in the words of the fathers of Trent, it is certain," says the encyclical, "that the church has been instructed by Jesus Christ and his apostles, and is taught by the Holy Ghost, who never ceases to suggest to her the truth, it is wholly absurd and supremely injurious to her to propose her restoration or regeneration as necessary to her preservation and growth, as that would be to judge her liable to failure, obscuration, and other inconveniences of this sort. The object of the innovators in this respect is to lay the foundations of a human institution, and to make the church, instead of a divine, a human church, the thing which St. Cyprian held in horror." But though the church can never fail, grow old, or be obscured, and therefore stand in need of restoration, or regeneration, we cannot say the same of nominally Catholic populations. Nothing is more unwise or unjust than to pretend that the conduct of all Catholics is Catholic; for nothing is more certain than that a Catholic population in a particular time or place may forget their high calling, become cold and dead, with their minds darkened by false or defective philosophical or political systems, and

their hearts hardened by love of the world and devotion to sensible goods. They may, and often do, fall below their religion, and have only a name to live; and consequently a regeneration, a restoration, or resuscitation of Catholic life, manners, affections, conduct, may often be a desideratum, and legitimately labored for, as we find in the lives of all great saints who have founded orders or congregations for the salvation of our neighbor. Did La Mennais and his friends really mean any more than this?

It is too much the custom to say the church has done what has been done only by Catholics, to say the church has done this or has done that, when it has been done only by churchmen, and even by these only when acting not as churchmen, but as politicians, as ministers of state, or as simple seculars. Confounding these with the church, we make her responsible for their conduct, and then contend that she has fallen, become corrupt, or obscured, and needs renewal, reform, restoration, or regeneration. This mode of speaking was very common in the Lamennaisian school, and it is universal with non-Catholics, who have no church conception, and hold that the universal church, as we not long since heard even a Catholic archbishop assert in a sermon, is simply "the aggregation of individual believers." The mystic character of the church and her real relation to the Incarnation, is too often overlooked even by Catholics, and the word *church* is often used with an inexcusable looseness, in a manner that excludes both unity and catholicity. We were present at the gathering of a few Catholic friends, and heard two priests, both of unquestionable orthodoxy, maintain that the church would have here a new field for the display of her powers, and would in this New World realize a new Catholicity, when all they really meant was that here, under her fostering care, would be developed a new civilization more strictly in accord with Catholic principles than any that has hitherto existed. This may or may not be so, but there is nothing uncatholic in hoping or believing that it will be so. We can easily conceive that the church has encountered obstacles in the political and social organization of other countries, the despotism of princes, the pride and oppressiveness of privileged classes, the ignorance, degradation, and slavery of the people, that she will not find here; and that if we can succeed in preventing what is objectionable in Europeanism from gaining a footing along with the church, there will be developed here a civilization far truer to

the original principles of natural society, and more in accordance with the principles and wants of supernatural society than she has yet met or been able to develop in her passage down the stream of ages. We ourselves believe it, hope it, and labor for it. Hence the reason why we so often find ourselves in collision with many of our Catholic friends, who identify the civilization of Catholic countries with the Catholic religion itself, and imagine that to have Catholicity here in its full vigor, we must combine it with the secular order, the ideas, habits, and manners of old Europe. We want nothing from Europe, but the Catholic faith and what pertains to it. We do not go to Europeans for lessons in the political and social organization of natural society, for we think in that matter we are some centuries in advance of them. Very little of the actual civilization of Catholic nations is either of Catholic origin, or favorable to the Catholic religion. We want the church here as she exists and has existed in Europe unmodified, unaltered; but we do not think it is uncatholic to wish for a reform, a regeneration even of very large masses of the Catholic populations of Europe and even of other quarters of the globe, not excepting North and South America. There is room for great improvement in their morals, in their life, their manners, their habits, and their secular notions and tendencies; and we think a good Catholic may labor for that improvement without necessarily falling into any error condemned by Gregory XVI., or by any other successor of St. Peter.

La Mennais and his disciples, simple presbyters or laymen, labored to effect important changes in the relations hitherto subsisting in nearly all Catholic countries between the church and the state. They called upon the church to cut herself loose from all connection with the state, to fall back on her own resources as the kingdom of God on earth; and to rely on the affections and voluntary contributions of the faithful, as she did universally before Constantine, and as she does now in Great Britian, Ireland, and the United States. We do not find that the Holy Father disapproved this in principle, and we have been assured that when he sent the late Bishop England to Hayti to settle the ecclesiastical affairs of that republic, he gave him instructions to place them there, if possible, on the same footing they are on in this country. But a measure, though not wrong or undesirable in itself, may yet be objectionable, because impracticable, inopportune, or urged by those who have no

right to urge it. The bishops did not believe the measure could be adopted in France without grave injury to the interests alike of religion and of society, and they, not simple presbyters and laymen, were the proper judges in the case. The pope seems to have censured the movement, chiefly because it was set on foot by persons who had no right to do it, and in opposition to the French episcopacy. "Let the presbyters," he says, "be submissive to the bishops, who, as St. Jerome admonishes them, are the fathers of the soul; let them not forget that the ancient canons of the church forbid them to perform any ministerial act, and to teach or to preach without the permission of the bishops, of whom the account of souls will be exacted. Let them be aware, that they who plot against this order are, as far as in them lies, disturbing the state of the church. It is manifestly culpable and contrary to the laws of the church, which should be respected, to find fault, from our insane license of opinion, with the discipline she has established, and which embraces the administration of sacred things, the rule of manners, and the rights of the church and of her ministers, to charge it with being opposed to certain principles of natural law, or to represent it as defective, incomplete, and subjected to the civil authority."

If this is to be said of presbyters, then, *a fortiori* of laymen. But, we have never to our knowledge arraigned the discipline, or any portion of the discipline, of the church as contrary to the principles of natural law, or as subjected to the civil authority; nor have we had the impudence to ask the church to change in any respect the relations which have subsisted in most Catholic nations between her and the state. We have undoubtedly maintained that portions of her discipline or of her canons were originally adapted to the state of things which she found existing at the time, and to govern the relations of the faithful with the temporal authorities as they were constituted; and that the changes in human affairs have rendered much of this part of her discipline inapplicable, and made changes in it necessary to meet new circumstances and new wants. We have maintained that the relations between the church and the state which subsist in Europe, do not subsist here, and we have expressed ourselves opposed to every effort to introduce them here; first, because such efforts must prove unsuccessful, and second, because we think the interests of religion do not require, and as long as our society remains consti-

tuted as it is, cannot require them to be introduced or reëstablished. What may be called the universal discipline of the church can never be changed, or need changing; but there is a part of her discipline, though just in principle, and while in force equally obligatory on the conscience, that does, and may change with the circumstances of time and place. The church in our judgment, is freer, and more independent here, than she is in any Catholic state in the world. She is entitled here, as a citizen, to the protection of the laws from external violence, and is free to exert herself in all respects according to her own constitution and laws for the salvation of souls. She is not recognized by our laws as a proprietor; but these laws are nevertheless such, if our bishops choose to avail themselves of them, as to secure her the use according to her own discipline of all donations, contributions, or bequests of the faithful for her services or her charities, for the principle of our laws is, that all eleemosynary gifts must be appropriated according to the will of the donor. The entire liberty which the church here enjoys more than compensates for certain privileges or favors she may have secured to her in Europe by concordats. She no doubt has in Austria an advantage which she lacks here, that of having the majority of the population in her communion; but in all other respects her position here is far better than it is in Austria, even under the new concordat. We have never pretended that the union of church and state as it has existed in Europe is wrong; but we hold it to be impracticable and undesirable here, for we believe that where the people are prepared for it the order prevailing here is much the best for religion and for society.

We have never urged the dissolution of the old union of church and state. We have treated it as *un fait accompli* in our own country, and as a result which is indicated by every movement and tendency of the age. We think it is sure sooner or later to come everywhere, and we believe that in the long run the church has more to gain than to lose by it. We do not seek to hasten or to retard what seems to us the inevitable tendency of events. Certain it is, that the change could not be effected in Europe at the present moment without a violent shock, both to religion and society; and the Holy Father says only what simple reason tells every one of us, when he says, "it is not permitted to produce present evil with a view to future good."

The terrible evils that would follow the adoption in old Catholic states of the Lamennaisian policy, are not doubtful; the good contemplated might fail to be obtained. Take the Catholic states and populations as they really are on the continent, with their constitutions, pretensions, habits, manners, ideas, and customs, and it is easy to see that the policy could not be suddenly introduced without a long series of most disastrous conflicts. We believe the order that obtains here is the best where it exists or can be peaceably introduced. So we believe the republican order we have established is, upon the whole, the best possible form of political and social organization; but we certainly would not urge the French people to undertake to throw overboard the emperor, and to establish a republic modelled after ours.

The encyclical certainly condemns those who seek to disturb the concord between the church and the state, and as certainly represents that concord as alike for the interests of religion and of society. This *Review* has not incurred the censure here implied. That concord is desirable for both, and still more for society than for religion. The state hath everywhere need of the church, and cannot discharge properly and beneficially its higher functions without her assistance. But this assistance may be given in different ways according to the different forms of political and social organization adopted. In a government where the people count for nothing, and all power is concentrated in the king or emperor, it can be rendered effectual only by real or virtual concordats with the sovereign. It is only through the prince that the church can reach the state, and hence for her there to cut herself loose from all connection with the state would be to abandon the state to political atheism. But in a republic like ours no formal connection of the church with the government is needed for either party, for she can assist the political order by her direct action on the people themselves. The relations of church and state under the Roman empire are neither necessary nor practicable under a republic like ours, and would not be even if the whole population were sincerely and earnestly Catholic. Under the empire, the church treats with the government; under a republic, where the people are the motive power, she does not need to treat with the government, for she can operate through the faithful, and assist the government by the just principles she inculcates, the lofty sentiments she

inspires in them, and the supernatural virtues she requires and aids them to practise. Establish the same general political order throughout the world that we have established, and the most desirable relations between the church and state will be those which subsist with us, and which are what we call religious liberty, or the full and entire freedom of religion. As this order does not subsist in Europe, different relations and forms of concord between the two powers, for the common interests of religion and society, are there no doubt required.

The real difficulty however, in our times is, that the concord the Holy Father demands no longer exists. The secular order has cut itself loose from the spiritual. The *politicians*, as they were called in the time of Henri Quatre and the *Ligue*, have carried the day; and the peace of Paris, 1856, has incorporated their political atheism into the public law of Europe. The sovereigns consult no longer the interests of religion, but are governed solely by what are called reasons of state—by mere secular policy, before which all moral and religious considerations must give way. Political atheism is now the religion of the state, and the church cannot, whatever her wishes, maintain the concord between true religion and the empire. She may restore it, but not through the sovereigns, for even if one sovereign were well disposed and determined to reëstablish it, he would find himself thwarted by the bureaucracy, or by his ambitious neighbors, who will appeal to the infidel and revolutionary sentiment of the age against him, as we see in the present war of Louis Napoleon and Victor Emanuel against Francis Joseph. The evil will be surmounted and concord restored only by winning back the affections of the people to the faith, and through them recalling the sovereigns to their duty. La Mennais and his party saw this as distinctly as we see it now, and they sought to detach the church from the sovereigns and to enlist her on the side of the people. There is, they alleged, an alliance between the church and the despotic governments of Europe. The clergy, instead of standing by the people and using their moral power on the side of popular freedom, arrange themselves on the side of the oppressors of the people, and exert all their spiritual influence to uphold despotism. This divides Europe into two hostile camps—the people and their friends in the one; and the clergy, the despots, and their slaves and tools, in the other. They called upon the church

to abandon the sovereigns, and to command her faithful children to take sides with the people against them, and go forth and fight manfully the cause of freedom against despotism. Nothing is apparently more simple or more just, since resistance to tyrants is said to be obedience to God; yet practically the matter was not so plain and simple as it appeared. In the first place, the church teaches her children, instead of being taught by them, and she is herself the judge for them what is for the true interests of both natural and supernatural society. In the next place, for her to have complied with the demand would have been for her to espouse the infidel and impious liberalism then and now rife in Europe—to turn revolutionist, preach sedition, and sanction rebellion. This the church could not do, and the encyclical of course condemns the demand, and sets forth the Catholic duty of obedience to the civil magistrate. We cannot perceive that we have on this point fallen under the papal censure. We have opposed the alliance which some of our friends would effect between the clergy and cæsarism, and the attempt of Louis Veuillot and others to bind up the Catholic cause throughout the world with that of the absolute sovereigns of Europe; but we have opposed with equal earnestness and perseverance the alliance of the clergy with the demagogues, and the attempt to unite the cause of Catholicity with that of European liberalism. We gave in 1848, some of our readers may perhaps remember, as much offence by our strictures on Padre Ventura's *Funeral Oration* on O'Connell as we have since given by our strictures on the *Univers*. The pages of this review, from 1847 down to 1850, bear ample testimony to our decided opposition to the alliance sought to be affected by La Mennais and his party. We have not changed since: the question indeed has changed its aspects, but we have not changed in the slightest respect our principles or views. In 1848, the tendency was to treat democracy as a Catholic dogma. The danger then was all on the side of liberalism—ultra-democratic revolutionism, and we met and opposed the danger where it was; since 1851, the danger—the immediate danger we mean—has been on the side of despotism, cæsarism, and on that side we have confronted it. There seem to be publicists who never can understand that one extreme is sure to beget another, and who always suffer themselves to be carried away by the popular passion of the moment. When that passion is for democracy, they are democrats;

when it is for cæsarism, they are cæsarists. They are always echoes or conduits of the popular passion or caprice of the moment. The red-republican revolutions of 1848 were very likely to provoke a reaction in favor of despotism, which, in its turn, was just as likely to provoke another reaction in favor of red-republicanism. We have differed from many of our friends in this, that while they have alternately favored each extreme, we have uniformly opposed both, and done what we could to prevent the Catholic cause from being linked in the public mind with either. It is now generally conceded that we were right in 1848, in opposing the alliance sought to be effected between the clergy and democracy, and it is beginning to be suspected that we have not been wholly wrong in refusing to hail the revival of pagan Rome under the imperial form in France as the restoration of Catholic society in Europe. Events, against which we warned our Catholic friends seven or eight years ago, threaten now to justify our refusal.

The man who is never carried away by the popular passion of the moment, and who steadily resists either extreme, and the extreme that for the moment is the popular one, always finds it hard to prevent his true position from being misunderstood and misrepresented. The fact is we have never favored liberty in the sense of the liberals, or authority in the sense of the cæsarists. We regard the church as a spiritual kingdom set up on the earth by God himself, and we look upon her as complete in herself and sufficient for herself. We have therefore never been able to understand her alliance, or league with any thing outside of herself. In our view she can form an alliance neither with liberalism nor with despotism. We ourselves are attached to constitutional or republican government; we believe it the best possible constitution of natural society both for its own sake and the sake of religion, but we would, if we had the power, no more commit the church to it than we would commit her to cæsarism or to Jacobinism. The church is instituted for the glory of God in the salvation of souls, and may often find that she can better accomplish her mission as things are by submitting to a less favorable political order than by encouraging her children to attempt by a revolution to obtain what under other circumstances would be better. She is the judge of what is, in any given time or place, the most for the interests of religion, and her enlightened and true friends will never attempt to embarrass her by forestalling her

judgment, and linking her cause with one political organization or another, with this political party or with that. We can never lawfully advocate one or another system of political and social organization in the name of the church, or pretend that it is Catholic in the sense that the church must by her own principles always and everywhere command it, or as the one so bound up with her dogmas and her immutable discipline that she can acquiesce in no other, or command her children to be loyal to no other.

We are firmly persuaded that the order we have elsewhere called the Germanic, and which with our feeble ability we defend, is more in accordance with the principles of natural society, and more favorable where it is the established order or where it can peaceably and without violence be established, to Catholic interests, to the freedom and independence of the church, than that which has been resuscitated from pagan Rome, and which before the commencement of the present war in Italy was widely defended as a revival of Catholic society; but we have never pretended that the church adopts it, and anathematizes the Romanic system, or that she ought to do so. There are countries where it is impracticable. The church could not, had she attempted it, have introduced it into the Roman empire before the barbarian conquest, and she cannot establish it now, if she would, in China, Turkey, Russia, Austria, or France. To attempt it in any of these countries would arm the whole secular power against her, and sacrifice the existing interests of religion without gaining any thing for the people or for true freedom. She may dislike the Romanic system as much as we do, but she must for the sake of souls deal with the authorities of those nations as *de facto* governments, and make the best terms with them for religion she can. We must leave the church free to follow the dictates of common prudence.

The church has to deal with the world as she finds it, and, therefore, must often acquiesce in a political *régime* which she is far from approving, and remind her children that it is better to be submissive to an order of things, under which, though by no means a desirable one, it is after all possible to live and to save one's soul, than it is to attempt by violence, by revolution, to overthrow it for another. On this principle the church often requires her children to be loyal to a government despotic in its constitution and oppressive in its conduct, and hence often has the appearance of sustaining

despotism and tyranny when she in reality sympathizes only with justice and freedom. Her mission is one of peace and love, and to fulfil it she wants peace in society, and that she cannot have without government, and there can be no permanent government where the subject is not taught to be submissive and loyal to authority. She cannot encourage sedition, insurrection, rebellion, or revolution, since she is too conscientious to do evil that good may come, and too wise to dream of ameliorating the condition of society and promoting the interests of religion by asserting and acting on principles subversive of all society and of all religion.

The Holy Father certainly censures the revolutionary spirit, and asserts that it is the duty of Catholics to be submissive to the existing governments as loyal subjects. But we nowhere find that he approves the constitution or the conduct of those governments. We cannot discover that on this head our *Review* has ever been in fault. We have indicated the danger of a new revolution which the policy so warmly defended by Louis Veuillot and the party he represents, if persisted in, is sure to provoke, and we have called upon them to desist from that policy, and to cease from their insane efforts to link the cause of the church with the cæsarism resuscitated from pagan Rome, and which should have been suffered to lie dead and buried in the grave prepared for it by the German conquerors of the empire; but our readers know perfectly well that we have never advocated revolution, or defended the right of disobedience in civil matters to the powers that be. The duty of obedience, of loyalty to the prince, has been as strongly stated in the pages of this *Review* as in those of the encyclical of Gregory XVI., and our uniform opposition to the revolutionary movements in Europe, and the fact that we have never failed to brand sedition, insurrection, and rebellion as high crimes against society and deadly sins against God, have, we need not seek to disguise, gained us the hostility of many nominal Catholics, especially those who take an active part in politics, whose Catholicity is strangely commingled with downright revolutionism, and who not seldom are at once ultra democrats and violent cæsarists.

But while we deprecate revolution and hold ourselves bound in conscience to be submissive to the powers that be, in all respects in which they require us to do nothing prohibited by the law of God, we are very far from feeling it incumbent on us to maintain that these powers are im-

maculate, and can do no wrong, or that it is forbidden us as good Catholics to point out the evils of an existing *régime*, or to do what we can to enlist public opinion on the side of true liberty. The strength of despotism is in the weakness, effeminacy, corruption, ignorance, indifference, or moral cowardice of the people. The impracticability of modifying cæsarism where it exists, is in the want of a sound public opinion against it, or in the fact that public opinion, as in France, is favorable either to it or to Jacobinism. Correct public opinion,—there are ways, if no revolutionary doctrines are broached, in which it can be done in the most despotic country where Christianity is professed, —correct public opinion, give the people, and especially the immediate leaders of the people, just views alike of authority and of liberty, and all needed changes or modifications will be gradually and peaceably effected. This is what every publicist should aim at. The revolutions of 1848 interrupted the steady progress of the European governments towards constitutionalism, and by compelling the friends of religion and society to assert the rights of authority and to strengthen the hands of government, prepared the way for the revival of despotism, and have thrown back the cause of liberty fifty or a hundred years. We have lost all the advantages we had gained by the long peace, and have now all our work to do over again. But the extravagances, the errors, the blunders, and the crimes of the revolutionists should never be suffered to drive us into cæsarism, to make us despair of society, or turn us against reasonable and orderly liberty. We may both by prudence and religion be required at times to submit to cæsarism, as a temporary necessity or as the less of two evils, yet we should never give cæsarism our approbation, or cease by every peaceable and legal means in our power to prove that we appreciate the rights of man and of society, and that we are prepared in every legal and practicable way to assert and maintain them. The primitive Christians in civil matters obeyed the pagan emperors, even the most tyrannical and persecuting, but we do not find it recorded that they approved the persecution or justified the tyranny from which they and the whole empire suffered, or that they hesitated to raise their voice, if in calm, still in strong and energetic tones, against both. We have never complained of our friends in France, or elsewhere, for acquiescing in the revival of the empire, and yielding a loyal obedience to

Louis Napoleon as the elected emperor of the French; we have complained of them only for having shamefully abandoned their own principles, for abusing every one of their former friends who has remained true to principle and to honor, for advocating despotism on principle, and defending it, as in 1848 they had defended democracy, as the *Catholic* order, and its revival as the revival of *Catholic* society in Europe,—and for using the little liberty they were suffered to retain to sound the praises of Cæsar and to rivet still firmer the chains of cæsarism, instead of using it to form and maintain a sound and healthy public opinion which would gradually and peaceably force the government to concede to the nation an effective voice in the management of its own affairs. It is they, not we, who really incur the censure the pope pronounces against the revolutionists; for Napoleon III., their master and their idol, not only avows, but boasts his adherence to revolutionary principles, since he professes to recognize and continue the revolution of 1789, in which were contained the germs of all subsequent European revolutions.

The Holy Father censures in severe terms *Indifferentism*, or the pretence that one religion is as good as another, and that it makes no difference of what religion a man is, whether of any or none, providing he maintains a certain moral decorum. We need not dwell on this, for we have made many enemies by the earnestness with which we have insisted on the dogma that there is no salvation out of the church. There are here and elsewhere many Catholics who are latitudinarian in their feelings, and are quite shocked to hear the doctrine of exclusive salvation asserted. They regard that doctrine as uncharitable, bigoted, intolerant, and altogether unsuitable to the liberal and enlightened age in which we live. We are, we think, in no danger of being included in their number, and we leave them to settle the matter with the doctrine of the church, so as to escape the papal censure, the best way they can.

The encyclical also censures the false notions with regard to liberty of conscience, so much in the fashion both then and now. "From this impure source of indifferentism," says the Holy Father, "flows that absurd and erroneous maxim, or rather that delirium—that liberty of conscience for every one is to be asserted and maintained. This most pestiferous error has the way prepared for it by the unrestrained freedom of opinions diffused far and wide, to the

grave injury of both religious and civil society; and from which some have the extreme impudence to pretend that certain advantages may result for religion; but what worse death to the soul, as said St. Augustine, than the freedom of error?" The liberty or freedom of conscience here censured is that which grows out of indifferentism, and which presupposes that there is no difference between truth and error, right and wrong. It is the assertion of the absolute freedom of every man to do what seems to him right in his own eyes, or to live as he lists, and is only another name for universal license, and wholly incompatible with all religion and morality, and all society, religious or secular. This error cannot be charged against this *Review*, for it has always maintained that no man has the moral right to err or to follow a false conscience. There may be, and doubtless are, cases in which error is excusable or inculpable, but every man is bound to do his best to have a good conscience,—to know and conform to the truth as God has revealed it.

But it does not follow from this that the state must take upon itself to suppress by force every error in belief or practice against religion, or that it may not recognize and protect before the civil law the equal freedom of all religions or of all consciences that enjoin nothing contrary to the law of natural society. The state, since it holds its power from God—*non enim est potestas nisi a Deo*—is under the law of God, and bound to place the interests of religion above all others; but it may often happen that the interests of religion are best promoted by placing the church and the sects on a footing of perfect equality before the law, and the state's recognizing its own incompetency in spirituals, as is the case with us in this country. The nations, in their present mood at least, cannot be held in the faith by civil enactments or the infliction of civil pains and penalties for heresy. In those states where Catholicity is the civil law, or enacted and upheld by the civil law, we find almost universally a bitter feeling of hostility towards the pope and the clergy; and that the people, however fond they may be of shows and processions, or however careful they may be in the observance of the external forms of the church, to a fearful extent lack the soul of religion. We demand for Catholics in all non-Catholic states the full liberty of conscience before the law; and we do it on principles that would authorize non-Catholics to demand it for

themselves in Catholic states. We cannot understand how what is right in our case can be wrong in theirs. Catholicity is always just and always consistent with itself. The tendency to the civil freedom of conscience is universal in our modern world, and that freedom is now at least partially recognized in France, Belgium, Sardinia, and Austria, and is beginning to be in some of the Protestant continental states, as well as in Great Britain. We do not say that the church has not the right, when she judges proper, to call in the secular arm to protect her against the external violence of her enemies; we say she has and must have that right as the representative of the spiritual order, but we deny to the state the right in its own name, or *motu proprio*, to enact what shall or shall not be the religion of its subjects. It is bound to protect the church of God in the free and full enjoyment of all her rights, but it has and can have no spiritual competency, no more competency to establish Catholicity as a part of the civil constitution than it has to prohibit its belief and practice. We do not urge any change in the legislation of any Catholic state on this subject, for that is not our business, but we believe that the order established in this republic will ere long be adopted in all civilized states, and are fully convinced in our own mind that the church will ultimately gain far more than she will lose by it.

The encyclical brands with severe censure, as growing out of the same false system, the so-called freedom of the press, or the unrestrained freedom of publication of all sorts of books and writings, however false or pestiferous they may be. This censure does not touch this *Review*, for we have never defended the freedom censured. We claim the right to exercise, holding ourselves responsible for its abuse, the freedom of opinion and publication conceded us by the church, and not incompatible with her authority, doctrine, and discipline. This freedom we will suffer no merely human authority to deny us or to abridge. But this freedom, we have said over and over again, is not a freedom or right against the church, but from and against all not clothed for our conscience with her authority. We have no rights against her, nor against churchmen in so far as commissioned by her. We recognize her full right of censorship, and we seldom publish an article in the *Review*, without submitting it before publication to the revision of a theologian, and shall always submit to such revision when it can be obtained.

We recognize no man's right to publish an erroneous or immoral book or writing, and we are aware of no government that does not place some sort of restriction on the press, either by way of prevention or punishment. So far as it concerns the spiritual order there is no difficulty in the question for Catholics, for the church has for all Catholics the right of censorship; but the civil question has grave difficulties, and which it is not easy to solve. We know the most rigid censorship established by the state has proved ineffectual to prevent the publication and circulation of bad books, and it generally is more effectual in suppressing good books than bad. There certainly are books which the police ought to prevent the circulation of, but no police can prevent every thing corrupt or corrupting from reaching the people. How far the police should intervene or in what form, it is hard to say. Our present supreme pontiff, as temporal prince, relaxed materially the censorship which had been maintained under his predecessor, and the free discussion of political questions was allowed all through the papal states. The question, in our judgment, is a practical question which must be answered differently in different countries and under different circumstances. The English and American system, that of freedom, but with responsibility for its abuse, is unquestionably the best, as it is the only practicable system, for Englishmen and Americans. Whether the continental system, which prevents the publication, or at least the writing of many a good book, and hardly prevents the writing or publication of a single bad book, is the best for the continental nations, it is their province, not ours, to decide. We will only add, that there are times when we have more to hope from meeting false liberalism with liberty than from meeting it with repression, which in the present absence of respect for authority can seldom be resorted to with advantage.

The encyclical certainly condemns, under all its aspects, and in all its applications, liberty in the sense defended by the so-called European liberals, but we respectfully submit, that it pronounces no censure on true liberty, or on liberty in the sense we have defended it. It is always an "audacious liberty," "a liberty without bounds," an "unbridled liberty," a liberty that respects no authority, no law, no order, and is in reality only unbridled license or pure Jacobinism, that is condemned. There is no censure of that orderly constitutional liberty which denies cæsarism, and

asserts the right of the nation to a legal and effective voice in the management of public affairs, as in Great Britain and the United States,—the only liberty we have advocated. This *Review* has never advocated, and we trust never will advocate, liberty in the sense the encyclical censures it. The liberty we advocate, is not liberty without, but with and by law. This is wherefore, while we condemn cæsarism, which is power without law, we equally condemn red-republicanism, which is liberty without law, and in principle simple anarchy. We defend republicanism, but authority is needed in a well-ordered republic, and should be held sacred and inviolable in a republic as well as in an absolute monarchy. There is no true liberty without authority, and it cannot subsist where the supremacy of law is not maintained, and wise and just laws are not enacted, and faithfully executed. Disloyalty is a vice, and treason is a crime in a republic no less than in a monarchy.

The great difficulty in our times grows out of the fact, that false notions alike of liberty and authority everywhere obtain. In old Europe, the party that defends authority tends to cæsarism, while the party that demands liberty tends to red-republicanism or Jacobinism. The English and American mind formerly steered comparatively clear of both of these errors, and adhered to the principles insisted on by all the great doctors of the church, prior to Bossuet, who mistook the political system of pagan Rome under the Cæsars for that presented in the Holy Scriptures. But there are plain indications that it is now following the continental mind, and in danger of identifying authority with despotism, and liberty with Jacobinism, as in France, Italy, and Austria. When, in 1848, we condemned revolutionism, we were denounced as an absolutist, and now when we condemn cæsarism, we are denounced as a revolutionist, and some over-zealous Catholics have read us, or threatened to read us, out of the church. This shows that public sentiment, even here, identifies liberty with liberalism, and authority with cæsarism, while the rapid strides we are making towards each, may well alarm the patriot and the Christian.

Now this *Review* holds that cæsarism and Jacobinism, absolutism and liberalism, are alike opposed to liberty. We want order with liberty, and liberty with order, and resist alike the despotism of Cæsar and the despotism of the mob. We wish to be the slaves neither of courtiers nor of demagogues, and therefore accept none of the simple forms of

government, but support, whenever practicable, for the constitution of natural society, what are called mixed governments, or governments into which enter the several simple elements of government, so combined as to balance each other, and temper or restrain within given limits each other's action. We do this, because we think it best for natural society, and the most favorable, as a general rule, to religious interests. We do not call this order *Catholic*, for the term Catholic we appropriate to what is in, or pertains to the church or supernatural society; and this is in natural society, and may be accepted by non-Catholics, and labored for with as much earnestness and good faith, as by Catholics. It is not Catholic, any more than the institutions of this country are Catholic; but it accords with Catholicity as natural reason accords with supernatural faith, and it is only the view of a superficial logic that concludes because the church, a divine institution, is under the supreme pontiff, that imperialism in the state is the government that best accords with Catholicity, for the church and the state belong to different orders, and the conclusion rests on an analogy which does not, and cannot exist, till you can assert the same supernatural assistance for the prince in the government of temporal affairs, that we on the strength of our Lord's promises assert for the successor of Peter in the government of spiritual affairs.

We hope these remarks will remove our friend's misgivings, and also be found to have an interest aside from that of vindicating the orthodoxy of this *Review*. Every periodical must, if it intends to have a living interest, treat the questions of the day as they rise, and as these questions are perpetually changing their aspects, the periodical must continually change the aspects under which it treats them. The editor has before his mind at each successive moment all he has previously said; and writes with the presumption that it is also before the mind of his readers. Thus he trusts that what he says to-day will be understood in the light of what he said yesterday. But unhappily what he said yesterday was not read, or is forgotten, and attention is only paid to what he says to-day, which is incomplete without what was said before. Many readers, too, forget what is said in one article in the same number, before they finish reading another, and hardly one seems to think it incumbent on him to read through a single article before pronouncing judgment on it. We have found some of our Catholic

journals condemning one article for its doctrine, and highly landing another in the same number, containing precisely the same doctrine. We pray our readers not to forget when reading what we say of liberty, what we have said of authority, and when reading what we have said of authority, not to forget what we say of liberty, for the one is qualified by the other.

ROMANIC AND GERMANIC ORDERS.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1859.]

The volume before us, by the late Dr. M'Elheran, a man who had gained some notoriety by his ethnological lucubrations, is not a work we can conscientiously commend, or even one that we think worth the labor of a serious refutation. The author, we have been assured, was an amiable and estimable man, a sincere patriot and an earnest Catholic, but the book seems to us to be written in a very bad spirit, disfigured by the most bitter and unwarrantable prejudices, incapable of serving either the cause of religion or science, and fitted only to stir up evil passions, and to injure the cause it espouses. We have introduced it, not to review it, but simply to use it as a text for some remarks we wish to offer on the theory which it favors—that Catholicity is Celtic, and Protestantism is Germanic; a theory which is very widely defended by Protestant Germans, Englishmen, and Americans, and sometimes by Irish and French Catholics.

We have in previous articles shown that the key to modern history is not, as some would have it, a struggle between the papacy and the empire, but a struggle between two systems of civilization; the one the Romanic, or that which obtained in the Roman empire under the Cæsars, and thence called by us cæsarism, and the other the Germanic, or that which the German conquerors of the empire brought with them, or which was developed among them after the conquest, under the influences of Catholicity. As we gave the

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**The Condition of Women and Children among the Celtic, Gothic, and other nations.* By John M'Elheran, M. R. C. S. E. Boston: 1858.

preference to the Germanic system, we have been accused by some of our Celtic friends of placing the Germanic race before the Celtic, and the Anglo-Saxons (so called) above the Irish. By systems of civilization, it has been asserted, we meant simply men; and by the struggle of two orders of civilization it is assumed that we meant a struggle of races. This was not our meaning; and our main purpose was, by showing the struggle has been one of systems of civilization, simply to show that the theory that either Catholicity or liberty is the monopoly either of the Celtic race or of the Germanic race, has no historical foundation. This theory, that Catholicity is adapted to the Celtic nations, and Protestantism to the Germanic, which for the Protestant is to the glory of the Germanic race, and for the Catholic is to the glory of the Celtic race, underlies the whole of Dr. M'Elheran's book, and is indeed a theory which we have occasion almost every day to combat, either against the Catholic or against the Protestant. To a Catholic born in this country, where the majority of his countrymen are or believe themselves of Germanic, Gothic, or Teutonic origin, and the majority of his Catholic brethren are or believe themselves of Celtic origin, this theory is a constant annoyance, in fact, a real embarrassment. For the American Catholic to accept it, is to confirm the majority of his countrymen in their prejudices against his religion, and for him to undertake to refute it is to arm the prejudices of the majority of his Catholic brethren against himself. It is impossible for the Catholic publicist to do his duty if he passes it over in silence, for it not only confirms Protestants by all the prejudices of race in their Protestantism, but it prevents the mass of our Catholic population from making the proper efforts for the conversion of our non-Catholic countrymen, and tends to keep them a foreign colony in the Union.

Neither the Catholic nor the Protestant advocate of this theory seems to be aware of its real character. The Catholic who defends it shows that he regards his religion as a gentile or heathen religion, and that he does not hold it to be catholic. The essential or characteristic feature of gentilism, under the present point of view, is that religion goes by races, and that each people or nation should have and adhere to a religion of its own. Gentilism stands for national religions as opposed to the one catholic religion, and is, as we often say, the primitive apostasy, originating in the confusion of tongues at Babel, and the consequent division and

dispersion of the human race. Religion is catholic only on condition that it teaches all nations and races, or is equally necessary for the Celt and the Teuton, the Greek and the barbarian, and alike adapted to the nature, the condition, and the wants of all men. That Protestants, who bear to the Christian church the relation borne by the ancient gentiles, with their idolatries and superstitions, to the patriarchal religion as preserved in the synagogue, should hold that religion goes by races and nations, is not to be wondered at, for it is in accordance with its genius, and the necessities of its nature; but that a Catholic should so hold is not a little marvellous, for it is simply a denial of the religion he professes. A Teutonic or Celtic, an American or a European, an English or an Irish religion were necessarily a gentile and not a catholic religion. By advocating such a religion, the Catholic renounces his own religion by denying its catholicity, and the Protestant confesses his to be gentilism, and therefore not Christianity, which we suppose it will be conceded is opposed to all gentile religions.

The theory we are considering rests on the assumption that Catholicity is restricted in the main to the so-called Latin nations, which are said to be Celtic, and that Protestantism is confined to the confessedly Germanic or Teutonic nations. But it is not certain that the so-called Latin nations are really Celtic nations; and if they were, the theory would not be sustained, for Catholicity is by no means confined to them. The Germanic nations were all, for ages, the leading Catholic nations of the world. The church has never had more faithful or more devoted children than the German Franks and Anglo-Saxons, from the seventh to the eleventh century. About one-half of the Germans in Germany proper are still Catholics, while among nations and races not claimed as Celtic, Catholicity counts a larger number of children than she has in the so-called Latin nations themselves, including among those nations the Irish. The so-called Latin nations cannot give more than about eighty millions out of the two hundred millions who acknowledge the authority of the church, and these eighty millions ought to be reduced by nearly one-third for the non-Catholics, unbelievers, and Protestants contained in these same Latin nations.

Protestantism, again, is by no means confined to nations or individuals of the Gothic or Teutonic race. It owes more to France than to Germany, for they were the French kings,

courtiers, and writers that prepared the way for its birth, and it was France that, by leaguing with Sweden and the disaffected princes of the empire, preserved it from being extirpated, at least deprived of its political *status* in the early part of the seventeenth century. It is not too much to say, that, if there is a Protestant nation in Europe to-day, the world owes it to France, to France that goes to war to sustain the Crescent against the Cross, and to subject to the anti-papal policy of her emperor, the principal Catholic empire of Europe. France has at present, indeed, less than a million of inhabitants that profess Protestantism, because it is the French fashion to follow Voltaire and Rousseau rather than Luther and Calvin; yet the real organizers of Protestantism, the Protestantism that has saved the pretended reformation and perpetuated its heresy and schism, were Frenchmen, and for aught we know men of Celtic origin, we mean John Calvin and Theodore Beza. But for Calvinism, purely French in its origin, the Lutheran movement would hardly have survived Luther himself. The provinces of France where Protestantism at first most prevailed, and where it still has its strongholds, are precisely those in which the Germanic element is weakest, and the Celtic, or Aquitanian, is the strongest. France owed, under God, her escape from becoming a Protestant nation principally to Lorraine, and the Lorraine princes, the Guises, of Germanic, not Celtic descent. Even to-day the most Germanic are the most Catholic departments of France. The French Canadians, for the most part Catholic, are descendants from the Norman and therefore Gothic, as well as from Breton and therefore Celtic ancestors. The Scotch, our Irish ethnologists assure us, are a Celtic people, and there is not a more thorough-going Protestant people on earth. The English are a leading Protestant nation, but Dr. M'Elheran contends that the English are for the most part of Celtic origin. There are no fiercer Protestants to be found than the Irish Protestants, both in and out of Ireland. The great body of the people of the United States are as stanch Protestants as are to be found in Scotland, England, or Prussia, and Dr. M'Elheran, it is well known, claims the American people as a Celtic people, and professed to demonstrate by diagrams in this city that they retain the Celtic type of face and skull. The Magyars also are by no means of German origin or character, and yet the great body of them are Protestants.

Were we to forget that God has made of one blood all

the nations of men, and that Catholicity is catholic, not gentilistic, we should be disposed to take the reverse of this famous theory, and to maintain that the Celtic people by their natural genius and temperament are far less fitted to be Catholic than are the Germanic or Teutonic nations. The German genius and temperament, it seems to us, are naturally far less averse to Catholicity, than the so-called Celtic. An Irishman or a Frenchman, by the grace of God becomes and remains a good Catholic, none better; but his nature is always not only *un*-Catholic, as all nature is, since Catholicity is supernatural, but *anti*-Catholic. French and Irish literature, whenever it is not formally religious, dogmatic or ascetic,—whenever it falls back into the natural order, is not merely below Catholicity, but is opposed to it. The French mind, the leading Latin mind of our day, conceives very generally of the two orders, the natural and the supernatural, as two mutually antagonistic orders. It opposes faith to reason, grace to nature, and seems always to take it for granted that the one can exist only by the destruction of the other. Hence it tends always either to Jansenism or to rationalism,—to grace without nature, or to nature without grace. Hence again we find with the French and even the Irish, far more Catholic piety or sentiment than Catholic principle, and a greater horror with the latter of eating meat on Friday than of lying or stealing, and with the former of misplacing a genuflection than of rejecting a dogma. With both their Catholicity seems to us to be embraced, retained, and submitted to in spite of their natural repugnance to it, in the very face and eyes of nature, not by its aid, or in accordance with its dictates. We say not this as a disparagement of the Catholicity of either, for it is really no disparagement at all; but as a conclusive proof that the Celtic or Latin nations, if Catholic, are not so in consequence, as the theory we are combating assumes, of their natural genius, temperament, and tendencies. As far as we can judge, the contradiction between the church and German nature is far less striking than the contradiction between her and Celtic nature. We find in German and English popular literature, for instance, far more that is in accordance with Catholic principle, though not with Catholic dogma, than in the popular literature of nations said to be Celtic. The most corrupting and licentious poetry in our language we owe to the Irish Catholic, Thomas Moore, in whose honor societies are formed and festivals held by Catholics in this country, and

who threatens to be in the affections of his countrymen in America, a formidable rival to St. Patrick. As far as we are acquainted with it, the most immoral popular literature, literature that is the most dangerous to purity, honesty, and even faith, to be found in the whole civilized world, is that of France and Italy. What must we think of those good, pious abbesses who used the *Decamerone* for spiritual reading in their convents? M. Audin makes a great ado about the coarse, low language of Luther, but Luther's language was refined and chaste in comparison with the contemporary habits, customs, language, and deeds of the polished Italians in Rome and Florence, to say nothing of other parts of Italy. Certain it is, that the so-called Celtic or Latin nations, are not Catholic by force of nature; and their long and steady adherence to Catholicity, in spite of their natural repugnance to it, is really, if duly considered, a most convincing argument that it is really from God and sustained by his supernatural providence. The Catholicity of Ireland is to us a standing miracle, for the Irish are the last people in the world whose nature would lead them to accept and adhere to the Catholic Church.

It is necessary, then, both for Catholics and Protestants, to give up their theory which reduces the Catholic question to an ethnological question, and explains the differences of religion by the differences of race. There are and can be no real differences of race, for God has made of one blood all the nations of men, and we are all his offspring. All men, white or black, yellow or copper-colored, are of the same race, have the same nature, and are descended from the same original pair. Pretended science, we know, attempts to controvert this; but we know also that it attempts it without any real success. Everybody knows that difference of color, even in the animal and vegetable world, indicates no difference of species. The ewe brings forth twins, the one white and the other black. Who pretends that a bay horse must needs be of a different species from the horse that is black? Science, to overrule tradition, or the dogmas of faith, must be science, not conjecture, a guess, an opinion, a plausible hypothesis, or even a probability. It must be real science, absolutely certain, leaving no possible room for doubt or cavil. We do not say that science has as yet demonstrated, we do not know that it ever will be able to demonstrate, the unity of the human race, or that all men have sprung from the same original couple;

but we do say, that whatever its pretensions, it has established nothing to the contrary; that, if it has not demonstrated the truth of revelation, it has proven nothing against it; and knowing, as we do *aliunde*, that the revelation is from God, who is truth itself, and can neither deceive nor be deceived, we dare assert that it never will. We accept science, whenever it is science, but we know beforehand that whatever professes to repugn the truth of revelation is not science.

A remarkable instance, in proof of this, may be found in what has been called metagenesis, or in the process of reproduction, a change of species. The aphid, it was said, produces an animal of a different species from itself; this produces still another, whose product returns again to the aphid. When we first heard one of our scientific friends state this, we assured him that it could not be true, for we know theologically that God has created all things after their kind, and each species reproduces its like; and, therefore, there can be no metagenesis in the case, and what has been so called must be simply a peculiar process of reproduction. This the late Dr. Burnham, of Boston, who died all too soon for science, found in the case of the aphid by long and patient observation to be actually the fact. Science has never yet possessed itself of a well-authenticated case of metagenesis. When between the alleged scientific discovery and a real Scriptural doctrine there is found a discrepancy, we are not to conclude that the Scriptural doctrine is untrue, but that our science is incomplete, has rushed to a too hasty induction, and further observation or experiment is necessary. We, therefore, leave science to take its course, and rest perfectly satisfied with the Christian doctrine or the teaching of the Holy Scriptures, that all men have originally sprung from the same Adam and Eve, are made of one blood, brothers of the same family. The brotherhood of the human race, however abused by philanthropists and French Jacobins, is a Christian dogma, and hence the Christian religion, in opposition to gentilism, is catholic, and if adapted to one man equally adapted to all men, in every age and nation.

We do not accept under any form the modern doctrine of races, which is only a reproduction of ancient gentilism, exploded by the Christian religion, and always condemned by the Catholic Church. There are and can be in the human family no radical differences of race. All have the same

nature, and that nature is one, invariable, and indestructible in all. Whatever differences we find between nation and nation, or people and people, are differences not of nature or race, but of development, manners, customs, and usages, and pertain to the category called by the peripatetics *habitus*, not to that of substance. We recognize different orders of civilization, but not different races. There is, moreover, no such broad line of distinction between the Celtic and Teutonic families as is just now pretended. It is even yet a moot point whether the people called Celts or Keltæ, inhabiting ancient Gaul, and the people called Germans by Tacitus, dwelling beyond the Rhine, were not one and the same people, though divided into different nations or bodies politic. Peloutier, in his learned and elaborate *Histoire des Celtes*, and after him Beaufort in his *La République Romaine*, contend that the Germans were Celts; and some learned German authors with superior erudition and equal ability contend that the Celts against whom Cæsar fought in Gaul were Germans, and go far to prove it from the names of persons and places, all of which so far as they have been transmitted to us, are significant in German, if not indeed pure German names. How the fact may be it is not for us to decide; but this much we hold to be certain, that the Celtic people belonged to the great Indo-Germanic or Aryan family of nations. This their language, which is undeniably Aryan, would seem to place beyond question.

The Celts and Germans have both migrated from the same old Japetic homestead in upper Asia, whence have migrated all the western or European nations. The Celts, probably, were not the oldest migration; they were most likely preceded by the Pelasgi and the Iberians; the former settling a part or all of Asia Minor, Greece, insular and continental, Epirus, Illyricum, and southern Italy; the latter the north coast of Africa, whence they crossed over into Spain, and extended themselves to Ireland, perhaps also to Britannia. The Celts came later by a more northerly route, ascended the valley of the Danube, extended themselves through the ancient Norieum, reached and crosed the Rhine, and peopled the country which the Greeks called Keltica, whence they made excursions into Spain, where they mingled with the Iberians, and hence were called Celtiberians, passed or repassed the Alps, and founded settlements in northern Italy, now Lombardy, and in what the Romans called Cisalpine Gaul. They probably added to

their possessions the British Isles and Ireland. The Germans followed at an unknown interval of time, pased into Europe by the Thracian Bosporus, the Crimea, and north of the Euxine, spread themselves though southern Russia, the Danubian principalities, up the valley of the Danube, south to the Rhætian Alps and the Rhine, north to the Carpathian mountains and the Vistula, and west to the ocean, as Plutarch tells us, in several places overlapping or driving out their Celtic predecessors. They extended themselves up the Northern Ocean, and occupied all Scandinavia, which would seem to have become the principal seat of the Gothic branch of the family. The name of *Germans* was recent in the time of Tacitus, and perhaps has never been applied till quite lately to the whole family. As has been maintained in the *Conversations of Our Club*, they are the people called by the ancient historians Scythians, who migrated eastward and southward as well as westward and northward, and are mentioned under the names of Asi, Sagetes, Assagetes, Massagetes, Gettæ, Guttones, Gottones, Teutones, that is to say, Goths, Teutons, or Teutscher, Deutscher, Dutch, or Germans. They are probably the people who, under the name of Gotti or Scoti invaded Ireland, and gave it the name of Scotia, for the Scots, according to Irish tradition, were *Σκύθαι*, Scythians, so that the Irish Milesians were Goths, Germans, *Saxons*, by origin!

The difference between Celts and Germans is doubtless owing to the different epochs at which they respectively migrated from the old homestead in Asia. The Celts migrated at an epoch nearer than the Germans to the time of the dispersion, and therefore at an earlier stage in the development of the Japetic civilization, which they were forced to continue in circumstances and under influences different from those of the mother country. Differences of language, manners, customs, usages, would inevitably spring up, and in time make the colonists seem a different people from the family that remained at home, especially if there was kept up little or no communication between them. So, notwithstanding the constant intercourse kept up between us and the mother country from the first, the American character is very different from the English, and there are great differences, even where the words remain the same, in the English language as spoken by the two nations. How much greater would have been the difference, if all intercourse, social, political, commercial, and literary, had been

broken off from the first? The Celtic migration, though subsequent to the Iberian, was evidently before the family, whence the sept or clan, had been fully developed into the nation, and when the divergence between the Japetic and Semitic dialects had only commenced. That of the Germans came after both had far advanced. Hence, we should expect to find the political development of the Celts less than that of the Germans, more traces with them of the original patriarchal order, and more resemblances in their dialect than in the German with the Semitic family of languages. And such we believe is the fact. These differences between Celts and Germans, be they greater or be they less, however, militate nothing against the identity of the origin of the two families.

Dismissing, then, the theory that differences of religion are to be explained ethnologically, or by differences of race, we must still meet another branch of the same theory, namely, that liberty is Germanic and despotism Celtic, whence it is concluded that Protestantism is the religion of liberty, and Catholicity the religion of despotism. Mr. George P. Marsh, a most estimable man, and really one of the most erudite men in New England, maintained this with great ability and learning, some years since, in three lectures on the characteristics of the northern or Gothic nations, which he contrasts with the southern or so-called Celtic nations. Mr. Marsh, if we recollect aright,—for his lectures are not just now within our reach,—maintains that the Gothic nation are marked by a strong sense of individuality, self-reliance, and independent thought and reflection, while the southern, or Celtic nations, lack individualism and self-reliance, look to the external rather than to the internal, tend rather to the sensuous than to the intellectual, to feel rather than to think, and seek the approbation of others rather than of themselves, are, as we may say, vain rather than proud. Hence, the Celt finds the Catholic religion, with its imposing forms, its pompous and splendid ritual, its strong appeal to the senses and the imagination, its definite creed, and absolute authority, more congenial to his nature than Protestantism; while the Goth finds the stern simplicity and rigidly intellectual and deeply spiritual character of Protestantism more to his taste and judgment. The strong sense of society, of authority, characteristic of the Celtic nations, favors a monarchical organization of the state, and even despotic government; the deeper interior sense, the greater

self-reliance, and the stronger individualism of the Gothic nations favor liberty, and make for them free institutions or self-government both desirable and practicable. Dr M'Elheran, without accepting all of Mr. Marsh's reasoning, comes very much to the same conclusion, as do not a few of our Celtic Catholics, only they consider the conclusions honorable to the Celt and to the Catholic religion, while Mr. Marsh considers it more especially honorable to the Goth and to Protestantism.

We have already disposed of this theory, so far as Catholicity is concerned. It, moreover, is based to a great extent on a misapprehension of the real character of Catholicity. Catholicity, in its external service, its rites, and its ceremonies, is fitted to enlist in the worship of God, as it should be, the whole man—the senses and the imagination, as well as the intellect and the heart; but to supose that it is purely external, capable of satisfying only the senses and imagination, or the purely æsthetic wants of man, without supplying food for his deeper spiritual wants, or to suppose that it refers merely to the external authority, without making any appeal to reason or the witness within, is to mistake wholly its real character. The Gothic or northern nations tend, perhaps, more to mysticism in both a good and a bad sense, than the purely Celtic nations, if, indeed, any such nations there are; but the profoundest German mystics that have ever meditated or written have been Catholics, and they have found Catholicity supplying all the food for contemplation and meditation they could desire. Mr. Marsh also mistakes, as do many others, the character of Protestantism. Protestantism has less than Catholicity to strike the senses and the imagination, does less to meet our æsthetic wants, but it has also less to meet the intellect and the heart. Protestants have rejected much that Catholics have, but they have retained nothing in any order that Catholics have not. Protestantism is less intellectual than Catholicity, as well as less beautiful, and affords less scope for deep thought, for the higher exercises of reason, and the profounder meditation of the soul. This is the testimony borne by every one who knows equally well both religions. While, therefore, we should in the main agree with Mr. Marsh, in his estimate of the characteristics of the northern nations, we should conclude against him, and maintain that they accord better with Catholicity than with Protestantism. Protestantism, in our judgment, is hardly less anti-Germanic than anti-Catholic.

The conclusion, as it affects the religious question, we reject without further remark; but as it affects liberty and despotism, something more needs to be said, for it directly or indirectly sets forth the only objection to our religion that has much real weight in our day with intelligent and fair-minded non-Catholics. The conclusion that the Celtic tendency is to despotism, what we call cæsarism, and the Gothic or Germanic tendency is to liberty, it is attempted to support by facts. It is assumed, in the first place, that the so-called Latin nations are Celtic nations, an assumption which Dr. M'Elheran is is as ready to make as Mr. Marsh, and then from this it is concluded that the Celtic race tends to cæsarism, because, as a matter of fact, cæsarism does actually predominate in all or nearly all the so-called Latin nations. The order of civilization that actually obtains in these nations makes the state or society absolute, and hardly retains, in the political order, a vestige of real individual liberty. In them prevails, in a greater or less degree, that huge system of centralized despotism we find in imperial Rome, both before and after Constantine the Great. On the other hand, the freest states, the only free states, in Christendom are of Germanic origin, and what for the Catholic is still worse, are Protestant, or at least non-Catholic, as Great Britain and the United States. Our Celtic friends agree with our German opponents that the so-called Latin nations are Celtic, and that the order of civilization that obtains in them is Celtic civilization. Hence when we condemned the Latin civilization, under the political point of view, our Irish friends unhesitatingly accused us of making war on the Celtic in favor of the Anglo-Saxon civilization, and cried out against our excessive Anglo-Saxonism.

Now, for our part, we are disposed to defend the Celtic family against the calumnies of its own members as well as of its enemies. We are not prepared to concede, as an ethnological question, that the southern nations, that is to say, the Italians, the French, the Spaniards, and the Portuguese, are, properly speaking, Celtic nations. The Celts may have had settlements in Spain, but the peninsula was never Celtic. It was Iberian, as were the original Irish, or the people the Milesians found settled in the island, and whom tradition says they conquered. The original inhabitants of southern Gaul were Aquitanians, an Iberian family, not Celts, and the Belgæ, who possessed the northern part

of Gaul in the time of Julius Cæsar, and who had conquered both Britain and Ireland, were in all probability a Germanic or Teutonic people. Helvetia and part of Italy were Celtic, but the original inhabitants of central and southern Italy, with Sicily, were, it is pretty certain, unless we except the Rasena or Etrurians of unknown origin, Pelasgians, and the Greeks of Magna Græcia, as well as the Hellenes in Greece proper, and the Romans, belonged undoubtedly to the Germanic, not to the Celtic family. But be this as it may, all these countries had been subdued by the Romans, and completely romanized long before the Germanic conquest. The Celts of Brittany are not the original Gauls, but Celts who escaped from Albion, now England, during the period of the Saxon conquest of that island, and belong to the same family as the Welsh, a different people from the Irish. After the Roman conquest and four hundred years of Roman possession and despotic rule, these countries were all overrun and subjugated by the Germans,—Burgundians, Vandals, Ostrogoths, Visigoths, and Franks, and in them all the governing people from that day to this have been of Germanic origin. It will not do then to call them Celtic nations. There may be Celtic blood remaining in them, but the Germanic and Romanic elements predominate.

But conceding that these nations are really Celtic, the political and civil order which obtains in them is not Celtic; it is, abstracting what is due to Germany and the church, Græco-Roman. If our Celtic friends go further, and contend, as some of them actually do, that both the Greeks and Romans were Celts, we still deny that the civilization which obtains in the so-called Latin nations is Celtic. That civilization is in the main resuscitated imperialism, which the Romans themselves did not originate, but borrowed from the East, and which is of Chamitic, not Japetic or Celtic origin. There is not a trace of that huge system of centralized despotism, brought to its perfection under Diocletian, who reorganized the empire, to be found amongst any purely Celtic people, ancient or modern, that we have ever heard of. The tendency of the Celtic people has never been in that direction, but usually in a contrary direction. The misfortunes of the Celtic family in all times have been due to their lack of unity—to their disunion, their divisions, their disintegrating spirit, to their devotion to the sept or clan instead of the nation. We see this in the ancient Gauls, who struggled so heroically, but so unsuccessfully,

for their liberty against the Romans under Cæsar; we see it also in the struggles which the Irish have continued for seven hundred years for freedom and independence against the Anglo-Saxons and Anglo-Normans. The resistance offered by the Scotch to the union of Scotland with England, the struggles of O'Connell for a repeal of the legislative union of Ireland with Great Britain and for an independent Irish parliament, were directly in the face and eyes of the Roman system we have condemned, and precisely in the spirit of that Germanic order or Carolinian constitution we have defended. In fact, there were not a few points of resemblance between the spirit and institutions of the Celtic and Teutonic families, and much that we commend to-day in the British and American laws and institutions was common to the original Celts and Saxons,—a fact, which, misinterpreted, has led some Irish writers to contend that the British order of civilization was borrowed by the Saxons from the Celts of Ireland. Nowhere have we found the Celts, whenever unromanized, the friends of despotism; we have always found them fighting bravely, heroically, if unsuccessfully, for independence and for personal liberty. To pretend that the huge system of centralized despotism established by imperial Rome, a system which deprived the nations subjected to her dominion of their autonomy, reduced the vast populations of the empire to slavery and misery, and rendered them an easy prey to the barbarian invader,—to pretend that that sytem is of Celtic origin, is to pronounce a censure on the Celtic family which they have never deserved, which nothing in their history warrants. It is a foul injustice. Indeed, no people have more often occasion to prefer the petition, "Save me from my friends," than the Celtic.*

* The Celts having emigrated while the family remained in force, or at least before the sept, clan, or tribe had expanded into the nation, we find that the sense of nationality was always very weak among them, or wholly wanting. The Celts, or Gauls, as the Romans called them, could often form confederacies under a popular chief, and carry on distant military expeditions, as in their conquest of Rome, under the leadership of Brennus, Brens, *Prens, Prins*, or the Prince, but they seem never to have fully developed the principle of nationality, and hence they were seldom able to retain their conquests. When attacked by Cæsar they were not a single state, they were not, properly speaking, a nation, but were an agglomeration of distinct tribes or clans, confederated by a sense of common danger, against the common enemy. If they had been a nation, organized into a single state, with a really national spirit, they would have been amply able to have defended themselves successfully

That imperial system, that cæsarism which proved the ruin of Rome, is historically of Asiatic origin, and would seem to owe its birth to Nemrod, a descendant of Cham, one of the three sons of Noah. We are informed in Genesis, that the sons of Cham were "Chus, and Mezraim, and Phuth, and Chanaan. . . . Now, Chus begot Nemrod; he began to be mighty on the earth, and he was a stout hunter before the Lord. . . . And the beginning of his kingdom was Babylon, and Arach, and Achad, and Chalanne, in the land of Sennaar. Ont of that land came forth Assur [or he came forth from the land of Assur], and built Niniveh, and the streets of the city, and Chale, &c." The system originating with Nemrod was established in Assyria, the first of the four great monarchies mentioned by the prophet Daniel. From the Assyrians it passed to the Medes and Persians, under Cyrus the Great; from the Medes and Persians it passed to the Macedonian Greeks, under Alexander the Great; and from the Macedonian Greeks it passed to the Romans, over whom it reigned in the West for five hundred years, till overthrown by the Germans, then the only living representatives of the Japetic civilization. Though overthrown in western Europe, it was not absolutely annihilated. It survived in Constantinople till the eastern

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against the Romans, whom they equalled in bravery, and far surpassed in numbers. We meet the same thing in Great Britain. When invaded by the Romans, the Britons were distinct peoples or tribes, not a nation. So find we it in Ireland, when invaded and subjected by the Anglo-Saxon Egbert, and even when the Irish, having emancipated themselves from the Saxons, their island was invaded by the Anglo-Normans. The Irish were divided and distributed into a vast number of septs, clans, or tribes, each virtually independent and owning no superior. They were not one state, one people, one nation. There was the unity of the clan, but no unity of the nation. This is wherefore the Saxons and the Normans so easily conquered them, and why England has held them, even under the most unfavorable circumstances, in subjection. After the reduction of the Saxon heptarchy, England became a nation, and had a real political unity, and a real national spirit; the same may be said of Scotland, after the accession of the Bruce, if not before; but this is not, and never has been true of Ireland. Ireland has never yet been moulded into one political people, with a true national unity and spirit, and this is the reason why in all their attempts at independence they have failed. But in this they show their kindred with the Germans. The Germans are and always have been, save for a time under the Frankish sovereigns, simply an agglomeration, not of clans, indeed, but of nations, rather than a single nation, with a single national spirit. German unity remains to be created, for as yet it exists only in the song of the poet and the dream of the enthusiast. The German *Vaterland* must be made one; Europe demands it.

empire fell entirely into the hands of the Ottoman Turks. It came very near recovering its power under the German Cæsars of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and has finally recovered its former glory in Russia, Austria, France, Spain, and Italy. It was not Celtic in its origin, or even Greek or Roman, and is now confined to no one family of nations. It finds itself as much at home in Slavonic and Teutonic or Germanic nations, as in the so-called Latin nations. Austria is as despotic as France or Naples, and Spain or Portugal is as free as Prussia or Denmark. It, no more than religion itself, goes by races, and civilization is just as little a question of races as Catholicity.

But these same Latin nations were at one time free nations, and the Germanic system was common to them and all the Teutonic nations. They were nearly all included within the states of Charlemagne, and each of them had its estates, its parliaments, its various checks on power, and an effective voice in the management of its own affairs. The Germanic order, though greatly weakened by feudalism, which made every feudal lord in some sense a Cæsar, and terribly shaken by the efforts of monarchy to subdue the feudal nobility, still survived in some force in all the so-called Latin states till almost our own day, and was in fact wholly extinguished in none of them till the French revolution of 1789 swept as a hurricane over Europe, toppling at once palace and castle, throne and altar. Notwithstanding the centralizing efforts of Richelieu and of Louis XIV. in France, Cardinal Ximenes and Philip II. in Spain, both France and Spain contained before the breaking out of that revolution the elements of the Germanic system, and either might have made them the basis of a free parliamentary state. Jacobinism and its armed soldier Napoleon I., have done much to efface them and to prepare the way for cæsarism pure and simple; yet even in France, the most hopeless case of all, we believe there are still Germanic traditions not yet lost, sufficient, with wise and prudent management, to serve as a *point d'appui* for the reorganization of constitutional liberty. When these Latin nations were free states, under the Frankish constitution of Europe, they were as Celtic in their blood as they are now, and this fact proves that the theory that the Celt tends to social despotism and the Teuton to individual and national independence, is unfounded. It is true the Latin nations have in great measure lost their Germanic liberties, but this is equally true of the greater part of

the Germanic nations themselves. It is clear, then, that we must seek the cause of this modern resuscitation and triumph of cæsarism elsewhere than in the pretended Celtic blood of the so-called Latin nations.

This cause, a very respectable class of modern writers tell us, is to be found in Catholicity. Mr. Marsh and writers of his class maintain that the Celtic nations are Catholic because they are despotic, and the Teutonic nations are Protestant because they are devoted to freedom. But this is not true, because some Teutonic nations are as despotic as any of the so-called Celtic or Latin nations, and because the Teutonic family is nearly equally divided between the two religions now, and was for centuries entirely Catholic. This is conceded by the other class of writers we allude to, who maintain that the Latin nations have lost their liberty because they have adhered to the Catholic Church, and the Teutonic nations have recovered their freedom through Protestantism. Hence they contend that Catholicity favors despotism and ought to be rejected, and Protestantism favors liberty and ought to be sustained. This is the pretence of the majority of English-speaking Protestants.

But the very facts we have adduced to prove that neither Catholicity nor the Roman despotism is Celtic, disprove also that the Latin nations are despotic, because they are Catholic. The Latin nations were once, and for a long time, free nations, and were then, to say the least, as Catholic, as submissive to the Catholic Church, as they are now; and furthermore, several Protestant states are as despotic and allow their subjects as little political liberty as any Catholic state. Prussia, a state that owes its very birth and existence as a kingdom to Protestantism, was till within a very few years, if in fact it be not now, as pure a despotism as ever was imperial Rome. In addition to this, the non-Catholic or even Protestant states that really are free, date their freedom from Catholic times. The United States are simply an offshoot of England, to whom they owe the best part of their freedom, and English freedom dates from Anglo-Saxon times, when all the world was Catholic. Holland, or the Dutch Netherlands, was as free in the middle ages as now, and became Protestant only because Philip II., a Catholic indeed, but not the church, wished to enslave them, in his insane attempt to make Catholicity his stepping-stone to universal monarchy. These facts prove that

the despotism we complain of is due to some other cause than Catholicity, and that the liberty we find in some Protestant states is due to some other cause than Protestantism, for it is older than Protestantism, and may be found in Catholic as despotism may be found in Protestant states.

We concede that, at the present moment, the freest states in the world are not Catholic, and that the Catholic states are generally more or less despotic. But as these Catholic states were, when as Catholic as now, once free states, and as despotism exists in its greatest perfection in non-Catholic and even Protestant states, where nobody can pretend it was the product of Catholicity, and as the freest Protestant states were as free as now before they became Protestant, it is evident that liberty and despotism depend on causes operating alike in Catholic and in Protestant states, irrespective of the religion of either. The class of writers we allude to, fall into the old fallacy: *Post hoc, ergo propter hoc.* A sound philosophy of history ascribes neither the liberty found in some Protestant states to Protestantism, nor the despotism found in Catholic states to Catholicity, for neither is ever found inseparably connected with the other. Protestantism regarded as a religion has never favored liberty, but regarded as a political movement in behalf of the Germanic system threatened by the old Romanic imperialism, it may have, and we think actually has had, in certain states, some influence in preserving the old liberties of the nation. Indeed, so strong was the centralizing tendency in the sixteenth century, in the empire, France, and Spain, that without some political movement of the sort, the old liberties of every European state would have been lost. As a purely political movement Protestantism, we are willing to concede, was not wholly indefensible. Its error was in coupling the political movement really necessary, with a religious movement quite uncalled for; in supposing that to retain and defend the old Germanic civilization it was necessary to break the unity of faith and make war on the pope, both as temporal sovereign of Rome, and as the spiritual head of Christendom. The pope, both as the vicar of Jesus Christ and therefore the defender of religious liberty, and as temporal sovereign of a small state and therefore the natural defender of the rights, the freedom, and autonomy of states, was the natural chief, if they had but known it, of the reform party, regarded as a political party. If they had rallied to him and sustained him against the kaiser, the kings of

France, Spain, and England, they might have gained all they really cared for, without falling into schism or breaking the unity of faith. By not doing so, by directing their first and hardest blows against the pope, both in his spiritual and temporal sovereignty, the reform party forced the pope to throw himself on the protection of the great princes of the time, and to make with them such terms for religion as he could. Indirectly the Protestant movement, for a time at least, favored cæsarism everywhere; in Protestant countries, by giving the Protestant princes supreme authority in spirituals, and in Catholic countries, by compelling the church to submit to the centralizing and despotic tendencies favored by the great princes who professed to adhere to her and to be her protectors. It thus made up a false issue before the world, and which has not even yet been corrected. So by coupling heresy and schism with its political aims, the Protestant movement has probably done more harm upon the whole to the Germanic order, than benefit, by its assertion of the autonomy of nations, and must in point of fact be deplored even by those who take no interest in the religious question involved.

The most the facts in the case authorize any one to say is, that liberty has survived under Protestantism, and that cæsarism has been able to revive under Catholicity; that there may be liberty under Protestantism, at least for a time, and that Catholicity is not of itself alone able to prevent the state that professes it from becoming despotic if it chooses; but we cannot say either that Protestantism as a religion favors liberty, or that Catholicity favors despotism or cæsarism. If we argue that where Protestantism is there must be civil and political liberty, or that where Catholicity is there must be civil or political despotism, undeniable facts are against us. Tyranny may creep in, in spite of the church, and liberty may, at least for a time, coexist with Protestantism. Still as Catholics it belongs to us to explain, in accordance with our doctrine,—that the church does not favor despotism, and is perfectly compatible with free institutions, nay, favorable to them, as most English-speaking Catholics at least maintain, in opposition to Louis Veuillot, and the late lamented Donoso Cortés,—how it happens that nearly all, if not indeed all, the Catholic states of Europe have in fact lost their former liberties and fallen under real or virtual cæsarism. That this fact can be explained without any reproach to our religion or our church, is certain,

but that it can be without more or less reproach, of some sort, to Catholics, even churchmen as well as laymen, we are not prepared to assert, and are not called upon to maintain. Many Catholics seem to imagine that whatever is done by Catholics is Catholic, and to be defended as such, and all non-Catholics proceed on the assumption that every Catholic always does all that his church requires, and never does any thing but what she commands, or at least approves. We wish it was so, but so it is not; and we are under the necessity of distinguishing always between what the church commands, imposes, or approves, and what individual Catholics do, even when not unsound in the faith, or neglectful of the precepts of their church. We must make a distinction also, often neglected by Catholics, and always by non-Catholics, between the traditions of Catholics in matters pertaining to the supernatural order, and their traditions in matters that pertain solely to the natural order. In the former case, the uniform and constant opinions and practice of the faithful, even though supported by no express declaration of Scripture or positive definition of the church, have great weight, and can seldom, if ever, be safely controverted; but in the latter case, Catholics and non-Catholics stand on the same footing, and the opinions and practices of the one have no more authority, and are entitled to no more respectful consideration, than those of the other; for in these matters the church has received no special revelation, and the faithful, whether of the clergy or the laity, have no supernatural guide.

Let us understand then, in the outset, that the church was not instituted to provide society with a perfect civil and political organization, and that her mission is the spiritual, not the temporal, government and discipline of mankind. Her mission is to evangelize, not civilize, the world, any further than its evangelization necessarily involves its civilization. The church has from God plenary authority to govern all men and nations in all things pertaining to salvation, or the eternal and supernatural destiny of man; but she has not been instituted for the temporal government of natural society in relation to its natural and temporal ends. There are in the Catholic view two societies—natural society, propagated by natural generation; and supernatural society, propagated by the election of grace. The church is the supernatural society, and operates solely in the supernatural sphere, or to a supernatural end. As the

supernatural presupposes the natural, the church has plenary authority over the natural, in relation to the supernatural end, but, for the same reason, she can have over it no authority in relation to natural ends. To give the church plenary authority in the natural, in relation to purely natural ends, would be to absorb the natural in the supernatural, and to deny that the supernatural supposes the natural; or, as say the theologians, *gratia supponit naturam*.

Now, as civilization lies in the natural order, and has sole reference to the natural rights, powers, and ends of natural society, it does not, as civilization, fall within the province of the church, and she, therefore, is not and cannot be held responsible for it. The temporal government of the ecclesiastical states by the pope as temporal sovereign, and by ecclesiastics under him, is not government by the church, and is as purely a temporal government, as purely within the order of natural society, as that of Louis Napoleon, or Francis Joseph. This has always been conceded, and canonists have always held, that Catholic princes could declare war against the pope as temporal prince, in like manner as against any other prince. Neither the pope nor the cardinals and prelates claim infallibility for the pontifical government in the ecclesiastical states, or that, as a temporal government, that government is not a purely human government, standing on the same footing as any other human government. If we may say this of the pontifical temporal government, surely we may say as much of the authority of the church in relation to the temporal order, and therefore to civilization, elsewhere. We do not forget what we have never ceased to assert, the supremacy of the spiritual over the temporal, of the church over the state; but this supremacy, as we have always maintained, is always spiritual, never temporal, for the state has no superior in its own order, in relation to purely temporal ends, or as we say, the natural ends of natural society. Civilization, then, which has relation to purely natural or temporal ends, and is the proper work of natural society, is not within the province of the church, as supernatural society, and the traditions of Catholics, and the opinions and practices of the faithful, even of popes and bishops, in relation to it, stand on their own merits, and can never be cited as those of the church, or as partaking of her authority. As a Catholic, I am under no special obligation to defend the temporal administration of the papal government in the States of the Church, and am

as free as any Protestant, if I see reason for doing so, to censure the temporal policy of Cardinal Beaufort, Cardinal Ximenes, Cardinal Wolsey, Cardinal Richelieu, Cardinal de Retz, Cardinal Dubois, or even Cardinal Antonelli; and in my judgment, all these, even the last, may be accused of great political blunders. If we may say so much of churchmen,—some of them bishops and archbishops, we are not obliged to spare Catholic kings or kaisers. Henry II. of England, Charles of Anjou king of Naples, Philip the Fair, Henry IV., Louis XIV. of France, Maximilian I. and Charles V. of Germany, Philip II. of Spain, I may judge as freely and as independently as Elizabeth Tudor, James Stuart, or the late king of the Netherlands. As a Catholic I am by no means bound to defend them, and am perfectly free to censure them as far as I think I have good reason to do so. In my judgment, Francis I. and Henry II. of France, to say nothing of Catharine of Medici and her profligate sons, were far inferior as sovereigns, to Henry VIII. and his daughter Elizabeth, of England; and I am not able to persuade myself that Isabella Segunda of Spain is a better queen than Victoria of England. Count Cavour is no better than my Lord Palmerston, and the late Sardinian parliament made no great show by the side of the English parliament, or even the congress of the United States.

This being understood, we can approach the question with entire freedom, and conclude at once that the church is not implicated in the fact, unless she has officially enjoined or sanctioned cæsarism, and made support of it a condition of salvation. This nobody can pretend she ever has done. She may require submission to cæsarism, where it is dominant, as a less evil than revolution; she may also forbid her children, in their capacity of Catholics, or in her name, to undertake to revolutionize the state, when it in fact leaves her free to pursue her supernatural mission; for her business is not, as we have seen, that of providing for the civil and political organization of natural society. But as she presupposes natural society, and demands the exercise of the natural virtues, the observance of natural justice by kings and rulers, she can abrogate no right of natural society, and absolve rulers from no duty or obligation imposed by the law of nature or by natural justice and equity. As despotism, since it is the government of power without justice, will without reason, is essentially repugnant to justice, she can never sanction it, or take away the natural

right of society to resist it. The teaching of all her great doctors is to this effect, and as it is only through her doctors she teaches, we may say that the church herself does not favor despotism, but asserts principles which lie at the basis of all true liberty. The fact that cæsarism prevails in Catholic states, then, must be explained so as not to implicate the church, however much it may implicate Catholics, or even churchmen.

Furthermore, it is certain that the church, as represented by her sovereign pontiffs, has always opposed the resuscitation of cæsarism. The popes have done it, both as temporal sovereigns, and as vicars of Jesus Christ. As temporal sovereigns, they have done it, and been obliged to do it, because cæsarism is as much at war with their temporal power and independence as with the autonomy and freedom of nations. The kaiser claimed to be emperor of Rome, and supreme temporal sovereign of the whole earth. It was contended by him and his lawyers, well versed in the Theodosian and Justinian codes, or the Roman law, that St. Leo III., in raising Karl der Grosse, or Charlemagne, to the imperial dignity, as his coadjutor in the temporal government of the ecclesiastical states, and armed defender of the Holy See, had revived the western empire and transferred it from the Romans to the Germans. This claim, which has no historical basis, and is really unfounded, the popes had to resist, and in resisting it, they necessarily resisted cæsarism, and favored the Germanic constitution of Europe, under the Frankish emperors, which, in our view of the case, was favoring liberty. The kaiser also claimed, as heir of the Roman Cæsars, the authority in spirituals which the Roman Cæsar had possessed in his quality of *pontifex maximus*, or rather he claimed full authority in the temporalities of the church, denying to the church the right to the government and management of her own temporal goods, or goods given to God, of whose rights she, not the state, is the divinely appointed guardian. In this the kaiser struck the rights of the church, and the popes were obliged to oppose him not only in their capacity of temporal sovereigns of Rome, but in their capacity of vicars of Jesus Christ, or spiritual head of the church, the supernatural society. In defending this right, they defended in principle the right of property, and even vested rights, without which there is, and can be, no freedom or liberty in natural society. The popes, and the church in the

popes, therefore, did resist the resuscitation of cæsarism, and favor liberty, by struggling to maintain the Germanic constitution of Europe.

But the popes, we grant, failed, and after Boniface VIII., were no longer able to oppose an effectual barrier to the resuscitation of pagan Rome in the political order; and whatever resistance the monarchs afterwards encountered, was the resistance offered by the feudal lords in the defence of their own privileges. The popes had maintained the struggle, upon the whole, successfully, save in the Byzantine empire, from the seventh to the fourteenth century, the most glorious period in the history of the church since the German conquest; but they failed when Philip the Fair and his uncle of Naples, the false friend of the pope, resumed the work abandoned by the German kaiser. The French undid virtually all the Franks had done, and in proportion as the hegemony of Europe passed from the empire to France and to French princes, the power of the papacy to serve the cause of freedom was diminished. If the Franks were the best friends, history will warrant us in asserting that the French have often been, with all their devotion to Catholicity, the worst enemies of the papacy. It was the French princes on the throne of England, that introduced and fostered anti-papal doctrines in that once thoroughly Catholic kingdom, and it was to no small extent French intrigue that lost it, and prevented its recovery to the church. It is only in proportion as France is humbled, that the papacy recovers its freedom and independence. We know that there is much genuine Catholicity in France, and we know not where to look for Catholics equal to true French Catholics; as we know not where to find, upon the whole, so polished, so able, so amiable, so attractive, so charming a people as the French, whom one cannot dislike if he tries, and whom he must love and respect, even in spite of himself; and yet it cannot be denied that France stands at the head of the anti-Catholic world, and leads the anti-Catholic army now on foot. Her chief influence as a nation on surrounding nations is anti-papal, nay, anti-Christian. "Paris," a distinguished French nobleman writes us, "is the centre and focus of the best and the worst influences of our day." It was French arms that prevented the thirty years' war from putting an end to Protestantism in Germany; it is French as well as Russian influence, that prevents the restoration of German unity, and the restoration of Catholicity throughout Ger-

many, as it is French influence that, on the one hand, convulses all Europe with Jacobinism, and drives it, on the other, into cæsarism as a refuge from anarchy.

But the causes that have tended to revive pagan Rome, not only in Catholic but also in non-Catholic Europe, and that have enabled the sovereigns to resist the popes and to rivet cæsarism on the greater part of the European states, are not very recondite or difficult to discover. The Roman system prevailed in the eastern empire till its downfall, and Russia naturally inherited it, as she received her religion and her civilization from Constantinople. In the West as well as in the East, the first political relations and associations the church formed, after emerging from the catacombs, were with Roman cæsarism. She had to adapt herself to the exigencies of a despotic state, and so much in her constitution and discipline as is human and dependent on time and place, was cast in the Roman mould. The civilization of the faithful was the Roman. The clergy even made their humanities in the imperial schools under pagan professors, and all secular literature in which both the clergy and the laity were trained, the manners, customs, and usages of society, all were Roman; and *Roman* and *Christian* became synonymous, as in Ireland and our country are *Irish* and *Catholic*. In adapting her canons to the civil relations of her children, the church adopted and incorporated the Roman law so far as applicable to her purpose. Naturally, the Christians of the empire, then almost the only Christians in the world, accepted and carried with them Roman habits of thought, feeling, and action; in a word, the Roman civilization, the only civilization they knew. To them the German invaders were not only heretics or pagans, but they were barbarians, men without manners, without civilization; and in laboring to convert them to the true faith, they naturally and unconsciously labored to form them to the Roman civilization, which in their minds, and in their habits, was intimately associated with their religion. An Italian, Frenchman, Spaniard, German, Englishman, Irishman, or American, would act, and does act, on the same principle to-day, whether it is to the Catholic religion or the Protestant he wishes to convert an unbelieving and barbarian people.

Moreover, though conquered by the German invaders, the western empire did not all expire at once. In some sense it has never been absolutely dead. The conquerors had to a great extent served in the imperial armies, and had become

half romanized. Roman art, science, and literature, were adopted and cultivated by the conquerors, as well as continued by the conquered, and have formed the basis of all liberal culture down to our own times. The first Germanic states formed within the limits of the empire, were modelled after the imperial constitution. The Roman law was intimately blended with the canon law, and was, as it is to-day, if I may so speak, the civil law of the ecclesiastical courts. It remained always the law for the Roman people, whether in the city of Rome or in the provinces, after as before the conquest; and except perhaps in Lombardy, where a fusion between the conquered and the conquerors took place at a very early day, the Germanic laws governed only the Germanic or barbarian population. By the twelfth century the Roman or civil law had become, in some sense, the law of all classes, not only within the states formed out of the Roman empire, but even in the Germanic states, with the exception of England, outside of it, superseding the Carolinian capitularies, and commencing a successful rivalry against the feudal law. To the continuance and final triumph of the civil law, or the old Roman law as finally perfected by Theodosius and Justinian, we may ascribe, more than to any thing else, the revival and subsequent predominance of the Roman order in Catholic and Germanic Europe. M. Savigné, a learned Prussian writer, a descendent from a French Huguenot family, in his learned and able work on the Influence of the Civil Law during the middle ages, attributes to it no little of the progress of European society since the conquest. He maintains that its influence has been as salutary as great. But this is only because he finds in the Roman his ideal or standard of civilization, as do all the civil lawyers, and the greater part of the European, and even American publicists.

We take no exception here to any of the provisions of the civil law or to the practice of the courts under it. It certainly embodies the best results of the jurisprudence of ages, and is admirable for its systematic unity and simplicity. To a logical mind it must appear immensely superior to the complications of feudal law, and even to our somewhat anomalous English common law. But to our minds its very systematic character, its strict logical unity and simplicity, are among its chief defects. In religion, which is divine and supernatural, and which is administered by a divinely assisted and protected court, logical unity and simplicity

are in their place, marks of truth, of divinity; but transferred to the constitution of the state and the civil code, where absolute truth and justice can never be expected, they are the worst of all tyrants. Our grand objection to the civil law is the principle from which it proceeds, which pervades it throughout, and to which it owes its unity and simplicity; the principle laid down by the old Roman jurist, and which we have often cited, namely, *Quod placuit principi, id legis habet vigorem.* This maxim makes the prince a god, as the Roman emperors claimed to be, in the temporal order, and presupposes absolute cæsarism. Unlike the English or common law, the civil law emanates from the prince, and is held to be imposed by him on the nation, not accepted by him from the nation, and binding both ruler and ruled. Under the civil law only the prince is a freeman, under the common law the nation is free, and in its freedom all its members are freemen.

There is no doubt that the clergy have usually preferred the civil to the common law, not because it is more favorable to despotism, but because it is the one they have most studied and the best known, and because, having been the law of the first Christian empire, it is that which best accords in the practice of the courts under it with the practice in the ecclesiastical courts; but we think their preference for it has been a great mistake, and has had a bad effect on modern civilization, although we find no fault with it so far as it has been incorporated into the canon law. The clergy, true to the primitive or Semitic civilization, rely usually on moral and religious restraints on power, and therefore have seldom felt much interest in the purely political organization of society. Hence the despotic principle that pervades the civil law has escaped their attention, or been considered by them of little importance. It has sufficed for them that the greater part of its positive provisions are wise and just. It has never been in accordance with their habits of thought to seek, in the political constitution of the state, a limitation to the power of the prince; they have, indeed, always opposed arbitrary power, but they have considered that we should seek to temper and restrain it by the spiritual authority of the church, and by appeals to the conscience of the sovereign.

In the primitive ages, under the patriarchal constitution of society, the power of the patriarch was absolute, but it was understood that its exercise would be so tempered by

his affection as a father, and his conscience as a priest, that it would never or seldom be abused. As long as the love of the father, and the conscience of the priest, were sufficient to prevent the excesses of the kingly authority united with them in the same person, this order was good, and no doubt far better for mankind, than the gentile or national organization which has succeeded it among the descendants of Japhet. But when the love of the father for his children, and his conscience as a priest, waxed feeble, and no longer sufficed to restrain the kingly authority, the patriarchal order became an intolerable burden, and the Semitic civilization had to give way to the Japetic, and Japhet has dwelt in the tents of Sem. So while men have a deep sense of religion, and kings, even in civil matters, listen with docility to the voice of the church, the moral and religious limitation on authority suffice to prevent Cæsar from greatly abusing his power. But even then they do not always suffice for wise and good government. The private virtues, even the heroic sanctity of the prince, cannot always suffice for that. Edward the Confessor of England was a good man, a great saint, but he was not a great king, and he left his kingdom in such a state, that it became an easy prey to the ambitious William of Normandy. St. Louis of France was a just and conscientious man, an eminent saint, but an indifferent king, and a worse general. It was for his sanctity as a Christian, not for his wisdom or greatness as a ruler, that Boniface VIII. canonized him; that is, the pope canonized the man, not the sovereign. Even among the popes, the most distinguished as temporal sovereigns have not always been those most eminent for their private virtues and personal sanctity. The private virtues, the truly Christian virtues in both prince and people, are certainly of great public importance, and the private vices of the monarch injure more than himself; but great eminence in the virtues essential to the salvation of the soul, does by no means necessarily secure eminence in the qualities essential to the statesman. The restraints of religion and morality, of the spiritual power, are indispensable, as we have proved over and over again, but the history of modern Europe proves that they are not alone sufficient, for, notwithstanding them, the Catholic nations have lost their Germanic constitution and fallen under cæsarism.

The mistake of the clergy, under the political point of view, has been, it strikes us, in relying on these restraints as

sufficient, without any regard to the purely political organization of the state. Power will ordinarily run to abuse, if able. The prince who is restrained only by the spiritual power, finds himself practically not restrained at all. If he is prepared to say with Macbeth, if we can make sure of this world, we will jump the world to come, he can do very much as he pleases, for he can count usually on the support of the greater part of the national clergy in spite of papal interdict or excommunication. A statue of *præmunire*, as in England, will silence their opposition, and enable him, if necessary, when they have great wealth, to push them, even to open schism and avowed heresy. Even in the legitimate discharge of their duty the clergy, if not strictly on their guard, may open the way for Cæsar. Their duty is to detach the faithful from the world, to wean their affections from earthly things, and to place them on things above, on the unseen and eternal. In proportion as they succeed they render the faithful indifferent to this world and its government, and occasion the throwing of the administration of the state from the good into the hands of the worldly, the ambitious, who seek power, and care little for society and less for religion. These things explain why it is the clergy, engaged in saving souls, have not always been on their guard, or instant to put the people on their guard, against the defects of the civil law, the organization of the state, and the encroachments of power on the rights of society.

Although the Germanic constitution was in the main wise and good, it practically, as fixed by Charlemagne, left the central power too weak, and under the feeble princes who succeeded him, it tended to dissolution, and Germanism lapsed into feudalism, worse for the people as distinguished from the nobility than cæsarism itself. The Franconian emperors and the Hohenstaufen were wrong in warring against the papacy and the free cities of Italy, but they were not wrong in seeking to strengthen the imperial power. They were wrong in seeking to revive the Roman empire, but religion, society, humanity required them and other lords paramount to aim to acquire power enough to bring the feudal nobility under the national authority; up to a certain point centralism was a want of all the Germanic or germanized states, for the original defect in the Germanic, as in the Celtic nations, was the want of unity, and an efficient central authority. But every system tends to become exclusive, and to reign alone. The reaction against feudal-

ism and in favor of monarchy, aided by a just social sentiment, by the interests of both religion and humanity, and directed by the unity and simplicity of the old Roman law, did not stop, and could not be stopped at its proper limits, but, like all reactions, continued until it had reached the opposite extreme. The law of action and reaction in the political, as in the physical world, is the same. Defect on the one side leads to excess on the other; the necessity of remedying the defect of feudalism, paved the way for the excess of centralism.

The same result was also aided by the false principles adopted by the friends of republican liberty in the middle ages. As the imperialist labored to revive imperial, these sought to revive republican Rome. The former labored to resuscitate the pagan empire, the latter, the pagan republic. Arnaldo da Brescia, Rienzi, the last of the Tribunes, and the Florentine Machiavelli, were political and very nearly religious pagans, and sought to reëstablish an order which was repugnant to all the beliefs, usages, and habits of their time, and their failure only strengthened the hands of imperial centralism, just as the failure of Jacobinical centralism in our day has resulted in the establishment of the imperial centralism of France and Austria.

These, in our view, are some of the causes which have permitted and aided the revival of the Romanic civil and political order in Catholic Europe. There is nothing in them that implicates the church, or affects in the slightest degree her character as the supernatural society, although they may not sustain all the claims which some Catholics have made for her as natural society, which she is not, and has never professed to be. They prove that if she received the mission of civilizer, or of founding a perfect civil and political organization of society, and maintaining in the natural order, wise and perfect government, she has not fulfilled her mission; but that mission she did not receive. Her mission was wholly supernatural, in relation to the salvation of souls, or the supernatural destiny of man. This mission she has faithfully fulfilled, and in fulfilling it she has undoubtedly rendered immense services to civilization. The private virtues she has enjoined and cultivated, the humane sentiments she has inspired and fostered, the purity of life and manners she has required and enabled men of good will to live, have elevated the general tone of society, have softened the asperities of power, and saved

the people from falling, even under the most galling cæsarism in a Catholic nation, to that low moral, or even physical degradation, in which she found the populations of the old Roman empire; and as much as we detest cæsarism, and as much as we are devoted to what is called self-government, we must have studied the condition of the people in modern society to no purpose if, upon the whole, the people in the most despotic Catholic state are not less unhappy, and have not more pure and rational enjoyment than the people of Great Britain, or of our own great republic. The church secures many compensating advantages for the loss of political liberty, and if, under cæsarism, there could be any adequate guaranty of her freedom and independence, the condition of the people in the worst governed Catholic nations would not be altogether intolerable, providing the people could be persuaded to be contented with what they have, and not to crave what they have not. But we must take the world as we find it, and man as he is. Men cannot be forced to be happy in a way contrary to their own. A system which seeks to make men either virtuous or happy by repressing their natural aspirations and their natural faculties, will never succeed, and never ought to succeed, as we may certainly hold since the church has condemned Jansenism as a heresy.

Man is never contented and ought not to be contented to remain forever an infant, to be always in leading-strings, to be dressed out in bib and tucker, and fed with a spoon in the hands of the nurse. He would go alone, feel his own strength, and enjoy the play of his own faculties. The slave on a southern plantation is often, as to his animal wants, better provided for, and has far less care and anxiety than the poor laborer at the North; but the poor laborer at the North, after all, is a man, feels that he is a man, and owns himself. "Massa," said his man John one day to a friend of ours, "I want you to price me." "Why, John, are you not well taken care of, kindly treated, well fed and clothed, and not overworked?" "Very true, massa; but you know a man wants to feel that he owns himself." The feeling belongs to all men, and instead of seeking to repress it, or to extinguish it, we should seek to govern men in accordance with it; that is, to govern them as men, as rational beings, not as flocks and herds. The government of men should be a moral government, recognizing and respecting the free-will, the rational nature of the governed,

and resorting to force only in exceptional cases. Man is a rational animal, and being rational, he is a political animal; and that is an abnormal state of society which deprives him of all political functions, and leaves him no space to govern himself, and prove that he is a man. The clergy, engrossed with their spiritual duties, are perhaps prone to think too little of this fact; and pious Catholics, rapt in sweet contemplation, feel not its importance; and hence, in spite of the church, in spite of Catholicity, Cæsar possesses himself of this world, and eviscerates the people of their manhood. The faithful should be made to feel, that as our duties to God are for the most part payable to our neighbor, it is detracting nothing from their piety and devotion, to keep an eye on Cæsar, and to study so to organize the state, that the ruler shall find it difficult to abuse his power or to oppress the ruled. The price of liberty is eternal vigilance, and quietism in the political order is as little enjoined by Catholics as quietism in the religious order. The Japetic civilization is that alone which comports with the European families of nations. We cannot return to the Semitic if we would, and rely on moral power alone to secure political liberties; and we can never prosper under the Chamitic. The Japetic civilization may tend to make too little of moral power, but it demands liberty, it places the nation above the prince, and the man above the government. As true conservatives we must retain this character of modern civilization. There is no reason in the world why Catholics should not study to organize free states, and earnestly defend them. And if they wish to maintain the freedom of the church, recall the world to their religion, and provide for the true and orderly progress of society, they must do so.

CHRISTIANITY OR GENTILISM?*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1860.]

The title of this anonymous and flashy publication reveals the class of works to which it belongs, and warns us that the author or compiler draws largely on the ignorance and credulity of the non-Catholic public. It is hard to believe that any one of ordinary intelligence can be moved by his "Startling Disclosures," or disturbed by his pretended "Facts for Americans." His work, however, is not without a certain smartness, as we Yankees say; but it bears no trace of a liberal culture, a generous mind, or a loving heart. It is, from beginning to end, unscrupulous in its statements, unchristian, indecent, and untrustworthy, and a melancholy example of the influence of passion and prejudice in warping a man's judgment and drying up all the noble and generous sympathies which nature denies to no one. We are almost amazed at its misapplication of the passages its author quotes from Catholic writers, and the facility with which it extracts a foul and revolting sense from the most simple and innocent language; and were it not for certain mistakes, misinterpretations, misapplications, and perversions of our own meaning and purposes by men whom we highly esteem, and whose motives we respect, we should say, without the least hesitation, that no honest man, no man not moved by satanic malice as well as assisted by satanic cunning, could have written it. But after all men are oftener weak than wicked, and it is seldom safe for us to go from the book to the interior motives and character of its author.

Of course, no man who respects himself, or the public, will attempt a detailed reply to the numerous misconceptions, misrepresentations, misstatements, and false inferences of this popular anti-Catholic and Know-Nothing publication. Its "facts" are no facts, and its "startling disclosures" are hardly so much as ingenious fictions. It falsifies even the facts it cites, and misrepresents and perverts the meaning of Catholic writers, even when it quotes, as it

Pope or President? Startling Disclosures of Romanism as revealed by its own Writers. Facts for Americans. New York: 1859.

seldom does, their words correctly, by separating them from their connection, and interpreting or applying them in accordance with a preconceived theory which has no foundation in fact, and which no Catholic does or could entertain for a moment. It misapprehends and misapplies every thing it encounters in Catholic books, Catholic history, Catholic doctrine, or Catholic practice. The extracts are garbled, and words are wrested to favor a meaning obviously incompatible with the whole scope and design of him who uses them. Its author starts with the foregone conclusion, that our religion is an imposture, that the church is mystical Babylon, "the mystery of iniquity," and the sovereign pontiff the man of sin, the veritable Antichrist foretold by the apostles, and then looks through Catholic history to find, not passages which, honestly interpreted, do sustain, but which *may* be made to appear to sustain that foregone conclusion. He constructs his theory from his passions and prejudices, his ignorance and weakness, and then seeks for facts to support it; he fixes his conclusion, and then seeks or manufactures premises that will warrant it. This is the case with all the popular "no-popery" writers with whom we are acquainted. That this is unfair, unscientific, and wholly objectionable, no man denies; but it is the method adopted by most men, when treating a subject under the influence of strong passions and strong prejudices, and on which the truth happens to be against them. Error is never fair, candid, just.

Then, again, no man, however thoroughly master of his subject he may be, or whatever the pains he may take to guard himself against misapprehension or misrepresentation, not even when writing a formal and scientific treatise, designed to exhaust its subject, can always so write that it is impossible for an unfriendly critic to pervert his language, or to cite his words in support of views he does not take, and would abhor to take. He must leave something unsaid; he must trust something to the intelligence, the candor, and the good faith of his readers. "The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God." Omit the words, *the fool hath said in his heart*, and you make the Scriptures teach atheism. "Judas went out and hanged himself." "Go thou and do likewise." Bring these two passages together, and the Scriptures will be made to enjoin suicide. By a similar unfairness our author or compiler perverts the sense of Catholic authors and of Catholic doctrines and practices. Men, even of honest intentions and fair minds, will sometimes also per-

vert the sense of their author through ignorance, or, what is worse, false knowledge. They lack the key to his purpose and meaning, and undertake to supply it from their own ignorance, or their own false theories, and thus give to a writer a sense which is by no means his. Our author or compiler lacks the key to the sense of Catholic doctrines and practices, and therefore to the writings of Catholics; and interpreting those writings by his own ignorance, or by his preconceived theory of what Catholicity must be, he perverts the teachings of the church, makes her teach doctrines which she rejects, and sanction practices which she abominates. Few men can see the real fact which passes before their eyes, and fewer still can relate the fact they have seen precisely as it happened, as the experience of all our courts of law amply proves. Most men give you, instead of the fact itself, their own impression, or their own theory of the fact. Hence it is, that ordinary history, as written, is so untrustworthy, and that so few, even among the highly cultivated, can read history with profit. We read some time since a letter from one of the most distinguished prelates, and one of the first scholars in Ireland, evidently intended to deny a charge brought by some Exeter Hall orator against one of his priests, in which the denial, though assumed in the writer's mind, is not once expressed in words. The writer is so intent on expressing his indignation at the baseness of the charge, that he forgets to make the denial itself. Yet nothing would be more unfair than to regard the charge as true, because the letter written to deny it does not expressly deny it.

These remarks apply to nearly all the popular works against our religion, that issue from the anti-Catholic press of this or any other country. We will not say that they are all written in bad faith; we will not say that their authors may not believe them passably just, or that they may not have written them with a sort of honesty of purpose; but we assure our readers that we have not seen one of them which is not a gross perversion of the truth, and an inexcusable misrepresentation of facts from beginning to end. Most of them seem to us to be written without any respect for truth, and on the principle, that the end justifies the means. Their authors seem to have really persuaded themselves that Catholicity is a bad and extremely dangerous thing, and that no means are unlawful that will tend to crush it. They are so carried away by their wrath and

hatred, that they see and judge every thing in a false light, and do and say things that would shock even themselves in their sober moments, if sober moments they could ever have. Hatred is love reversed, and blinds one not less than love itself, if not, indeed, even more. Who trusts the lover's account of his mistress? Or who that has had the misfortune to be in love has not said and done a thousand fantastic things, that he cannot, now the fit is off, bear to have recalled to his memory? She that was so fair, is now black as an Ethiop, and instead of kissing her "batlet," or the very ground where she had stood, he can hardly bear the mention of her name. Hatred has the same effect; we have, we hardly know or ask ourselves for what reason, a dislike to a man, and thenceforth nothing he can do or say will please us, still his words and actions are dark as Erebus, and his soul "is fit for treasons, stratagems, and spoils." We find in every one of his words, looks, deeds, evidence of the blackness of his heart, of his falsity, of his baseness. A change comes over us; we have mastered, for some reason or no reason, our dislike, and all the blackness disappears; the words and actions we had condemned appear to us now perfectly just and proper. In a word, the whole air and bearing, the whole life and character of the man, have undergone a complete metamorphosis. And yet nothing has changed but our own feelings; nothing but the subjective medium through which we beheld him. These anti-popery writers hate the church, often with an intensity that, could they but see it, would surprise even themselves, and they can see nothing true or good in any thing she does or says. So was it in the case of our Lord. Never man spake like this man. He went about doing good, and there was not in him a fault in thought, word, or deed; all was right, true, proper, just, pure, holy, and infinitely loving, yet the Jews saw in him no beauty or comeliness; they called him a glutton and a drunkard, a friend of publicans and sinners, looked upon him as the enemy of their name and nation, became enraged against him, gnashed on him with their teeth, took up stones to stone him, and finally crucified him between two thieves. "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do," were the only words he pronounced against them from the cross to which they had nailed him. Was the cause of their wrath and hatred in him or in them? Do the charges they brought, and the acts they performed against him, do discredit to him or to themselves? "If they have called the

master of the house Beelzebub, how much more them of his household?" These anti-popery writers are as deluded as were the old carnal Jews, and, blinded by their passions, know as little what they do when they are railing against the church, as those Jews did when they crucified their God. Let grace, which suffers neither the delusions of love nor of hatred, once change their feelings and rectify the medium through which they see the church, and their judgments will be reversed, and they will deplore their past blindness.

Take, as an illustration of the lengths to which hatred of the church carries these anti-popery writers, what they all assert, that the church denies the sanctity of oaths, that she sanctions perjury, and teaches that no faith is to be kept with heretics. In proof of this, they allege that popes and councils have declared that an oath, taken contrary to the rights and interests of the church, is an unlawful oath, and not obligatory. In the belief of a Catholic, an oath contrary to the rights and interests of the church, is an oath contrary to the law of God; and an oath contrary to the law of God is, of course, an unlawful oath. Will any man in his sober senses pretend that an unlawful oath binds, and that it is perjury to break an oath which we have no right to take? If a man takes an oath to murder his neighbor, must he actually murder him, or be guilty of the sin of perjury? To take such an oath is unquestionably sin; but the additional sin is in keeping, not in breaking it. That no faith is to be kept with men who are heretics is no doctrine of the church; but that faith pledged to heretics, to rob or despoil the church, to dethrone the pope, to dispossess a bishop, murder priests and religious, or to protect known heretics in performing any unlawful acts against religion, we presume she does teach is not to be kept, and she could not be the church of God if she did not. We all know the proverb, "A bad promise is better broken than kept." Faith pledged to heretics stands on the same footing with faith pledged to Catholics, or to any other class of men. Faith pledged to anybody in regard to what is lawful and right, or that is lawful and right for the parties in question to do, is to be kept according to its conditions; but faith pledged to others to do for them, or to unite with them in doing that which is wrong, contrary to the law of God, revealed or natural, is not to be kept; for no man can bind himself morally, or be bound by any power in heaven or

earth, to do that which any law of God forbids. Such we understand to be the doctrine of the church, and we are sure it is the doctrine of common sense and of simple justice. Would these "no-popery" writers contend that a number of men who have banded together against the state, and pledged themselves or sworn to each other to conspire to overthrow or resist its lawful authority, must actually do it, or stand as perjurers before God? Suppose a number of these have conspired together, pledged each other by oath, to destroy by violence the Presbyterian Church, to burn down Presbyterian meeting-houses, to dispossess, hunt down, or assassinate every Presbyterian parson they find in the exercise of his ministry, seize and appropriate to their own uses the funds contributed by Presbyterian liberality for the services of the Presbyterian religion, or to sustain the poor of Presbyterian congregations; or in other respects to act in a way detrimental to the rights and interests of Presbyterianism—do you think there is a Presbyterian minister in the world that would say that this oath binds them, and that they must do these things on pain of being perjured? No; the Presbyterian minister would say, such an oath is unlawful, and in taking it there is a great sin, but there is no sin in breaking it, for the moral law which forbids taking, forbids keeping it. Why, then, this outcry against the church?

Now go through the book before us, go through any book of the sort, and you will find no charge paraded against the church that is not as baseless as the one just refuted, and that cannot be as easily disposed of. There is not one we have ever met with that is not either false in fact, or false in principle; or, if sound in principle and true in fact, that is not irrelevant. The state of society in Italy, or some other country where the Catholic religion is generally professed, is not, it is alleged, under a political and material point of view, all that can be desired, therefore the church is hostile to the political and material prosperity of nations; therefore is not, and cannot be the church of God. A valid argument, if the lack of political and material prosperity be really due to the church,—in the mouth of a carnal Jew, who looks for a temporal Messiah to raise his people to the summit of human greatness, and to reward his followers with earthly goods,—but a very inconclusive and inappropriate argument in the mouth of one who professes to be a Christian, and to hold that our Lord came not as a temporal ruler, but as a spiritual prince, to found on the

earth a spiritual kingdom; a kingdom, though set up in this world, not of this world, but heavenly in its principles, in its laws, and in its ends; who enjoins detachment from the world, self-denial, mortification, prayer, humiliation, the life of the cross; and while he promises his followers consolations here, teaches them to despise earthly goods, and to look for their reward only after death, in the kingdom of his Father. The objection proves nothing against the church, but it does prove the worldly-mindedness and lack of Christian thought in those who bring it.

A pope in his private capacity as a man, or as temporal sovereign of Rome, has done, or is asserted to have done, things incompatible with wise and just policy, or true morality even; therefore, these popular "no-popery" books cry out, "the pope is Antichrist, evidently the man of sin, the apocalyptic beast, and popery a huge imposition." Their authors forget that our Lord said to his disciples, "Have I not chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?" They forget also that in the faith of no Catholic is the pope impeccable, or infallible even, except in matters in which he inherits the promise of the special supernatural assistance of the Holy Ghost made to Peter; and this promise extends to him neither when acting unofficially, as a simple private man, nor even when acting as temporal sovereign of the Roman states. We believe that nearly all the supreme pontiffs have, as a matter of fact, been good and holy men, and that the papal sovereigns of Rome have from the first surpassed, not only in private virtue, but in public spirit, in enlarged and liberal views, in wise and just policy, by far every other line of princes to be named in the world's history; but whether so or not, it is nothing to our faith as Catholics, for that faith does not repose on human wisdom or human virtue.

History, again, presents us periods when in particular countries faith has waxed cold, when the prelates are fonder of basking in the sunshine of the court than of residing in their dioceses and attending to the spiritual wants of their flocks; when the clergy live more like seculars than meek and self-denying ministers of him who died on the cross to save souls; when vice and immorality invade even religious houses, and the mass of the faithful do not rise in their conduct much above the common level of the better class of non-Catholics; therefore, once more conclude our "no-popery" writers, the church is the synagogue of Satan, the

mystery of iniquity, the scarlet lady of Babylon, against whom every honest man should cry out, "Down with her, down with her, *Écrasez l'infâme.*" What virtuous indignation! Shall we not admire and trust the noble-minded men who manifest it? Yet what would they have us do? Is there no vice, no immorality outside of the church? Why not manifest their virtuous indignation against Almighty God, the creator and upholder of this world which lieth in wickedness, in which evil spirits hold their revels, and make men their victims? Surely Omnipotence could, for aught we can see, with a word, if he so pleased, put an end to it. He does not do it, because he saw proper to create man with free will, and because he chooses to govern him as a free agent. Would you have the church destroy man's free will, take away every vestige of human liberty, and leave us no merit in our obedience, any more than have the sun, the moon, or the stars, in fulfilling their appointed revolutions? Objections of this sort amount to nothing. The church is responsible for the conduct of those only who submit to her direction, obey her laws, and observe her precepts. If these are found vicious, corrupt, or criminal, then conclude, from the conduct of her children, against her, but not otherwise.

Passing from objections of this sort, that form the great staple of the class of works to which the one before us belongs, to those of a more doctrinal character and of more theological pretensions, we find that they are all, in the last analysis, objections to the mystery of the Incarnation, to redemption and salvation through the Word-made-flesh, or God in his human nature, and, therefore, to Christianity itself. Take the first title of the book before us, "*Pope or President?*" The alternative it presents shows that the author unconsciously, unintentionally it may be, rejects the supernatural order, the whole Christian order, and falls back under the order of nature alone. "Pope or President," would say, Christ or Cæsar? Christianity or paganism? religion or politics? The mind of him who presents this alternative has never risen above the natural order, and has utterly failed to grasp, if we may so speak, the fundamental idea of Christianity; has no conception of mediatorial grace, or of the real office of the sacred Humanity in the Christian economy. Take even the highest-toned Protestants, those who claim to be orthodox, and condemn Unitarians, Universalists, Quakers, &c., as heretics, and they shrink from

calling the Blessed Virgin the mother of God, and they all with one accord censure the worship we pay her, and our whole *cultus sanctorum* as idolatry. Why is this? They know that our church teaches the ten commandments; they know that she formally forbids idolatry as treason to the majesty of Heaven, and therefore they know that she does not, and cannot tolerate any thing that she herself regards as idolatrous. Evidently in her estimation this worship is not idolatry. Why, then, is it so in theirs? Simply because they do not really believe that God in his human nature is God, or that God has really assumed human nature, and in the hypostatic union made it really, substantially, his nature, as truly and substantially as the divine nature itself; because they do not understand that it is not God in his divinity alone, but God in his divinity and humanity that stands at the head of the Christian supernatural order, and is its origin and end, and its true object of worship; and because not understanding this, they dissolve Christ, and worship him in his divinity alone, and not in his divinity and humanity inseparably united. They worship the Word, it may be, but not the Word-made-flesh. They shrink from worshipping God in his humanity, and from honoring the Son of man as they honor the Son of God, or of including in the object of their supreme worship the sacred flesh assumed in the womb of the Virgin, by the second person of the ever-adorable Trinity. They follow the example of Lucifer. It is a tradition, that the cause of the revolt of Lucifer and his rebel angels was the command to worship the Son in his humanity and in his divinity. When the Father brings his Son forward as incarnate, or in the fulness of time to become incarnate, he says: "Let all the angels of God adore him." This offended Lucifer, not because it commanded him to worship the eternal Word as God—for he knew the Word was God, one in essence or being with the Father,—but because it commanded him to worship the Son in his twofold nature, and therefore in his humanity as well as in his divinity, which seemed to him to involve the worship of the creature, nay, the worship of man. This he could not brook; for man was made a little lower than the angels, and if any creature was to be worshipped it should be an angelic creature, and himself as the first and highest of the angels and archangels. It is clear that he did not understand the mystery of the Incarnation, and he appears even yet not to understand it, for the war

he carries on is a war not intentionally against the Son as Son of God, but as Son of man. It is the same with Protestants, and hence they condemn as idolatry the worship which Catholics pay to Mary and the saints. They do not see that this worship grows out of and is authorized by the worship of the God-man, to whose humanity the saints are related by nature, and to whose divinity they are related by the grace which makes them sons of God by adoption, and joint-heirs of Jesus Christ.

Mistaking the sense of the Incarnation, or denying it altogether, the non-Catholic world are logically led to the denial of the supernatural order of grace and life, the very life and immortality brought to light through the Gospel. They reject, in fact, even when not in words, the "mystery of godliness, which was manifest in the flesh," and therefore the whole Christian order, and the whole economy of Christian salvation. They have lost sight of the mediator between God and men, the MAN Christ Jesus, and expect salvation, if they expect it at all, through the divinity distinctively taken, without the mediation of the flesh, or the human nature hypostatically united to the divine. Even they among Protestants who assert in words the Incarnation, recognize nothing in the Christian economy that necessarily demands it, for even the expiation or satisfaction for sin made by our Lord on the cross could have been dispensed with, since, if he had so chosen, God could have forgiven sin on simple repentance, without the expiation or satisfaction so made; and there is nothing else in their theology that could not have been as well effected without as with the assumption of the flesh. They really have no use for that assumption, for the flesh plays no part in the economy of grace, or the final beatitude of the Christian. With them the Word-made-flesh is not the creator and founder of a new order of life, by which man is placed in new and supernatural relations with God,—an order of life which flows from the God-man as its first principle and returns to him as its last end, or in which the Word-made-flesh is the beginning and end, the alpha and the omega, in a real and not merely in a putative or fictitious sense.

Not seeing that all in the Christian economy grows out of the stupendous fact of the Incarnation, your evangelicals reject the whole system of mediation. They reject the church as the visible body of Christ; reject sacramental grace; deny infused habits of grace, which elevate man to

a supernatural life, and enable him to merit a supernatural reward, and hold that regeneration is effected by an immediate and direct act of God distinctively in his divinity alone, in which the humanity does not participate. The most that can be said is, that since God expiated man's sin, he can now consistently with the demands of justice pardon the sinner who believes; but in the work of regeneration and sanctification it performs no office. The Blessed Trinity does all directly and immediately without it. Hence among the higher and more independent intelligences in the non-Catholic world there is a strong tendency to reject the Incarnation, even in words, and to regard the Christian dogma as simply symbolical of a metaphysical and cosmological fact of the natural order,—the divinity in humanity, or the immanence of God as cause in man as the effect,—an immanence in some sense which all must recognize who recognize the relation of cause and effect.

Rejecting, in reality, even when not in words, the mystery of the Incarnation, or virtually explaining it away, the non-Catholic world necessarily rejects the supernatural order, and fall back, as we have said, under the natural order, and recognize no order of life but the natural; that is, they fall back under pure rationalism, or a sort of natural mysticism, sometimes expressed and sometimes not expressed in Christian phraseology. Let us not be misunderstood; we do not mean that all Protestants deny the supernatural in the sense that God is above nature, as the cause must needs be above the effect, or even that God communicates his will to many, and intervenes now and then in human affairs otherwise than through the so-called laws of nature. What we mean is, that they reject the supernatural order, the life and immortality brought to light through the Gospel, and whose principle, whose origin and end is God incarnate, or Jesus Christ, in whom the two natures, the human and the divine, though distinct, are forever united in the unity of one divine person. The supernatural they admit is simply the Divinity, and the supernatural intervention in human affairs is a direct and immediate exertion of divine power, not intervention in accordance with a supernatural order, through the human nature assumed or taken up to be the human nature of God. The life and immortality they assert is the natural life and immortality of the soul, not the life and immortality that proceed from the God-man, as nature proceeds from the divine Word alone, or unincarnate. Even

Protestants who most affect orthodoxy, can give us no good reason on their ground why none ascended into heaven before Christ, why, till Christ visited them after his crucifixion, the patriarchs, though they had died in faith in him who was to come, and in a state of sinlessness, were detained in what is called the *limbus patrum*. It is doubtful if they really do so believe at all, or if they would not greet us with a derisory smile were we to mention to them seriously even the word *limbo*, which, in their minds has only ludicrous associations. They do not see that the fathers could not enter into the life and immortality brought to light through the Gospel before that life and immortality really existed in fact; and that they existed only in promise before the Incarnation was consummated, or before our Lord had pronounced on the cross the words, *consummatum est*. Hence so many of them see no reason for the descent into hell, and would erase that article from the creed. It is this supernatural order of life and immortality founded by the Incarnation, or by the Word-made-flesh, and which is in no sense proved by proving the natural immortality of the soul asserted by Socrates and Plato, hoped for by Cicero, and in some form believed by most men, that non-Catholics in all ages and nations of the world, deny or fail to recognize,—a life and immortality which faith foretastes in this world, and the saints enjoy in fulness by the light of glory in heaven. We may believe in the natural life and immortality of the soul, which may be proved with certainty by natural reason, and have full assurance of an individual personal existence after death; and yet, if we deny the new order of life and immortality created by the Incarnation, and into which we can enter only through the door of faith, and which we can live and possess only in Christ Jesus,—only by being created anew in him, or becoming in him a new creature,—we deny Christ himself, or that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh, and retain nothing really Christian,—have nothing left but the simple order of nature alone.

The whole supernatural order in the distinctively Christian sense, is in the Incarnation, is in the Word-made-flesh, the father and founder, principle and end of the new creation, the new heaven and earth. Christ and Christianity are inseparable, and out of Christ there is and can be nothing distinctively Christian. All in Christianity grows out of the mystery of the hypostatic union. Christianity, no doubt, presupposes a natural order. It presupposes God, the Trinity,

creation, reason, moral duty, the natural immortality of the soul, &c., all of which a man may fully recognize and firmly believe without recognizing or believing any thing of the Christian order. God is eternal, and the distinction of three persons in the Godhead is eternal; the Word that became incarnate is eternal, and therefore precedes the facts of the Christian order. The creation of the natural world, including man with all that belongs to him in the natural order, also precedes the establishment of Christianity, for man exists only by virtue of creation, and his existence is presupposed by the fact of the assumption of his nature by the Word. The natural order precedes in time the Christian order, although the intention to found that Christian order may have preceded, and most likely did precede in the divine mind, if we may talk of precedence where all is eternal, the intention to create the natural order, so that the real end of all creation may have been from the first, and we believe was, the glory of God in Jesus Christ, or, in other words, the natural may have been created for the sake of the supernatural, and not the supernatural precisely for the sake of the natural. But in the order of facts the supernatural is subsequent to the natural, and presupposes it. Though presupposing it, the Christian order is always distinct from the natural, and is itself all in the Incarnation. Hence there can be no doctrinal objections to Christianity that do not directly or indirectly impugn this great and fundamental mystery. An analysis of the errors and heresies which the church in every age or nation has condemned, will show that they all in some form contravene the doctrine that God became man. The Ebionites denied the Incarnation by maintaining that our Lord was simply a man, and not God as well as man; the Docetæ denied it by denying the reality of our Lord's body, and maintaining that he suffered and died on the cross only in appearance; the Arians denied it by denying the divinity of the Son, and maintaining that the Word was distinguishable essentially from God, really a creature, though the first-born of all creatures. The Nestorians denied it, by denying the unity of the person of Jesus Christ, as they did in denying that Mary was the mother of God, and implying that she was the mother of man only. The Eutychians or monophysites denied it by denying the distinction of the two natures, and maintaining that after the resurrection our Lord had but one nature, and that the divine nature, into which they contended the human nature has been transub-

stantiated. The monothelites denied it by maintaining that our Lord had but one will, and denying that he had a human as well as a divine will, as plainly implied by our Lord himself: "Not my will, but thine be done," since there is and can be no human nature without a human will. All these directly impugn the fact that the Word was made flesh, and strike at the very foundation of the supernatural order.

The same may in reality be said of all subsequent errors and heresies. They all, directly or indirectly, impugn the mystery of the Incarnation, either in itself or in its *consectaria*. The Pelagian heresy strikes at the Incarnation in denying the necessity of the grace that flows from it in the economy of salvation, and Pelagianism, in its historical developments, has always had a tendency to rationalism and humanism. Calvinism or Jansenism, the opposite heresy, impugns the Incarnation by denying nature, or destroying it to make way for grace; thus rejecting the office of the humanity in the Christian economy. The reformers denied the same mystery, indirectly at least, in denying the infused habits of grace, or what is called sacramental grace, the church, and the priesthood. All the objections we hear against the Catholic doctrine of the church, the sacraments, the priesthood, the papacy, absolution, indulgences, the intercession of the saints, holy oils, holy water, the blessing of bells, the consecration of churches, altars, &c., are all directed against the Word-made-flesh, inasmuch as they impugn the great principle of mediatorial grace, as we hope, one of these days to be able to show more in detail, and to prove to the full satisfaction of all who will read and understand. It is worthy of remark, that Dr. Nevin, who yet, we are sorry to see, lingers outside of the church, was led by meditating on the idea of a sacrament, and by the endeavor to establish the fact that a sacrament signifies something, to the whole theory of the Catholic priesthood and the Catholic Church, as set forth in the writings of the fathers, and we commend his essays in the *Mercersburg Review* on the *Apostle's Creed*, *Primitive Christianity*, *the Incarnation*, and *St. Cyprian*, as among the profoundest and most remarkable of all contemporary theological writings in our language. The Protestant movement in the sixteenth century did not openly, perhaps not even intentionally, make war on the Incarnation; but in denying the system of mediatorial grace, the very principle of mediation, except in a putative sense; in deny-

ing the Catholic priesthood, and therefore Christ as a priest; in rebelling against the church, and denying it as the visible body of Christ, as, in some manner, the visible continuation of the Incarnation on earth, uniting the saints on earth in one communion with the saints in heaven, as Mœhler has well maintained; and in rejecting the sacrifice of the mass, the veneration of the saints, prayers for the dead, indulgences, &c., prepared the way for all courageous and logical minds to reject Christianity entirely as a supernatural order of life and immortality.

All in the non-Catholic ranks have not yet advanced so far as to renounce absolutely the Incarnation, have not pushed the Protestant movement to its last logical consequences; but what we may call the age has done so. The age believes in no supernatural order of life founded by the Word-made-flesh. It believes in no Jesus Christ, the mediator between God and men. In its heart it has said of our Lord, "we will not have this man to reign over us." It may be learned, scientific, philanthropic, but it is not Christian, even when in relation to the natural order its conduct and pursuits are not reprehensible, or are even commendable. It may worship the God of nature, worship as can a Mahometan, a Unitarian, or a deist, but it performs no act of Christian worship; for it worships not Jesus Christ, the God-man. Here is where the age now stands. Where it is not *anti*-Christian, it is *un*-Christian. The governments of the world act no longer from Christian principles, with a sense of obligation to the church, and for the interests of religion as the supreme interests of individuals and nations, but from simple state policy, with an exclusive view to political and material interests. At times the age even goes further. If we recollect aright, Humboldt, in his *Cosmos*, never uses the name of our Saviour, or the word God, or, at most, but once. The *savants* who dominate the age, seek to explain all the phenomena of nature without referring to a creator even. Historians see no Christ in history, and seek to explain all history on natural principles alone. Religion, we are told, is the result of the efforts of man to supply the wants of his nature, and the differences of religion are explained by differences of race, of soil, climate, production, &c. Even Dr. Bellows seeks a church only to satisfy the wants of the soul.

Arrived at this point, the old controversies between Catholics and Protestants, with regard to particular doctrines, cease to interest the age. The controversy as it exist-

ed in the time of Bellarmine and Suarez, has done its work for the higher intelligences of the times. It received its *coup de grâce* from the great Bossuet in the seventeenth century, and since then, Protestantism has virtually ceased to be dogmatic, and is now defended rather as a movement towards freedom, individual and social, intellectual and religious, than as a definite system of truth of any sort. The grand argument in favor of Protestantism just now, is that it sustains, and is sustained by, liberty, as the grand objection to Catholicity is, that it enslaves the mind, upholds despotism, and prevents the political, civil, and material prosperity of the nations that adhere to it.

It is on this ground, below the supernatural, and from the point of view of the natural order, that we have now to conduct the controversy between us and our adversaries. Take the work before us, *Pope or President?* its only significance is, that it places the controversy in the natural order, and requires us in order to meet it to establish the fact and the supremacy of the supernatural order. Its alleged "startling disclosures," its pretended "facts for Americans" would be impertinent, and conclude nothing, if non-Catholics, as well as Catholics, believed in the Christian supernatural order, as we have endeavored to explain it. But as it is, we overcome their damaging effect only by proving, first, the fact of the Incarnation; and, secondly, that the order it founds, or that grows out of it, though above nature, is not contrary to nature,—does not suppress nature, abridge or supersede any of its rights. To meet entirely the difficulties or wants of the age, we have not only to prove these two points, but we have to explain the various historical and other phenomena which seem to militate against them. We have also to show that without coming into this supernatural Christian order, no man can attain to his supreme good, and that no one can by his own natural reason and strength, attain to a knowledge of this order, much less enter into it, and live in it.

None of our old controversial works can render us much service in any of these things. Nothing can be more excellent for the controversy in the form it then wore, than the *De Civitate Dei* by St. Augustine, or the *Summa Contra Gentiles* by St. Thomas; but though necessary to be studied, they do not answer our purpose in the form it now wears. The works on Evangelical Demonstration, recently collected and published in Paris by the Abbé Migne, who is rendering such

valuable service to the Catholic student, though possessing great as well as various merit in their way, do not touch the questions now up for discussion, at least not in the form we must meet them, or not meet them at all. The Catholic works against unbelievers in the last century are, for the most part, out of date. The fathers, the scholastics, and the theologians of later times, no doubt, supply us with all the principles we need, but we can meet the new forms of error we have now to grapple with only by new and original expositions and applications of the truth. No doubt we have at bottom the same old error, but it is that old error under a new form; no doubt it is the same old truth that we must oppose to it, but that truth will not seem to the adherents of the error to refute it, unless we give it a further exposition and a new application. In no previous age, to our knowledge, has error assumed the precise shape it now assumes, or has truth been combated with forces so difficult to dislodge. Error to-day, if less subtile, is also far less inconsistent with itself than we have ever before found it. Formerly, though it impugned the Incarnation, it honestly professed to accept it, did not intentionally deny it, and planted itself distinctly, with malice prepense, on the natural order alone. The Arian denied the proper divinity of the Word, but he acknowledged his obligation to worship, with divine honors, Jesus Christ. The Socinian did the same. It was easy to show either his inconsistency with himself,—to show the Arian that he was reviving paganism, and the Socinian that he defended idolatry. But error has now gone further, and freed itself from its old inconsistencies. It is not heresy we have now to combat, but infidelity, or gentilism, rationalism, or natural mysticism. The non-Catholic world, in its advances, has taken up its position on the purely natural order, and the natural order is a real order, as true as the supernatural order, and as consistent with itself. The man who plants himself on it stands on a solid foundation, and to explain any of its phenomena is under no necessity of borrowing any thing from the supernatural order. The supernatural or Christian order certainly presupposes the natural, but the natural does not presuppose or imply the supernatural.

Here begin the difficulties. We cannot proceed, as formerly, by proving, first, the supernatural is necessary; second, it is possible, and third, it actually exists, because modern discussions have made it necessary to concede that there is nothing in the natural order from which the necessity

of a supernatural order can be logically concluded. The natural order must suffice for itself; for the natural end of any existence is the end it is naturally able to attain. The supernatural that could be rationally concluded from the natural would not be supernatural, but natural; for if the premises are natural, the conclusion must be natural, since there can be nothing in the conclusion not contained in the premises. How then prove, by natural reason, to the non-Catholic, who rejects the supernatural order, that the supernatural is necessary? In fact, is it necessary? If so, God, having created nature, obliged himself to become incarnate, which is contrary to the teachings of the church. God might have created man as he is now born, and left him to the natural consequences of his own acts. The Incarnation proceeded not from his decree to create, but from his superabounding love, and is an act of pure grace, not implied in or necessitated by the act of creation. No doubt, we can by natural reason, prove that a supernatural revelation is possible, for creation cannot have exhausted the powers of the creator; but we cannot prove by natural reason that even such a revelation is necessary. We cannot infer from the miseries of this life, from the errors and weaknesses of human reason, that man, regarded as standing in the natural order alone, needs either supernatural light or supernatural strength; for, in fact, strictly speaking, he needs neither, except in relation to the supernatural order, or as appointed to a supernatural destiny. We must then establish the fact of the supernatural end, and that man is placed under a supernatural providence, before we can prove that he stands in need of supernatural assistance in the Christian sense. We must confront the non-Catholic to-day with the fact of the supernatural order, before we can convict him of being illogical, or inconsistent in planting himself on the natural order alone.

We have another difficulty peculiar to our times. The age does not directly deny or make war on any form of religion. Religion, it is contended, is natural to man, and to worship is an original want of his soul. Man is a religious animal, as he is a rational animal, a political or social animal. Religion has its seat in his interior nature, and is developed as art, or as society itself is developed. Indeed the more approved æsthetical writers of the day confound art and religion, and the worship of God with the worship of beauty. Religions may be more or less perfect, but at

bottom all religions, it is assumed, are identical,—all good in their time and place, and all bad when outliving that time. Catholicity is regarded not as absolutely true, nor as absolutely false, but as one of the varying and transient forms of religion, very serviceable and good for a certain stage in human progress, but now useful only for those who have not yet been brought up to the level of the age. It is good for nations in their infancy, but bad for nations that have attained their manhood. Protestantism is not a religion, is not a *credo*, or a worship, but is a suspense of faith, a transition from the old superannuated Catholic form to some newer and nobler form yet to be developed, a transition from the church of the past to the church of the future. Now, here is an order of thought that none of our predecessors treat, or even recognize. In former times, religion was regarded as having an objective truth, a subsistence independent of man, and the question was, which and what is the true religion, if any? But now it is not so. This order of thought denies all absolute, and therefore all objective truth, and makes both religion and truth purely relative and subjective. To refute it, we must establish the objectivity of thought itself, or the objective truthfulness of reason. For this we need philosophy, and unhappily, nearly all the philosophies in vogue justify in principle the very error to be combated.

The age, furthermore, is rapidly losing sight of the unity of the race, and the fashionable process now is to explain nearly all the phenomena of human history by the diversities of race. Thierry and Michelet, in their historical works, have found diversities of race everywhere. Ecclesiastical histories are now written on the theory of differences of race, and thus we hear of eastern Christianity and western Christianity, Greek Christianity and Latin Christianity, Celtic Christianity and Teutonic Christianity,—Catholicity is Celtic, Protestantism is Germanic. The diversities of natural genius and temperament lead to the diversities of religion. The Catholic religion is developed and embraced by the Celtic nations; the Protestant by Germanic nations. Non-Catholic *savants* are disposed to maintain, not merely varieties in the human race, but diversities of race, and to assign, at least to the colored races, an origin different from that of the white races. In our southern states we have found Catholics even, who were quite unwilling to regard the negro slave and his

white master as having descended alike from the same Adam and Eve. The doubt as to the unity of the race, the brotherhood of all men, is much more widely diffused than we commonly imagine; and it is a mistake to suppose that the present scientific tendency is to assert it. Even in some Catholics, who certainly believe God has made of one blood all the nations of men, so strong are the prejudices of race or nation, that they can hardly be persuaded there is any use in laboring for the conversion of a different race from their own. Evidently this modern doctrine of races, and this gentile method of explaining the fact, that different nations embrace different religions, is one of the errors the Catholic controversialist is forced to meet. A kindred error, *rationalism*, has in all ages been one of the errors the church has had to combat, and the truth that God has made of one blood all the nations of men, and all have one and the same nature, invariable and indestructible, save by the power of the Creator, has always been, and is now one of the most difficult truths of the Gospel to be practically maintained, for national pride, national partiality, or national hatred always opposes it.

The great argument for Protestantism and against Catholicity, what we may call the social and political argument, presents difficulties, which, to our knowledge, have never been fairly met by our controversialists—fairly met, we mean, for the non-Catholic mind. The argument apparently rests on incontrovertible facts. Take the non-Catholic point of view, and you cannot deny the superiority of non-Catholic over Catholic nations. The only nations politically free are non-Catholic nations, and the leading commercial and industrial nations of our time are, as to the controlling influences, Protestant nations. The great Catholic states of the sixteenth century, unless France forms an exception, have greatly deteriorated, while the non-Catholic states, Russia, Prussia, Great Britain, and the United States, have either sprung into existence since the reformation, or been constantly growing. Compare non-Catholic America with Catholic America, and you may see, we are told, the immense difference between the two religions. Compare Mexico with the United States. In nearly all Catholic countries, at the present day, we find despotism, and almost an entire absence of what we in this country regard as civil and political liberty. How explain these facts to the non-Catholic mind, and prove that Catholicity is really not

unfavorable to liberty and the political and national growth and prosperity of nations? These facts, we know, do not sustain, but we cannot deny that they appear to sustain, the non-Catholic objection now so generally and so confidently urged. The Catholic who wishes to defend his religion against the attacks now made must meet these objections. What publication in this country, except this *Review*, has done it, or seriously attempted to do it?

Here are the questions to be discussed, the objections to be answered, if we mean to take part in the living controversy of the day. But here arises for us in the United States a grave difficulty, hardly less for American Catholic writers than is the censorship of the press in Europe for European Catholic writers. The controversy must be carried on through the press by books, pamphlets, periodicals, journals, &c., and these on the Catholic side must be sustained, if sustained at all, by the Catholic public. Few non-Catholics will at present buy our books, for they have something to lose, and we much to gain by the controversy. The most we can expect of them is that they will read our publications when placed in their hands by their Catholic friends and acquaintances. We have a small, enlightened, pure-minded, and independent Catholic public who are up to the level of the age, master of the controversy in its present form, and prepared to do their duty, and even more than their duty in sustaining the right sort of publications; but these, though more numerous than we could reasonably expect, all things considered, are, after all, only a small minority of even our educated Catholic population. The mass of our Catholic population are not a literary or a reading people, and even of those who do read and seek to acquire information, the majority take no interest in the great questions it is absolutely necessary to discuss, if we hope by controversy to make any impression on our non-Catholic countrymen, and they see not why they should sustain such publications as are devoted to those questions, and which have no interest for themselves. Moreover, not taking the pains to master the points at issue, they are liable to misapprehend and misapply such works, to imagine them erroneous or dangerous, and to look upon it as their duty to discountenance them, to decry them, to denounce their authors, and to deprive what they write of all weight either with Catholics or non-Catholics.

We have had, in our own case, more than one illustration

of the offence an honest Catholic publicist may give by frankly discussing questions for which a portion of his readers are not prepared. Even the article on the Romanic and Germanic orders presents us with a striking case in point. That article is long and elaborate, and is addressed directly to the great questions now up for discussion. It was intended to refute a very popular theory, much relied on by intelligent non-Catholics, that differences between Catholics and Protestants are to be explained by differences of race. Catholic nations, it holds, are of Celtic origin; Protestant nations are of Germanic origin. The Celtic nations are Catholic by virtue of the peculiar genius and temperament of the Celtic race; the Germanic nations cannot be Catholic, because the peculiar genius and temperament of their race repel it. The article also undertook to refute the doctrine also widely maintained that liberty is Germanic, and despotism Celtic; that Protestantism sustains and is sustained by liberty, and Catholicity sustains and is sustained by despotism. Finally, it endeavored to show by a rapid generalization of historical facts, that none of these positions can be historically sustained. What more proper or necessary to be done? Under the first head, after having shown that the theory is gentilistic, not Christian, the writer undertakes to show, that on the principles of the theory itself, the reverse of what it assumes would follow. Thus he says: "*Were we to forget that God has made of one blood all the nations of men, and that Catholicity is catholic, not gentilistic*, we should be disposed to take the reverse of this famous theory, and to maintain that the Celtic people, by their natural genius and temperament, are far less fitted to be Catholic than are the Germanic or Teutonic nations. The German genius and temperament, it seems to us, are naturally [in the natural order as distinguished from the order of grace] far less averse to Catholicity than are the so-called Celtic." The writer having said this, proceeds to mark, in proof of it, certain characteristic traits in the natural order of the so-called Celtic people, especially the French and Irish, assumed to be the best representatives of the Celtic race. Some of our Catholic friends, by omitting or making no account of the words we have *italicized*, have made the writer say precisely what he did not say, but only said he should be disposed to say in case he accepted, as he did not, the theory in question, and, having thus misrepresented him, proceed to accuse him of contradicting himself,

of asserting the very theory he professes to reject, of being un-Catholic, and seeking simply an opportunity of indulging his supposed national prejudices in saying hard things and venting his spleen, with which he is assumed to be filled, against the French and Irish, and of calumniating the Catholic faith and piety of the Irish and French, who have been and are so distinguished for their Catholicity, and to admonish every man of Irish or French descent to show his appreciation of the national insult offered, by erasing his name from the list of subscribers to the *Review*. Why is this? Because the writer denies that the French and Irish are Catholics by virtue of a Catholic nature, and maintains, that when Catholics they are so not by force of nature, but by virtue of the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ! What is wrong in this? Do the Catholic critics themselves hold that the French and Irish become and remain Catholics by virtue of their natural genius and temperament? Are they Catholics, or are they gentiles? Good and earnest Catholics we doubt not. Then they must hold with the writer that the French and Irish, like all others, are Catholics only through the operation of divine grace, by which they are begotten anew, regenerated, or born into the supernatural or Christian order of life, and placed on the plane of a supernatural destiny. What was said, then, against their *Catholic* faith or their *Catholic* piety, by representing them as further removed in the natural order from Catholicity than the English or Germans? "An Irishman or a Frenchman, by the grace of God," the writer said, "becomes and remains a *good* Catholic, *none better*." Who can say more? Suppose, then, the writer did represent the Celtic nations, or the nations assumed to be Celtic, as being in the natural order more averse by their genius and temperament to Catholicity than the Germanic nations, and even attempted to prove it, what did he do or attempt in disparagement under a Catholic view of them as Catholics? What he said of their peculiarities and tendencies outside of their Catholicity could be no reproach to them as Catholics, at least not in his mind, since the very point of his argument was to prove that Catholicity in no case depends on the natural peculiarities or tendencies of those who embrace it. Therefore he adds, "we say not this in disparagement of their Catholicity, for it really is no disparagement at all." What the writer in the passage, that appears to have given so much offence, was aiming to show, obviously was, if we assume

that nations are Catholic or Protestant, according to the genius and temperament of the race to which it is assumed they belong, the Germanic nations should be Catholic, and the Celtic nations Protestant, contrary to what the adversaries maintain, and therefore the attempt to make the adoption of Catholicity depend on race, and to reduce the Catholic religion itself to a simple gentile religion must be abandoned, and the theory rejected as not being sustained by facts. We see nothing in this that should offend any Catholic,—for every Catholic must believe, or be no Catholic,—that God has made of one blood all the nations of men, that the church is catholic, and that men are Catholics by virtue of grace, not nature.

It is very possible that a hasty reader, paying no attention to the general scope and design of the article, reading little more than the offensive passage itself, and attending only to certain phrases and expressions somewhat epigrammatic, and of course, as is always the case with such phrases and expressions, never intended to be taken *au pied de lettre*, might innocently mistake the motive of the writer, and imagine that it was really his intent to speak disparagingly of the French and Irish. The writer, in fact, laboring to be brief, became obscure, and left more for his readers to supply from their own knowledge than was prudent—a not uncommon fault with him. We observe, too, that he uses the term *natural* in two senses, the one that of the theory he is arguing against, that is, pertaining to the specific nature of man, or the race; the other that of pertaining to the natural order as distinguished from the supernatural or Christian order. He marks, indeed, the distinction between the two senses, but he is not careful to state explicitly every time the term occurs, in which of the two senses he uses it. Some little confusion may thence arise, and we can easily conceive that a reader preoccupied with the cares of business, of his vocation, his office, or his profession, reading only by snatches, a sentence here and a sentence there, not recollecting for the moment that Catholicity is wholly in the supernatural order, and therefore that whatever is natural is *un*-Catholic, might, with very honest intentions, and without any disparagement of his understanding, imagine that the writer contradicts himself, and asserts in the passage in question what he elsewhere denies. Some portion at least of the misapprehension which has occurred, is no doubt due to the writer's own fault; never-

theless, we think, that a conscientious reader, unwarped by prejudice, reading attentively the whole article, with his theology fresh in his mind, and taking time to interpret what seemed doubtful or obscure in particular passages, by the obvious scope and design of the whole, might, without serious difficulty, have followed the several steps of the argument, seized the writer's meaning, and, whether agreeing with him or not in all his particular judgments, have acquitted him of palpably contradicting himself, and especially of writing with the express or even covert purpose of insulting the French and Irish, or of calumniating their Catholic faith and piety. Certainly, he recognizes differences in the natural order between the two classes of nations, but he denies that these differences spring from original differences of race, or that they are due to any other than adventitious causes. If he speaks of a specific Celtic nature, and of a specific German nature, it is in accordance with the theory of races, which he grants momentarily for the sake of the argument, but which he does not concede, and does his best to refute. There may be national differences in the order of nature, without differences of race, and some nations through the more or less of the patriarchal religion retained in principle or practice, and through difference of education or development, may be said to be more or less in accordance with Catholicity, though below it, without any original difference of race or nation being asserted, or that Catholicity is catholic, and adapted alike to the nature of all men being denied.

But the grand difficulty, we apprehend, and that which has led to the grave accusations against the writer, is precisely the fact that he was discussing questions from a point of view under which his critics had not been accustomed to consider them. His argument, as a whole, was out of their ordinary line of thought, and his mode or manner of treating them was unfamiliar and novel to them. Never having thought beyond or outside of the matters treated by the old controversialists, they saw no real importance in the questions he was discussing with so much earnestness and warmth; for, not able to see them from his point of view, they looked at them only from their own, under which they really have no importance. Not suspecting that possibly he meant more than they dreamed of, if not, indeed, something very different from what they imagined, they concluded that he was only discussing the old question between

Saxon and Celt, and regarding what he said as only fitted to stir up national animosities, provoke angry feelings, and wantonly to disturb the peace and harmony of Catholics, who, in this country at least, have no strength to waste in internal divisions, disputes, and quarrels, they considered it their duty to denounce the article, and to deprive the writer, as far as possible, of the respect and confidence of the Catholic community. Yet had they viewed the questions discussed from his stand-point, and seen that he was really furnishing a key to the struggles of modern history, explaining historical facts in accordance with the divine titles and character of the church, and showing the real answer to the only objections to our religion, that now have much weight with intelligent non-Catholics, as it had not been previously done in our language, and, as far as we know, in any other, they certainly would have taken a more generous view of the writer's labors, would have never believed that he was spending so much time and thought and labor in discussing a mere trite or common-place question; and certainly, even if objecting to certain words and phrases, would never have regarded them as the key to the whole article, or charged him with writing expressly to insult the French and Irish, or to decry the Celtic and to extol the Germanic race. They would have felt that he was grappling with a subject too weighty, and that he was too grave and earnest to think of descending to any thing so low, not to say, so mean, and so contemptible.

The article, undoubtedly, hurtles a little rudely against some old and fondly cherished prejudices, and dismisses certain popular answers to certain popular objections to the church, as superficial, inconclusive, and not worth reproducing, and makes it necessary to look a little deeper, and seek hereafter answers a little profounder, and of a less inconclusive character; but this, if rightly considered, deserves to be treated as a merit rather than as a fault. The critics who have felt themselves wounded by the article, would do well, perhaps, to reflect, that they have been confirming the non-Catholic world in their prejudices against our religion. Intelligent non-Catholics meet us with the objection: "What you present as Catholicity is very well, reasonable and just, but it is an ideal Catholicity, a Catholicity of your own imagination, not the Catholicity of history, and you will find the Catholic public will not accept your statements, or sustain you as a Catholic writer." Is this so? Are we

really un-Catholic or not? We have said no more than any Catholic is free to say, and the opposition to us not only injures us personally, but the Catholic cause itself.

Of course, we have no thought, in this remark, of setting the *Review* up as a standard of orthodoxy, or pretending, that to oppose it, is necessarily to oppose Catholicity; but we have for these four or five years been laboring with all our might to separate Catholicity, in the public mind, from all foreign elements, which, by being associated with it, have alienated vast numbers from it. We have endeavored to present Catholicity separate from what belongs not to it, but to the imperfections of individuals,—to mere human policy, necessary and just for the time it may be, but frequently the reverse when times have altered, and to show that the church is answerable for none of the defects of modern civilization, or the faults of modern society in or out of Catholic nations. We have never knowingly compromised a Catholic doctrine or principle, or hesitated to maintain the most rigid and high-toned doctrines on all the points generally regarded as the most offensive to Protestants, or to defend any genuine Catholic practice, however offensive to non-Catholics, and, in this respect, have gone even further than has suited those who pride themselves on being *liberal* Catholics. We have acted on the rule, that it is rarely that fair-minded and intelligent non-Catholics gravely object to any thing really Catholic, and that what they object to is almost always something which they take to be Catholic, but which is not,—something, perhaps, which has been associated with our religion without being any part of it, though Catholics may have sustained or practised it, the church has never sanctioned, favored, or approved it. We have shown, that though nature is below grace, there is no necessary discordance between them; that though reason is below faith, rightly understood, there is no conflict between faith and reason; that though despotism often prevails in Catholic states, it is due to non-Catholic, not Catholic causes, and that while the church exacts full and unquestioning faith in the word of God committed to her to dispense, she enjoins natural justice upon all men, and requires us to respect alike the natural rights of individuals and nations.

In doing this, we have succeeded in removing the principal objections of intelligent and well-disposed non-Catholics, if it be indeed true, that what we present as the church is really the Catholic Church of history. But they contend

that it is not, and cite in their justification and against us the fact, that no recognized organ of Catholics in this country sustains us. All the supposed Catholic organs keep an ominous silence, or openly and bitterly denounce us. Not a Catholic voice is raised in public to repel the attacks made on us, or to defend the course we have pursued. So far as the non-Catholic public can judge we are denounced and completely isolated.* This silence, this denunciation, this isolation, renders nugatory all that we can do or say in defense of our holy religion. Are these non-Catholics right? Is it true that the Catholicity we defend is an ideal Catholicity, a Catholicity of our own construction, and not the Catholicity of history,—the glorious old church which has had so many conflicts with the powers of evil, and won so many victories over them, and whom we would fain honor as the church of God, our own dear mother? If so, why not some competent authority tell us so, point out to us our errors against Catholic doctrine or Catholic practice, and give us an opportunity to correct them? If not, if we really are faithful to Catholic teaching, and have not abused our freedom, then, for the sake of the world outside, let the opposition from Catholics cease, and let Catholics abandon the petty and frivolous controversies, which some of them, from the moment of our entering the church, have been laboring to force upon us. We understand very well the case. No Catholic does, or will pretend that we are heterodox, or that the Catholicity we defend is not the Catholicity of the church. What the *Review* states for Catholicity is Catholicity, and the snapping and snarling at us, the denunciation of us, or wrath against us,—for argument against us, we have yet to see,—are all about matters outside of Catholicity, which we wish to distinguish and keep separate from the Catholic cause, but which they who oppose us, having always associated with that cause, or with their method of defending or advancing it, wish to retain unmolested, not seeing or not heeding the fact, that by retaining and so identifying them with that, they are keeping thousands and hundreds of thousands aliens from the church, who otherwise might be her friends. It is not that we are anti-Catholic, or un-Catholic, that causes the opposition or coldness we meet; but that we do not want the Catholic cause identified

*Since this was written, we have unexpectedly found two exceptions, *The Guardian* and *The Catholic Mirror*.

in our own, or any other country, with matters that have no necessary connection with it, and which serve only to embarrass it.

And this brings us directly to the point to which we wish, with all respect and deference, to call the attention of our Catholic friends. It is the duty of all Catholics to maintain the form of sound words, and to fly all profane novelties and vain babbling; but we must be on our guard against taking every thing that happens to be new to us, as a profane novelty, or every thing said, of which we see not the full importance, as a vain babble. We are all, to a great extent, creatures of habit, and few of us are able to get out of routine, or to recognise an old familiar friend in an unfamiliar dress. We are most of us disposed to look at what is presented to us from our own stand-point without making, or its occurring to us that it is proper to make, any effort to look at it from the stand-point of him who presents it. If our own minds are narrow and contracted, we can discover only a narrow and contracted meaning in what another addresses us, however elevated, broad, or comprehensive may be its meaning in his mind. We are all liable to forget to exercise that hospitality we are commanded to exercise toward strangers, and the result is, that we miss the angel we might chance to entertain, and place, by our inhospitality, a greater obstacle to the defence and diffusion of truth than is ever created by the advocates of error. We are unwise in this. We cannot, if we would, confine controversy to-day to the old beaten track, or hinder those who engage in it from criticising many things, with a freedom not tolerated in past times, nor pleasing to those who are wedded to them, or who have never for a moment doubted their wisdom or propriety. Truth is always the same, unchanged, and unchangeable; but it may from time to time require further expositions and new applications to meet the ever-shifting forms of error. The church is from God, always the same in spirit, in principle, in doctrine, in sacraments, and in universal discipline; but as Catholics pertain to both the church and natural society, they partake more or less of the character of each,—of the truth and permanence of the one, and the defects and mutability of the other. In what pertains strictly to the spiritual order, they are divinely instructed and guided, and are right in their principles, their doctrine, and their practices, if obedient to the light they have; but in secular matters they follow the age, and share its spirit,

its prejudices, its opinions, and its tendencies. Some of them, like non-Catholics, may be above, some may be below, their age, advancing or retarding secular progress, proving themselves its friends and advocates, or its enemies and opponents. When, as at present, controversy between Catholics and non-Catholics turns chiefly on the relations of the church with natural society, or of natural society with the church,—the mutual relations of the natural and supernatural,—we must allow a large margin to the freedom of discussion, and place a generous confidence in every Catholic publicist of adequate learning and ability, so long as he shows honesty of purpose, keeps within the limits of orthodoxy, and proves himself willing to hear reason when offered, and to submit to authority when it speaks. We must judge him by the infallible standard of the church, not by that vague and uncertain thing called public opinion, whether the public opinion of Catholics or of non-Catholics. The traditionary opinions of Catholics in the spiritual order, if not always infallible, are always respectable, and never to be departed from on the authority of mere private judgment; but the public opinion of Catholics, in relation to secular matters, stands on the same footing with that of non-Catholics, and may be precisely the thing at fault and in need of correction. To impose this public opinion upon any Catholic, as authority to which he must meekly bow, and against which he must never dare speak, on pain of being denounced as false to his religious duty, is to subject him to a mere human authority as if it were divine, and to deprive him of that freedom which God gives and the church leaves him. It is, indeed, to endow the secular order with all the attributes of the spiritual, natural society with all the prerogatives of the supernatural. In relation to the secular order, we must leave the Catholic publicist to follow his own rational convictions, so long as he does not oppose himself to the demands of the spiritual, without any Catholic having the right to call him to an account. If he errs in his judgment, we must still respect his rights, his personal character and dignity, and labor to correct his errors, not by peevish paragraphs in newspapers, or by denunciation and abuse, but by fair reason and solid arguments.

In doctrine and discipline, in all that proceeds from the church, every Catholic publicist must defend what has been believed and done by the great body of Catholics in all nations and ages; but this obligation does not extend to all

they have done or believed in the secular order, and we must not imagine that, in matters lying below the spiritual order, Catholics in all ages and nations have always been irreproachable, or that the controversialist can to-day conduct freely and successfully the arguments for the church, if forbidden to express his dissent from many of their views, and his disapprobation of much they have done. We cannot defend Catholicity against objections drawn from the modern theory of races, without reasserting the doctrine of the unity of the race; and we cannot do that effectually without offending some Catholics of one nationality or another; for, unhappily, the theory has its advocates even among Catholics, and affects the judgment and practice of more of the faithful than is commonly imagined. Must the Catholic publicist forbear to bring forward the truth, to assert the Catholic doctrine that God has made of one blood all the nations of men, to prove that Catholicity is catholic, adapted alike to the human nature of all men, because some of his Catholic brethren, against the letter and spirit of their religion, entertain gentilistic theories, prejudices, and susceptibilities, and he may chance to offend them?

We cannot meet the objections drawn from the social and political order, and disprove the assertion that Catholicity opposes liberty and generates and sustains despotism, unless permitted to draw sharply the line of distinction between the natural and the supernatural; to defend the church simply as the representative of the supernatural order, and to make natural society itself alone responsible for the vices and defects of modern civilization; and we cannot do this without running athwart the prejudices, the habits, and the practices of many of our brethren, or opposing, sometimes strenuously, the policy and conduct in the secular order of Catholic princes, prelates, and populations. Nothing is more unwise, or untrue, than to call the civilization of Catholic nations *Catholic* civilization, as if it had an infused habit of grace, to represent it as the work of the church, and on that ground to vindicate her titles to be regarded as the church of God, and the benefactress of nations. To place her defence on that ground, as do some of her friends, a ground insidiously conceded by her more adroit enemies, is to declare our defeat in advance. Civilization lies in the natural order, whether we speak of Catholic or non-Catholic nations, and is the work of natural society, which alone is responsible for it. The church indirectly aids it, assuredly,

but by cultivating in individuals the virtues necessary to secure the rewards of heaven. This aid is certainly great, and not easily overrated; but her proper mission is not civilization, but the glory of God in the salvation of souls. Civilization depends on the natural virtues—virtues which men may practise by their natural light and strength, and which are often practised in an eminent degree by non-Catholics. Churchmen, save by their superior secular knowledge and virtue, are no more able to advance civilization than seculars. Men may be saints and yet not great statesmen. The saints excel the mass of their contemporaries in sanctity, but in secular matters they may not rise above the common intelligence of their age. We have not to prove that the church advances civilization; it suffices to show that she is not hostile to the secular order; that she does not favor despotism, but enjoins upon all her children the practice of justice, and does respect liberty, whether of individuals or of nations. But we cannot do even this much without recognizing the fact that Catholics have supported despotism, and that the clergy, even now, to a great extent, place themselves on its side, through fear of socialism, which they regard as a greater evil, and perhaps justly so, though we dread socialism less than despotism.

The very necessities of modern controversy compel us in many cases to combat the views, the principles, and the conduct of Catholics, not as Catholics, indeed, but as members of natural society; and it will not do to take alarm or to be scandalized at our doing so. Because the church is infallible in the spiritual order, it does not follow that Catholics are both infallible and impeccable in the natural order. We could not hang a heavier millstone about the neck of the church than that of holding her responsible for all that has ever been said, done, or attempted by her children in the secular order. The past and present views and policy of Catholics in relation to secular matters, partake of the imperfections and errors incident to humanity, and must be open to the judgment of the publicist, and allowed to be freely canvassed. The hush-up policy avails nothing, and, besides, is impracticable in our age and country. We cannot shut men's eyes, stop their ears, or take away their judgments if we would. True, our enemies say this is what our church demands and seeks to do. But we Catholics know it is false, and why, then, shall we seek to confirm it? Facts will out, whether we tell them or seek to suppress them,

and it is far better for us to tell them, and place them in their true light, than it is to leave them to be told by our enemies, who are sure, by perverting them, to make them the basis of serious objections to our religion. We, and we only, can state historical facts truly, for we, and we only, have the key to all history, ancient and modern. The church is infallible and holy, but not all who are included among her children are either holy or infallible, and why shall we seek to maintain for ourselves a worth we do not possess?

We know—every Catholic knows—that the church does not sanction, or in any way approve despotism, and even her own prelates she calls pastors, and commands them to govern as fathers, not as lords. Why, then, when we find Catholic princes, Catholic publicists, or Catholic populations condemning liberty, sneering at all political guaranties, and proposing and defending Cæsarism as the only *régime* compatible with the interests of society both natural and supernatural, shall we, who live in a free country, where our religion is opposed almost exclusively on the alleged ground that it is hostile to free institutions, and favorable to despotism, not attempt to prove these European princes, publicists, and populations speak without the authority or sanction of the church? Or, when we find them really supporting cæsarism, why shall we turn round and abuse American non-Catholics for the charges they bring against us? It is easy to declaim against American Know-Nothings, perhaps easy in most places to vote them down; but were it not better to kill the Know-Nothing spirit by showing that they misjudge the church, and that the facts which mislead them may be explained, and ought to be explained, so as not to authorize, in any degree whatever, their conclusions? Why shall we not frankly own the fact—for fact it is—that Catholics, not the church, in Europe, and to some extent in this country, have done and are doing many things which, to an outsider, implies that we cannot at once be good Catholics and loyal Americans, or sincere and hearty supporters of American republicanism? As long as the fact is so what do we gain by refusing to own it, and to give it its proper explanation? Suppose the explanation does require us to recognize faults in ourselves, to acknowledge we have suffered ourselves to be too much influenced by the opinions and policy of the Catholics of Europe, and have not appealed, as often as we should have done, from the opinions and conduct of our European brethren to the

requirements of the church and the great principles of natural right or justice recognized by her, and considered what is most befitting us as citizens of a free but non-Catholic republic? Shall we, therefore, refuse to place ourselves right before the American public at large, or accuse as a traitor to our cause the Catholic publicist who labors honestly and zealously to do it?

It may be said, that the Catholic publicist may avoid all questions of this sort, and should do so, because he cannot treat them without stirring up strife where all should be peace and harmony. We know we are commanded to "follow after the things which make for peace," but we have never understood that we are commanded to seek peace at the cost of duty or principle. Our Lord is the Prince of peace, and yet he said, "Think not that I am come to send peace on earth; yea, a sword rather." If the controversy between Catholics and non-Catholics were confined to the regions of theology and metaphysics, were chiefly a controversy concerning particular theological doctrines and religious practices, no Catholic publicist would or could be justified in broaching questions whereon Catholics differ among themselves. The questions which we have indicated would then have little or no importance, and it would be wrong on the part of any Catholic to discuss or even to broach them. But we have all along been laboring to prove, that these are *the* questions of the age, and that we cannot take part in the living controversy of the day without taking part in them. No doubt a considerable number of Catholics here and elsewhere do not see this, and this is precisely the great difficulty we have to encounter, and the cause of the hostility the living Catholic controversialist meets on the part of his own brethren. Certainly there is a large body of non-Catholics who are to be met where and in the way they were met by Bellarmine and Suarez, Bossuet and Fénelon, and we complain not that there are none amongst us who are ready and willing so to meet them. We do not want these neglected, and we applaud every new work that issues from our press, at home or abroad adapted to their state of mind. But these are laggards, the old fogies of Protestantism, and do not represent the age, and works appropriate to them do not reach the practical wants of the men who lead the age, determine its character, and give it its tone. These, the advanced party of the non-Catholic world, understand well that they

cannot maintain the controversy on the old ground, or if confined to the sphere of theology and metaphysics, and have transferred it to the political and social field, where we are now required to meet it; and, therefore, we are obliged to take up questions in which Catholics are more or less divided among themselves, or not take part in the controversy demanded by the times. It is no choice of ours that we take up these practical living questions. We are forced to do it, if we would speak as a living man to the living men of the present day. It is not we who have placed the controversy on its present ground; we have only found and met it there.

We do not say that every publicist must engage in the discussion of these exciting questions, exciting, simply because living and practical, but we do contend, that the discussion of them is not to be sacrificed to the discussion of questions, which, for the age, are out of date. We say it is necessary that they should be grappled with, and he who grapples freely with them, let him do the best he can, the best that any man can, will seem to those who are unaware that the world has moved since the seventeenth century, imprudent, unnecessarily offensive, warped by prejudice, following his own eccentricities or idiosyncrasies, magnifying molehills into mountains, and, upon the whole, a very restless, uneasy, and unsafe man, who can never be brought to see or acquiesce in the holy admonition: *Quieta non movere.* Now, what we maintain is, that the Catholic public must not hastily condemn the publicist who takes up these questions and discusses them with freedom, candor, and impartiality. If Catholics want living men, men up to the times, and able to strike the insurgent error the moment it raises its head above the waters, or to defend the church against its real enemies at the moment, they must encourage him, liberally sustain him, for it is only on the condition of their doing so, that we can command and lead the intelligence of the age. If he says hard things, even cutting things, even if he errs, as he is sure to do,—for he is human,—in judgment or in matters of fact, do not decry him as an enemy, as a traitor in the camp, a wolf in sheep's clothing, deprive him of all power of doing good, and break his heart. Vindicate the truth against him, wherever and whenever there is occasion, but do it with firmness and moderation, with the manners of gentlemen, and the charity of Christians. Above all, do not make a mountain of

what may seem to those who take only little interest in the questions he treats, to be imprudent expressions, or an imprudent way of doing a thing which you admit it is lawful and right to do. Every man, who is a man, has a way of his own. The style, somebody says, is the man; deprive him of that, and he is no longer the same man. Besides, the man may be as good a judge as you of what is true prudence, or its contrary, and you are sure to take away half of his courage and all his power to serve the cause of truth, if you are always charging him with imprudence, especially if you do it as his friend, by way of apology or excuse.

MANAHAN'S TRIUMPH OF THE CHURCH.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1860.]

The first volume, completing the first section of the long-promised work by Dr. Manahan, on the Triumph of the Church, has now for some months been before the public, and has been received in a manner which must be highly gratifying to its learned and eloquent author. Some portions of the volume will be recognized by many as having been previously given to the public in the highly successful course of lectures which the author gave a few years since in this city, and we believe in one or two other places; but the form of lectures has not been preserved, and the whole has been recast and much new and important matter added. The present volume opens with a masterly sketch of the ancient gentile civilization in its material greatness and splendor, and its moral aberrations and defects, showing what men without Christianity may accomplish in the material order, and the errors, vices, crimes, into which they run; the moral and religious degradation to which they fall, without its guiding and succoring hand, or when abandoned to their disordered nature, and the arts and influences of the great enemy of souls. It shows what was the world the church had to battle with when the apostles went forth

Triumph of the Church in the Early Ages. By Ambrose Manahan, D. D. New York: 1859.

from Jerusalem to proclaim the glad tidings of a Redeemer. It then sketches the founding of all or nearly all the sees represented in the Council of Nice, the labors, struggles, and victories of the church in the first three centuries, or the church at war with and triumphing over paganism, backed by all the material greatness of the old world, and all the political majesty and physical power of the Græco-Roman empire. A second volume is promised us presenting the triumphs of the church in the middle ages, and a third presenting her in her struggles with heresy, especially with the heresies introduced or developed by Protestantism. Completed, the three volumes will probably present the best vindication, historical, philosophical, and theological, of the church, especially against those who object to her on the score of civilization, that has as yet appeared.

The best vindication of the church is her history, especially in her relation with the world that preceded the establishment of the chair of Peter at Rome, and the world outside of her since. He who has studied carefully the world she found, and in the midst of which she was placed, and the world that has since remained outside of her influence, and contrasted it with what we call Christendom, can have no hesitation in pronouncing her a divine institution, dispensing divine light and strength. Certainly not in this way can he attain to the conception of the Christian supernatural order, or to the conviction of the church as the mystic body of Christ, as it were a visible continuation of the Incarnation on earth; but he can, on the plainest and soundest principles of inductive reasoning, conclude that she is more than human, that God specially manifests himself in her for the good of mankind, and, therefore, that she is worthy of our full confidence, and, of course, must be what she professes to be. Her superhuman and divine light and strength, which come out from her history, establish her authority to teach, or accredit her to human reason, and make it reasonable to believe what she teaches and to do what she commands, in like manner as miracles wrought in attestation of the divine mission of the miracle-worker, accredit him as commissioned by God. The divine commission once established, we believe the teacher on his word; that is to say, on the authority of God who gives it; and it is sufficient for all matters covered by it. The church, after her divine commission or character is established, is sufficient authority as to what is the real Christian order, or what are the real

Christian mysteries. Dr. Manahan's work is not purely historical, but the historical element predominates in it, and though he does not expressly present heathendom and Christendom in contrast, he so presents the two that the real contrast between them in the moral order, comes out to the reader in a more or less striking light on almost every page.

The aim of the author, we take it, has been first, to show how far and in what respects Gibbon's estimate of the Græco-Roman civilization is correct, and how far and under what relations it must be rejected; and secondly, to refute indirectly, but conclusively, those Protestant writers in our day, who object to the church that material civilization is less advanced in Catholic than in non-Catholic states, by showing that the peculiar truth and excellence of Christianity do not lie in the material order, as they seem to assume, and that the Protestant argument against the church proves if any thing, too much, and becomes an argument in favor of gentilism; for, under the relation of simple material civilization, the most advanced non-Catholic nation falls short of the more renowned heathen nations of the ancient world. Gibbon wrote his history of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire to destroy the hold of the Christian religion on the world, by insinuating that under it civilization has deteriorated, and that the political and social well-being of mankind under gentilism was far superior to what it is under Christianity. Confining our views solely to the material order, to matters of wealth and luxury, to the material greatness, splendor, and refinement of nations, Dr. Manahan joins no issue with Gibbon, but concedes all, and indeed more than he asks. But he goes into the interior of that civilization, and shows that under its dazzling and brilliant exterior, there is nothing but rottenness, cold-hearted barbarity, inhumanity, licentiousness, and cruelty; that in the moral order, in humanity, in respect for human life, in tenderness and compassion, in love, in benevolence, in sympathy with the unfortunate, the poor and afflicted, in provisions or institutions for the relief of want, sickness, distress, in succors for the weak and feeble, in all that which makes the moral glory of civilization, or of human nature itself, it was utterly deficient, and can stand no comparison at all with the civilization that obtains in Christendom. In the whole ancient gentile world, he maintains, that there was not a single institution of benevolence, not a single hos-

pital for the infirm or the orphan, not a single foundation for the poor and destitute. Love, in the sense of philanthropy, was unknown before He came who said: "By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye love one another." Taking, then, the ancient civilization as a whole and especially under its moral and humane aspects, it is not, as Gibbon would have us believe, far superior, but far inferior, to the modern; and the comparison of the two will show that the world, even without looking to another life, owes an immense debt to the Catholic Church.

Were we to hazard a criticism, it would be to ask, if the learned and brilliant author does not make his charge against the inhumanity of the gentile world a little too sweeping? Certainly its inhumanity was great; certainly we do not find in that world the workings of that Christian charity, which loves God with all the heart and soul, mind and strength, and our neighbor as ourselves in God, or for the sake of God, for the heathen retained only faint reminiscences of the primitive revealed religion; and it is true, also, that we find few or no institutions of beneficence, properly so called; but we can hardly persuade ourselves that, as far gone as the gentiles were, they retained no natural benevolence, no natural kindness, no sympathy with suffering, and performed no acts in relief of the poor and afflicted. Human nature existed then as well as now, and the natural virtues were within their reach, by means of that natural grace, or grace of God as distinguished from the grace of Christ, which is given to all men; and we see not how any society absolutely destitute of natural affection could have held together or subsisted for a day. There must have been then, as in non-Catholic nations now, many who occasionally at least, practised the greater part of the natural virtues; there must have been mutual friendships, mutual attachments, mutual confidence between man and man; and acts of kindness and benevolence towards the poor and afflicted, the sick and infirm, if not sometimes even towards slaves. We find indications of it in all ancient literature; and in Rome the *proletarii* were so called from being regarded as the *proles*, or offspring of the city, and were fed by her bounty. Besides, the love which is the distinguishing mark of the disciples of Jesus Christ, is not philanthropy, benevolence, or the simple sentiment of humanity, but charity, a supernatural affection, which loves God supremely for his own sake, and man in him. The

gentile world never lost all trace of the primitive religion, and were never wholly abandoned to disordered nature. Yet there can be no doubt that the gentile civilization was marked by extreme cruelty and inhumanity, of which it is hard for us to form a conception in our day, and which it is not easy to exaggerate, especially in the laws, institutions, and religions, or superstitions, and we agree with our author in the conviction he expresses, that the gentiles not seldom reached a depth of cruelty, and of moral degradation, of which even our unregenerate nature is incapable by itself alone, and which it reaches only under satanic influences.

The popular method just now with Protestants of attacking the church, is to assert that the nations who adhere to her are less advanced in civilization than those that have emancipated themselves from her authority, and adopted the reformation. Against this method of attacking the church, and drawing an inference in favor of Protestantism, the lamented Balmes wrote his popular work, comparing the influence of Catholicity with that of Protestantism on European civilization. The excellent author endeavors to prove that under the influence of Catholicity, civilization had been constantly advancing from the sixth to the sixteenth century; and would, if permitted to continue its course, long ere this have reached a degree of perfection far beyond what it has now attained to in either Catholic or Protestant nations. He looks upon Luther's movement as an interruption of the progress of civilization, and maintains that Protestantism, so far from advancing, has really retarded, and greatly retarded it. Dr. Manahan says, in substance, suppose Protestant nations are more advanced in civilization than Catholic nations, it is only in material civilization, and in that your Protestant nations do not equal the great gentile nations of antiquity; and if the Protestant are superior to the gentile nations in the moral elements of civilization, it proves nothing in their favor, for they owe those elements to the Catholic Church, who was the first to introduce them, and whose active presence in the world, sustains and fecundates them even among nations, originally trained by her, now outside of her communion. Moreover, as our Lord did not found his religion to promote mere material civilization, you can conclude nothing against that religion from the fact, if it be a fact, that your material civilization surpasses that of Catholic nations; and as the distinguishing badge of that religion is love manifesting

itself in zeal for the moral well being of man, in beneficent acts or institutions for the relief of the multifarious forms of human suffering, you cannot conclude any thing to her discredit, unless you can show that in these things you surpass Catholic states,—which you do not, and will not even pretend,—nor indeed even then; for all of these things you have you owe to the influence of the church, to the habits formed when you were in her communion, or to the light which shines now even to you, as the light that shines from the city set on a hill penetrates and relieves the darkness even beyond its walls.

The Protestant argument certainly proves too much for those Protestants who really mean to be Christians; for there is no doubt in the mind of any man who has seriously studied the subject, that in the purely material order, the more renowned nations of antiquity surpassed any modern Protestant nation. Neither Great Britain with all her colonial and other dependencies, and her immense naval and commercial marines, nor the United States with all their industrial activity, and all their vast extent of trade and commerce, can really match, in physical force and material greatness and splendor, ancient Rome, or the vast Asiatic empires that preceded the Roman; and neither has the science of agriculture, or the industrial arts by which it can maintain on the same extent of territory, with so little derived for their subsistence from abroad, so vast a population as that of modern China or Japan. If we may believe the glowing accounts of Japan, published by some of the English who visited the capital with Lord Elgin, that empire is better policed than Great Britain, and the people more prosperous, better off, more contented and happy than the people of the United Kingdom, the first Protestant kingdom in the world. The facts in the case, then, if the question is to turn on purely material civilization, prove Christianity false, and authorize us to conclude in favor either of ancient gentilism or of comparatively modern Buddhism.

It is remarkable how forgetful are our modern Protestants, especially of Great Britain and the United States. What they find true of their respective countries to-day, they imagine has always been true of them. If either has projected a good thing, they treat it as already adopted, and abuse all other nations who have it not as laggards, as behind the age, as degraded and besotted by popery. Great Britain speaks of the slave trade to-day, as if she had never

fought with Spain for the privilege of supplying her colonies with slaves from Africa, and of slavery, as if she had never been a slaveholder, and as if she had not herself forced slavery upon our own country during our colonial dependence on the British crown,—of liberty, as if she had always both enjoyed and upheld it,—of the administration of justice, as if she had never had a Scroggs or a Jeffreys,—of cruel laws and punishments, as if she had not had the worst criminal code in Europe, and had not been remarked among civilized nations for the wretched condition of her prisons, and the severity of her punishments. One would think, to hear Englishmen talk, that England had always respected religious liberty, and had never subjected any man to civil pains and penalties for his religious belief, while even yet her statute-books are disgraced with penal laws against Catholics, which she refuses to repeal. She is fierce for oppressed nationalities,—in Italy and Hungary,—but forgets that she holds subject to her sway more oppressed nationalities than any other European power; that she formed one of the league that prepared the way for the partition and suppression of Poland; that she has for a century and a half, been leagued with Austria in sustaining the miserable Ottoman empire in holding the oppressed Christian nationalities of the East in subjection. Does she not hold Ireland, Malta, the Ionian Isles, or Septinsular Republic, in subjection, and yet she has the effrontery to complain of Austria for holding Venice by virtue of a treaty to which she was herself a party. All this she forgets. She complains of the temporal government of the pope, and forgets that she was foremost among the powers that restored to him his temporal estates on the downfall of the first Napoleon. We, in our way, are just as forgetful. We forget that we are but of yesterday, and that we owe our prosperity to the advantages of our position, and our freedom from the incumbrances of the Old World. We talk of liberty, and yet hold four millions out of thirty in slavery, and though declaring the slave trade piracy, are extensively engaged in it; we boast of education, our free schools, in which we are behind Prussia, France, and Austria; we are great sticklers for universal education, and yet keep some four millions in ignorance, forbid them by law to be taught even to read. We are loud in our censure upon all Catholic states that do not place the sects on an equal footing with the church, and yet some of our states do not yet place

the church on an equal footing with the sects before the law, and it is only since the formation of the federal government, that there has been any general recognition of religious liberty in the country. We forget, too, that our experiment of a free government, if it has not failed, has, nevertheless, not yet fully succeeded. It is still a doubtful experiment, and no man can study carefully the political evils of the country, and the manner in which we seek to remedy them, without seeing a strong probability, that here, as elsewhere, extreme democracy, by involving anarchy, must lead at no distant day to military despotism as the only practicable remedy. We can no longer elect a first-class man to any important office; we can elect only the Polks, the Taylors, the Pierces, and Buchanans for president, and it would seem that at each successive election, we must descend yet lower and lower in the scale. The government is a job, and even the material prosperity of the country does not correspond, and never has corresponded to the extraordinary advantages received from the hand of Providence.

We do not deny that with all its drawbacks, we hold the British and American political system the best in the world; but this system holds in its elements from the old Germanic system, which once prevailed over the greater part of Europe, and in its present form and developments is hardly a hundred years old. We grant that at present the leading industrial and commercial nations of the world are Great Britain and the United States; but how long have they been so? How long will they continue so? Great Britain can date her preëminence only from 1763, and the United States only from 1848, the peace of Guadelupe-Hidalgo, at the conclusion of the Mexican war, by which we acquired New Mexico and California. Before the peace of 1763, the superiority, even in material civilization, was on the side of Catholic Europe, as it may be again during the lifetime of some now living. Austria is preparing to become a great maritime power; Italy and Greece are in a fair way of regaining their former commercial importance; Spain shows a wonderful recuperative energy, and is rapidly recovering her industrial and commercial importance; and should Great Britain in the next maritime war lose her naval supremacy, which France is even now in a position to dispute, she would lose her industrial and commercial supremacy. We say not that it will be so; we say not that we even wish it

to be so; but we do say stranger things have happened, and may happen again. We have great confidence in the energy, in the strength, and the pluck of the English people; but no man can say the present position of Great Britain is not more or less precarious, and that she has not to struggle with formidable enemies, if not formidable odds to maintain it. She may fall, as fell Tyre and Carthage, as fell Venice and Genoa, Spain and Portugal, Holland and Sweden, and if she does, what becomes of the Protestant argument? An argument which has only a few years' support in the past, very little in the present, and may have none to-morrow, cannot have much weight with thinking men, or be urged with confidence in its conclusiveness.

If abstraction be made of all that directly or indirectly pertains to the moral order, we cannot be indisposed to award the superiority at the present moment to the non-Catholic nations of what is called Christendom. We are willing to concede, also, that Catholicity does tend more than Protestantism in those who embrace it, to moderate devotion to the world, and the desire for mere material greatness and prosperity, and in our judgment it would not be worthy of the slightest respect, if it did not. It would ill-deserve the love and veneration in which we hold it, if it placed no check on the ambition of princes, imposed no restraint upon the fraud and cupidity of traders, and did nothing to make Catholic populations feel that there is something besides this world worth living for, and that, after all, it is far more important to be rich in the virtues which ensure eternal life than this world's goods. "Blessed are the poor in spirit," said our Lord, and, "How hardly shall they who have riches be saved? Verily, I say unto you, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven." It would be sad to think that these words have no effect on Catholics, who believe them to be words spoken by God himself. We should expect to find a Catholic population more engrossed with spiritual than with temporal things, and more anxious to make sure of heaven than of earth. Nevertheless, in the purely material order, we are not prepared to say that Protestant nations owe what superiority they have to their religion, save in so far as it leaves them free from all regard for heaven, and from all sense of moral obligation. It is to the fate of wars, to the disasters of internal revolutions, and to the discovery of new routes of commerce, and other

changes to which all nations are more or less liable, that we should ascribe it.

Not only has Dr. Manahan sought to give a briefer and more conclusive answer to the Protestant argument drawn from the comparison of civilization in Catholic, with that in Protestant nations, than the one given by Balmes in his great work, but he has endeavored to account for the existence in Protestant states of that regard for the poor, the infirm, the afflicted, that you never find in gentile, or even Mahometan nations. The mass of the Protestant world, no doubt, as regards the world to come, are very much in the condition of the ancient gentile nations. They cannot be assumed to live in Christ, and to have the promise of the supernatural reward promised to the true Christian who perseveres to the end; they have, we must fear, forfeited, even in case they have been baptized, their birthright; or, like Esau, sold it for a mess of pottage. But they retain their nature, as did the ancient gentiles, and are capable of the natural virtues, as all men are, or else we could not call them natural virtues. Now in these Protestant nations we find a spirit of humanity, a generous sympathy with the unfortunate, a tenderness for the afflicted, a sentiment of justice, a respect for the rights of men and of nations,—if far below what they should be,—that we find in no ancient gentile nation. Whence this fact? Are we to accuse them of insincerity, of hypocrisy, or of acting by calculation from mere selfish motives? Not at all. We need not suppose the English are wholly insincere in their opposition to slavery and the slave trade, although we need just as little suppose no pride or selfishness mingles with their philanthropy; we need not doubt that they mingle much real disinterestedness in their efforts to improve legislation, to reform prison discipline, to diffuse generous sentiments, and defend the cause of popular freedom. We may say as much of our own non-Catholic countrymen. Alms-houses, public hospitals, houses of reformation, homes of the friendless, societies for the relief of the poor, and the thousand and one other associations wisely or unwisely directed, effecting or not effecting these ends, founded and supported by our non-Catholic countrymen, are not mere calculations of interest; and they are, to a great extent, the offspring of disinterested tenderness, of genuine humanity. True, they are not, strictly speaking, Christian, and are no more than men can do, if they choose, by their own natural light and strength. How

happens it, then, that we find none of these things among the ancient gentiles? Simply, our author maintains, because they are, though in the natural order, the effect of the education the modern nations have received from the church; modern civilization lies in the natural order, it is true, but even in non-Catholic nations within its pale, it is Catholic, in the sense that it has been developed and grown up under Catholic influences. It has not, indeed, been baptized and taken up into the supernatural order, but it has been fostered by the church, and moulded to a certain extent after her image, so that what in these nations themselves places them really in advance of the ancient gentiles, they owe to the church, and are most ungrateful when they boast it against her. The argument is a good one. Nature is the same in both, and if the modern Protestant surpasses the ancient gentile in the natural moral order, as he undoubtedly does, he owes it, for he can owe it to nothing else, to the changes in civilization effected by the church, or the new principles of love, tenderness, and humanity, developed by Catholicity even in human nature itself.

On the other hand, the Catholics need not make war on the principle of these various philanthropic movements outside of the Catholic body, or in any way oppose them, unless they take a direction hostile to the rights and interests of Catholicity. As the learned author has said elsewhere, "Nature is not good for nothing." It is good for nothing by itself alone, without the grace of Christ, in reference to salvation, for in no sense can we by any natural virtue merit the grace of conversion. The man who remains in the state of nature, unborn by the grace of regeneration into the supernatural order, has no more title to heaven if he keep than if he break every precept of the decalogue; and we cannot say that he is any more or less likely to receive that grace in the one case than in the other. There is sometimes a disposition in now and then a Catholic, to regard those who have been brought by conversion into the church, in mature life, as having been in some way, better or less sinful than those with whom they were brought up. It may sometimes be so, and we know it is sometimes not so; and no one can regard his conversion in any sense as due to his natural merit; yet a man who keeps in the main the whole law of nature, deserves less punishment than he who breaks it; and even if he die unconverted will suffer less, for he has fewer actual sins to be punished for. But in the order of nature, non-

Catholics may perform works which, though they do not merit heaven, are good in that order, and ought never to be slighted by the Catholic. More especially is this the case when, though they have rejected her authority, they have been under the tuition of the church, and are still more or less influenced by her example and the memory of her lessons. In this fact, since nature, though *below*, is not, unless by abnormal development, *against* Catholicity, there is a basis of community of action between Catholics and non-Catholics, and so long as non-Catholics do nothing against the Catholic religion,—that is to say, against the Christian supernatural order,—Catholics can coöperate with them in politics, in benevolent enterprises, and in works of philanthropy, if they see proper. The benevolent associations in our cities, for the relief of the poor, to supply food, clothing, and fuel to the needy, or to save the orphans from ignorance and vice, if they respect the religion of Catholics, and do not seek to detach them from their faith; or, in case of children, do not aim to withdraw them from Catholic influences, and bring them up in a non-Catholic religion,—or in no religion at all,—may receive, without any violation of Catholic principle, the support of Catholics. Unhappily we find, for the most part, in these associations more Protestant zeal than natural benevolence; or at least a feeling that it is necessary for their worldly respectability and well-being in this life to withdraw our children who need assistance from Catholic influences, and to prevent them from being brought up in the religion of their parents. This compels us often to assume towards them an attitude of hostility, when otherwise we would heartily join in them.

Still in nations that have once been Catholic, though now far gone in heresy, we find always a benevolence, a regard for human life, a tenderness towards the sick and infirm, a respect for the rights of the poorer and more numerous classes, that we find in no purely gentile nation, ancient or modern. It is true we find as those nations remain longer outside of the Catholic communion, and plunge deeper and deeper into heresy, they fall back nearer and nearer to the moral condition of the ancient gentiles, and reproduce more and more of the ancient gentile vices and crimes. The old gentile leaven has never been entirely cast out of any Christian nation, for it has its source in our fallen nature, and is retained by our study of ancient learning, and our own profane literature; and in proportion as the coun-

teracting influence of the church is withdrawn, it begins to ferment anew, and to produce the results we deplore in the ancient gentile world. Still no nation, once Christian, has ever lost all traces of the new order of civilization developed under the fostering care and influences of the church. The immense superiority of the Christian populations of the Ottoman empire to the Turks is apparent to the most careless traveller, and nothing deserves more the utter condemnation of all Christendom, than the policy of Great Britain and Austria, not to say France, of preventing them from liberating themselves from their infidel masters. The worst nominally Christian sect is worth far more than the best pagan or Mahometan people—except in the eyes of such statesmen as Lord Palmerston, and Lord John Russell.

It is not easy for us to give a complete analysis of Dr. Manahan's splendid volume, for the argument of the book and the lessons it inculcates are suggested rather than formally drawn out, and its great merit is in its several pictures, sketches, aphoristic statements, elucidations of particular points in history, taken by themselves —in the variety of its views and suggestions, and in the influence it has on the mind and heart of the reader, rather than in it regarded as a whole, and as a work intended to maintain a single uniform thesis. It is not, perhaps, so compact and well-jointed as it might be, but if, in some respects, apparently fragmentary, its several parts will be found to produce a unity of effect, that of a deep and grateful sense of the world's indebtedness to Catholicity, even aside from the considerations of the world to come. No man can read the work without feeling the profoundest gratitude to Almighty God for giving us the church, or without having quickened in him deep veneration for the holy and indefatigable men, who in all the early ages, led on by Peter, labored and struggled even unto death to secure her triumph over the barbarism, the cruelty, the licentiousness, the impurity, and the fearful and degrading superstitions, combined with high literary and artistic culture, with rare military prowess, political majesty, and social refinement of the ancient Græco-Roman empire; because, being the triumph of the Son of God incarnate over Satan, it was the triumph of humanity. Its diligent reader will also find it making manifest that all errors and heresies against the church, all the ancient and modern sects, are only so many attempts in one form or another of ignorant, conceited, or uneasy men, to return to gentilism and undo the

work of Jesus Christ. The part of the volume whence this comes out is to us the most original and striking part of the work. The Catholic religion in substance is only the continuation, under other conditions of the patriarchal religion, save that the patriarchal religion was a religion founded on the promise of things to be consummated and necessary to the perfection of the faith of the patriarchs, and Catholicity is a religion founded on fulfilment, on the actual consummation of the things promised in the patriarchal religion to be consummated. As gentilism was a departure or apostasy from the patriarchal, so is heresy a departure or apostasy from the Catholic religion, and, therefore, the two are necessarily one and the same in essence. Let the heresy extend to the whole of Catholicity, what we call complete apostasy, and the non-Catholic world lapses into complete gentilism; and as the ancient world descends with perfect rapidity not only from the supernatural to the natural, but from the natural to the subnatural, or dæmoniacal, so we see it doing now in modern spiritism or dæmon worship. Catholicity is not a collection of separate and independent doctrines, but is an order, with its own unity and central life, and must necessarily be accepted or rejected as a whole. He who rejects holy water denies the part of matter, therefore, of the body, the flesh, of our Lord in the work of salvation, and, consequently, the whole principle and office of the humanity,—indeed the very principle of mediation, on which Christianity itself rests. Hence the reason why heresy, even in the slightest degree, if formal, has always been regarded by the Catholic with so much horror. It involves, to whatever point it may attach itself logically, the rejection of the whole Catholic order, and the lapse of the world once more into gentilism. Heresy is a sin against God; it is also a crime against humanity; and it is not the least among the proofs of the wide departure of this age from the Christian order of thought, that it sees in heresy, really such, only a harmless exercise of our natural reason, and holds that one of the strongest objections to the church is, that she has branded it as a sin, and suffered the state to punish it as a crime against society. Hence, too, the heroic efforts of Catholic saints, apostles, missionaries, and martyrs in every age to spread the true Catholic faith, to regain the heretic, and to convert the heathen,—efforts which fulfil, in the highest degree, the great law of charity; for in laboring for the conversion of a soul to the church, we show, in the most perfect

manner possible, our love both to God and to our neighbor. Not a slight thing is heresy before God, for it gives him the lie, scorns his bounty, and forfeits heaven; not a slight thing is heresy before humanity, for it sends men back once more under gentile civilization, to groan anew under all its horrors, its cruelties, its vices, and crimes, in which man falls wholly into the power of the evil one, and becomes the most miserable slave of Satan.

From the several points we have touched upon, and which are treated at greater or less length in the volume before us, our readers will at once perceive that the work is one of rare interest, and full of important bearings on the principal controversies of the day, as we have endeavored to state and describe them from time to time in the *Review;* but nothing we can possibly say will give the reader an adequate conception of the wealth of thought and learning of the volume itself, or of the fresh and original manner in which the author treats questions with which most of us had considered ourselves previously familiar. The author's style is original, rich, and splendid, and in passages highly ornate and finished; and, under any point of view we can consider it, his book is the most important and valuable work, in what we hold to be the right direction, that any American Catholic writer has yet produced. It does not do all that needs to be done, but it does one portion of the work that remained for the Catholic American scholar, and does it well. It cannot fail to have a wide and salutary influence on our literature. It directs thought and investigation into the right channel, and, without being itself a controversial work, will do much to prepare our young athletæ for the living controversies in which they will have to take their part, and wrestle for God and humanity, for truth and virtue, for liberty and order, for time and eternity. It cannot fail to breathe into our literature a new spirit, to give it a modern air, and to prepare it to act on the world that is, on the present and the future, not merely on a past that is no more. Literature should always be up to the age, be adapted to its wants, and fitted to exert a salutary influence in correcting its present errors, and insensibly to mould it into conformity with the church that never changes, any more than the invisible and immutable God, whose representative on earth she is.

We are told that this volume has met with a very favorable reception from the Catholic public. We are glad to hear it, not only because it deserves it for its own sake, but

because it augurs well for our future literature. Our Catholic population, as our booksellers can tell us, have not been remarkable for their readiness to encourage general literature produced by Catholics. Purely devotional and ascetic works meet, we believe, a ready sale, which speaks well for the piety of our people; but works of general literature, written by Catholics, and breathing a Catholic spirit, have been treated with great indifference, much to the discouragement of Catholic authors and publishers. A work by a Catholic author, not precisely devotional or ascetic, and appealing specially to no national sentiment, can reach in its sales, on an average, only about two thousand or twenty-five hundred copies in a Catholic population of from two to three millions. Even Cardinal Wiseman's exquisite and popular volume, *Fabiola*, with all his Eminence's reputation, and all its intrinsic merits, has had a sale, we are informed, in this country, of not much over ten thousand copies, many of which must have been bought by non-Catholics. Explanations of the fact, some creditable and some not creditable, to Catholics, may no doubt be given; but it is, nevertheless, a fact, that our Catholic population do not feel, as we think they should, their obligations to encourage Catholic scholars and literary men to labor for the creation of a literature of our own, worthy of us and worthy of the country. We have a population large enough, rich enough, and educated enough to sustain a national literature complete in all its parts, notwithstanding that a considerable number are not English-speaking Catholics.

We fear our Catholic population do not see and feel as they should, in a time and country like ours, the value of a Catholic literature, by which we mean a general literature produced by Catholics, and conforming, in tone and spirit, to Catholic truth and morality. We Catholics are placed here by divine Providence, not merely to preserve and enjoy our own faith and worship for ourselves and our children; and, indeed, if we think only of doing that, we shall not succeed in doing even so much. The church, in all ages, is essentially propagandist, and whenever in any particular country she ceases to make converts, if there remain any to convert, she ordinarily declines, and fails to keep even her numbers good. In England and Wales, at the opening of the eighteenth century, more than one-third of the population still held the ancient faith; but before its close the Catholics were estimated at less than a hundred

thousand. The English people never became thoroughly Protestant, till the last century. The church has a better *status* in England now than she had in 1745, but she counts by no means as many English among her faithful children. We have not, in this country, made any thing like the real advances we sometimes boast, and it is extremely doubtful if there are as many Catholics in the country as have migrated to it from Ireland, Great Britain, and the Continent. We are building churches, many of them large, and highly creditable under the relation of art; but if immigration, which is rapidly diminishing, should cease altogether, and nothing more be effected in the way of conversions than heretofore, men are now living who may see many of them lack congregations. The most fatal sign of a want of true Catholic life in any Catholic population is the little effort it makes for the conversion of non-Catholics. This sign we show in this country. Providence has placed us here to be a missionary people, and to make this a Catholic country, and we shall have to account to him for its remaining in heresy. It will not do for us of the laity to say to ourselves the conversion of the country is the work of our bishops and priests, and we have nothing to do with it, for that is not true. We have something to do with it. We must sustain our venerable bishops and priests, and coöperate with them. We must second their charity and zeal, and aid them in the way they require.

Now, the great difficulty in the way of the clergy is, that they are too few, are overworked in taking care of those already Catholic, and have little strength and less time to devote to the conversion of others. Even if they had the time and strength, to labor directly for the conversion of our erring countrymen, how are they to do it? How are they to approach them? They cannot do it to any great extent from the pulpit, for few non-Catholics attend our churches, and little can they do by social intercourse, beyond, perhaps, softening a few prejudices. The only way that the clergy, or any body else, can reach the mass of them, is through the press; and we can do it even through the press only on condition that our publications are of that high intellectual, scientific, literary, and moral character, that non-Catholics must read them, or remain behind the most advanced intelligence of the age. In a foregoing article, we have argued the necessity of Catholics giving a cordial support to such controversial works as are adapted to the

wants of the times; now we argue the necessity of their doing the same for works pertaining to science and general literature. We must conquer the country, or dwindle into insignificance; and we can conquer the country only by mastering it on the side of intelligence. We must humble its pride of intellect by proving that we are its intellectual superior, and we can prove this only by producing works intellectually superior to any non-Catholics can produce.

Do not let us turn away from this question. It is no matter what are our present numbers, or what is the perfection of our organization; we cannot depend on migration from abroad to keep up our congregations, and if we do not advance by conversions from the non-Catholic population, we shall, in a few years, begin to go back, and settle into a position, something like that of the Guebres among their Mahometan countrymen. We must, on this point, give way to no illusion. If we have not life enough to act on the mind of the country, it may well be feared that we have not life enough to hold our own. We have already neglected more than one golden opportunity, and lost many of the advantages we had gained. Instead of increasing, our moral influence is declining. In the calculations of politicians, and the policy of the country, the Irish and the Germans count for much; Catholics, as such, count for nothing. The deep interest felt a few years ago in our religion by intelligent non-Catholic Americans throughout the Union, appears to be felt no longer, and the American mind seems to have come to the conclusion, that the church, after all, is very much on a par with one of the sects, and that Catholics are not much better or more to be relied on than Protestants, and we think there can be little question that we do not hold in public estimation so high a place as we did five or six years ago. We state what we believe to be the fact. We do not judge persons, or presume to offer any opinion as to the cause of this fact. Much, certainly, may be said in our excuse, but whatever may be so said, or not said, the fact remains still the same, and if there come no change for the better soon, we have only a gloomy outlook for the future; we have not a little to do to regain the advantages we have lost.

Yet we are by no means disheartened, and are very far from despairing of the future of Catholicity in this country. But we must understand, and never forget, that we are here a missionary people, and be always ready and prompt to

avail ourselves of all lawful means to act on the mind, the intelligence of the American people. We know as well as others, that conversion is the work of grace, the human will coöperating therewith; we know that prayer is more effectual than argument, and preaching than writing; but we have a preparatory work to perform, that of removing prejudices, and exciting interest in the Catholic question. We must satisfy the world outside that our church is here and now a moral power, and the only living and productive moral power in the Union. It is our duty, certainly, to trust to Providence and pray, but it will not be amiss, at the same time, as Cromwell said to his soldiers, to keep our powder dry. In this age kings and queens do not help on the work of conversion, and in this country the conversion of distinguished individuals does not secure that of the people. We can here, in the preparatory work we speak of, operate only by intelligence on intelligence, and by surpassing in their own sciences and on their own ground our non-Catholic countrymen. We must not run away with the notion that a Catholic priest must never try his hand at polite literature, or that a Catholic layman must never do any thing but place on the table a rehash of the controversial tracts of a prior age. We must feel that we are a people, a Catholic nation, and labor to supply a real national literature, a literature that will live, and compete with any of the great national literatures of ancient or modern times. Not that literature is our only want, or, indeed, our most urgent want; but it is one of our wants, and a much more urgent want at present than it was formerly, when the mass of the people relied on oral instruction, not on reading.

The demand in literature, as in every thing else, creates a supply, and every Catholic who has the means, it seems to us, should make it a point to place a copy of every work written by a Catholic, in his library, if the work is not repugnant to faith and morals, and has the least literary merit. If this were so, we should find that we have no lack of mental activity, literary genius, or true scholarship. Now little is produced because there is little demand, and literary labor brings the author little or no remuneration. Many a book of vast utility would be written, were it not that, if written, it could find no publisher, or, if published, find few purchasers. Every man must live by his profession or his trade, and if he cannot he must abandon it. Light trashy works, supplying the place of solid and merito-

rious works, may, indeed, find a market, but the solid and meritorious works, except in one or two departments, if written and published, would lie on the bookseller's shelves, or go to the trunk makers. No doubt, the newspaper is in the way; no doubt the popular and corrupting non-Catholic literature of the day supplies, to some extent, the market that should be reserved to the Catholic author; but still the great obstacle is in the carelessness and indifference of the great body of our Catholic population, nowhere more marked than in this same city of New York, where literature is at heavy discount alike with Catholics and non-Catholics, and little is read but the morning paper. The Catholic population of this city alone ought to absorb six or seven thousand copies of any respectable Catholic publication, while they, in fact, absorb rarely as many hundreds of the most popular Catholic work.

We speak plainly, perhaps some will say impudently, but Catholics have a conscience, and can bear to be told their faults by one who they know loves and respects them. Their neglect in respect of Catholic literature, is with them chiefly a matter of oversight, and it is only necessary to call attention to it, for them to remedy it. There is always one comfort in dealing with a Catholic population, that we never have in dealing with a non-Catholic population. They may on a variety of matters entertain wrong notions, and fail in doing the right thing at the right time; but we find them generally acting from good motives, and amenable to reason. They do many things, which, in our judgment, are not for the best interests of religion; but convince them that it really is so, and they will at once labor to correct their error. In no country in the world do Catholics love their religion more than in the United States, and nowhere are they prepared to make greater sacrifices,—pecuniary sacrifices at least,—for it. To a great extent strangers in this country, they may not at once understand, or properly adjust themselves to their new position, or comprehend what their religion here requires of them; but let them clearly understand that what you say to them is prompted by zeal for religion, and what you ask is really demanded by the interests of Catholicity, and their ears listen, and their hearts open to you, and your cause is won. There are other and greater claims on them than literature, but we have endeavored to show that literature, however, has claims, and that its interest is one of the pressing interests we

should, without neglecting other and more pressing interests, seek to promote. We have no fears that they will not give the subject the attention it deserves. With a few more such publications as the one before us, there will be no further occasion to refer to the subject. There will spring up a taste for reading, a demand for literary excellence, and our authors will find an audience not only "fit," but large. Such works, too, will tend much to promote harmony among us, mould us into a homogeneous people, and to put an end to the petty disputes and frivolous controversies, and personal altercations and denunciations in which we have been prone to indulge. We thank the author for his book, and the Catholic public for the cordial reception they have given, and will continue to give it. May we have many more equally worthy.

CHRISTIAN POLITICS.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1860.]

There grew up, under the auspices of the church, in Europe, after the conquest of the western empire by the barbarians, a system of public law, *jus publicum*, founded on the principles of natural justice, which all Christian nations were held bound to recognize and observe. This system, regulating the relations of sovereign and subject, and nation and nation, was placed under the protection and arbitratorship of the pope as the divinely appointed representative and guardian of the moral order. It created a Christendom, and united all Christian nations in a sort of confederated republic, with the pope for its president, or supreme chief. Individual princes, more or less powerful, might frequently transgress this law, and commit acts of great violence and gross barbarity, but these were never defended on principle,—their conduct was understood to be exceptional, illegal, criminal, and the public sentiment of Christendom condemned them. Society was founded on a

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* *Le Pouvoir Politique Chrétien: Discours prononcés à la Chapelle Impériale des Tuileries pendant le Carême de l'Année 1857, par le* T. R. P. Ventura de Raulica. Paris: 1858.

moral basis, under the safeguard of religion, and power was regarded, by whomsoever held, as bound by all the restraints of the moral law, the transcript of the eternal law residing in the eternal reason or will of God.

This system or the social and political order it founded—what is meant when we speak of Christian or Catholic civilization—is now broken up, and very extensively discarded, not only in practice, but even in principle, by the greater part of European nations, whether we speak of sovereigns or people; and a new political system has been introduced in its place—a system that emancipates power not only from the authority of the church, or the pope, as the father and chief of the Christian republic, but from all the restraints of the moral order. The new political system holds itself entirely independent both of religion and morality, and recognizes in the political order no law for sovereigns or people but reasons of state or simple expediency. It rejects all moral basis for society, and founds politics on the simple law of force. It rests on the principle that might gives right, or that right is always on the side of the strongest, and takes it for granted that the weak are always in the wrong. This system was always more or less acted on in practice, but it is now adopted in principle, deliberately and theoretically by both sovereigns and people, and by the sovereigns even more than the people. Governments and people cry out the loudest precisely against those sovereigns that still have scruples about adopting the new system, and that have a lingering, half-avowed respect for the old. They are run down by the organs of the people and of other sovereigns, and they are treated as outlaws. Who thinks that Austria or Naples has any rights civilized nations are bound to respect? They are regarded in Europe very much as Mr. Chief Justice Taney says negroes were at the time of forming our federal constitution. Yet their offence is that they hold vested rights even to be real rights, and that legitimate authority should be sacred and inviolable. The whole political world, princes and people, cry out against the pope, and consider his estates lawful plunder, because he resists the new system, and insists on a moral and religious basis of society.

The consequence of this rejection of the old papal system and the adoption of the new political system—which is rightly named political atheism—is, that Europe has receded from Christian civilization and fallen into moral an-

archy. Authority has lost its moral hold on princes and people, and the noble sentiment of loyalty has well-nigh become extinct, or come to be regarded as a folly or a vice. Power has emancipated itself from all moral restraints, and ceases to have any support in the affections or consciences of the people. Usurpation and revolution are held to be legitimate and sacred—when successful, or when there is the least chance of being successful. The emperor of the French makes war on Austria without the slightest provocation for an "idea"—a "Napoleonic idea;" and Mazzini and his associates excite insurrection and rebellions wherever able, not because the established governments have abused and forfeited their powers, but because they are not constituted according to their ideas, or because their administration is not in their hands. There is in scarcely a European state any recognized public right. In all European states society is more or less unsettled, and in nearly all—certainly in all the great continental ftates—authority is maintained only by armed force. If we understand by civilization any thing more than literary and scientific culture, and refinement of taste and manners—if we include in our definition of it the moral organization of society, the supremacy of law, and the dominion of reason instead of lawless passion, Europe has fallen from the civilized to the barbarous state, and the progress we so loudly boast as characteristic of our age has been, not progress in civilization, but progress in getting rid of it.

We know very well that to say to this age that its boasted progress under the political aspect has been simply a progress towards barbarism, will be counted by our men of the world as an eccentricity or a paradox, if nothing worse; but we wish these men would tell us what is barbarism? As we understand the matter, barbarism is not incompatible with cunning, craft, hypocrisy, smoothness of speech, or polish of manners. These are all qualities which may be found in the North American Indians in nearly as great perfection as in any royal or imperial court in Europe. Byron says that one of the mildest-spoken men he ever met was Ali Pasha, whom he visited at Janina, one of the most cruel monsters that even modern Turkey has owned, and we have found in the polished and soft-spoken French and Italians, in their revolution, acts of a cold-blooded barbarity that would do no discredit to the cruellest savage tribe which has ever yet been described. Barbarism, we

take it, is not simply ignorance of letters or the arts and sciences, for this ignorance is the effect of barbarism, rather than barbarism itself. Barbarism is essentially the predominance of passion over reason, brute force over moral power; and any society not based on morality and under the restraints of law is barbarous. Let such a society, or rather such a social condition continue anywhere for any great length of time, and the ignorance of art, literature and science will be sure to follow. We do not say that Europe has lapsed into complete barbarism; far from it; but we say it has been tending towards it, has rejected the principle and conditions of true civilization, and adopted the principle and condition of barbarism, and, if it continue its present career, it will soon present all the usual characteristics and concomitants of barbarism. In principle it has already become completely barbarous, but not all the natural consequences of the principle have as yet been developed, and, we hope, will never be.

It is well known that the revolutionary spirit is rife in nearly all the continental states of Europe. The people, that is, the more active and influential portion of the population, have lost their reverence for authority, and no longer hold that the political constitution and organization of the state is something to be regarded as sacred and inviolable. Nearly all the populations of Europe hold what La Fayette called "the sacred right of revolution," and they who are regarded as the enlightened and advanced minds of the age maintain that the people, whenever they choose, have the right by insurrection, rebellion and force, to dispossess their rulers, and change the constitution of the state, simply for the sake of introducing new and, as they fancy, better institutions, without being able to allege any tyrannical or unconstitutional act on the part of the constituted authorities. The sovereignty of the people is understood not in the sense that the people in the absence of all legitimate authority have the right to meet together in convention and reconstitute authority in the way they judge best, but as a sovereignty persisting in them even under the constitution, irrespective of constituted authority, and allowing them at any time and in any way that seems to them proper, to cashier their kings, presidents, or magistrates, and to install new sovereigns or rulers,—or that the existing authorities in any state are but mere agents, dismissible at the will of the people as simple population, or rather, the will of the unruly few,

who have the impudence to call themselves the people. Hence the government, however constituted, ceases to be regarded as clothed within its sphere with sacred and inviolable authority, and becomes a mere agency existing at the mercy of the demagogues or the mob. This is the doctrine of the whole revolutionary party, or so-called party of the people everywhere, and with this party law is merely public opinion or public sentiment for the time being. Hence in this country scarcely a court or jury can be found with sufficient moral courage to enforce an unpopular law, to condemn or acquit an accused in opposition to the public sentiment of the time and place.

But as bad as it is with the people, it is even worse, if possible, with the sovereigns. International law and public right were violated by the sovereigns before they were by the people. The people have only imitated, at a distance, their sovereigns; and even in their wildest frenzy they have never equalled them in their violation of public morality. The rejection of the old European system, the Christian or papal system, was the work of the sovereigns, before it became the work of the people. All the secular sovereigns of Europe participated in it, and no one more fully than the sovereigns of France. The German kaisers, in the middle ages, made war on the moral order sustained by the church, but even the worst of the Hohenstaufen never went so far as to deny that order in principle; and they pretended that, even in warring against the popes, they were only asserting or defending their own vested rights,—rights which had been conferred, recognized, or sanctioned by the chief of the spiritual society. It remained for France under Francis I., to break openly with Christendom, and to attempt the formal inauguration of a new political system, independent alike of religion and morality. This was done by discontinuing the war of the crusades, by making peace with the Turks, and allying himself with an infidel power against a Christian nation. The treaty of friendship and alliance, made by Francis I. with Solyman the Magnificent, against Charles V., we regard as the first formal and solemn rejection made, by a professedly Christian prince, of Christian politics, founded and supported by the popes as vicars of Jesus Christ, and fathers of Christendom. For this, France is answerable. France, again, in pursuance of the same policy, in assertion of the independence of politics, of religion, and morality, leagued, under Cardinal Richelieu,

with Sweden and the Protestant princes of the empire, against Catholic Germany fighting in defence of the old public right of Europe; and she consummated that independence, and consecrated the new system she had steadily pursued for more than three centuries, by the aid of Great Britain and Sardinia, and with the connivance of Austria, in the peace of Paris, 1856, which brought the Turk into the family of European nations, and placed the crescent by the side of the cross, if not, indeed, above it. The new system is the French system, and through France, aided by Protestantism, which she has accepted in politics, but rejected in religion, it has become European. But we exonerate no European sovereign, and all the secular sovereigns of Europe have aided in its introduction and consolidation; some more, and some less.

We conservatives speak with great horror of the popular revolutionists, and not without reason; but we are aware of no popular revolution that has so outraged public right, or done such violence to society, as the sovereigns of Europe have done. The old French Jacobins are no favorites of ours, but they never went further against religion than went the Protestant princes of Germany, the kings of Sweden and Denmark, and the king and parliament of England. The reign of terror, under Robespierre, did not inflict greater horrors on France than those inflicted on the noble duchy of Lorraine by the French armies under Louis XIII.; and the democratic propagandism under the convention, or the directory, never effected a more wanton invasion of an unoffending nation than was the invasion of Holland by Louis XIV.; and the various annexations effected by the republicans were not so revolting as the partition and annexation of the unhappy but noble and chivalric kingdom of Poland, by the sovereigns of Russia, Prussia, and Austria. The republican armies have never proved more cruel, more ferocious, or licentious, than had been for centuries the royal and imperial armies. The republicans of 1848 proved far less hostile to public and private right, and far more respectful to the moral and religious basis of society than has the present astute and inscrutable emperor of the French,—inscrutable because governed by no principle. You cannot name an act of the republicans of 1848 that was more atrocious in principle than the confiscation of the Orleans estates, the war against Russia, or the more recent war against Austria,—or more properly, against the

temporal sovereignty of the pope; and we know no republican leader, not even Joseph Mazzini or Louis Kossuth, more utterly reckless of public law or public justice than my Lord Palmerston, the prime minister of Queen Victoria, on whose dominions the sun never sets.

With this utter disregard, on the part of both sovereigns and people, of public right and of a moral basis for political society, there can be no solidity for governments, no peace and order for modern populations. Christian politics have been exchanged for the politics of anarchy, and the illustrious Padre Ventura, in discoursing of Christian political power, discourses of what, for some centuries, has had only a problematical existence. Christian political power is precisely what Europe needs, without which there is no return for her to civilization, and what many Catholics thought they were to have in Louis Napoleon, when he put an end to the republic he had sworn to defend, and proclaimed himself emperor of the French. The real plague spot of modern Europe is the want of a Christian political power, or, as we say, a Christian or moral basis of political society. Till that is recovered, no changes of dynasties or constitutions will prove to be any real amelioration. The new system which severs politics from the moral order, and asserts the freedom of political power from all moral and religious restraints, has been tried and failed,—miserably, shamefully failed. With that system no government, royal, imperial, or popular, will work well; or be able to maintain itself and social order, without an army at its command, for it must, from the nature of the case, be simply a government by physical force, and not by moral power. Padre Ventura sees and feels this, and in these learned and eloquent discourses, preached in the imperial chapel before the emperor and the principal personages of the empire, he insists on the necessity and duties of Christian political power, with a boldness and an earnestness not unworthy of one who is a minister of him who is King of kings and Lord of lords. He sees, feels, deplores the evil, and seeks to remedy it by teaching authority, and them who pertain to the government, that all power is from God, has a moral origin, and is to be exercised in accordance with divine law, for a moral and religious end. Secular society exists for the spiritual, and secular authority should govern in the temporal order, in relation to the real end of all society, the ultimate end of man. The preacher sets forth the nature

and obligations of the civil power with a force, a directness, an eloquence and a majesty that remind us of the immortal Bossuet, and with a distinctness, a freedom, a fervor, an energy that proves him one of the first preachers and most eminent men of the age. Yet the most serene emperor of the French, while listening serenely to the impassioned preacher proclaiming the law of God, and enforcing the claims of justice, right, public and private, was, it would seem, meditating his unprovoked, unjust, and un-Christian war upon Austria, as a step towards suppressing the temporal sovereignty of the pope and placing Italy at the mercy of a Bonaparte. Something more, in these times is necessary to reëstablish society on a Christian basis, than the simple instruction of power in its duties, for, having discarded all moral ideas, it retains no sense of duty, or denies that it can be held to any duty. We take Napoleon III. as the representative man of modern political society. Take as your key to his mind and his heart *Les Idées Napoléoniennes*, and you will search in vain for a single moral conception. If a certain respect for religion and morality is recommended, which we are not aware is the the fact, it is never for a moral or religious reason. Neither religion nor morality is even once referred to as law for either prince or people, and no other good is contemplated than simple material or purely earthly good. The work is the most perfect exposition of political atheism we can imagine. How, then, hope by moral and religious considerations to influence its author? Policy is the only thing that can weigh with him.

Padre Ventura not only tells power that society has, by the law of God, a moral and Christian basis, but reminds it that in view of this end a reform of education, that will render it Christian, is necessary. This is well; but he forgets that a Christian education, so far as relates to politics, is precisely what power does not want, and will not have, if able to prevent it, because it wishes to hold itself free from all moral restraints, at liberty to do as it pleases. Perhaps, also, the good father hopes from education more than it can give. Education can develop, but not create. It is powerful to preserve, but impotent to originate. By education you may do much to keep a Christian community Christian, but very little to make an infidel community a believing community. The father says, and perhaps truly, that the education now given, and which for a long time has been

given our youth, is pagan; and proposes to reform it, and render it Christian by excluding from our schools and colleges the pagan classics, and requiring the pupils to learn their Greek and Latin from extracts made from the early Christian fathers. He seems to suppose that the paganism we encounter in modern society is due to paganism in education, and that paganism in education is due to the use of the classics of pagan Greece and Rome; and he, therefore, concludes that we may get rid of paganism in society, by banishing these classics from our schools and colleges, and substituting Christian text-books. With Christian text-books education will be Christian. We deplore, as much as he, the paganism in society, but we cannot attribute it to the use of Greek and Roman classics as text-books. Text-books are of far less importance in education than teachers and professors. If the teachers and professors are Christians, and men of character and influence, pagan text-books will do little harm, and such text-books were used in the most brilliant ages of faith as much, to say the least, as they are now. Then, again, the least effective part of education is that acquired from text-books in school-rooms or college halls. The education that forms the character is acquired at home, from associates and companions, and from the society in which one is brought up and lives. You cannot expel paganism by beginning with the schools; you must first expel it from society itself. When you wish to preserve, begin with the young; but when you wish to reform, or to introduce a new order or state of things, you must begin with the adult. The education of youth was never more Christian than it was in France in the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth. The infidelity of the latter half of the last century did not come out of the schools and colleges, but came from individuals who, by their writings, conversation, and influence, corrupted the grown-up generation. The classics had something, nay, much to do with it; but it was as studied by adults in whom licentious tastes and passions were fully developed, not by being read by youths at college as text-books.

Besides, in the present state of the world, the classical authors usually studied in our colleges have an influence favorable to Christianity rather than otherwise; for they breathe more respect for authority, nobler sentiments, and a higher morality than we find in the men of our age. We know nothing in Greek or Roman pagan literature so low,

so degraded or degrading as the newspaper press of the modern world. There is no prudent parent who would not fear far less for the morals of his son in finding him reading Homer, Hesiod, Æschylus, Sophocles, Xenophon, Plato, Demosthenes, Virgil, Horace, Livy, Sallust, Tacitus, Persius, Juvenal, or even Lucretius or Catullus, than to find him reading such a journal as *Le Siècle*, *La Presse*, the *London Times*, or the *New York Herald*, to say nothing of the pious *Journal of Commerce*, the philosophic *Tribune*—the least objectionable of the lot—or the professedly religious journals of the various Protestant sects. These journals catch and express the tone and sentiment of the age. The *Times* is a faithful exponent of the English, and the *Herald* of the American world. The classics are Christian in comparison with these, and exert a far less paganizing influence Your popular literature,—your sensation novels and exciting romances, which constitute the *pabulum* of your American and even European youth,—unfit both the mind and the heart for the reception of Christianity far more than the worst portions of pagan literature which have come down to us. So long as this is so, matters, in our judgment, would be made worse rather than better by expelling the classics from our schools and colleges. We know in our own case that the study of Plato and Aristotle had a salutary influence in turning our mind, after years of doubt and uncertainty, and of wild and anti-Christian speculations, towards sounder views, and in disposing us to accept the Christian mysteries. Few go further astray than we went, and certainly they were not the classics that misled us, for they were not opened to us till youth was already past.

Far be it from us to underrate the importance of a Christian education; we admit its utility, its necessity; but we hold that by it alone we cannot remove the plague-spot from modern society, because it is constantly counteracted by the ideas, the habits, the manners, the tone, the sentiments of the age,—and because in few countries, if in any, will the church be allowed to have full control over the education of the young,—and in no secular state will the civil authority permit the education to be thoroughly Christian; nowhere will it allow children to be taught thoroughly the principles of Christianity in their application to public as well as to private and domestic life, for nowhere is power willing to be Christian and to govern according to the Christian law,—the precise evil of modern society being in

the refusal of both prince and people to acknowledge religion to be *lex suprema*—the supreme law—in the political order. The imperial pamphlet, *Le Pape et le Congrès*, does but express the general conviction of the age when it assigns as a reason why the pope should not be a temporal sovereign, that being supreme pontiff he must be governed by Christian dogma and discipline, and therefore cannot be free to promote the national and political interests of his subjects! That is, to be able to govern for the real national and political welfare of his people, the prince must not be hampered by any moral or religious obligations—he must be a political atheist.

For our part we see nothing to remedy the evil, but in rallying around the true representative among sovereigns of the moral order or of public right, that is to say, the pope. The pope is the only real support under God of the moral order in the kingdoms of this world; and if there could be on this point any doubt, it would be removed by the fact that the modern political system makes him the principal, almost the sole, object of attack. We saw the edifying spectacle, a few years ago, of France, Great Britain, Sardinia,—Austria consenting and aiding with all her moral force,—making war, without the slightest provocation, against Russia, avowedly for the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire; that is, to sustain the chief of Islam in his full temporal sovereignty, and to maintain to him the integrity of his dominions. We have seen, within the last year, France and Sardinia going to war against Austria, to deprive the chief of Christianity of his chief temporal support; and these same powers, with the coöperation of Great Britain, and the applause of the revolutionary and popular party throughout the world, combining to dismember his temporal estates, to rob him of his temporal sovereignty, and to reduce him to the condition of a pensioner on the bounty of his despoilers. The sympathies of the greater part of Europe and America went with the allies in their war for the protection of the chief of Islam, and goes with the powers in their war against the pope, the chief of Christianity. Could there be a more instructive fact? Why this sympathy with the padishah, and this joy at a war against the pope? Simply because the padishah offers no moral or even physical resistance to the new system, but is one of its chief representatives and supporters, while the pope is a standing protest against it, and must be removed before its

triumph can be universal and complete. All the partisans of political atheism, feel this instinctively; and Cæsars and demagogues feel, while they see the pope sovereign of Rome, very much as Haman did when he saw Mordecai sitting in the king's gate, that all their successes and powers avail them nothing; and perhaps they may, in their mad attempts to remove him, meet with Haman's fate,—that of being hung on the new gallows fifty cubits high which they are erecting for him; for there is a King in heaven, and one more powerful than Æsther the queen to intercede with him for the pope and her people. The bare fact that all the political atheists of all nations, sovereigns as well as people, direct, instinctively, their attacks against the pope, should suffice to teach all of us who would assert and maintain Christian political power where our strength lies, where is the rock of our safety, where we must seek our *point d' appui*, and what we must defend to the last gasp. It is the papacy on which our Lord builds his church, and which he has made the guardian of the moral order of the world. We must rally to the pope, and rally all to him that we can. In the present state of things, it is possible to rally to the papal cause Austria, in spite of her Voltairian *bureaucracie*, —chivalric Spain, whose Catholic fervor is intensified by her war with the Moors, and whose power is becoming again one with which Europe must count,—Naples, perhaps Bavaria, —and some four or five of the smaller German states, whose safety they are becoming aware depends on the restoration and maintenance of the old papal system of public right. But, however it may be with sovereigns who act with a view to their own interest, the populations of Europe can be recalled to the support of moral order by seeing in the pope not only the firm but the invincible defender of public right.

The anti-papal powers and populations, or the political atheists, pretend that they make war not on the papacy or spiritual power of the pope, but simply on his temporal authority, which they pronounce incompatible with his functions as supreme pontiff. But why do they deem his temporal sovereignty incompatible with his spiritual functions? If they held that politics should accord with religion and morality, they could not pretend that there is any incompatibility in the case. This very pretence, especially on the part of those who profess to recognize the spiritual authority of the pope, is a proof that they hold politics and relig-

ion are antagonistic, and that might, not right, is the basis of power. Why, again, do they oppose the temporal government of the pope? They say they do so because his government is bad, oppressive, and its administration abusive and intolerable. But even they will not pretend that the papal government is worse than that of the padishah, or that it is even so bad. Yet they went to war to sustain the padishah, and to secure him in a position to continue his oppression of the Christian populations of the East. There is not and cannot be a baser, a more tyrannical, or more oppressive government than the Turkish, which broods, as the shadow of death, over the fairest regions of the globe, the primitive seats of civilization and the cradle of Christianity. Let the papal government be as bad as the *Times* or M. About pretends, it is infinitely better than that of the Grand Turk. Yet the men who cry out against the former, waged war to support the latter. The Crimean war is standing proof that the reasons alleged for opposing the papal government, and seeking to efface it from the list of independent states, are not their real reasons. There are as gross abuses under the British and American governments as under the papal, and the subjects of the pope have more freedom than the subjects of Victor Emmanuel or Louis Napoleon. The real ground of hostility is that the papal government does not, will not, and cannot enter into the new European political system, because the sovereign, as supreme pontiff, is the divinely appointed guardian and defender of the moral order. He is compelled by his very spiritual character, by his office as the chief of Christendom, to oppose, even in his temporal government, the new system of politics asserted by Cæsars and revolutionists. He must recognize, and to the extent of his power, defend public right, and insist that politics shall be subordinated to religion and morality. It is not because his government is bad that it is opposed, but because it maintains the old system of public law, of public and private right, demanded by Christianity, and to which is due the superiority of modern civilization over that of pagan Greece and Rome. The system adopted and sustained by the pope is essentially antagonistic to that which the powers have introduced, and are resolved to render universal and complete. Here is the ground of the hostility the papal government encounters,—the reason why the press of England, France, and the United States decries it, and demands its suppression. At bottom it is the papacy itself that is op-

posed; for as long as the papacy stands, there is a moral power that embarrasses the political power, and rallies the conscience of Christendom against the tyrant, the despot, the revolutionist, the political atheist.

We see what is the object of attack by all the enemies, crowned or uncrowned, of society and true civilization, and wherefore the attack is made. We know, then, what is deserving of our love, our reverence, and our support. The question whether the pope shall be a temporal sovereign, is not, in itself, of great importance; but the question whether right shall be respected and maintained is of the very highest importance. The Catholic bishops, throughout the world, seem to have felt this, and have recently spoken out with unanimous voice, and in tones that refresh one's heart to hear,—not for the temporal government of the pope, abstractly considered, but for public right, identified to-day with that government. The pope's temporal sovereignty is the symbol of the supremacy of the moral order over the merely political; and in attacking his right, the right of all sovereigns, of all legitimate authority, without which society cannot subsist, is attacked,—nay, the whole moral order itself. We lose sight, here, of Pius IX. as a mere temporal prince; we see only the cause outraged in him. The pope, in resisting the impertinent advice of the French Cæsar, and asserting his rights, has proved faithful to his office, and been true alike to the cause of God and humanity. The Catholic bishops, in coming to his aid, and in warning their flocks against the policy of the political atheists, have proved themselves the enlightened champions of humanity,—the bold, Heaven-inspired asserters of authority and liberty, as well as true preachers of the Gospel. Some of the French bishops allowed themselves to be deceived by the fair words of the new Cæsar. Many of the bishops of other countries, taking their cue from them, looked upon Louis Napoleon as a second St. Louis, or a second Charlemagne; but the recent pastorals prove that all now have their eyes open, and see the danger; and never, in any age of Christendom, has the episcopacy been more faithful to its mission, or more at one with the papacy. This universal sympathy of the bishops with the pope, and the noble words they have spoken, are a grand fact,—one of the grandest facts in modern history. We have never before seen or heard any thing like it; never before have we witnessed so brilliant a proof of the unity of the church, or of the lofty freedom,

noble courage and high intelligence on the part of the pastors of the church. Thank God, the church, to-day, is confessedly papal, and never was the triumph of the pope more complete than in what has seemed to an unbelieving world his deepest humiliation. The laity have hardly been behind their pastors, and we have heard within the last few months one loud, earnest and sublime protest of the universal Catholic heart against political atheism, and its aiders and abettors. This protest sounds out through all lands, and is heard and recorded in heaven. For the first time in our Catholic life, we have ceased to despair of society and civilization. The wicked may triumph for a moment, the Holy Father may be stripped of his provinces one after another, he may be compelled, as so many of his predecessors, to take refuge in the catacombs, he may be driven into exile, or fall beneath the blow of the assassin's dagger, but his victory is won. There is a Catholic heart in the world, and the new political system has encountered in the pope and the bishops its conqueror, and nothing remains for it but to writhe in pain and expire in the midst of its worshippers.

We may all see now where is the hope of society, and feel assured that that hope is not in vain. The world, after all, will not completely relapse into barbarism. France is more Catholic at heart than any one has reason to believe, and will not sustain her emperor in the policy he has so fearlessly announced. He has already paused in his diplomacy, and seems at a loss to decide what course to take. We shall not be surprised to find the pope succeed in reducing to obedience the provinces seduced by Sardinia backed by Napoleon to revolt, and paralyzing the arms that gained the victory of Solferino. At any rate, we know the path of safety, and whence must come the cure of modern society. We see on what side we must rally, and that we can rally on that side with full confidence of final success. Since we have witnessed the manifestation of sympathy for the Holy Father by the pastors of the church everywhere, we have full confidence that Providence has resolved to arrest the downward tendency we have spoken of, by suffering the crafty to be caught in their own craftiness, and by reviving the faith and love, the courage and zeal of the faithful, which, in too many lands, had waxed faint and cold. The papal, if apparently the weaker, is the stronger side; and it is now clear to all who are willing to open their eyes, that

the enemies of the pope are the enemies of intelligence, of civilization, and of society itself. No man of good sense or right feeling can any longer go with them.

In attacking the temporal sovereignty of the pope, the powers not only attack the rights of sovereignty in general, and lay down a principle wholly incompatible with the rights and independence of nations, but they attack the rights of God, and are guilty of both the sin and the crime of sacrilege. The papal states are the states of the church, not of the pope personally,—not of the particular diocese of Rome, but of the Holy See, and therefore of the whole Catholic Church, and the pope, *ex officio*, administers them in the name of and for the church of God. Catholics in every country have an interest in those states, and a right to demand that they continue to belong to the church, and to be governed by the supreme pontiff. We American Catholics have the right against all the world to demand that the Holy Father be independent, the subject of no prince or state, but master in his own house, where he can exercise towards us the hospitality of the bishop, and enjoy the freedom of intercourse of the father with his children. It is not for us to solicit permission of France, Austria, or Sardinia to visit the Holy Father and transact our business with the Holy See, or to have our correspondence with the Holy See pass through the hands of the French or any other police. These states are held, like all ecclesiastical property, for the benefit of the church, and the church holds them by the same sort of title by which she holds church or glebe lands, church vestments or the furniture of the altar. They come under the head of the temporalities of the church, and as such are consecrated to the service of God. Nothing is better settled than that the church has not simply a human, but a divine right, to manage her own temporalities. We see this in the case of Ananias and Sapphira. While their property remained their own, they were free to keep it or to bestow it upon the church, as they saw proper; but having bestowed it on the church, they were guilty of a sin against the Lord, in holding it back, or any part thereof. They attempted this, and were struck dead for their sacrilege. The papal states, consecrated to the church, are set apart for God, and the pope in defending them is simply defending the rights of God. To strip the pope of his power as temporal sovereign, is in principle precisely the same thing as to deprive the church of any of her property

or temporalities,—is simply church robbery, neither more nor less,—a robbing of God, which is sacrilege.

We do not say, nay, we deny that the people of the papal states are the property of the church; all we maintain is, that the right to govern them is vested in the Holy See, and *ex officio* in the pope, as the occupant of that see and supreme pastor and governor of the church, in temporals as in spirituals,—the temporalities of the church we mean. The people under the Holy See retain all their natural rights, that is, all the rights that any other people have in civil society before their legitimate sovereign. They have a right to be governed by the law of justice and equity for their common good, the same as any other free people. But they have no right—*and no people have the right*—to rebel against legitimate authority, and no right to choose their own form of government, save when they have no government. The right to choose their own government is the right of no people that already have a legally constituted government. The people deprived of legitimate government, or legally without government, have the right to form a government for themselves, and to constitute it in such way as they judge wisest and best for their own social interests; but this right lapses the moment the new government is constituted. The sovereignty then passes from the people in convention to the constituted people, who have no political rights or powers outside of the constitution. The sovereign people are then only in the constitution, —are the constituted people, and can speak or act politically only through the constituted authorities. Such is the case with the people of these United States. The people here have no right of rebellion, no right to seek to overthrow the government, or to change, save in a legal way, the constitution of any state in the Union. This was settled by the supreme court of the United States, in the Rhode Island case, growing out of the Dorr constitution, and has been settled again, in a way not soon to be forgotten, by Virginia, in the case of old John Brown and his associates. They were condemned and hung for treason, as well as for murder and robbery. The people here, in a constitutional way, by authority of the existing constitution, may change the constitution, but to attempt to do it in any other way is illegal, treasonable, as against the majesty and inviolability of the state. It is the same with the people of the papal states; as long as the papal government remains they are

under that government, and have no political rights not recognized and guarantied by it. They are sovereign with and in the pope, but not outside of him. They have no rights of sovereignty which they can oppose to him. Their every attempt to act independently of him, as a sovereign people, is an act of usurpation, of rebellion, treason, for which in this country is reserved the punishment of death. Those emissaries of Sardinia and other states that stirred up the revolt in the Romagna were John Browns, and Virginia would have hung them by the neck till they were dead, dead, dead. A great outcry has been raised against the pope about the Perugia affair; but the pope only exercised the same right the authorities of Virginia and the United States marines exercised in firing upon John Brown and his companions in possession of the arsenal at Harper's Ferry.

But we are told that a government may, by abuse, forfeit its rights, and on this principle the popes in past ages have declared crowns forfeited and subjects absolved from their allegiance. No doubt of it. But the fact of forfeiture must first be established before a competent tribunal, which subjects, alone, are not and cannot be. If the pope were so to abuse his trust as to forfeit his right, he could do so only for himself; he could not forfeit the rights of the church or of his successors, and the most that could be pretended would be that his subjects were free from their allegiance to that particular pope; not that they were absolved from their allegiance to the Holy See, or that they acquired the right to secularize their government, or to establish a new government for themselves. But we are spared all discussion on this point. The great powers, Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Sardinia, have solemnly declared by the treaty of Paris, March 30, 1856, which put an end to the Crimean war, that the padishah, or chief of Islam, had not forfeited his rights of sovereignty, and they guaranty by treaty his independence as a sovereign, and the integrity of his empire. They who consented to that treaty cannot allege that the papal government has by its mal-administration forfeited its rights, for no one will pretend its mal-administration approaches that of the Turk. The emperor of the French reminds the Holy Father of "the irresistible logic of events;" he must permit us to remind him that we can appeal to logic as well as he, and that the Crimean war and the peace of Paris are events which have a logic which

serves as an estoppel to the suit he and others would prosecute against the Holy Father, and from which the conclusion may be drawn at St. Helena, where he has taken already the precaution to acquire an estate, at present, an empty grave! We do not pretend that there are not reforms in the papal states both desirable and practicable, and we know no administration on earth of which the same may not be said. But the clamors against the papal government come principally from those who covet the papal states, and arise not from the abuses that can be alleged, but from the simple fact that the government is papal, and opposed to political atheism. In the judgment of its enemies its vice is in its very origin and nature, and they wish to deprive the pope, as the completion of their grand scheme carried out in most countries, of church spoliation. They hate the papal government because they do not wish the Son of man to have even one spot on earth whereon to lay his head. We need then say no more about the papal government having by mal-administration forfeited its rights; and so long as we cannot say, by the judgment of a competent tribunal, that it has done so, we must say the people of the papal states owe allegiance to the pope, and have no right to change their government but in concert with their sovereign and by his consent. In this we only apply to them the rule we must apply to the people of the United States, supposed to be the freest people on earth.

There is no use in the anti-papal party undertaking to defend themselves on the ground of right. They can have no right, for they recognize no right; and can have against the pope only the reason of the wolf against the lamb. Right, public law, religion, morality, the security of sovereigns, the independence of nations, above all of religion, are on the side against them. Their lamentations over the people of the papal states are hypocritical, and worthy only of the scorn and indignation of every honest man. They have misled for a time a portion of the Catholic population of different states, who, without knowing it, have in their admiration of the four articles of the assembly of the Gallican clergy, in 1682, adopted political atheism, and in 1848 identified Catholicity with democracy, and in 1852 with despotism; but these having reaped their own sowing, are beginning to come to their senses, and to feel that after all political atheism offers no guaranties, and is very likely to devour her own children. The present tendency of the Catholic

populations throughout the world is more decidedly and affectionately papal than ever before, and is to reëstablish by sustaining and strengthening the hands of the pope, Christian political power, and to restore the old public law of Europe. All power is from God, and is accountable to him. The forgetfulness or rejection of this truth has caused all the evils we deplore in modern society—the evil done by Protestantism as well as by infidelity. By rallying anew around the pope, the representative and guardian of this truth, and sustaining him in his resistance to the new political system, the evil can be removed, and the old system, founded on public right and the principles of eternal justice, be reëstablished. In the effort to do this we have the whole Catholic sentiment of the world, we have divine Providence, we have the common sense of mankind, and the obvious interest of several important European states on our side. Austria, since her recent drubbing, which she richly deserved for her ingratitude to Russia, her support of Turkey, her indifference to the just demands of the Christian populations of the East, her Voltairian *bureaucracie*, and her cold-hearted selfishness, must now see that her interest, almost her existence as a great power, depends on her fidelity to the papacy. It is only by union with Austria and the pope that Naples can escape being absorbed by Sardinia, or else reduced to a satrapy of the emperor of the French. The interest of Spain reviving, and becoming once more an important Catholic power, as well as her old heroic traditions, point in the same direction. Southern Germany has the same interest as Austria, for it is only in sustaining or restoring the old European system of public right that the smaller German princes can hope to retain their thrones, or the smaller German states their independence. These, strengthened by the Catholic populations of Russia, Poland, Prussia, Great Britain, Ireland, the Canadas, the United States, and, above all, of France and Italy, marshalled under the banner of the pope as chief of Christendom, constitute a force capable of offering, in the long run, a successful resistance to the two great western powers, France and Great Britain, the only first-class powers indissolubly wedded to political atheism. In case of the renewal of the war, Napoleon and Lord Palmerston can hardly count on success, and would not unlikely fail, because each would be jealous of the success of the other; and, after all, Great Britain cannot well consent to revolve as a satellite around

France. She has nothing more at heart than the prostration of Napoleon, and the expulsion from France of the Napoleonic dynasty. She would much more willingly fight to sustain the pope than the emperor of the French; and when she gets him fairly embroiled with the pope, and so far committed to an anti-papal policy as to combine the whole Catholic sentiment of the world against him, she, not unlikely, will dissolve the *entente cordiale*, and make common cause with his enemies. Whatever else England may want, she does not want a French sovereign whose menaces compel her to keep in time of peace her army and navy on a war footing, at the expense of one hundred and fifty millions of dollars annually. That is paying too dear for supporting political atheism on the continent of Europe. There is no doubt but France and England are both trying in their diplomacy to outwit each other. The new commercial treaty negotiated by that political charlatan, Free-Trade Cobden, would seem to indicate that for the moment France has the better of England, for the advantages secured to France are present and real, and those of England are prospective, and may, and we believe will prove illusory; yet it will go hard, but in the long run the British Lion proves more than a match for the Gallic Eagle.

Some years ago we had, even with some of our Catholic friends, a hard fight for the Roman doctrine of the papacy against the Gallican, and for something like eight years have had to bear any amount of abuse for expressing a lack of confidence, under a Catholic point of view, in the emperor of the French, and warning our friends against suffering the Catholic cause to be even in appearance identified with his new-fangled cæsarism. Time and events have done us justice on both points, and we do not think that on either point there is any difference between us and the great body of Catholics. Years ago we told our readers that the plague-spot of modern society was political atheism, then wearing a popular or democratic form, as it has since worn an imperial or monarchical form, and we maintained that our only protection was in asserting the supremacy of the spiritual order, and therefore of the pope as the representative of that order. Political atheism was able in the greater part of Europe to supplant the papal politics based on religion and morality, only because of the refusal of not only sovereigns, but even of Catholic prelates, to recognize the papacy as absolutely essential to the being of the church, and to assert its suprem-

acy in face of the temporal power, which is, in other words, only asserting the supremacy of the spiritual order. Men were willing enough to say the spiritual is superior to the temporal; but there were even churchmen as late as 1854, and in our own country, too, who could not suffer this truth to be regarded as practical, or as concreted in the church and her chief. We trust that race of Catholics has passed away. They having really, though unintentionally, prepared the way for political atheism, it was clear to us that it could be checked and extinguished only by elevating the papacy to the highest point compatible with orthodoxy. You can refute a falsehood only by opposing to it the precise truth it denies, and you can cure the evil of modern society only by reëstablishing the exercise of the papal supremacy, want of which has caused it. Congresses of sovereigns or of states, popular or otherwise, will never succeed in reseating society on a moral basis, restoring order, and enabling the European nations to resume their progress in true civilization. The summoning of congresses, however, proves one thing, the necessity of an arbitratorship, or moderatorship, formerly exercised by the supreme pontiff, and that they are incapable of exercising it, because their decisions, founded on mere policy, carry with them no moral force, and have no authority for conscience. It can, in the nature of the case, be exercised only by the representative of the spiritual order, whose decisions, it is felt, must be impartial and according to the law of God,—infallible, in all respects, save as affected by a misstatement, on one side or the other, of the real facts in the case. Only the pope can meet the exigencies of the case. His judgments must, from his spiritual character, the authority he inherits as the successor of Peter, have moral weight, and satisfy the demands of conscience.

The experiment of dispensing with that arbitratorship, has been tried for three or four hundred years, and has failed. There is no remedy but in returning to it, and the necessity of returning to it is widely felt in Protestant as well as in Catholic states. No doubt the proposition to restore it is offensive; but it is and can be offensive to no one who sees and feels the necessity of a moral basis of society. It can be offensive only to those who favor the modern system of the independence of the political order of all the restraints of Christian power, or imposed by the law of God. But it is that system that creates the evil, and that it is necessary

to abolish. Cæsars and demagogues may cling to it, substitute might for right as they have done, vote God out of the constitution, and proclaim political atheism, but that will only be to augment and continue the evil. The wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the nations that forget God. It is absolutely impossible for a nation to reject God or his vicar, without gradually finding itself on the declivity towards barbarism. If Europe is ever to resume its upward tendency, and to reconstitute Christian political power, it must restore, under some form, the system it has rejected. Even now all that prevents it from falling as low as Turkey, and becoming as barbarous as Morocco, is the conservative influence still exercised, in spite of all lapses and changes, by the sovereign pontiff. If the papacy were not, there would be not a single power in Europe, or in the world, to speak for the right, to stand up for God and humanity. Europe may refuse, if she will, to consent to the papal arbitratorship, or moderatorship; no power on earth can compel her to do it against her will; but she can withhold her consent only at her peril. But for ourselves, we believe it will yet be given, and cheerfully given. The elder Napoleon told his minister to treat the pope as a sovereign with an army of two hundred thousand men at his command. It were better to say, treat him as a sovereign who has an army of two hundred millions at his command, prepared, or soon will be, to a man, to die for the cause he represents. Never yet has a sovereign or state made war on the pope and prospered, and no one ever will make war on him without finding, even what he counts victory, the worst of all defeats. The pastors have spoken worthily. Let the flock respond. Let the Catholic laity feel that the pope is their father, the papal states their father's house, the old Catholic homestead, and let them count no sacrifice of life or treasure necessary to save it from being despoiled and desecrated by sacrilegious hands, and the present mad attempt will fail.

We have, in our remarks, gone further than the letter of the pastorals which have been published, but we have gone no further than is necessary to secure the end all these pastorals propose. On the principles of the four articles of the Gallican clergy, drawn up by Bossuet, but inspired by Louis XIV., it is impossible to offer any effectual resistance to the new political system. On those principles you cannot defend the temporal sovereignty of the pope, for if they are true, it is an offensive anomaly, that he who has only

spiritual authority, and by virtue of his pontificate no authority in temporals, should yet be a temporal sovereign. According to those articles, the church has no divine right to the government and management of her own temporalities; and if this be so, the pope can have no divine right to his temporal sovereignty, for that sovereignty is simply a temporality of the church. The right of the pope to govern his estates is not a grant or cession of kings or people, but is in the divine right of the church to govern and manage her own temporalities. Kings, emperors, princes, or people may have ceded those estates to the Holy See; but when ceded, they became the temporal estates or temporalities of the church. The cession placed them within the right of the church, but did not confer the right, for that is the right of the church over her own temporality, and is original and inherent in her divine constitution; therefore conferred immediately by God himself, and the pope exercises this right by virtue of his office as supreme head and governor of the church in both spirituals and temporals. This is wherefore to deprive him is not simply treason, but sacrilege, and is *ipso facto* excommunication, with the greater excommunication. The papal right as sovereign of Rome is then included in the right of the church over her own temporals, and to deny his right to govern the states of the church is to deny her right over her own temporalities. This is the answer to those flippant New York journals who, in commenting on the pastoral of the archbishop and his suffragans of this province, say, if the people, as they interpret the pastoral to concede, conferred the government of these states on the pope, the people are competent to resume it. We do not concede that this would follow, even if we understood by the grant, the act of the people constituting the pope their sovereign as they might a simple secular; for the grant perfects the right of the sovereign, and is irrevocable, unless forfeited, and not even then without a court in which you can sue out against him the writ *quo warranto*, or its equivalent. But in this case the cession being made to the church, that is, in law, to God, is complete; and whatever is ceded is parted with for ever, and can never again lawfully, without the consent of the church, be appropriated to secular use. The people were free to make the cession or not, but having made it, they ceased to have any right over it; and it came under the divine right of the church to govern and manage her own tempor-

alities without any secular authority whatever having any right to intervene in the matter.

This proves that, to maintain the validity of right of the pope to his temporal principality, we must assert the divine right of the church not only in spirituals, but in her own temporals. But this right can never be effectually maintained, unless we assert the supremacy of the spiritual order, and defend for the pope, not a temporal authority beyond this, but a spiritual authority in all that relates to the assertion and maintenance of a moral basis for society; for, if he have not this authority, how is he to defend the right of the church to her own temporalities? We recognize the independence of the state in its own order, but we do not recognize its independence of the spiritual, or superior order. It is bound to confine itself within the limits prescribed by the spiritual. What we claim for the pope is full authority in the spiritual order and what pertains to it, whether naturally or only accidentally spiritual. In order to maintain this authority, he must be created the representative and guardian of all the rights of the spiritual, which necessarily involves the right to keep the temporal in its own sphere. More than this we have never asserted, and as far as this, we think, all the pastorals, in reality, require us to go.

We have said in this article all that we deem necessary to say on the present complication of affairs in Italy. We have not been disappointed in Louis Napoleon, and we see no reason why any Catholic should ever have expected any thing better from him, in relation to religion or the church. We have not found him making so many or so fair promises as some have represented; and we never credited any promise he did make, because he made it knowing that Catholics are ready to make almost any sacrifice for the maintenance of authority. He very naturally concluded that they at any rate would support him, and therefore that he had little to do except to conciliate and secure the support of the revolutionists. If our memory is not at fault, he, as a member of the national assembly, both spoke and voted, in 1848, against the expedition to Rome for the restoration of the Holy Father. Nobody had any right to expect him to sustain the temporal authority of the pope any longer than he found it convenient for the carrying out of his "Napoleonic ideas." We never believed he understood Christian politics, or had the slightest intention of maintaining a Christian

political power in France or anywhere else. He adopts, avowedly, the principles of 1789, of which the deeds of 1792 and 1793 only followed as the inevitable "logic of events." He is neither a worse nor a better man than we have always considered him. He is astute, he is inscrutable, mysterious, if you will, but because he is governed by no moral or religious principles,—because he always, instead of controlling circumstances, follows the "irresistible logic of events." We have nothing more to say of him. The pastorals of the French bishops have reassured us as to the church in France, for these bishops would never have spoken as they have, if they had not been strong alike in their faith and their following.

We do not profess to be able to foresee what will be the settlement of either the Italian question or the Roman question, but we doubt not there will be a French question before either is settled. The Holy Father may, for a time, be driven out from his house, but, if so, he will return to it. No Catholic power ever yet made war on the pope and prospered, and no one ever will. Much suffering there will be, much sin, and the perdition of many souls; but heresy and schism will gain nothing, and the papacy, we believe, is really stronger to-day than it ever was before. The present complications and menaces prove, to all who are willing to see, that despots can never be relied on for the support of the Catholic cause, and the suppression of the *Univers* may teach our journalists the folly of sharpening the axe to strike off their own heads. Liberty and justice go together, and the papacy is the guardian of both.

THE PAPAL POWER.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1860.]

In the brief remarks we made on these volumes in the *Review* for January, 1854, we aimed simply to express our dissent from the author's theory, adopted from Fénelon, that the power exercised over temporal princes by the supreme pontiffs in the middle ages was not inherent in the papacy by divine constitution, but was a power conferred on the popes by the concession of sovereigns, public opinion, and what at the time was the public law, the *jus publicum*, of Christendom. As to the merits of the work beyond the advocacy of this theory, which we did not, do not, and cannot accept, we offered no judgment, indicated no opinion. Having had recently occasion to consult it anew, and to examine it with more care than we had previously done, we have been struck with the wide and patient historical research it indicates, and the vast amount of most valuable historical information it contains. We have nowhere else found the origin of the temporal sovereignty of the Holy See more fully explained or more satisfactorily defended, and it would be difficult to find in the same compass so much light thrown on the relations during a great part of mediæval history of the church and the empire. The author is a man of extensive and solid learning, and his work, though defending what we regard as an untenable theory, has evidently been honestly and conscientiously written, and is one which should be in every scholar's library.

The reperusal of these volumes has made us think better of the author personally, and more favorably of the *animus* of his work. His theory is virtually Gallican, and amounts to the same thing as the four articles imposed on the French clergy, in 1682, by Louis XIV. or his minister Colbert, but we are satisfied that his intention was not so much to defend Gallicanism as it was to defend the popes in their mediæval relations with the temporal power from the charge of usurpation, so confidently and so intemperately brought

**The Power of the Pope during the Middle Ages.* By M. Gosselin, Director in the Seminary of St. Sulpice, Paris. London: 1853.

against them by partisans of the Gallican school, as well as by non-Catholics, by showing that they held legally the power they claimed, though only *jure humano*, not *jure divino*. His aim was to vindicate the character of the papacy in its relations with temporal sovereigns without assuming the high ground of Bellarmine and Suarez, and to indicate a ground on which he imagined all parties might meet and shake hands as friends and brothers. His aim was laudable, and in the estimation of a very considerable number of Catholics, and Catholics highly respectable for position, learning, and ability, he has fully accomplished it, for we hardly see a work produced since its publication in explanation of the history of the papacy in the middle ages that does not adopt his theory. Nor is his theory without its side of truth. The historical facts, we believe, are in the main correctly given by the author, and certainly the popes held the power they claimed and exercised in the way and by the tenor he alleges. The *jus publicum* certainly did clothe them with the power they exercised. It recognized the Holy Father as supreme judge in all controversies between sovereign and sovereign, and between a sovereign and his subjects. Of this there can be no reasonable doubt. Why then object to Mr. Gosselin's theory, evidently sustained by the historical facts in the case? And why not accept it, since it effectually frees the supreme pontiffs from the charge of usurping power, or encroaching on the rights of temporal princes?

We have never refused to accept the theory because it asserts that the popes held their power over temporal princes by the *jus publicum*, or *jure humano*, for that we believe; but we have objected to it because it denies that they, in any respect, held or hold it *jure divino*. We object to it not in what it asserts, but in what it denies. We hold that in point of fact, the popes held the power in question both *jure humano* and *jure divino;* but we never find them appealing in their public acts to their human title, and it is a fact that militates not a little against Mr. Gosselin's denial of their divine right, that when a pope deposed a sovereign and absolved his subjects, he invariably professed to do it *jure divino*, by virtue of the authority which he inherits as the successor of Peter, or the power delegated to him by Almighty God as his vicar, or the supreme pastor of his church. We have found in our historical reading, no exception to this fact. It is always with the sword of Peter

and Paul he smites the offending sovereign. Nothing is more certain, in our judgment, than that the popes did claim and profess to exercise the deposing power as a power vested in them by the divine constitution of the papacy. Mr. Gosselin's theory, then, does not meet the exigencies of the case, and fails, after all, of its main purpose, to vindicate the popes from the charge of usurpation, if it be a fact, as he maintains, that they held the power only by a human title, for there can be no greater usurpation than to claim a divine where one has only a human title.

In some respects it would be a great convenience to be able to adopt Mr. Gosselin's theory throughout. It would save us from the obligation, and even the odium of asserting the supremacy of the spiritual order, against which our age wages such universal and relentless war; and would enable us to quiet the fears and soothe the susceptibilities of the temporal power, which seeks always to emancipate itself from the law of God. Far from us, however, the thought, that any such consideration weighed with the learned author, or that it weighs with any of those who adopt his theory. But after all, truth is truth, and remains the same whether we assert it or deny it. The spiritual order is none the less supreme because men refuse to acknowledge its supremacy. It is supreme in the very essence and constitution of things, and God himself cannot make it otherwise. This fact, we apprehend, has not been sufficiently meditated by Mr. Gosselin and others who adopt his theory. They apparently do not see that the power in question grows out of the natural relation of the two orders, and must be inherent in the pope as representative of the spiritual order, unless expressly or by necessary implication reserved in the divine commission given him. Mr. Gosselin and his school seem to make no account of the natural relation of the two orders, and to proceed on the assumption that nothing can be claimed for the pope not expressly granted; that all power held and exercised by a pope, not so granted, is either usurped or held simply *jure humano*. According to them, all the powers of the pope must be conferred by positive legislation expressly enumerating and granting them, and therefore he has no spiritual power not so conferred; we, on the other hand, maintain that he has all spiritual power not denied him, that is, he represents the spiritual authority in its plenitude, unless there is some express or necessarily implied limitation in the divine com-

mission. The two rules are very different, and very different conclusions will be arrived at from the same historical facts, as we adopt the one or the other. Which is the one the Catholic ought to adopt?

We suppose all Catholics, and indeed all men who have ordinary sense and fairness, will concede us that the distinction between the spiritual and the temporal is not simply arbitrary or merely conventional, but is a real distinction, founded and defined in the very nature and constitution of things. The spiritual is the creator of the temporal, and is therefore its sovereign lord and proprietor,—its superior, not in rank and dignity alone, but in power, office, authority. Under no possible point of view can the spiritual and the temporal have between them the relation of equality, or be two coördinate and mutually independent orders. In like manner as the creature is subject to the creator, is the temporal subject to the spiritual, and bound at all times and in all things to do its will. This natural relation of the two orders not God himself can alter, for he cannot alter the natural relation between himself as creator and contingent existences as his creatures. He can create or not create as seems to him good; but he cannot create creatures and not be their creator, or not have over them the intrinsic and indestructible rights of creator. The spiritual in itself is God, and the temporal is only his creature, and hence we say the temporal is the creature of the spiritual, and the temporal order is absolutely subjected to the spiritual, as the creature to the creator. If this be so, the spiritual is sovereign lord and master of the temporal, what we mean when we assert the supremacy of the spiritual.

All Catholics, again, will concede us that our Lord has instituted the church as the representative of the spiritual order on earth. The church is the kingdom of God set up in this world, to make the kingdoms of this world the kingdoms of God and of his Christ. The pope has been instituted by our Lord himself the visible head of this church, and he possesses in its plenitude all the authority of the church herself. He has the sacerdocy in its plenitude, and all spiritual jurisdiction takes its rise in him, even that of bishops, which he can enlarge, contract, or take away. He then in himself, as chief of the spiritual society, is the immediate *representative* of the spiritual order in the government of men and nations and is the vicar of Christ, the vicegerent of God on earth. We know the old questions

about the superiority of the council to the pope, about the pope being bound by the canons and all that; but all these questions are obsolete, since the concordat conceded by Pius VII. to the first consul, in 1801, in which the Holy Father gave them a practical answer once for all. He then showed that he possesses all ecclesiastical power in its plenitude, and the old-fashioned Gallicanism expired with the last prelate of the now almost forgotten "*La petite Église.*" We assume then, that the pope, successor of St. Peter, and chief of the spiritual society, is really the vicar of Jesus Christ, and really represents, by divine appointment, the authority of the spiritual order on earth, so far as God has given it any representative at all.

But, if the pope represents the authority of that order at all, he must be held to represent it in its plenitude, so far as his power is not expressly or by necessary implication restricted. It is necessarily restricted by the authority of him who makes him his representative. Our Lord does not make the pope God, does not divest himself of his own power, and become himself subject to his own representative; but he does constitute the pope his vicar, and therefore gives him authority to do whatever he may himself do unless he states to the contrary, or imposes on his power a limitation. Does our Lord impose such limitation? when? where? and what? He gave him plenary apostolic power, we must concede, for in commissioning the apostles he said: "All power is given me in heaven and in earth. Go ye *therefore.*" Here is no restriction expressed, and no reserve except to himself. The fair inference, then, is that under God, as the vicar of Christ, the pope represents the spiritual power in its plenitude, that is, the plenitude of spiritual authority, or has all spiritual authority which Christ does not reserve to himself. As this authority by virtue of the fact that it is spiritual is supreme over the temporal, the pope, as representative of the spiritual order, must stand in the same relation to the emperor or representative of the temporal, that the spiritual order itself does in the essence and reality of things to the temporal order, therefore as his sovereign lord and master. The power then claimed and exercised over sovereigns in the middle ages, though very properly recognized by the *jus publicum*, is inherent in the spiritual order, and therefore, in the papacy as the divinely constituted representative of that order. This conclusion follows necessarily from the fact that the papacy is the di-

vinely constituted representative of the spiritual order on earth, and the fact that the power in question, undeniably the inherent right of the spiritual order, is nowhere excepted from the powers conferred by our Lord on his vicar.

We complain of M. Gosselin and his school, that they nowhere take any notice of this reasoning, which seems to us conclusive. They forget that the presumptions are in favor of the pope, and that we are bound to claim for him, since he is conceded to represent the authority of the spiritual, all the authority of the spiritual order not denied him. He is in possession, and the *onus probandi* is on the side that asserts this or that limitation of his authority. That the power in question belongs to the spiritual order, it is not necessary to prove to any enlightened Catholic. We have already shown the absolute supremacy of the spiritual order, and no man who believes in the spiritual order at all, no man who is not a political atheist, can deny it. The law of God is universal and binds all classes, ranks, and conditions of men. The prince is as much bound to obey God as the subject, and as much bound to obey him in his public as in his private acts; the people are as much bound to conform to the law of God in their collective as in their individual capacity. No man has the right to transgress a single precept of the law of God; and however much we may talk in these days of the sovereignty of the people, there are few Americans even, so far gone in their democracy, as to contend that the will of the people, simply because it is their will, is the highest or supreme law either for individuals or the state. If we hold that our rulers are responsible to them in the political order, we hold, at least the majority of us hold, that the people themselves are responsible to God for all their acts. Very few of us have fallen so low as to maintain openly, avowedly, that the people are ultimate, and that there is no law above them which they are bound to observe, or that their will is to be obeyed when it commands us to do what is repugnant to natural or eternal justice. All the ancient lawgivers, indeed all nations, civilized or barbarous, recognize religion as the basis of society, and accept the assertion of St. Paul, *non est potestas nisi a Deo*, hold that God is the only source of power, and assert the supremacy of the divine law, therefore, necessarily the absolute supremacy of the spiritual order. Themistocles told the Athenians that he had a secret by which he could secure to them the supremacy of all Greece. They appointed

policy of Count Cavour, to which we should not object. As a European statesman, we should regard the political union of all Italy under a federal or a consolidated government, monarchical or republican, as a desideratum. But that union is impracticable so long as the North and South are separated by the papal government. It is possible only by all Italy coming on the one hand, under the supreme temporal authority of the Holy Father, or by dispossessing the Holy See on the other, and establishing a laical government for the whole peninsula. We may talk as we please, except on one or the other of these conditions, the union is impracticable, and Italy must remain divided, and therefore too weak to suffice for itself against either Austria or France, and the intrigues, either of Russia or of Great Britain. The thing is so, and we cannot help it. The several states of the peninsula, the papal as well as the others, are obliged to depend on the alliances they are able to form out of Italy. The pope when his temporal power was greatest, could maintain the exercise of even his spiritual independence only by playing off one state or empire against another, the Franks against the Longobards, the Italian republics, and subsequently Sicily and Naples against the emperor, and the emperor against the republics, Naples, Sicily, and the Italian nobles, France against Germany, and Germany against France. To protect himself against the Hohenstaufen, he invested Charles of Anjou, a French prince, with the Neapolitan kingdom, and soon had to call on Rodolph of Habsburg to protect him against Charles, his own creature and vassal. In more recent times he has preserved his states only by the mutual jealousies of the great powers, while he has seldom been able to conduct the affairs of his government as an independent prince, and owing to her divisions, Italy has sunk to a "geographical expression." The first alternative, the union of all Italy as a federal state under the effective presidency of the pope, or its union as a monarchy with the pope for sovereign, would in our judgment be the best for Italy herself and for European society. But that is impracticable; the popes, themselves, have never desired it, and the powers will never consent to it. What remains? If the present state of things is not to continue, nothing remains but the second alternative, the dispossession of the Holy See and the establishment of a laical government, monarchical or republican, for the whole peninsula. This

soever represented, is, in the nature of the case supreme. Moreover, our Gallican friends also either fail to distinguish the two orders, or at least to recognize for each a distinct and separate representative. In their view the pope represents a certain portion of the spiritual authority, and the emperor or prince a certain other portion. Their doctrine, if we understand it, is that the church and state are two mutually equal and independent powers. But to be mutually equal or independent in the face of each other, both must be equally representatives of the spiritual, for the temporal never is and never can be in any respect whatever independent in the face of the spiritual. Gallicans, in fact, if they did but know it, make the prince a spiritual person as well as the pope, and indeed they actually call him *episcopus externus*, and regard him as clothed with a certain spiritual character and a certain spiritual authority. Though they hold marriage to be a sacrament, they yet hold that the temporal sovereign can establish an *impedimentum dirimens*. All this, and much more like it, proves either that they do not recognize the natural supremacy of the spiritual, or that they do not hold that God has under the Christian law given to each order its separate representative, any more than he did under the patriarchs.

But it will be seen that, though we assert for the pope supreme authority, it is spiritual authority, not temporal, authority *over*, not *in* the temporal order. We believe the two orders are distinct, and that it has pleased God to give each a separate representative; we, therefore, agree that the state is independent in its own order, and that the church exercises over it only a spiritual authority. But for the state to be independent in its own order it is not necessary that it should be independent out of it. The state is independent in face of all powers in its own order, and has supreme authority so long as it confines itself to that order; but it is not independent, and has not supreme authority, nor any authority at all, in face of another and a superior order as is the spiritual. I am a man, the equal as a man of every other man, and no man has, or can have, any right in his own name to command me. Under the law of nature all men are equal, and no man has or can have dominion in another. Hence the church condemns the slave trade, and interdicts every one who reduces or aids in reducing a free man to slavery. One man may, indeed, have a right to the services of another, but he can have it only by virtue of

benefits conferred, or as the redress of wrongs received. The southern states have in relation to the northern or any other states, the political right to authorize slavery; but when the question comes up as a question between them and the spiritual power, or between the slave holder and his slaves, that is, as an ethical question, the case may be different. The state has no right to authorize any injustice, and the master has no right to exact the services of any one who is not his debtor, either for advances made to him for his benefit, or for injuries received from him. I may compel the payment of a debt honestly my due, but I cannot exact the services of another simply because he is of different complexion from myself, because I want them, or find them agreeable, convenient, useful, or profitable to me. The temporal is free and independent in face of the temporal. In matter of justice or natural rights, man measures man the world over, and one sovereign state is the equal of another. As a temporal power, the pope has no authority out of his own states, and stands only on an equality with other sovereigns. He has no authority, even as the vicar of our Lord, over temporal sovereigns in temporalities for temporal ends, or in the respect that they are pure temporalities. He has only authority in what pertains to the spiritual order, and judges sovereigns not in relation to the wisdom, prudence, policy, or expediency of their acts, but only in relation to their obligations to God, and the bearing of their acts on the rights and interests of the spiritual order. This rule subjects the prince in spirituals, but leaves him his autonomy, his freedom, his independence in temporals.

But it is precisely here where the controversy begins. The two orders, though distinct, are not, and cannot be separated. Philip the Fair, the founder of the Gallican school and of modern political atheism, did not avowedly claim for the prince authority in spirituals, or deny that the pope, under God, is supreme as to the spirituality. He pretended that in his war on Boniface VIII., he was only vindicating the freedom and independence of the prince in temporalities. On the other hand, Boniface, in censuring and resisting him, expressly asserted that he only defended the legitimate authority of the sovereign pontiff in spirituals. Philip the Fair knew that the two orders are distinct, and that each has its separate representative; but he forgot, or did not choose to remember, that the two *orders*, though distinct, are not separate, and that their separation would be

the annihilation of the temporal. Man is distinct from God, as the creature is distinct from the creator; but he is not separate from God, for it is in him we live, and move, and have our being, *vivimus, et movemur, et sumus.* Man exists only as joined to God by the creative act, a persistent, and not merely a transient or transitory act, and hence his separation from God would be his destruction, his annihilation. Separate him from God, and he ceases to exist, sinks back into the original nothingness from which the creative energy of God produced him. So the temporal order, separated from the spiritual, ceases to exist. Physically separated, it loses its very physical existence; morally separated, it loses its moral existence. This lies in the nature of things, and not even God himself can alter it, for the temporal is his creature, and he can sustain his creature only as united to him. It is overlooking this fact that has led some Catholics even, to deny the divine right of the authority claimed and exercised by Gregory VII., Innocent III., Boniface VIII., and other great popes over temporal sovereigns, and to maintain either that they usurped it, or that they held it only *jure humano*, by virtue of the concession of the prince, and the *jus publicum* of the time.

Every temporal act on some side touches, and must touch the spiritual, for there is no act that is morally indifferent, at least on the side of the actor. The spiritual authority must have the right to take cognizance of the spirituality wherever it is, and hence it extends, in some sort, to all the acts of every rational creature, as was dogmatically defined by pope Boniface VIII. in the bull *Unam sanctam.* The pope, then, as supreme representative of the spiritual authority, has, and must have, supreme authority in relation to all temporals on their spiritual side, that is, in the respect that they are subordinated to the spiritual order, devoted to a spiritual purpose, or to be referred to a spiritual end. Nothing is more clearly within my right as a father than the education of my children, the selection of masters to teach them, and the determination of the school and the branches in which I wish them instructed. Yet this very right I hold, not from, but in subordination to the church. I have no right to bring up my children without any religious education, to educate them in a false religion, or to send them to schools, which, for spiritual reasons, the spiritual authority interdicts.

Nothing is clearer than that treason is a temporal matter,

and within the jurisdiction of the temporal authority. Our older writers, indeed, recognize treason against God as well as treason against the state, but in our younger writers, treason against God is dropped, or made no account of. Yet treason against the state is still recognized, and to some extent regarded as a crime, and all who recognize it as a crime place it within the jurisdiction of the temporal sovereign. But suppose a sovereign, as in England, under Elizabeth, if not under Victoria, should define treason to be the denial of the supremacy in his own dominions of the temporal prince in spirituals as well as temporals, and the open profession and practice of the Catholic religion, would he remain within the limits of the temporal order, and in no sense encroach on the rights of the spiritual. Nearly three hundred Catholic priests, to say nothing of the laity that suffered, in the single reign of Elizabeth of England were put to death by the common hangman, hung, drawn, and quartered, ostensibly for treason against the queen's majesty, but really for exercising their functions as Catholic priests, and therefore were really martyrs to the Catholic faith. Are we to accept the definition of treason which makes the profession of the Catholic religion treason, Catholics, by the very fact that they are Catholics, traitors, and authorizes the state to be a persecutor? Is there here no place for the supremacy of the spiritual to assert itself, to fulminate the persecuting sovereign, and release Catholics from their allegiance to him; nay, even to forbid their compliance or obedience? The prince is bound to protect and defend the true religion, but he has no right to prohibit it, or to interfere with its free exercise, even in case he rejects it for himself, and prefers to support a false religion.

Property, again, by its own nature, pertains to the temporal order, and comes within the province of the temporal power. But the state does not create the right to property, and its chief right as its chief duty in regard to it, is to protect the proprietor in the free and full enjoyment of his property. The right to hold property is prior to civil society, and is one of those rights called the natural rights of man, which civil society is instituted to protect. My right to my property is spiritual. My protection in the enjoyment of it is the duty of the temporal power. Now, when the state, under the pretence of its independence in temporals, attempts to deprive me of this right, and treats me as if I held my property only as its grant revocable at its will, it

strikes a blow at the sacredness of all rights, and goes beyond the mere temporality, and aims a death-blow at the spiritual. Has the spiritual no authority here to interfere, more especially when the church is the proprietor despoiled? My right of property involves my right to use, to give, grant, devise, bequeathe property to whom, and for such purposes, not defined to be immoral, irreligious, or superstitious by the supreme spiritual authority, as I choose, and the state, so far from having the right to restrain me by mortmain laws, or any other laws and enactments, is bound to provide for carrying out my intentions. If I dispose of my property for eleemosynary or religious purposes, the state must see that it is held sacred to the purposes I designate, and can divert it to no other purpose whatever. If I give it to the church for God and the poor, it is, so far as the temporal power is concerned, church property, and subject to her management and disposal alone. It is consecrated to a spiritual use, and cannot be diverted to secular uses without sacrilege, any more than could the *corban* among the Hebrews, or the *devotum* among the Romans. Property so given, is withdrawn from the management and control of the state, which has nothing to do with it but to protect the spiritual proprietor in the free and full use and enjoyment of it according to the intention of the donor.

We are here only stating in substance the recognized principles of the common law in force in the United States, as argued by Mr. Webster in the famous Dartmouth College case. Gallican and Anglican prejudices have prevented the statute law from distinctly recognizing the church as proprietor, and some notions derived from the feudal law as to the right of eminent domain have dictated in several instances certain restrictions on gifts *inter vivos* and the testamentary right of individuals, but generally the law with us recognizes the sacredness of property given, devised, or bequeathed for Catholic purposes, and extends to it the protection it extends to all property given for eleemosynary purposes. It is a mistake to say that in this country the law simply lets us alone. It does more, it protects us. It punishes the violation of the right of property in case of the Catholic Church the same that it does in case of any one of the sects, and allows no one to molest or disturb us in the free and full exercise of our religion whether in public or in private. Godless, as our state is called, it recognizes that it is its duty to protect religion, and to secure to all the free-

dom necessary to its unrestricted profession and practice. Even the recent laws in New York, Connecticut, and some other states respecting the holding of property devoted to Catholic uses, although inspired by sympathies that we do not approve, and pervaded by a laical spirit that is justly reprehensible, still recognize the property as held for Catholic uses, and profess to protect it for those uses. They are very far from confiscating our church property, or professing to divert it from its legitimate ends. It is possible that our laws afford a better protection to church property than even some of our prelates have supposed; better, indeed, than is afforded even in those Catholic countries where, by virtue of concordats, the state recognizes the church as a proprietor, because these laws all proceed on the assumption of the inviolability of property, and the obligation of civil society to respect it, and to protect the proprietor in its use. But this by the way.

Property given to the church, whether given by individuals or the state is given to God, and is therefore rendered spiritual in its character, and necessarily placed by right under the control of the spiritual society. It can no longer be managed, disposed of, or used by secular society, without the consent of the spiritual authority. It is not a fief of the temporal suzerain, and the church in holding it does not become his vassal or liegeman. The Franconian and Swabian emperors of Germany, and after them, Philip the Fair, king of France, denied this. The German emperors regarded the sees of bishops as fiefs of the empire, and therefore claimed as suzerain the right of investiture; Philip the Fair, under direction of the legists of the time, claimed the supreme right over the entire property of the church in his realm, as pertaining in like manner as lay property to the temporality of his kingdom. Hence, with the former, the quarrel with the pope about investitures, and of Boniface VIII. with the latter, as to the right of the church, if we may so speak, to manage her own temporalities. It is this union of spirituality and temporality that creates the difficulty, and renders the mutual equality and independence of the two powers impracticable. The one or the other must be supreme, or there will be a perpetual conflict of rights. If the two powers are assumed to be mutually equal and independent, the prince by virtue of the human element of the church, and the temporal side of even spiritual things, can stretch his authority so as to leave nothing to the spiritual

authority but simple dogma, and perhaps the administration of the sacraments, as has actually been done in most countries whether Catholic or non-Catholic. If neither is supreme, the state has as much right to define its own powers, and to say where the temporal ends and the spiritual begins, as the church has to define her powers and to say where the spiritual ends and the temporal begins. Hence nothing but a conflict of powers. The only remedy is in taking a common-sense view of the case, and recognizing the natural supremacy of the spiritual. The civil authority is independent in its own order, but its own order is dependent and subordinated in all things to a superior order, namely, the spiritual, represented on earth by the Roman pontiff or vicar of Jesus Christ.

It will be seen, also, that in this we assert for the papacy not a temporal but simply a spiritual supremacy. That nothing different was claimed for the popes or that they, as a matter of fact, did not in some cases exercise a direct temporal supremacy, we will not assert. It was in feudal times a very general opinion or doctrine of theologians and canonists that the pope by virtue of his office as head of the church was the suzerain or lord paramount of all the states and empires of the world. This opinion or doctrine is not the one we defend ; and with regard to all cases in which the pope exercised a suzerainty or temporal supremacy over temporal princes, either to invest or to deprive them for purely temporal reasons, if such cases there were, we think M. Gosselin's theory offers a very satisfactory explanation. Certain it is, that several European states were at one time the fiefs of the Holy See, and their sovereigns vassals of the pope; but we have always supposed this was by virtue of a mutual arrangement between those states and the pope, by which they placed themselves under the protection of the Holy See, not by virtue of the inherent rights and powers of the papacy. There is nothing in the fact that the pope is spiritual sovereign, to hinder him from being the suzerain of as many states as choose to vest the high dominion in him.

The relation of the emperor of Germany to the pope was of a different nature, and grew neither out of the pope's spiritual supremacy, nor out of his alleged temporal supremacy, except in the states of the church. Doubtless, there was between the papacy and the German empire, the same relation which always and everywhere exists between the spiritual power and the temporal, but there was also an-

other and a peculiar relation, a relation between the emperor and the pope as temporal sovereign of Rome. The pope raised Charlemagne, patrician of Rome, to the imperial dignity, and associated him with himself as coadjutor in the temporal government of the states of the church. The emperor as such, was, strictly speaking, an officer of the papal government, and therefore the pope as sovereign, had naturally the right to elect and crown him. This position as coadjutor of the pope in the government of the pope's temporal subjects, the Frankish emperors seem to have for the most part respected; but the Franconian and Swabian emperors were not satisfied with it, and labored to change it for that of sovereigns of Rome, as was Augustus or Constantine, though with indifferent success. If the pope was forced to concede electors, he retained the right of bestowing or withholding the imperial crown, and never conceded that he was bound to crown the candidate presented. It would be idle to pretend that an emperor crowned by the pope had no political authority in Rome, and equally idle to pretend that he was, except by usurpation, the sovereign of Rome, or the successor of Augustus. In Rome he was not the sovereign, but the coadjutor of the sovereign, and sworn protector and defender of the Holy See against the violence of its enemies, especially heretics and infidels.

Neither do we derive the temporal sovereignty of the pope in the states of the church from his office as representative of the spiritual order. We have never pretended and are far from pretending, that temporal sovereignty, strictly so called, is in any case inherent in the vicar of Christ, that is to say, a temporal authority in temporals, or power to govern temporals in the respect that they are purely temporal, and for temporal ends. The pope may have such power, as may bishops and simple priests, but it falls under the category of temporal power in general, and is not included in the grant of apostolic or sacerdotal power. Hence, under a certain aspect and up to a certain point, Louis Napoleon and others are right in asserting that, in the present complication of Italian affairs, the political question is distinguishable from the religious question. The pope has, as we have endeavored to show, a universal spiritual authority over temporals in the respect that they have spiritual relations, but his authority as temporal sovereign of the Roman states, is quite distinguishable from this spiritual authority, and is in its own nature as temporal as that of Francis

Joseph as emperor of Austria, or as that of Victor Emmanuel as king of Sardinia.

Yet there is a peculiarity in the case which we have all along had in mind. Though the sovereignty in its own nature is temporal, yet the right of the pope to govern is not purely temporal. These states are not precisely the domain of the pope, for he is, after all, their administrator rather than their sovereign. He is not elected sovereign of those states, but is elected bishop of Rome, and therefore pope, or supreme visible head of the church, and it is because he is pope that he exercises the right of sovereignty over them. They are states of the church; the sovereignty is vested in the Holy See, and therefore is a right of the spiritual society, and invested with the spiritual character which attaches to all the rights or goods of the church. Here is the reason why, though we can distinguish, we cannot practically separate the political from the religious question in the recent act of wresting Æmilia, or Romagna from the Holy See, and annexing it to the kingdom of Sardinia. There is in the act not simply a political crime punishable by the civil authority, but a sin against the church, the sin designated in all times under the name of sacrilege, not only because it despoils the Holy See of its goods, but because it appropriates to profane uses what was devoted to sacred uses. The church, by her divine constitution, it may be conceded, was not invested with the right of sovereignty over these states, nor any right to appropriate the government of them to herself. But when they came legitimately into her possession, and she became, whether by the act of the people, or the concession of princes, or as first occupant of the vacant throne, their legitimate sovereign, the right of sovereignty over them ceased to be a laical right, and became a right of the spiritual society, and of the pope as supreme chief of that society. It then could not be attacked without attacking not merely a temporal, but also a spiritual right, and incurring the guilt of sacrilege. The pope in his capacity as temporal ruler has and can have no authority even to alienate them, and can alienate them only as spiritual head of the church, and then only for spiritual reasons, for the interests of religion, of which he is supreme judge. Under every point of view then, the political question is complicated with the spiritual.

Treating the question solely from the political point of view, were we at liberty to do so, we could see much in the

Aristides to hear his secret and report on it. He heard it, and reported that nothing could be more advantageous to the state, but at the same time nothing could be more unjust. He therefore advised the Athenians to reject it. They did so, and all the world has honored both him and them for their love of justice. The natural reason, we may say, the natural instincts of all men assert the supremacy of the spiritual order, and the very men who clamor against the exercise of the power we claim for the pope, do it on the ground that it is *unjust*, contrary to *right*, thereby evincing their persuasion that the spiritual order—for justice, right, pertain to that order—is supreme. All the world, all at least that retains any consciousness of the validity of our nature, repeats from age to age, *Fiat justitia, ruat cœlum*, and every true man says with the apostles Peter and John, even to the magistrates, *si justum est in conspectu Dei, vos potius audire quam Deum, judicate*, or that, WE MUST OBEY GOD RATHER THAN MEN.

Now we do not pretend that God must necessarily give the authority of the spiritual order a human representative; we do not pretend that he could not limit the power of the representative to any degree he judged proper; nor do we doubt his power to unite the spiritual and temporal representatives in one and the same person, as under the patriarchal order, where the patriarch was at once priest and king, or supreme spiritual and supreme temporal ruler at one and the same time. But we do maintain that, if he chooses to distinguish the two powers and give each a separate representative, he must give the supremacy to the representative of the spiritual because otherwise, the representative would not represent the spiritual at all, since the spiritual by its own nature is supreme, and the temporal by its own nature is everywhere and always inferior and subordinate to the spiritual.

Much of the confusion on the subject, as we have heretofore shown, grows out of the shallow philosophy of the gallicanizing Catholics, which confounds the representative with the order represented. The church is not, under the point of view it must be considered in this argument, the spiritual order itself, but its representative; the state represents, but is not itself the temporal order. The pope is not Christ, but his vicar, or as we say his representative. He represents up to a certain point at least, the authority of our Lord, which wherever it is, and by whom-

is alike the policy of Count Cavour and of Mazzini, only the former would have a monarchical, the latter a republican government. Each, however, aims at getting rid of the papal government, and at establishing Italian unity. As a mere statesman, governed by political reasons alone, we should not hesitate for a moment to adopt what is apparently the policy of Count Cavour, and favor the annexation of the whole of Italy to Piedmont, under a constitutional monarchy, if the thing were possible, without a violation of vested rights.

But it has been our purpose in the whole of this article to show that politics cannot be wholly separated from religion, and that the interests of the temporal order cannot be advanced in opposition to those of the spiritual order. The Sardinian government has no more right to annex the papal states, or any portion of them, to Piedmont, without the papal consent, than we have to appropriate our neighbor's purse without his permission, and the pope cannot *give* his consent, unless, in his judgment, the interests of religion and the welfare of souls demand it, which apparently he judges not to be the case. Violence may be used, but violence is always criminal, and against the pope is sacrilegious. There are, no doubt, many Catholics who, for themselves, think the interests of religion would be promoted by the pope's ceasing to be a temporal sovereign, and by his permitting all Italy to become united under Victor Emmanuel, who would, in that case, change his title from king of Sardinia to king of Italy; but the pope is the divinely appointed judge in the case, and his judgment in all spiritual matters must be ours. It has always been the policy of the popes to keep every great power as far from Rome as possible, in order to preserve their spiritual independence and freedom of action in the government of the church and the administration of ecclesiastical affairs. We know from history the position of the pope placed in the immediate neighborhood of a great power. How often have the German emperors interfered with the freedom of election, and pretended to depose and to create popes to suit themselves? Who forgets the terrible evils of the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries, of those in the thirteenth, when Charles of Anjou interposed and forced the election of a French pope, Martin IV., wholly devoted to his interests, and used as his creature? Would we renew those evils? Do we want a new "Sicilian Vespers," and a new "Babylonian

Captivity?" Were Sardinia to gain all Italy, where is the pope to reside? At Rome, to be claimed and treated as a subject of the king? How much better off would he be than when the powerful counts of Tusculum held him a prisoner in his palace, put him to death when he did not comply with their wishes, or placed a boy twelve years old on the papal throne? Looking to the interests of the church, and regarding, as we ought to regard, religious interests as paramount to all others, we cannot view the union of all Italy under a consolidated government as at all desirable, unless the pope himself be its supreme chief.

We are not—waiving the question of right—sorry to see the Duchies annexed to Sardinia, for we do not think it likely to prove injurious to either temporal or spiritual interests, that Sardinia should be strong enough to make her alliance worth counting. Waiving the original sin of Napoleon III. in making an unprovoked and therefore an unjust war on Austria, his error in policy has been in consenting to the union of Romagna to Sardinia. The best practicable policy under the circumstances, alike for the temporal interests of Italy and the spiritual interests of the church, it seems to us, would be to leave the pope in possession of all his estates, Austria in possession of Venetia, and placing the two Sicilies under a Bonapartist prince, and giving all the rest to Sardinia. The pope, Austria, and Sardinia would be strong enough to match France and Naples, and France and Naples would be strong enough to resist Austria and Sardinia, even backed by British influence; and this, we apprehend, will prove in the end the settlement of the Italian question. Sardinia to-day is anti-papal and anti-Austrian, but she is not likely to remain permanently either. France has enabled her to annex Lombardy; British diplomacy has aided her to annex the Duchies and Romagna; but France has taken from her Savoy and Nice, and will resist her further expansion, and she will yet need the alliance of both Austria and the pope to protect her against French ambition on the side of Naples, which, we have no doubt, unless England is prepared to fight for Sicily, will revert to a Murat, and thus become as much an appanage of France as Venetia is of Austria. In that case, Sardinia will restore Romagna to the Holy See, become reconciled with the pope, and resume her position as a Catholic power. Her interest then will unite her to Austria.

The king of Sardinia had incurred the major excommunication, decreed by the canons against all who invade the papal territory, or undertake to despoil the Holy See of any of its possessions, and the pope could do no less than pronounce it. The excommunication, though at present it only exasperates the Piedmontese authorities, will ultimately have its effect. The Piedmontese are neither heretics nor infidels; they are Catholic, and will remain Catholic. It is not in them to be any thing else. But they are Italians; that is to say, they can, without difficulty, be inconsistent with themselves. They can, with a firm Catholic faith under their impulsive nature, say and do an infinity of things in direct hostility to what their faith requires of them, hold the pope to be the vicar of Jesus Christ, and yet insult, abuse, or even assassinate him. If they were Germans, Englishmen, or Americans, we should never expect to find them returning to their obedience, for Englishmen, Americans, and Germans aim to be self-consistent, and when they do not choose to square their practice with their theory, they square their theory with their practice. The government may, for a time, remain under the papal excommunication, but gradually the fact of the excommunication, in spite of the precautions of the government, will become known to the Sardinian clergy and people, and the government will find itself losing the confidence of the nation. In the meantime changes will go on, and new moves on the political chess-board will demand new combinations, and a new ministry will seek to be relieved from ecclesiastical censures. A compromise of some sort will be effected, and peace will be made.

The present condition of parties in Piedmont will not long continue, for after all, under the Piedmont constitution, there is some freedom of thought, some freedom of discussion—publicity, political life. Count Cavour has committed a grand blunder in excluding from the parliament the old conservative party, for he will find a worse enemy in the advanced liberals he has admitted. The radicals are strong, and will give him trouble, and in order to sustain the monarchy and public order against them, he will need the support of the party now excluded. As the liberals or radicals, whose hero is Garibaldi, and whose oracle is Mazzini, become more violent, Cavour will be obliged to become more conservative, and to seek his support in the Catholic instincts and religious convictions of the people. We should

be sorry to find constitutionalism failing in Sardinia. It has made a bad beginning, it is true, for Count Cavour, who is unquestionably one of the ablest ministers of state in Europe, coupled constitutionalism in Sardinia with the creation of Italian unity, and thus brought it into conflict with the papacy, which otherwise would have favored it. We are aware that in Sardinia, as elsewhere, there is a party, respectable alike for its numbers and its social position, opposed to all political innovations, with no confidence in constitutionalism, and sincerely attached to absolutism. The members of this party are attached to the church, and generally contrive to make it appear that it is in her name, or her interest, that they oppose political changes. But Count Cavour should have known that these men are always the friends of the established order, and are precisely those on whom he must rely, not to introduce constitutionalism, but to sustain it, after it has been introduced. Men who love religion, who reverence the church, and who really have a conscience, respect vested rights; and if they oppose innovations, it is not only because they are averse to changes, but because changes and innovations in the established order are seldom attempted without violence to existing rights. Count Cavour might well disregard the *vis inertiæ* of the conservative party, but he went further and offended their sense of justice and religion, and made them active against him. He must, if he wishes to have his memory honored or his work remain, exert himself to repair his blunder, and make it the interest and the duty of that party to give him its support. His great error is in attaching more importance to the national than to the constitutional question, and in aiming to make Italy one, rather than Sardinia really free, prosperous, and happy under the new constitution. He has been more ambitious of governing a large state than a constitutional state. This has been the source of all his crimes, blunders, and sacrilege. It is this that has caused his tergiversations, his falsehoods, diplomatic lies, and his contempt of the laws of nations and the rights of his neighbors; and it is this that will yet, if he does not take care, make his name execrated by his countrymen as long as it remains unforgotten. He might have consolidated the constitutionalism of Carlo Alberto without offending either the pope or Austria, or disturbing the consciences of any portion of the subjects of his king. At present he stands before the world as a great, bad man.

After all, honesty is the best policy. Even in politics a firm adherence to right is the true policy for states and empires, and only such changes and reforms as are in accordance with the rights of individuals and nations are ever really advantageous. Those made against right, against justice, and in defiance of legitimate authority, always carry along with them a curse that more than neutralizes all the good they are able to effect. It is the misfortune of most reformers that they create a false issue before the public, and make themselves enemies where they might have friends, by seeking to introduce their reforms against instead of in accordance with authority. They violate a principle, the maintenance of which is of the last necessity for public order, public freedom, and national prosperity. No doubt there were in the sixteenth century great and crying abuses, though not so great as in some preceding centuries, but by attempting to reform them in defiance of authority, and in violation of vested rights, the reformers only brought a curse on themselves, and created new evils of another sort more fatal than those they sought to redress. This will always be the case, for there is a moral governor of the universe, who always sooner or later avenges his outraged laws. Aside from the papal government and the Austrian in the hereditary states, we cannot point to a single continental government in Europe whose title has been honestly acquired or maintained without violence or iniquity. Hence in no state has the government the affection of its subjects, or can sustain itself except by force of arms. The penalty of the original sin is visited upon them, and the transgressions of the fathers descend upon the children to the third and fourth generation. The whole history of the world proves that no nation can forsake God, or what is the same thing, violate right, trample on justice, and practise iniquity, with impunity.

We do not see how any Catholic can have any opinion with regard to the papal states except that expressed by the pope himself. We do not feel ourselves bound by all the arguments or reasonings we find in many of the recent pastorals of the bishops, whether at home or abroad. We cannot believe it necessary to maintain when defending Catholicity from all responsibility as to the alleged abuses of the temporal government of the pope, that the pope as temporal sovereign is the same to us as any other sovereign, and when the question is as to supporting that government against

those who would secularize it, to maintain that it is indispensable to the spiritual independence of the head of the church, and therefore to the very existence of the Catholic religion. That the temporal government of the pope serves the interests of religion we are bound to believe, because the Holy Father who is the judge has so declared, but that the church would fail, or the pope be unable to discharge his functions as vicar of Christ, were he to cease to be a temporal prince, we do not believe. Our Lord founded his church on Peter, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. Our trouble is not there. The pope can maintain his spiritual independence in some way; if in no other, by taking refuge again in the catacombs, or by suffering martyrdom, as did his predecessors for over three hundred years, from St. Peter downward to St. Sylvester. The renewal of the martyr ages would, perhaps, not be very injurious to the church or the salvation of souls. The church has lost ground by being too much mixed up with a worldly policy, by her children relying too much on the friendship of princes and states, and not depending enough on the naked truth to sustain them.

But we fear for those who wish to secularize the papal states, and to carry out what they regard as a wise and profound policy without regard to right or justice. Nothing is better settled than that we may not do evil that good may come. Were we fully convinced of the desirableness of Count Cavour's policy in itself considered, we should still condemn the course he and his master Victor Emmanuel have taken, because it is a course they have neither a moral nor a political right to take. No man has the moral right to seek even a good end by immoral means, or to promote the interests of his own country at the expense of the rights of another. It is not so much the simple annexation of Romagna by Victor Emmanuel to his own dominions without the consent of the pope, as it is the violation of right, and the sacrilege involved, that is the evil. If the annexation had been made with the free concurrence of the supreme pontiff, we should have had nothing to say. We hold that a scrupulous respect for international right is of the highest interest to all sovereigns, to the strong as well as to the weak, for the strong to-day may be the weak to-morrow. The violation of the rights of the Holy See by Victor Emmanuel is a blow struck at the sacredness of his own, and already has France made him feel it in compelling him to cede to

her Savoy and Nice. If he respects not the rights of others, how can he expect others to respect his? Iniquity propagates itself. When Austria recovers from her temporary embarrassment, and France, perhaps, is engaged in a death-struggle with Great Britain, or is embarrassed by an imbecile regency, what is to prevent the Austrian army not only from restoring the grand dukes, but from re-annexing Piedmont to Lombardy, and reëstablishing the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom? The *plébiscite* relied on is a two-edged sword, and may take away to-morrow what it gives to-day. If the people either of their own motion or as stirred up by foreign emissaries have the right to withdraw themselves from their legitimate sovereign and give themselves to another, and that other his enemy, which would in old times have been called rebellion and treason, what guaranty has Victor Emmanuel that his old or his new subjects will obey him any longer than it suits their capriee? No crown is safe, no throne is secure, and all established order, all legitimate government becomes impracticable, if the new doctrine of imperial France and Sardinia is to prevail. It is democracy in its worst form, in its bad, without its good.

Here is the terrible evil of the recent acts of the Sardinian government, sanctioned or acquiesced in by his most serene majesty, the emperor of the French. In them a blow is struck at all government, and therefore at society itself, for society is impossible without government. The cause of the pope is the cause of all sovereigns, of all legitimate government, whether monarchical or republican, of society, of the human race; and we regret that we are too old to bind on a knapsack, shoulder a musket, and march to his defence as a soldier under the brave Lamoricière. All Greece armed to avenge on Paris the rape of Helen; all the Catholic world should arm to avenge the rape of Æmilia, and vindicate the cause of political justice. We see now what the world has lost by the changes which have rendered impracticable the exercise of the inherent supremacy of the papacy over temporal sovereigns, that while the judicial power remains, the executive power is crippled. The present is precisely one of those cases when the vicar of our Lord has need to intervene with the full spiritual authority to vindicate outraged humanity, and the laws of God set at naught. It is because such cases as the present are constantly occurring, when the last refuge of violated truth, and justice, and humanity, is the papacy, that we have felt it not inopportune,

nor unnecessary to recall to the minds of the faithful, the supremacy of the spiritual order, and therefore of the pope as its representative on earth. It has been the forgetfulness of that supremacy that has emboldened professedly Catholic sovereigns to despoil the Holy See, and to defy the censures of the church. Gallicanism and Gosselinism have prepared the way for what we see, and made even some Catholics doubt the propriety of excommunicating a king, especially a king who pretends to head the movement for political freedom and national independence. It would without asserting the power we have claimed for the pope be difficult to justify the excommunication of Victor Emmanuel and his counsellors, aiders, and abettors. It is because we hold the pope has that power from God, that we approve the spiritual censures with which he brands the despoilers of the Holy See.

However, it is not for us *componere lites* between Catholics, any more than it is to foretell what is to be the final solution of the present Italian and Roman questions. We place ourselves on the side of the pope and assert, as in duty bound, the supremacy of the spiritual order; we defend the excommunication, and we do so in the interest alike of religion and politics, and without abating in the least our confidence in constitutionalism, or our sympathy with the Sardinian movement, so far as it is a movement in favor of constitutional government, or abandoning our hopes for the brave Piedmontese, who are now suffering for the faults of their rulers. We go as far as the Holy Father goes, but no further. We condemn the stirring up by Sardinian agents of the revolution in Romagna, and the annexation of that portion of the States of the Church to Sardinia, but we do not condemn the constitution given to his kingdom by Carlo Alberto, or feel that we are called upon to swing round to the side of despotism, or to seek to reëstablish Austrian prepotence in the Italian peninsula. We trust Victor Emmanuel, who, though not much of a man, if what we hear be true, is yet a Catholic in his faith, will return to his senses, learn that he can do all the good to his subjects that he is prepared to do, without incurring any ecclesiastical censure, and make up his mind to be reconciled to the church. The pope has spoken, but we do not think it our duty to throw in our impertinent voice to aid in making the breach wider than it is. No Catholic can defend the king, no Catholic should wish to do it, but we should all pray for peace between him and the Holy Father.

RIGHTS OF THE TEMPORAL.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1860.]

We presume few of our readers have neglected to read Tom Brown's *School Days at Rugby*, and that few who have read it have failed to admire it, or to be amused and instructed by it. It is, perhaps, a little Carlylish, though hardly perceptibly so, and we confess we like it hugely, and would warmly commend it if the public had not already anticipated us. The book gives, we are assured, an admirable and faithful account of the spirit and character of the famous English school at Rugby, under the head-mastership of the celebrated Dr. Arnold, saving that he was a Protestant, one of the most successful educators of modern times, and perhaps of any time; and our purpose is to make some few remarks *apropos* of the article on *Dr. Arnold and Catholic Education*, contributed to the *Review* for July last, and on some criticisms it has called forth. The article, as far as it went, coincided in substance with our own views, which may be found in *Conversation X.* of *Conversations of Our Club*,† and that offence has been taken at some of its expressions, or that it has been made the occasion for the usually quarterly onslaught upon ourselves, has not surprised us in the least.

There are persons, very excellent persons too, placed in positions of trust and influence, who think a Catholic publicist should resolutely defend every thing called Catholic, and especially every thing said, done, or approved by spiritual persons, direct all his attacks against outside barbarians, and studiously avoid agitating any question on which Catholics differ among themselves, or which may lead to discussions offensive or disagreeable to any portion of the Catholic community. But a good general spends usually much time in collecting and disciplining his troops and preparing their appointments before taking the field against the enemy; and he who wishes to conduct a successful campaign, must also take precautions that when he has

**School Days at Rugby.* By An Old Boy. Ninth edition. Boston: 1859.

†Vol. XI., pp. 410—431.

taken the field he be not exposed to a fire from his friends in the rear as well as from the enemy in front.

The evils which from time to time befall the church, and often so great and so deplorable, are in most cases, if not in all, far more attributable to the faults, errors, and blunders of Catholics themselves, than to the craftiness or wickedness of non-Catholics. If we Catholics always understood and observed our religion, were really enlightened and virtuous, the enemy would have no power against us; heresies and schisms could never obtain; and the whole world would acknowledge in a short time the truth and beauty of our religion. But baptism does not take away concupiscence, grace does not change the laws of human nature, and though members of a holy and infallible church, we are liable to all the infirmities of the flesh. We have our human side, our human passions, propensities, and appetites, and may become slaves of ignorance and vice, and even superstition. It may happen that the more luxuriant our faith, the ranker the growth of the weeds of superstition that infest it, while the fear of scandalizing the weak may prevent the pastor from taking effective measures for uprooting them. Superstition and error may be transmitted from parents to children, as well as religion and faith. The pastor himself, but poorly instructed in his theology, as is sometimes the case, may fail now and then to distinguish between the true and the false tradition, and mistake the traditions of Catholics, when traditions of his own countrymen, in which he himself has grown up, for Catholic tradition itself. He may also, misapplying the admonition of our Lord, in the parable of the wheat and the tares, "let both grow together," really fear to distinguish suddenly and sharply between them, lest he shake or weaken faith in the true tradition, and occasion the ruin of precious souls committed to his care. Moreover, pastors are men, and they may think certain superstitions with which they have been familiar from childhood, and which they have seen in a venerated father or an honored mother, although they know them to be superstitions, are harmless, perhaps poetical, the exuberant foliage of a believing soul, and really have no tendency to obscure faith, or to smother devotion.

Protestants accuse our church of overlaying faith with a mass of errors, and smothering true piety with a multitude of superstitious practices and observances. The charge is false; but if brought against portions of a Catholic popula-

tion, and not against the church, it would be not absolutely unfounded. We have many devotions perfectly true, holy, and useful, in the sense in which they have been proposed; but which individuals may abuse and render superstitious in practice. All these devotions are fitted and intended to impress upon the mind and heart the great mysteries of our faith, and to quicken our love and gratitude to him who hath died to redeem us. Thus we wear the scapular or a miraculous medal, or make a pilgrimage to La Salette in honor of our Lady, and so far as these things remind us of the mystery of the Incarnation, render our faith in that great mystery more lively, our devotion to God more fervent, our love to our neighbor more ardent, and our resolution to imitate the supernatural virtues of our Lady herself firmer, they are good, and serve admirably the purposes of the Christian life; but if supposed to be sacraments, to have some virtue in themselves, independent of the disposition of him who observes them, they become in those who so suppose, simple superstitious practices. To suppose that the simple wearing of the scapular of our Lady, even if one should die with it on, is of itself a sure guaranty against eternal punishment, is mere superstition, and not a harmless superstition either. The scapular is not a charm, and the benefits promised to the wearer are secured only by his faith and piety, his earnest devotions, or his observing certain prescribed conditions, and he who observes those conditions will be saved, without wearing it, though he may be detained longer in purgatory. There is no way of getting to heaven without true faith and intrinsic justice. Extreme unction even avails nothing to one who is in mortal sin, or not in a state of grace.

There can be no doubt in the mind of him who goes among the people, that there are many devotions and observances intended to be helps to faith and piety, and are so when observed in the sense and spirit of the church, which practically are sometimes taken as substitutes for genuine virtue, and which by being abused tend to smother true devotion, and to prevent the growth of a robust and manly piety. The superstition their abuse generates is no doubt far less, a thousand, a million times less to be deprecated, than the sneering unbelief, the cold-hearted irreligion, and the *satanic* superstitions so rife among non-Catholics, but it is, nevertheless, hurtful to the soul, enervates the mind and heart, and is in the way of that instruction and

that moral elevation of the people, which the earnest Catholic pastor always labors for. Too many external applications and stimulants, as the best masters of spiritual life assure us, enfeeble the frame, and a multitude of external helps to devotion, if necessary, both indicate that the internal life of faith has become weak and tend to keep it so, and really have an influence in preventing the faithful from becoming strong, from rising to the dignity and robustness of "men in understanding," as the apostle exhorts us to be. It is an evil day when the faithful, save in simplicity and docility of heart, and innocence of life, are mere children, and need to be kept in swathing clothes, and fed on pap.

It cannot well be doubted that in our times, faith with many is weak, and devotion pale and sickly. So many medicines as are made use of would not be needed, if the faithful were in sound health and full strength. We see it in our devotional literature for the people, when compared with that which has come down to us from earlier and manlier ages. In scarcely one of our popular and devotional works of modern date, will you find a moderate space devoted to thoughtful and *direct* devotion to God. Indirect and external devotions predominate over the internal and the direct. We do the little and half-mechanical things, and shrink from the greater and more intellectual. We fall into the condition of those who "pay tithes of anise, cummin, and mint, and pass over justice, and judgment, and the weightier matters of the law," forgetful that "these we should have done, and not have left the other undone." The modern bureaucratic system which predominates in all Catholic countries and affects even the church in her administration, the stringent means adopted to guard the faithful against the heresies and schisms which everywhere surround us, and the non-Catholic tendencies so strong in all the world, operate in emasculating our devotion, in suppressing individual freedom, in hindering the development of thought and the growth of intelligence, and result in preventing the formation of true manliness of character. We become timid, weak, and imbecile; we lack energy and courage, we lack self-reliance and feel that we cannot move without the assistance of a dry-nurse. We have the characteristics of a conquered people, a people who once held and exercised the empire of the world, but are now reduced to slavery, and what is worst of all, are becoming resigned to their condition. Those who are not,

and feel they cannot be resigned, those who feel that they are not made to be slaves, and that they have the right to be free, and the energy to assert their freedom, escape from what they regard as slavery by leaving their religion behind, and affiliating themselves to the enemies of their church.

The Catholic publicist who has a moderate share of intelligence, and who loves his church, and burns to recover for her the position she has lost through the folly and wickedness of her own children, sees and deplores this sad state of things, and feels it his duty to direct the attention of the Catholic public to it, and that, too, although he well knows the application of the remedy belongs to the spiritual chiefs of the faithful, not to him, or to the laity. Yet the moment he does this there is a breach of sympathy between him and a portion of the Catholic population he addresses. "We believe and do as our fathers did," say they, "and they were wise and good men in their day, are, we trust, now with our Lord in paradise, and who is this that comes forward with his rebukes and reproofs, with his clamors for reform, as if he monopolized all the wisdom and virtue of his age? Is he wiser or more virtuous than our venerable and illustrious hierarchy? Down with the impudent and intermeddling wretch!" What can he say in his own defence against this *argumentum ad verecundiam*, especially if he be a man of some natural modesty, and not absolutely destitute of Christian humility? If he persevere, though every word he says is true, and the word needed to be spoken, and to be spoken at the moment he speaks it, it is not in the nature of things that he should not give offence, or rather that offence should not be taken, and taken in quarters where he looks for sympathy and support. What shall he do? Shall he desist and reconcile himself to the general apathy in which it appears to him so large a portion of his brethren are sunk. Shall he fold his hands and remain silent and inactive, consoling himself with the somewhat fatalistic reflection, "it is God's work, and he will take care of it; none of the elect will be lost, and I need not trouble my head about it?"

We are not so far gone as to pretend that the fact that one gives offence, or says or does things at which good and pious men take offence, proves that he is in the way of his duty and doing God's work; but we do maintain that the simple fact that offence is taken at what one says

or does, is not of itself conclusive proof, or any proof at all, that he is wrong, or not in the discharge of his duty as a Catholic publicist; and if we did not so maintain, we should be obliged to accept conclusions from which every Catholic recoils with horror. Did not the Athenians condemn Socrates, the wisest of their sons, to drink hemlock? and did not the Jews take offence at One between whom and Socrates, or any other mortal man, no comparison can be instituted without irreverence, if without blasphemy, get enraged at the words of him "who spake as never man spake," and finally crucify him between two thieves? At what is more offence taken than at our holy church, the immaculate spouse of God, who is all beautiful? Was there ever a saint, engaged in active duties, and dealing with the world in his own times, the ignorance, the vices, the crimes, the sins he found amongst Catholics, at whose words and deeds, even good men, priests, bishops, and cardinals, did not for a time take more or less offence? Has not our Lord himself said, "Woe unto you when all men speak well of you?" The church here is the church militant, and every child of the church must be always an armed soldier, doing battle somewhere, and against some enemy. How, then, from the simple fact that offence is given, conclude that he who gives it is in the wrong, rather than they who take it? A time may come when they shall "look upon him whom they have crucified and mourn."

The *argumentum ad verecundiam* is seldom a fair or generous argument. The Catholic publicist does not assume the invidious attitude supposed. He does not set himself up as wiser than all his contemporaries or predecessors. He does not assume to be wiser or better than his spiritual chiefs; for he only calls public attention to evils which they see and deplore as well as he, and he discusses them not with a view of deciding questions which it is their province to decide. He usurps none of the functions of the court; he only occupies the position and discharges the duties of the advocate. The advocate does not by acting as an advocate assume to be wiser than the court. He presents and defends his client's cause, according to the best of his ability, and then leaves the decision to the court and jury. So the Catholic publicist. He does not go out of his sphere; he, as well as the court and jury, or the judges, is a Catholic, may feel as deep an interest as they in the

maintenance of Catholic faith and the promotion of Catholic virtue, or the prosperity of the Catholic cause in his own country and throughout the world; he may even have thought as long and as earnestly and with as much intelligence and virtue as they on the hindrances to that prosperity, and on the best means of promoting it, and he does but offer the results of his reflections and experience for what they are worth, without pretending that the ultimate decision or application rests with him, or with the laity.

Indeed, we cannot accept the assumption which, not the clergy but some laymen in their name make, that laymen, in matters of religion, can neither know nor say any thing, that they are, wherever the interests of religion are involved, to be counted as interlopers or nullities. The church in the broad sense we now regard her includes the laity as well as the clergy. The clergy and laity make but one church, and are all equally members of Christ's mystic body. To the clergy God has given a distinct mission in his church, given them for the discharge of this mission, certain rights and duties, with which the laity have no right to interfere; but this does not imply that the laity are a nullity, and that God has left them nothing to do but passively to submit to what they are told. They also have rights and duties; they have the right to be instructed, to be taught their faith and duty by the clergy, and to do any thing for the interests of religion as taught them by the clergy, they are able to do, or which can be done without Orders, and which no canon of the church enacted, promulgated, and not fallen into desuetude, forbids. They are not judges of faith; they cannot teach by authority; they cannot make canons for the government or discipline of the church, or the regulation and performance of the service of the sanctuary; they cannot administer the sacraments, unless it be baptism in case of necessity, and in one sense marriage; but we know nothing else proper to be done that they may not do, and which they are not, according to their means, ability, learning, condition in life, under as much obligation to do as the clergy. No doubt they must work under their spiritual chiefs, but that is not saying that they may not work at all, or that it is not lawful for them to work with intelligence of their own, and with free will, as free moral agents. We know no law of the church which exempts us, as laymen, from our obligation to labor for the

promotion of the interests of religion; that imposes on the clergy alone the duty of loving our neighbor and seeking his salvation; or by which we can discharge our moral and religious duties vicariously.

In our age, when education and intelligence are not confined to the clergy, and are often possessed in as eminent a degree by the laity as by them, when the most notable defences of Catholic history have been made by laymen, sometimes even by non-Catholics, and when the controversy between us and our enemies is removed from the sphere of theology, and made, in the main, a lay question, to be decided by the reason common to all men, rather than by authority, the fullest liberty must be given to laymen, compatible with the supremacy of the spiritual order and the discipline of the church. In our own country, if we mean religion shall prosper, the church take root and flourish in the land, we must leave laymen free to do all that laymen can do, and we must exact of the clergy, few in numbers, too few for our wants, only those labors which none but clergymen can perform. The laity not having hitherto been trained to do all that laymen may do, will at first, no doubt, commit many blunders, assume, if you will, important and even ridiculous airs, and abuse their trusts. Such things must be expected, and the clergy, they will permit us to say, instead of excluding them, or narrowing their sphere of action, will bear with them, and labor to educate them for the new position in which the inevitable tendencies and exigencies of things in our modern world require them to be placed.

The modern world is to a great extent laic, and if the laity are not frankly recognized, and freely permitted to do whatever laymen can do, we shall find that they will undertake,—the rise and continuance of Protestantism prove it,—to do more than they have any right to do, and will usurp the special functions of the clergy themselves. There is not now the distinction in education and intelligence between the clergy and the laity which formerly existed. The political order also has undergone great changes, and the people no longer remain a distinct body, without education, without intelligence, without political rights, governed or despoiled, but counting for nothing in the government. They now, even in states not republican in name, are, if not the governing power itself, held to be the origin and basis of that power. The whole population of the country are now directly or indirectly taken up into the

governing class, or the political society, and stand now in relation to the spiritual order in the position which has usually been occupied by sovereign princes and nobles. This new state of things renders obsolete or impracticable many old arrangements and methods, and makes the adoption of new arrangements and methods necessary and indispensable. We cannot now treat the mass of the laity as nobodies in the social world, as without rights or powers, as a nullity in government, and as permitted no thought or intelligence but to do as they are bid by their chiefs, spiritual or temporal. The whole theory of ecclesiastical training, aside from what pertains to faith and universal discipline, has to be modified so as to permit every layman to be treated, in principle, very much as temporal princes professing the Catholic religion have heretofore been treated. The policy imposed upon the clergy under this new state of things is not to exclude the laity from doing any thing a layman by the constitution of the church may do, which, if desirable, is no longer practicable; but to labor to educate and enlighten the laity, the people, the new sovereigns, for their new duties, and to fit them to perform their new duties without encroaching on the prerogatives of the spiritual society.

We go as far as man does or can go, in asserting the rights and prerogatives of the spiritual society as representing the spiritual order, indeed, it has been a grave charge against us that we go too far; but the supremacy of the spiritual order, as we understand it, does not absorb the state in the church, or deprive the temporal of its autonomy in its own order. We are not pantheists. The church is supreme in spirituals, and as the spiritual is supreme, she must have the right to define her own rights and powers, and, consequently, the rights and powers of the temporal. We do not admit that the state has the right to say to the church: "Thus far, but no further." This language can only be used by the church to the state, and therefore we say, the temporal has no rights against the spiritual. We take the rights and powers of the temporal order as defined by the church, and by so doing, we recognize and assert her full supremacy. But within the limits of her definition,—a definition, by the way, long since made and settled, not a definition that remains to be made, —we maintain the autonomy of the temporal order, whether represented by the monarch, the nobility, or the people, or,

in a word, the autonomy of lay society. We recognize and assert the supremacy of the church as the representative of the spiritual order or divine government on earth; but this does not say, and must not be understood to say, that we recognize and assert the supremacy of spiritual persons, or the divine right of spiritual persons, no matter of what rank or dignity, to govern us in all things. The government of the church is not a government of arbitrary will, but a government of law. The church has true legislative power, not in matters of faith or morals indeed, but in matters of government or discipline, and the canons enacted and promulgated by councils approved by the sovereign pontiff, and edicts formally published by the pope, are for us laws which we are bound to obey, but they must be promulgated and known to us before they can bind us in conscience. They must come to us in the form and with the solemnities of law, not as the arbitrary will or caprice of a spiritual person. The law defines the rights and powers of my bishop or my pastor to govern me, and it is only so long as he keeps within the law, and commands me according to and by virtue of the canons of the church, that I am bound to obey him.

The Catholic lay society is not a monastery, and cannot be governed on the monastic principle of obedience. In the religious life, the postulant, when admitted to his vows, voluntarily pledges himself to be governed by the will of his superior, for he seeks to obtain the merit of the virtue of obedience itself. But in Catholic lay society, we are not, except in the case of children, and the very weak and ignorant, held to this sort of obedience, which is of counsel, not of law; and we have the right to demand and to receive a good and sufficient reason for the order that is given us. Such is the will of the superior, is not a sufficient reason. The reason must be, Such is the law, which the bishop or priest is appointed by the Holy Ghost to administer. We are held to obey not man, but God, the law, not the person, and hence it is, that obedience is not servile, or incompatible with just self-respect and true manly dignity, and the government of the church is in accordance with the truest freedom,—a government of law, therefore a moral government, not a government of mere will or brute force. To forget this, to regard every spiritual person as the superior of a convent, or to attempt to govern general Catholic society on the monastic principle of obedience, to which

those not under vows are not bound, would only lead to a practical spiritual despotism as repugnant to spiritual welfare as to secular freedom. It is the erroneous supposition that the supremacy of the spiritual society which we so energetically assert, necessarily involves the supremacy of all spiritual persons in all things, and makes all they do or say, no matter in what order, or in relation to what subject, sacred and privileged, that has led many good Catholics to accuse us of going too far, and to assert against us the independence of the temporal even in face of the spiritual. They see very clearly, that if it logically or practically involved that consequence, it would leave to secular society no autonomy, to secular persons no freedom of thought or action, and render the church so odious, that few except women and children, would practically adhere to her.

Moreover, the supremacy of the church, as we understand it, is supremacy in spirituals and in temporals only in relation to spiritual ends, as was explained in our article on *The Papal Power*. The point of difference between us and our friends of the Gallican school, is not that we extend the authority of the church to an order from which they exclude her, but that we hold that she defines by divine right what things are spiritual and what things are temporal, and thus defines her own rights and powers and those of secular society. Within what *she defines* to be temporals, we, as well as they, hold the secular to be independent. In these, spiritual persons, as such, have no authority and can take no part in them by virtue of their spirituality. Cardinal Ximenes, in his acts as regent of Spain, was simply a secular person. So the pope himself as temporal sovereign of Rome, is not a spiritual person, for he holds not that sovereignty by virtue of his spirituality. He holds it simply as a secular right acquired by the Holy See, and therefore held subject to all the conditions of temporal sovereignty in general. If it be objected that this sovereignty is treated as a temporality of the church, and the attempt to rob her of it punished as sacrilege, it may be answered, that the canons cover not only the divine rights and powers of the church, but also those she acquires by the *jus publicum* of the time, and by the concessions of secular society, or by mutual arrangement between the two powers. Constantine, after his conversion, made the bishops, each in his own city or diocese, a sort of

civil magistrate, and gave them, for Catholics, exclusive jurisdiction in certain mixed questions, that is, questions partly temporal and partly spiritual. The canons everywhere proceed very properly on the assumption that this exclusive jurisdiction is her right; but we are not thence to conclude that it is a right inherent in her divine constitution, otherwise we should have grave difficulties with modern concordats. We have always supposed the church, as the church, claims ny divine right authority only in the spirituality and in temporalities only so far as is necessary to save the spirituality. We have treated the temporal sovereignty of the Holy See as a temporality of the church, as church property, because we supposed it so treated by the cabons still in force; but we have never contended that the canons in this respect cover only the divine rights of the Holy See. Though we do not accept M. Gosselin's doctrine throughout, there is much in canon law that we cannot explain, if we in all cases and in all respects reject it. The special sacredness and privilege with which the sovereign pontiff, as temporal sovereign, is clothed, we have never held proceeded from the original and inherent rights of the Holy See, for we have always maintained that, as temporal sovereign, he stands on the same footing with all legitimate temporal sovereigns, that his temporal sovereignty is a proper temporal sovereignty, not a spiritual sovereignty, or altered in its character by the fact that he holds also the spiritual sovereignty of the church.

But as we are discussing the rights of the temporal order, therefore of the lay society, we must not overlook the fact that the Roman people, although they may have no rights in face of the pope as respresentative of the spiritual order, yet have rights in face of their temporal sovereign. Sovereignty at the time the popes first became temporal sovereigns, and all down through the middle ages, was indeed treated by the *jus publicum* as property, and as transferable from one proprietor to another in like manner as any other species of property; but the people themselves were not regarded or treated as property, and did not pass under the absolute dominion of the new sovereign. They retained, as a matter of course, all the inalienable rights of man, or rights recognized by the *jus gentium*, and they were also held to retain all their municipal and vested rights, and the right to be governed according to their ancient laws, customs, and usages, unalterable without their consent, or the

consent of the estates of the kingdom, duchy, principality, or county transferred. The Holy See received the sovereignty of the Roman or ecclesiastical states subject to this reservation, and therefore, though vested with the absolute right of sovereignty, she was not vested with absolute sovereignty or unlimited governing power, what in our times is called absolutism. Her sovereignty, like all sovereignty of the times, was a limited sovereignty. She then must be regarded as holding her temporal sovereignty subject to these limitations and reservations in favor of the subject. Under the *jus publicum* according to which these states were acquired and held, the people had the right, subject to certain limitations indeed, if their liege lord violated their rights, disregarded their ancient laws, customs, and usages without their consent, and governed them in an arbitrary and absolute manner, to renounce his allegiance and to choose another liege lord. This right was as perfect in the Roman states as in any other.

Do the Roman people still retain this right? They undoubtedly retain it, if right it be, in the same sense and to the same extent that they would in case their sovereign were a layman and not sovereign pontiff. The right of a people in extreme cases to depose their sovereign and elect a new one, is almost universally asserted, and never to our knowledge denied by the church. We have always asserted the right, but have maintained that its exercise by a Catholic people is subjected to the judgment of the sovereign pontiff, since it involves the spiritual question, whether the oath of allegiance has or has not ceased to bind, of which he is the divinely-appointed judge. Hence we hold that the sovereign must be deposed and his subjects absolved from their allegiance by a judicial sentence of the pope, before they can lawfully proceed to the election of a new sovereign. But here is a grave difficulty in the question between the Roman people and their sovereigns, because the two powers are united in the same person, and the judge is a party in the case. Either our doctrine is wrong, and then the Roman people are free without the pontifical judgment, or our Lord did not, in commissioning his vicar, make provision for his being a temporal sovereign. The pope, in his allocutions and encyclicals on the subject, appears to have pronounced in favor of the sovereign against his subjects. Has he pronounced judgment only in his capacity as temporal sovereign, or in his capacity as sovereign pon-

tiff? If the former, he has only judged in his own cause, and what right has he to judge in his own cause, that the people have not to judge in theirs? If the latter, what surety is there that his judgment is free from bias, and that he has not used his spirituality to sustain his temporality, since the judgment is in a case where we can claim neither for him nor for the church the infallible assistance of the Holy Ghost? Are the Roman people to be deprived of the exercise of rights which the church recognizes or does not condemn in other people, because their sovereign is supreme pontiff?

It is true, the Holy Father and a very large number of bishops have asserted that the maintenance of the temporal sovereignty of the pope is necessary to the maintenance of his freedom and independence in the spiritual government of the church; but we cannot take this absolutely, because the popes had no temporal sovereignty till 752, and have been temporal sovereigns, only in name and *status*, no inconsiderable portion of the time since, and because, if taken absolutely, it would make his title a spiritual title, held by virtue of his spirituality which we believe is not pretended. As between the sovereign of Rome and other sovereigns, the question is clear enough, and the reason alleged by the pope and bishops, if true, and of that they are better judges than we, is a valid reason. We believe the temporal sovereignty is at least a very great convenience, and its abolition would, for a long time at any rate, be a very great inconvenience, in the administration of spiritual affairs. So it would be a very great convenience to our prelates, and of very great service to religion in this country, if they had larger revenues at their command, but we have never understood that the church claims by virtue of her divine constitution, the right to take property without the consent of its owner. One thing is certain our Lord did not give the temporal government of this world to the sacerdocy. He separated the two powers, and gave to each its own representative. We cannot, then, it seems to us, insist in the name or interests of religion, that the Roman people are bound to submit against their will to a sacerdotal government in temporals. Why shall they be so bound any more than the French, the Austrians, the English, or the Americans? Why may not the separation of the two powers be pleaded at Rome as well as elsewhere?

If we consult history, we shall find that the Roman gov-

ernment was till recently hardly a sacerdotal government at all, except in name. Till down almost to the last century, the effective government of the papal states was in the hands of laymen, municipalities, corporations, and feudal lords. It is only at a comparatively recent date that the old intermediate powers between the sovereign and subject have been swept away, and the pope has governed as an immediate and absolute sovereign by his ministers and legates. The change is important, affecting the whole character of the papal government, and if it has been effected without the consent of the Roman people, how can we argue that they are bound in conscience to submit to it against their will? The rights of every temporal sovereign are sacred; are the rights of the people less sacred? Are the people for the sovereign, or is the sovereign for the people?

We confess, moreover, that as Catholic publicists, we should find it embarrassing to defend our church against the charge of hostility to free government and republican institutions, so vehemently urged by our enemies, if we were obliged, on our faith and duty as Catholics, to defend absolutism at Rome, as we should be, if obliged to defend the papal temporal government as essential to the freedom and independence of the pontiff. "If your church opposes despotism, why does she sustain absolutism in the immediate temporal government of her spiritual chief? If she favors free institutions, why does she not introduce them at Rome, where the supreme spiritual power and the supreme temporal power are both in her hands? How can she be compatible with republican institutions, when the maintenance of absolutism is essential to the independence and freedom of her spiritual administration?" These are not easy questions for the Catholic publicist to answer, unless he is free to treat the papal temporal government precisely as he is free to treat any other temporal government. Our present Holy Father seems to have been aware of the embarrassment absolutism at Rome creates for Catholics elsewhere in this age of the world, when liberty is the watchword, and immediately on his accession to the pontifical throne, he took measures to give his subjects a constitution, and to reign as a constitutional monarch; but failed, as every pope probably would fail in such undertaking, because his subjects are not a complete people or nation in themselves, but a small portion of a vastly larger people, of a great nation,

to which they are bound by the strong ties of language and race, interests and feelings, and in whose movements they cannot but sympathize and wish to take part. He failed because he felt himself obliged to keep his own movements confined to his own states, and distinct from the national movements for the resurrection and autonomy of Italy; because his own subjects felt themselves more strongly attached to the national cause than to their own temporal sovereign, and felt more deeply as Italians than as subjects of the sovereign of Rome. To be able to reign as a constitutional and independent prince, the pope would need to be the sovereign of all Italy, with the whole Italian nation placed under him, to which neither the Italians nor the great powers of Europe, least of all himself, would ever consent. Our readers know well our views. We did not side with the pope in his constitutional movements, because we foresaw they must fail; we do not defend, and never have defended the temporal sovereignty on the ground of its necessity to the spiritual government of the church; but we are with the pope heart and soul in the question between him and foreign powers and influences, because he seems to us to be the representative, and the only remaining representative among sovereigns, of vested rights and the inviolability of independent states.

But we will not deny that we sympathize with the Italian nation, and we cannot find it in our heart to denounce the temporal subjects of the pope in the terms so often used by some of our friends, who in their situation might do as they do, or somewhat worse. We do not believe the law of God, or the interests of religion are opposed to the resurrection and autonomy of Italy, or doom the temporal subjects of the pope to hopeless slavery or perpetual nonage. We know that every one despoiling, or aiding and abetting in despoiling the pope of his temporal dominions, incurs the greater excommunication, and therefore we have opposed the war of Napoleon against Austria, the annexation of the duchies and Æmilia to the kingdom of Sardinia, and the filibuster operations of Garibaldi in Sicily and Naples, yet we dare not be too hard upon the Roman people themselves. They want what they have not, a career, political life and activity, to live and develop themselves as a nation with a central life of its own. This they believe is not possible without political as well as national union with the rest of Italy, and the temporal resurrection and autonomy of the

whole peninsula under a single political and civil organization,—precisely in principle what is craved for Ireland by the great body of Irish Catholics, and we have yet to learn that what is right, noble, patriotic in Ireland can be the contrary at Rome. Say what we will, the centre of Italian political life and nationality at present, is Turin. Turin today is as much the political as Rome is the religious capital of Italy. They who wish to see Italy resuscitated, and taking her rank as a great power in the European system, see no way of realizing their wishes but by turning to Sardinia and enrolling themselves under her banner. The pope's hands are tied; nothing is to be hoped from the prepotence of Austria, the intervention of France, the imbecility of Naples, or the destructive doctrines of the Mazzinians. As things are and are likely to be for some time to come, we can see no hope for the Italian cause but in Sardinia, and the only real obstacle to that cause is the temporal sovereignty over a small Italian state of the Holy See. Every Italian patriot believes this, and however attached he may be to the pontiff, he feels his wrath burn against the sovereign. But for the fact that the Roman sovereign is also pontiff, and the alleged necessity or utility of the pope's temporal sovereignty to the exercise of his spiritual authority, Catholics very generally, without approving all her particular acts, many of which are deeply censurable, would sympathize with Sardinia in her movement for the union of all Italy under a constitutional government, and justify the Italian people in endeavoring to sustain her. We should not, then, it seems to us, condemn them without measure.

No sane man can wish things in Italy to remain as they are, or for a long time have been. Say what we will, the great body of the subjects of the sovereign of Rome, are deeply dissatisfied with his temporal government, and they who best know them doubt if left to their loyalty, the pope could sustain his temporal throne for twenty-four hours. It is impossible to explain their disaffection by the influence of foreign emissaries, secret societies, or British gold; for these things can effect little with a loyal and contented people. The papal temporal subjects are not hostile to the pontiff, for after all they are Catholics, or if hostile now and then to the pontiff, it is only because they think he abuses his spiritual authority to uphold his temporal sovereignty; they are not hostile even to their temporal sovereign, because he overburdens them with taxes,

because his administration is harsh, cruel, tyrannical, as so many anti-Catholic scribblers pretend, and in the ordinary sense, oppressive, but chiefly because it is not, and extending over only a few provinces of Italy, cannot be, an Italian national government, and because under it, it is impossible for them to unite with the rest of their countrymen in resuscitating the Italian nation, and combining the whole Italian people in a single free and independent state. Italy has been sneeringly called a "geopraphical expression," but in these days of great centralized states like France, Austria, Russia, Prussia, Great Britain, and the United States, it can be nothing else, unless united under a single political organization. Italy parcelled out into a large number of separate states, under native or foreign princes, without civil and political unity, counts and can count for nothing in the present political organization of Europe. The Italian people under the order they are endeavoring to cast off, have no career, can live no national life; become enervated, feeble, inert, corrupt, without strength or opportunity to play a noble and energetic part among the nations of the earth. It is to their credit that they are disaffected with this state of things, and that they still have energy enough to attempt to become a state that may play as important a part in these days of great centralized empires and kingdoms, as the Italian cities and republics did in former times, when all Europe was under the feudal *régime*, and parcelled out into small states under feudal chiefs, or communal governments. The political interests of the world demand the union of all Italy under a single effective political organization, and aside from the interests of religion, very few of us would oppose the policy of uniting the whole nation under the constitutional monarchy of the house of Savoy.

Now are the interests of religion really incompatible with this national resuscitation and union of all Italy? Can there be any thing more likely to alienate the Italian people from their religion and to drive them into hostility to the church, than to be constantly assured on high authority, that their religion requires them to remain divided and weak, without national life or strength, with no opportunity to develop the hardier and manlier virtues in the struggle of nations? Let every man consult his own human nature, and answer. Why should our religion require this sacrifice of Italy more than of any other country? and if

she requires it of Italy, how can we say that she exacts nothing incompatible with national independence, national unity, and national prosperity? The question it seems to us is a serious one, and there can be little doubt that the present state of Italy is the most formidable objection to the papacy, the Catholic publicist has to meet and dispose of. We may say what we will, but it is a fact, that the mass of thinking men, Catholics as well as non-Catholics, cannot be made to believe that the interests of the church, if the church of God, require the sacrifice of Italian unity and independence, and the more earnestly the Catholic authorities contend they do, the more will their affections be alienated, and the weaker their confidence in the wisdom of the papacy. We hold the doctrine of the sacredness of vested rights, and we have no right to labor to change the relations between the pope and his temporal subjects against his consent; but we think the Holy Father himself, must be convinced that the interests alike of religion and of modern society, require the old policy of feudal Europe to give way, demand the reorganization of Italy as a single state, and her elevation to the rank of a great power in the European scale of nations. The same powers and influences which sustain him in his principality now, would perhaps be not less effective in sustaining him in his *status* of sovereign without it, and in his freedom and independence as sovereign pontiff, as well as securing free access to him by the faithful of all lands.

Of course it is not ours to decide any thing, and we merely discuss a question which it seems to us is a very important question, and open to discussion. The question is not of faith, and not one on which all Catholics are obliged to think alike. It is, no doubt, a mixed question, having its spiritual as well as its temporal side. In its spirituality the church has supreme and exclusive jurisdiction, but on its temporal side it is by virtue of the distinction of the two powers under the jurisdiction of the lay society, and may be freely discussed without irreverence or disloyalty to the spiritual. We love and venerate the chief of our religion, and whatever he commands, as within the sphere of the spiritual, and he, not we, is the judge whether it is or not within that sphere, we hold ourselves bound to do; but as sovereign of Rome, he is not our sovereign, and neither his judgments nor his orders bind us. We are ready to contribute to the full extent of our ability to the

support of our chief pastor, our chief priest, our spiritual father; but we are free as a Catholic to contribute or not, as seems to us good, to the defence and support of his temporal sovereignty. To this end the pope may solicit the contributions of the faithful, but he can make no requisition on them. They have the right to refuse the requisition, and under certain circumstances, the civil authority might prohibit them from making any contributions to support the pope as temporal sovereign, without infringing the freedom of conscience or denying the supremacy of the spiritual order, though under no circumstances could it justly prevent them from contributing, if necessary and they see proper, to the support of the supreme pastor, for this comes under the head of tithes, and Catholics are bound by their religion to pay tithes; that is, contribute of their worldly substance for the support of religion and its ministers.

We are not free to oppose by violence the temporal sovereignty of the pope, nor are we free to oppose by violence the temporal sovereignty of any other legitimate prince, but we cannot for the life of us understand why the temporal sovereignty of the pope is in itself any more sacred and privileged than that of other princes. As temporal prince, he seems to us, to stand on the same footing with others, to have the same rights, neither more nor less. He holds his principality by a temporal, not a spiritual title, and no power on earth can make it a spiritual principality. Even the declaration of the popes and bishops that it is necessary to spiritual interests, is only a declaration within the sphere of human prudence, and founded on human judgment. It is not a dogmatic decision, and though necessarily entitled to great weight and profound respect with all the faithful, it is not an infallible declaration, for the church even claims to be infallible only in questions of faith and morals, and so-called dogmatic facts. She has authority in spiritual administration, and binds to obedience, but is not infallible, and does not require us to believe that it is impossible for her or for her ministers to make a mistake in policy, or to err in a question of human prudence. We may question the wisdom of the policy pursued by the spiritual authority even in spirituals, but we are never free to disobey its orders. No doubt such questioning should be reverent in tone, submissive in spirit, and so conducted as not to cause scandal, or to weaken the hands of authority; and it is only in extreme cases that extreme rights should be asserted, or the

questioning be indulged in. For our part, we have not sufficient confidence in our own knowledge and judgment to maintain in the face of the declaration of the papal government, and nearly all English, Irish, French, and American bishops, that the temporal principality of the pope is not necessary, that is, relatively, not absolutely necessary, to his freedom and independence in his spiritual government. We respect that declaration, and therefore hesitate to assert, what in its absence we should not hesitate for a moment to assert. Yet as we cannot regard that declaration as dogmatic and binding to submission on our faith as Catholics, we cannot condemn as without faith, or as wanting in Catholic loyalty, those who venture to dispute it, and who think, from their knowledge of history and the present state of the world, the temporal sovereignty of the pope, instead of sustaining, rather embarrasses his freedom and independence in his spiritual government. We cannot say they are wrong, and aside from the judgment of those who must be far more competent to judge than we are, we should, perhaps, be of the same opinion. But be this as it may, we cannot believe, even supposing it necessary in the only sense in which it can be said to be necessary, that we can on that ground alone justly demand the division and nonage of Italy, or withhold from the Italians the rights accorded to all other nations, the separation in their government of the two powers, and national union under one and the same political organization. It seems to us unwise to force a whole people, and that as Catholic a people as there is in the world, into hostility with the sovereign pontiff on a question which after all is only a question of expediency.

The same principle, that the supremacy of the spiritual does not absorb the temporal, or imply the supremacy of spiritual persons in all things, is of universal application. The church has a divine right to tithes, to a portion of the temporal goods of the faithful for the support of her ministers and the service of the sanctuary, and the civil authority has no right to interfere with her reception and free disposition to this end of the contributions of the faithful. But she cannot, at least she has never defined that she can, come and take property wherever she can find it, not recognized as hers by civil society, and against or without the consent of the owner. Ananias and Sapphira his wife, while they held the title to their property, were not obliged to surrender it to the church, and by her own laws the church

can only collect voluntary offerings. Where she has the power of imposing and forcibly collecting a tax, it is by virtue of the civil law, which accords her certain rights, and comes to her aid in enforcing them. The church cannot hold, use or dispose of her temporal possessions without the aid and protection of the civil law. It is the civil law which protects her in the possession and use, according to her own laws and discipline, of her churches, her seminaries, colleges, school-houses, and revenues, be they more or less. Can we deny, then, to the state, all right to say on what conditions it will protect her temporal possessions, or to inquire if they are faithfully appropriated to the end for which she holds them? The civil society can justly impose no conditions incompatible with her divine rights, yet where it has never recognized her canons as the law of the land, it is not bound to conform to them in the respect that they are founded only on the grants or concessions of temporal society. In our country, where the canon law is not in force either in church or state, the state is bound to respect only the divine rights of the church, and saving them, is free to impose such conditions on the acquisition, management, and disposal by the church of her temporal goods, as it judges fit, and to refuse to protect her in their possession and use if she refuses to conform to those conditions. If rejecting the conditions of the law, she makes a decree requiring all her property to be vested as private property in her prelates, the civil law must treat it as the private property of those prelates, and is under no obligation to recognize or protect it as church property. If the bishop should happen to forget to make a will, or should make an improper will, betraying the trust she has committed to him, or during his life should dispose of the property which is really hers, but which he holds as his private property, to his friends or relations, the civil law is not bound to afford her any redress. By refusing to comply with the requirements of the law, the church foregoes her claim to the protection of the law.

This question of the tenure of church property may be of no great practical importance just now in our own country; but a time may come when it will be very important, and perhaps the civil law be needed to protect the property of the church against the abuses of spiritual, as well as of secular persons. It would seem desirable then, so far as practicable with the divine rights of the spiritual society, to

comply with the requirements of the civil law regulating the tenure of church property. We see nothing in the principle—we speak not of the details—of the law recently passed by the New York legislature on the subject, incompatible with the rights of the spiritual society. We know nothing in the constitution of the church that makes it absolutely necessary that the title to church property should vest in the bishops alone, or that prohibits those who hold the title from rendering any account to the lay society or laity of their management of church funds, or that prohibits the laity from inquiring into the disposition made of funds derived principally from their contribution. The legislation of the several states is not now, in general, hostile to the rights of the church; that is, the rights inherent in her divine constitution, though it may be hostile to many of the rights she acquired from civil society in past times, and it seems to us the part of wisdom to study to keep it friendly, and not by unreasonable declamation against it, and unnecessary refusal to comply with its requisitions to render it our enemy. It is bad policy to proceed on the assumption that the law is an enemy to be overreached or evaded whenever possible. It is better to regard it as intentionally our friend, and in a friendly way obtain a correction of those provisions which are really repugnant to Catholic conscience.

Marriage is also a mixed question, and one on which the two powers not unfrequently come in collision. Marriage is a sacrament, and in all that pertains to the sacrament is without any question under the exclusive jurisdiction of the spiritual tribunals, and the civil law has not one word to say. But marriage has civil effects; the just rights of the wife, the *status* of children, the ownership, the transmission, inheritance, or the division of estates, &c., which we cannot say are necessarily placed by Catholic faith under the control of the church. As Catholics, we deny that the state can establish any *impedimentum dirimens*, and have the right to insist that a marriage, valid in the eyes of the church, shall be valid in the eyes of the civil law. The condemnation of the change in the marriage law, and the introduction of civil marriage in Sardinia, was because done in violation of the concordat, not because necessarily opposed to the original rights of the church, for the same change had previously been introduced into France, obtains there now without any breach of communion with the Holy See. In

France, with Catholics at least, there is a double marriage,—a religious marriage, which is the only marriage recognized by the church and conscience, and a civil marriage, on which depend all the civil relations and effects of marriage. In this country the law recognizes the religious marriage, and holds it to be valid when solemnized according to the church or religious sect of which the parties are members, and also when it is performed by a civil magistrate. Our laws are more favorable to Catholic marriage than the French law, and the fault the church may find with them is not that they do not recognize the validity of her marriages, but that they recognize the validity of marriages which she declares to be no marriages at all. Yet they do not require her in her own courts to recognize and treat these as marriages. As the state has cognizance of marriage in its civil relations and effects, it has been asked, why may it not require a registry of marriages to be kept? In New Jersey, where we reside, a marriage must be recorded in the town or city clerk's office, or it is not valid in the eyes of the civil law. Can we say that the temporal law has encroached on the rights of the spiritual? The canons touching mixed questions in force, or once in force in old Catholic countries, are not in force here, and cannot be introduced by the spiritual authority alone, because they touch the rights of the civil power as well as the rights of the spiritual. It is easy to cry out against the state, but it is the aim of all good Catholics to keep as far as possible peace and harmony between the two powers, and we should not accuse the civil power of usurping the prerogatives of the spiritual, unless such be actually the case, or claim as the prerogatives of the spiritual power, what the church has not defined to be such, or what are only concessions in other times and countries of secular society.

Education, too, is a mixed question, partly spiritual, partly secular. Of the religious education, teaching the catechism, &c., the spiritual society has supreme and exclusive jurisdiction. It has the unquestionable right of forbidding parents to send their children to schools which it, with a knowledge of the facts, judges to be dangerous to Catholic faith and morals. The church has also the unquestionable right of founding, sustaining, and managing, in her own way, schools for the education of persons intended for orders, or to enter the spiritual society, and fill spiritual offices. But beyond this, education is secular, and an affair of secular

society. For these fifteen years we have been told, over and over again, in the war against the public schools, state schools as they are improperly called, that education is the right of the parent. Is this so, or is it not? If it is so, then parents have a right to inquire into the character of the schools and colleges, and to have some voice in the schools and colleges to which they are required by their spiritual chiefs to send their children. We are expected to send our children to Catholic schools and colleges, and we lose something of our Catholic standing if we send them to schools and colleges under the control of non-Catholics. I should give a great scandal to many good Catholics were I to send my son to Harvard, Yale, Columbia, or Princeton College. Our Catholic colleges are all under the control of spiritual persons, secular priests, or religious orders or congregrations, in which a layman has and can have no authority. How then are parents, who form a notable part of lay society, to preserve their acknowledged right of education? How but by public discussion of the merits of these same colleges? Why then the outcry against W. J. B., a Catholic, a priest, and a professor in a Catholic seminary, for writing, and ourselves for publishing the article on Dr. Arnold and Catholic Colleges?

We Catholics, notwithstanding certain appearances to the contrary, do not form a mutual admiration society, bound to laud every thing said or done by Catholics, and maintain through thick and thin that it is always just and holy. We yield to no man in our reverence for the clergy, in our veneration for spiritual persons, or our admiration for the various orders and congregations of religion, who are doing so much for the Catholic cause; but we deny that every thing that is done by priests and religious, even under the patronage of the ordinary, is sacred and privileged, and is in no case, and under no circumstances, to be made the subject of public criticism. Our colleges, for general learning and science, by whomsoever founded, managed, or patronized, are secular, not ecclesiastical institutions, and are as open as any other secular institutions to the remarks of the publicist; and the saddest thing for them that could happen would be to have it understood that they oppose the public discussion of their merits. It would at once breed the suspicion that they cannot bear the light, that they have something that it is necessary to cover up and keep from the public eye; which, we need not say, would do them a thousand times

more harm than the most unfriendly and unjust criticism could do them.

We have no intention of discussing the merits of our colleges, for we have said heretofore all we judge necessary for us to say. Our *collaborateur* is free in our pages to develop and defend his views, and those who disagree with him are equally free to reply to him. The controversy is in the hands of the professors themselves, and we leave them to fight it out. Our colleges, we are aware, do not meet the wants of the Catholic community, and we have never yet met a Catholic parent, who has sent a son to them, that expressed himself fully satisfied with them. We are persuaded, too, that they might be much better than they are. But we wish, for our own sake, to say that we do not lay the principal fault on the college faculties, the priests, or religious who control them. We must be just to the learned and noble-minded men who devote themselves to the important, but often irksome and thankless task of education, and we must consider the circumstances in which they have been placed, and the means and materials they have had to work with. We must not treat them as the Egyptian taskmasters treated the Hebrews, and insist on their making their full tale of brick without straw. Most of our colleges are of very recent origin, none of them are endowed, all of them are poor, and we have asked them to be primary schools, grammar schools, high schools, colleges, universities, and to send out their pupils with a finished university education at the average age of eighteen. Having demanded an impossibility, we turn round and berate them because they have not done it! This will not do. It is not fair, it is not honorable, it is not just. The colleges, and even the conventual schools, though truly enough described by our collaborator, have done all that under the circumstances they could reasonably be expected to do, and it is but simple justice to the priests, fathers, and sisters, who have devoted themselves to the labor of instructing our children, to acknowledge it.

Still, we are as much dissatisfied with the results of our colleges and conventual schools as any one is or need be. But where is the fault? The fault, not a moral fault, is chiefly in the Catholic community as we find it in this country, a community not formed, but simply undergoing the process of formation, composed of heterogenous elements, having nothing in common but their human nature and their

Catholic faith, and in addition mixed up with and affected more or less by an older and more fully formed non-Catholic community. The mass of Catholic parents, in this country, have had no thorough education themselves; many of them are illiterate, began life poor, have acquired means by their hard labor, or have become rich by trade or speculation, and have been unable, because incompetent, to give their children a proper home education. Their children, to a great extent, are sent to the college unformed, or in need of being re-formed. Here is the first great difficulty our colleges have had to encounter and overcome. They have not had the pick of the children of a whole community, the *élite* of the children of an old, well-formed, and upon the whole, a highly cultivated community. The children were bright enough, with capacity enough, natural dispositions good enough, but they had not much of the previous training which fits them for the hand of the professor, had not had their literary tastes developed, and an emulation for learning and science excited in them by the tastes, habits, associations, and pursuits of their parents.

Many parents have not had learning enough themselves to know that their children were receiving only a superficial education, and a still larger number have been unable, or unwilling, to keep their children long enough at college to acquire a thorough classical or liberal education. Then, the college has been required to take all, of all ages and classes, teach every thing in the shortest possible space of time. All had to be received and huddled together; children, youths, and young men, a heterogeneous mass, impossible to amalgamate, or to form into a body with a proper *esprit de corps*, and able to educate, to a great extent, one another, within the time allotted to their stay at college. Every thing was thrown upon the professor and the prefect, and what better than we have had was to be expected? Undoubtedly, the results are unsatisfactory, for we are becoming conscious of the ability to realize something better. But with whom rests the remedy? No doubt, to a certain extent with the colleges themselves—but chiefly with the Catholic public. There should be a separation of the primary school from the grammar school, of the grammar school from the high school, or academy, and the academy from the college, as also ultimately the college from the university. They should never be all combined in the same institution, or under the same roof, if possible to do otherwise.

None should enter college under a certain age, or without sustaining an examination in certain specified preparatory studies. But the colleges cannot effect these changes unless sustained in making them by the Catholic public; and how are the Catholic public to be brought to sustain them, made to see and feel the necessity of doing it?

It can be only by public discussion of the various questions involved. The college faculties, aided by the bishops and clergy, cannot make the colleges what they would have them, without the people; and they can secure the coöperation of the people only by drawing their attention to the subject, either from the pulpit or the press. One of our most reverend archbishops insisted, some years ago, that we should take up, and discuss in our pages, the question of Catholic schools. We urged, in reply, that we were laymen, and did not think it our business. The bishops and clergy had taken it up, and it was not necessary for us to intervene. He overruled us, said it was our business as a Catholic publicist, and it was necessary also to wake up the people to its importance, and draw their attention to the subject. We further urged that our views of the question might be, and probably were, different from his own and those of several other prelates. That, he insisted, was no objection; as it was a great and vital question on which the people required to be instructed, we had no right to remain silent. No doubt, the same illustrious prelate has disapproved of many of the views we have put forth since, and at times he has certainly lashed us severely for them; but we are not aware that he has ever objected to the discussion itself. The reason assigned for it was a good and valid reason. We do not urge the discussion of the college question in any unfriendly spirit to any of our colleges. We wish ourselves to be fair and just towards them, as our feelings are certainly friendly, and wish our collaborators to be the same. But even a little sharpness, now and then a one-sided or incomplete statement, may do less harm than good. It is necessary, sometimes, to stick a man with a pin, or to give him a round shake to wake him up, and compel him to collect and use his faculties. Our college professors are men, and may sometimes fall into routine, and become a little dull. The Catholic public, also, need to be made to understand on what conditions, and on what conditions only, they can have proper schools and colleges for Catholic children and youth. The colleges, themselves, need behind

them a sound and healthy public opinion, and only on that condition can they do effectually their work.

Our readers can be at no loss to understand what has been our purpose in this article. We have aimed to show that the high-toned papal doctrines, the strong assertions of the supremacy of the church as representing the supremacy of the spiritual order, which they find in our pages, and which we trust they always will find, do not absorb the temporal in the spiritual, and deny all rights to the secular, or assert the exclusive right of spiritual persons in all things. We have heretofore vindicated the rights of the spiritual order. We have wished, in this article, to vindicate the right of lay society and laymen, and to set an example of their free use and application. We have wished, also, to provoke thought and free discussion within what we suppose to be the sphere of free opinion, on the greatest, the most exciting, and the most delicate topics now before the Catholic public. That we have gone to our limits, is possible ; but we hope we have not really overleaped them. We have for years fought the battles of authority, and at times have gone further, as many Catholics have believed, than we should, because we believed it necessary to its full and just vindication, and because we found it everywhere resisted or decried. We have this once done the same for liberty, for the temporal order, because, as regards ourselves, we would not have it supposed that we forget the rights of the temporal in asserting the rights of the spiritual, but chiefly because we believe that the interests of the spiritual, itself, require that there should, in our times, be a full and unreserved recognition and assertion of the rights the church leaves to laymen and lay society, and there seemed to be no one who could more safely do it. If we have gone too far in this direction, it is through error of judgment, not through an irreverent, unbelieving, or insubordinate spirit.

We live in times when nearly all the old political and social arrangements are broken, or are breaking up, and throughout the world it is clear to us that the church is destined to lose all the rights she acquired from secular society, and be thrown back on their naked rights and resources, as the spiritual kingdom of God on earth. There is no longer a Christendom ; and the church can no longer expect any thing from civil society, but the simple legal protection she enjoys here in common with the sects. We

respect those Catholics who live in their memories, and struggle bravely and heroically against what we believe can not be successfully resisted. Perhaps we sympathize heartily with them, and regret as deeply as they the changes which have taken or are taking place; but we can never war, with courage or energy, against the inevitable, or what seems to us the inevitable, and when we see the inevitable coming, we look round to see what we can retain, and what must be surrendered, and we try to prepare in the best way we can for it. Yet we do not believe that it is all over with the victories of the church, or that we are not to hope for her, in the future, days as bright and conquests as glorious as any in the past. The popes made more conquests to Christ before they were temporal sovereigns than, being temporal sovereigns, they have retained. We Americans have one advantage over our European brethren; we have long since occupied the ground towards which they are tending, and been loosened from the old customs, and usages, bandages, and swathing clothes, they are now having rudely torn from them, and we see and know that it is possible to live without them, to live as free men, and yet to love our religion and obey our church. All Europe is tending, not to democracy, but to the genuine American system, and the church in the old world will before long, be placed on the same footing she is with us. We believe the change necessarily involves many evils while it is going on, but when once effected and acquiesced in, will be found to be highly beneficial both to the spiritual society and to the lay society. We do not struggle against that change, we seek rather to prepare for it.

SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1861.]

The first two volumes of the profound and brilliant *Conférences* of Father Félix were some time since briefly noticed in our pages. Since then, we have received two additional volumes, which, with the fifth, for 1860, not yet received, complete the series. We must reserve a full analysis and appreciation of the whole series till the last volume reaches us. In the meantime we call attention especially to the fourth volume, which treats of "The Progress of Society by Christianity," for we wish to offer some few remarks, which we trust will prove neither inopportune nor unimportant, on a topic it suggests to our mind, and in which we ourselves just now take no slight interest. We beg our readers to understand, however, that it is the topic suggested rather than the *Conférences* themselves, on which we propose to make our comments.

Father Félix, unless Father Lacordaire, the eminent Dominican, be an exception, is unquestionably the first preacher in France, and is not an unworthy successor of the lamented Pére de Ravignan. His *Conférences* strike us as models of pulpit eloquence, and in brilliancy of style, simplicity and dignity of expression, depth of thought, earnestness of tone, and richness of illustration, they are unsurpassed by any modern series of sermons we have read or heard. The preacher is a man who thinks, and has thoroughly studied his subject, and if there are here and there views to which we cannot assent, they are the views of a mind of no ordinary capacity, and such as a man may entertain without discredit to his understanding or his general attainments. We esteem him the more, the more thoroughly we penetrate his spirit and master his doctrine; yet, as we said on the former occasion, his *Conférences* do not quite satisfy us, chiefly, however, because they are not what their title led us to expect. From the title, by our own fault it is very possible,

**Le Progrès par le Christianisme. Conférences de Notre-Dame de Paris*, 1856-60. Par le Père Félix, de la Compagnie de Jésus. Paris: 1858-60.

we were led to expect a discussion of progress in the sense the word is usually taken, and to be shown that progress requires and receives the aid of Christianity. But we find that the *progress* he treats is the progress by grace in the interior life of individuals, and in society only in so far as the exterior is the exponent of the interior. He discusses, we grant, a progress infinitely superior to that which we expected him to discuss, but, nevertheless, not it, and not in all respects easily attainable without it.

The reverend father will permit us to say, and we do so with all deference and respect, that we think (regard had to the state of things in Europe) these *Conférences* were not well timed, and that they would have been more opportune and more really useful, if they had been preached from 1846 to 1850, ten years earlier, when the immediate danger to European society was from socialism, communism, and red-republicanism. It is always necessary, we grant, that people of all ranks and conditions should understand, that without religion and stable government, society cannot subsist and perform its appropriate functions; but even this great truth may be presented at such a time, or under such circumstances, as to have the effect of error, and to operate unfavorably both to moral and social progress. Brought out and insisted on with peculiar emphasis when the danger is from the efforts of power to extinguish freedom and suppress all voices and all institutions favorable to liberty, it can only tend to alienate minds opposed to despotism from both religion and authority. At the time these *Conférences* were preached there was a manifest increase of infidelity in France, provoked by the alliance of the clergy with the new-fangled cæsarism of the day, and the savage bitterness with which their most influential organs treated the noble and disinterested men who, having for twenty years fought the battles of liberty and religion with success, regretted in the imperial constitution the absence of all adequate guaranties of political freedom, discussion, and publicity. Was this the time to insist specially on authority?

In 1848 society itself was threatened in its very foundation by the mad theories and mad deeds of revolutionists and anarchists; and the friends of order and religion, who had so bravely struggled during so many years for political and religious liberty, without in the least changing or abandoning any principle they had ever possessed, rallied to the standard of authority, and labored with what power and influence

they had to restrain the revolution, to roll back the tide of anarchy, to reëstablish order, and to save society. They did not labor to restore the the old *régime*, or to reëstablish the old governments against which they had warred, and which the revolution had prostrated; they accepted the republic the revolution proclaimed in France, and simply sought to make it an orderly republic, compatible alike with religion and social well-being; they denounced not the concessions made to popular demands in Prussia, Austria, and the smaller German states, nor did they demand their revocation when the danger to power was over; they only labored to restrain the revolution, and to prevent it from prostrating European society, and establishing the reign of anarchy on its ruins. But they were not strong enough to do this without accepting the aid of the partisans of the old *régime* everywhere overthrown or menaced. The conflagration was raging, and they must accept help to check and extinguish it, let it come whence it might. There was in consequence danger that after the revolution had been mastered, the sovereigns, or their ministers, taking a wrong lesson from their recent fright, would seek, and that the people, under the influence of the panic themselves had created, would encourage them to seek, to crush out liberty as well as the revolution, and to reëstablish the very system with more stringency than before, which had provoked, and, in many minds sincerely attached to order and religion, had justified the revolutionary movement. They saw this danger, and we, acting with them, warned our readers to be on their guard against it so early as October, 1848; but the more pressing danger was from the excesses of liberty, and effectual precautions against the excesses of power could not well be taken.

But long before these *Conférences* were preached to the men of France, the counter-revolution had triumphed, and all danger from the socialists, communists, and red-republicans, save as a reaction against despotic power, had passed away. The danger was then from the other side. Yet the reverend father seems totally unaware of this fact, and proceeds as if things remained as they were in 1848: yet in that very year 1848, the revolution had been defeated, crushed, in France, and order reëstablished under a republican form of government; and before the close of the following year the German princes had recovered their authority, Charles Albert had been repulsed from Lombardy, the Mazzinian republic had been put down at Rome, the

Hungarian rebellion suppressed, and Venice reduced. Power, after 1850, was everywhere triumphant, and order was nowhere seriously threatened. The movements of the revolutionists were only the spasmodic motions of the serpent's tail after its head has been severed from the body. Even then it was manifest to every man of some little foresight, that the danger was not from the revolution, but from the reaction of authority against it. What was foreseen in 1850 was an actual fact in 1856. The old system had been revived in most European countries, and the French empire, based on a new-fangled cæsarism, itself reposing on *ex post facto* suffrage, had been restored, and the most stringent measures of repression were everwhere adopted against every species of liberty, except the liberty of praising Cæsar and insulting religion. At this moment these *Conférences* were commenced, with the apparent design of bringing the sacred lessons of religion to sustain authority, which, in the public mind, could only mean despotism.

There are certain lessons which ministers of religion, as well as ministers of state, would do well to learn and profit by,—that, in this age of the world, after the preaching of the Gospel for eighteen hundred years, no religious teaching, no religious discipline, no possible education or governmental repression will suffice to put an end to revolutions, and keep the people quiet and contented under despotism, or what they regard as despotism. The church has too well educated the people, too thoroughly imbued them with the conviction that power without right or justice is without authority, and may be resisted without disobedience to God, for that any longer to be possible. All efforts to reconcile them to cæsarism, or to any government that adopts the maxim, "All for the people, nothing by the people;" which allows them no free thought, no free speech, no initiatory movement, and no effective voice in the management of public affairs, will, however supported, prove abortive. Whether you hail this as the harbinger of a glorious future, or deprecate it as the forerunner of Antichrist, it is a fact, and as a fact must be met and dealt with. All attempts, whether by ministers of religion or by ministers of state, to reëstablish social peace on the basis of political absolutism, can end only in grave injury both to religion and society. The passion for change has become too strong to be resisted. To war against it is as idle as to plant yourself on a railway, and command the locomotive, thundering

on at the rate of sixty miles an hour, to stop and go no further. You may be crushed, but its speed will not be checked. We speak of what is possible in the ordinary providence of God, not of what is possible to his miraculous power; we restrict not his power, nor attempt to interpret his secret purposes. In his ordinary providence, we are not afraid to assert that peace on the old system between the European populations and the governments is not possible. The war will continue, marked by alternate victories and defeats for each party. The excesses of power will give the victory to the mob; the excesses of the mob, in turn, will give the victory to power; and each alternate victory or defeat will only loosen still more the bonds of society, and render the war more desperate and vindictive.

We agree, assuredly, with Father Félix, that religion is necessary to render people truly loyal to authority, and that authority is necessary to liberty and social progress,—the two great truths he develops with equal force of thought and brilliancy of language. Here, certainly, we have no quarrel with him, for his thesis was ours from 1844 till 1850, and his *Conférences* were preached in substance in our pages some years before he preached them in the church of Notre-Dame of Paris. Yet it is always necessary in our assertion of authority to be on our guard against giving it an origin or a character incompatible with national and individual freedom. The reverend father's theory of authority, if he intend on the one hand it shall be power, and on the other a support to freedom, requires, in our judgment, some important qualifications.

"Authority, considered in its origin," he says, "comes from creation. He who is creator is author, and he who is author is authority in relation to what he creates. This reason of authority is radical; it is in the root of things, and is written in the root of words. Strictly speaking, God is the only authority, for he is the only creator. He is master of all, for he is the beginning of all. But men, associated to his creative power, are associated also to his authority, in so far as their acts are creative. Where in *imitation of God* free agents create, there is authority. In this sense there are authorities in science, art, and literature. He who creates order in ideas, and makes them resplendent in speech, is an authority, and not meaningless is the expression, Royalty of speech, which we find in all languages. Wherever men encounter genius displaying creative power in its works, they say, Behold an authority. In vain do we protest against this domination; it asserts itself. Before their like men rise to the honor of authority just in proportion as they manifest creative power.

"On these principles, founded in the nature of things, it is not difficult to determine the true notion and the last reason of social authority. Social authority is also creative power, the power of founding society, the efficacious force of arranging men in order to the end of their association. Authority, with the divine concurrence, creates society; and, as God the world, continues its creation in governing it. A man appears in a nation; men are in strife; things are in ruin; the people are in servitude; society is in the dust; by a power communicated to him by God, he unites all men, restores all things, makes a free people, a prosperous society. That man is authority. Whether God gives him power immediately as he did to Moses, or through the intervention of secondary causes coöperating with his providence, that man, with God, creates society, and having created, preserves it, and is its lord and master. Parties may deny, rivals may contest, enemies may attack his authority, but authority it is, and will be. Society is not deceived in him; and owning in its creator its master, it says to him: 'You are able to create order, liberty, productiveness—in a word, society; command, we obey.'"

The reverend father, in his eagerness to burn incense to Cæsar, forgets, for the moment, the dignity and authority of the priest of God, before whom kings and kaisers are simply men, standing on a level with the humblest of their subjects. We cannot concede the pretence that Louis Napoleon put down the revolution, reëstablished order, and created society in France; for the revolution had been defeated and order restored before he made his appearance on the scene, by the representatives of the people, and the French army under General Cavaignac. All we can give the nephew of his uncle credit for, is, that he and his friends succeeded in rendering insecure the republic he had sworn to uphold and defend, and by a well-managed *coup d' état* overthrew the national authority, and seated himself in the throne he and they had made vacant; for we make no account of the suffrages of the nation, given *ex post facto*, after he had usurped the supreme authority, and left the nation no choice but him as supreme dictator or anarchy and its horrors. His special merit is in having so managed as to force or persuade the French people to abdicate their own authority, and vote themselves slaves.

"This doctrine," the author continues, "has nothing in common with the consecration of material force, and the glorification of despotism. Authority, thus conceived, is, in its very nature, a moral power. Let it come from the suffrages of the nation, the right of birth, or a providential situation clearly manifesting the will of God, the power to create or restore society is essentially moral, and it is repugnant to the very nature

of things that society should be guided to its end by material force. Authority, at need, may use material force to remove an obstacle interposed between it and the end of society, but the material force can never be the social authority itself. Armed or unarmed with material force, the social authority remains in its ground as in its essence, the efficacious power of creating society, that is to say, of creating order, liberty, productiveness, ... order by giving it stability, liberty by giving it activity, and productiveness through stability and liberty. It is, therefore, for society, the reason of being, growing, and producing,—the supreme reason of social progress."

There is in this doctrine a slight touch of the hero-worship for many years so energetically preached to us by Thomas Carlyle. It places the right to govern in ability, and with Carlyle makes *king* come from *can*, can-ing, that is, able-man. He has the right who has the ability to govern society. He is your real God-ordained king, kaiser, president, or governor; all others are shams, simulacra, and the sooner they are sent back to the pit whence they have ascended, the better for society. Does the illustrious preacher intend to endorse this doctrine, and thus resolve the *rights* of man into the *mights* of man? He derives authority from author, both as to the word and the thing. The man's authority depends on his creative power, or his power to imitate the creative act of God. It is then an inherent and personal power. How, then, can it come from national suffrage, the right of birth, or a providential situation? In the one case he makes power a personal and indefeasible right, in the other case he makes it a trust from God, or from society, or from both. How does he reconcile the two contradictory theories and make them one?

The distinction between authority and material force is important. Authority may use material force as an instrument, but is never itself material force. Nothing more true. But who has the right to use material force as an instrument of government? The preacher's doctrine answers, he who has the ability, which excludes, of course, all idea of moral and political right. If, again, authority be essentially moral power, the government which has no moral power and can sustain itself only by a permanent resort to material force, has no authority. Then it has no right to govern; then no right to use material force; then in using it, it is a tyranny, and there is no treason, no crime, no sin, in resisting and attempting to subvert it; for tyranny has no rights, and where no rights are violated, no wrong is done. French Jacobins

and Italian carbonari will hardly ask for more than this. If you arm the government with physical force, which it may use to sustain itself whenever it judges proper, you confound authority with physical force itself, unless you have already established the right of the government to use physical force. How will you explain and establish this right?

Father Félix defines authority to be the efficacious power to create or to restore society, and maintains that the prince has the right to govern, because he creates social order, liberty, productiveness. If his moral power meets grave obstacles, that fact alone proves that it is not in itself alone efficacious, and therefore that it is not authority. Then the resort to physical force is tyranny. The preacher forgets that he must recognize the right of government when resisted and its moral force is inefficacious, or else he cannot assert its right to use material force, for it is only where moral power fails that material force is needed. Father Félix is a Christian preacher, and can no more intend to assert order without liberty, than liberty without order. He is right in founding authority on creation, but only in the case of God, who only is creator. Authority in God is a right, but not in man, who has no proper creative power, and it is only by a figure of speech we say of any man he is authority. His error lies in founding civil authority on man's act imitative of the divine creative act, instead of founding it on the act of God, immediately or mediately delegating it to man. God does not, as he supposes, delegate the authority through the medium of the act of the prince, but by his own act, mediate or immediate. He may, if he choose, delegate it immediately to an individual, as in the case of Moses, or to a particular family, as in the case of the family of David; but ordinarily he delegates it to the nation, and through the nation to the prince, who is therefore accountable for it, both to God and to the nation. This makes power in whose hands soever lodged a trust, and liable to forfeiture; in opposition to the divine and indefeasible right of kings defended by the English Solomon and his Anglican divines, from whom Bossuet seems to have borrowed it. In God power is a right, in man it is a trust. No man has created other men or society, and if *per impossibile* he had, he would have no right by virtue of his creative act to govern them; because, as creature himself, he belongs to God, in all he is, in all he has, and in all he can produce by his faculties. *Non est potestas nisi a Deo.* The right of the prince is derived from

God, who alone is the living law, not from his personal and inherent creative power.

Father Félix proceeds in his theory of authority on the supposition that simple moral checks on power are adequate safeguards of liberty. In this he lacks the practical experience of the statesman. He himself is aware that power, to maintain order, must be permitted at need to use material force; but liberty is as essential to society as order; and if authority needs material force to protect order, how much more must society need material force of some sort to protect liberty? The experience of all ages proves that power, with material force at its command, is sure to encroach on freedom, if not prevented by material checks in the very constitution of the state. Hence the wisdom of mankind rejects all the simple and absolute forms of government, as monarchy, aristocracy, democracy; and the statesman seeks to temper one absolute form with elements borrowed from the others, to constitute what is called mixed government; and by a wise division and distribution of powers to guard against the abuses of authority without impairing its unity or efficiency. Mr. Calhoun was accustomed to laud the admirable provision in the old Roman constitution of the tribunitial veto, which while it left to the patricians the positive exercise of authority, prevented them from adopting and carrying out any measure offensive to the *plebs*. A constitutional negative of some sort on power when it would go beyond its just limits is necessary, if we mean the government shall maintain a free as well as a submissive people.

We had, indeed, no right to ask a statesman in the preacher, but we have the right—if he chooses to discuss a topic intimately connected, either by its own nature or by time and circumstance, with the political passions of the day—to ask that he avoid defending, in the name of religion, a theory that makes the prince the living law, and which, when it favors not Jacobinism, sustains the worst form of cæsarism. We doubt not the excellent intentions of the preacher, but we doubt, perhaps we more than doubt, the wisdom or justice of associating the interests of religion with a political system, not enjoined in the Gospel, which is opposed by the living thought and intelligence of the age, which alienates vast numbers from the church, and which all experience proves can be sustained only by the most stringent system of repression. The church is a spiritual kingdom, independent and complete in and by herself. She

prescribes for her children no particular form of civil polity, and her interests, whether spiritual or material are necessarily attached for all times and places to no one form of government. As a man and a citizen I may have my political preference, and even a very decided preference,—but let it be what form it may I have no right to demand for it the positive sanction of the church, or to put it forth in her name as the Catholic form of civil society. It is enough that she does not condemn it. The very worst service we can render her, is to labor to involve her in the political movements and party conflicts of the day, whether at home or abroad.

As a spiritual kingdom, the church represents the spiritual order in the government of human affairs; and as that order changes not, is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever, she must be fixed and unalterable in her principles, her doctrines, and her spiritual constitution—speaking always in the same tongue, with the same voice, to all men, whether what she says accords with their sentiments and opinions, or arraigns and condemns them. She must be as unchangeable as truth, and as inflexible as justice. It is not for her to conform to the world, but for the world to conform to her. But in civil polity this inflexibleness and immutability would be out of place; for all wise human government is founded not on absolute principles, but in compromise. Civil government represents the human element, and demands not the attribute of immutability, but the faculty of change. No civil government answers the end of its institution, if between it and the sentiments and convictions, wants and wishes of its subjects there is a general and permanent antagonism; and it is a grave error on the part of statesmen to seek to constitute the state in imitation of the church of God, and to render it, like her, fixed and unalterable; as if like her it were designed to represent the absolute, not the relative,—the immutable and eternal, not the changeable and the temporary,—the divine, not the human, —God, not man. The changes from time to time demanded may be unwise, may be likely to introduce more evils than they will cure; but if earnestly, constantly, and generally insisted on they must be conceded, if they are within the scope of the temporal order, and involve no sacrifice of the rights of the spiritual. When the children of Israel grew tired of the government of the Lord through divinely appointed judges, and demanded a king to go in and out be-

fore them, that they might be like other nations, he rebuked them sharply for their ingratitude, and exposed to them the folly of their request: nevertheless he complied with it, and gave them a king.

Undoubtedly, the changes which it is lawful to demand or to concede are such as lie within the province of the temporal, in regard to which the people under God are sovereign, and have the right to follow their own will. Certainly, the state has no right to make at the popular demand any concessions incompatible with the moral and spiritual order represented by the church; for neither it nor the people have any authority in that order. The proper sphere of all human government is the sphere of human prudence, and it is only within this sphere that changes are admissible. All in human society that must be fixed and unalterable, and all that, though not fixed and unalterable, which pertains to spiritual discipline, is placed under the jurisdiction of the church, whose authority both prince and people must always respect and never contravene. But civil society, saving the supremacy of the spiritual and the freedom and independence of the church, is free to act for itself, and to make such changes and compromises as it judges expedient under the circumstances of the time and place. As the state represents not the absolute and unalterable, but the relative and the changeable, it should always be constituted with the faculty of change, of keeping itself in harmony with the wants and wishes of the age and nation. In this necessity of change on the part of civil society, we may see the reason why the church leaves the constitution of the state to the people, and prescribes no particular form of civil polity. It is because no one particular form is adapted to all nations, nor to the same nation through all the stages of its existence.

That the clergy, as a body, have a strong tendency to introduce into civil society the fixedness and unalterability of the church, is no doubt a fact; and in this fact we may probably find the reason why sacerdotal governments are generally regarded with disfavor by both statesmen and the people. Dealing in their own order with fixed and unalterable principles, with the absolute and inflexible, only softened in the administration by kindness and charity, they are apt, from their special education and habits of mind, to look upon change as evil, and to seek to prevent it in the civil administration, and to compress all civil and political thought

and action within certain fixed and unalterable rules, which permit the people no free spontaneous motion. It has been pretended that the great aim of Pope St. Gregory VII. was to establish a theocratic or sacerdotal government for Christendom, but unjustly; for he labored only to emancipate the church from the domination of Cæsar, and to compel princes and peoples to respect her freedom and independence. The same charge has been brought against that great and much maligned pope, Boniface VIII.; but he tells us expressly that he had no thought of interfering with the civil rights of princes or the civil independence of their crowns. Certainly, in distinguishing the two orders, and in giving to each a separate representative, our Lord did not alter their natural relation one to the other. As the temporal order is, by its own nature, inferior and subordinate to the spiritual, so is the state inferior and subordinate to the church, against which it has and can have no rights. But under the church in spirituals, in its own order the state is free and independent.

The distinction of the two orders under separate representatives is asserted with unanimous voice by all Catholic theologians, and has been recognized by every sovereign pontiff who has had occasion to touch the subject. A Catholic prelate, one of the ablest theologians we have ever had in this country, and whose resignation of his see on account of continued ill health and departure from among us all good men must lament, publicly criticised, some years since, some essays in the *Review* on the papal power, because he thought we pushed the doctrine of spiritual sovereignty so far as to deny this distinction, and to absorb the state in the church. He misapprehended our meaning, as did many others; but, however inexact, unusual, or unguarded our language at times may have been, we have never used a word which meant, in our own mind, any thing incompatible with the distinction of the two powers contended for by the eminent prelate himself, or which we are now asserting. We asserted then, we assert now, and we trust we always shall assert, the supremacy of the spiritual, and, therefore, the duty of the temporal to recognize and conform to the spiritual order; but we have always understood and maintained that the spiritual leaves the temporal its freedom and independence in its own order. What we were and still are sedulous to guard against, is political atheism, or the assumption of the *spiritual* independence of the

temporal, or the freedom of the state from the law of God as interpreted and applied by the church. As against the spiritual, or the church, the temporal has no rights, no freedom, no independence; but within its own order, and taking care not to contravene the spiritual, it is free, and may follow its own judgment.

The importance of this distinction of the two powers is not always recognized and appreciated by statesmen. Conservative statesmen usually study in the constitution and administration of political power to copy the fixedness and unalterability of the spiritual order, and to make the state a *quasi* church. Radicals or reformers aim to copy in the church the mobility and changeableness of all things human, and to reduce the church to simple civil society. Reformers understand well that the faculty of change—progress in their language—is essential to the political constitution of society, and therefore conclude that the church should have the same faculty, and change as the world changes. Conservatives understand equally well that the church, as representing the divine, must have the attribute of immutability, and hence conclude that political society should also be immutable, and repress instead of yielding to the demand for change on the part of the people. The one reasons from the human to the divine; the other from the divine to the human. Each has a truth, and each an error. The truth of each is preserved and the error avoided by the distinction of the two powers, and the understanding that the church represents the unchangeable, and the state the changeable or the progressive. We may demand progress in civil society, provide for amendment or alteration in its constitution, as in the imperial constitution of France and the several republican constitutions in our own country, but not in the essential constitution of the church, because that was perfect in the beginning and adapted to the spiritual wants of all ages and nations.

The neglect to recognize in its true light this distinction between the two powers has led to the standing charge against the church, that she favors social immobility, permits no progress, and is therefore the support of despotism, the enemy of light and liberty, and the friend of darkness and slavery. She is believed to be leagued with the old system of government which has outlived its time, and has now become tyrannical and oppressive, and a barrier to all social progress. For this reason men make war on her,

and large masses of the European populations are alienated from her, are exceedingly mad against her, and persuade themselves that the secular rights of individuals and nations can be secured only by her destruction. All this is false as false can be ; but, unhappily, there is a class of very excellent people, and very excellent Catholics, learned and devout, where there is no question of politics,—called in Italy *oscurantisti*, who, by their words and deeds, contribute much to confirm in the minds of the alienated this false charge. They are, no doubt, honestly attached to the old *régime* and to modern cæsarism, and firmly believe that the changes contended for by the popular party cannot be introduced without serious detriment both to religion and society. They deny that the hostility manifested to the church is primarily hostility to the politics which it is falsely assumed she upholds with her spiritual authority, and quietly dispose of the undeniable recrudescence of infidelity in the last few years by ascribing it to the native wickedness of the human heart, or to the machinations of the enemy of souls. Instead of yielding in the order of the changeable to the demands of the age, they do all that in them lies to strengthen the hands of power, to render more stringent the system of repression, and to exaggerate, if possible, the odious features of the very system which provokes opposition. Here is our great difficulty.

We honor and respect these people for their many virtues, and we honor their inflexibility and their superiority to all demagogical arts, and perhaps our own natural disposition would associate us with them. But we believe them mistaken. We believe we know these disaffected classes better than they do, and we do not concede that it is to the church or to any thing essentially Catholic that, as a body, they are primarily opposed, but that it is to the politics defended in her name, and with which they believe her necessarily associated. The political and social obscurantism they find supported by what seem to be her accredited organs, they are determined to get rid of, and they imagine that they can successfully attack it only over her prostrate form. We speak not without warrant when we say their hostility to the church not seldom springs from the only good that is left in them. They are wrong, fearfully wrong ; but their hostility to the church does not, as our conservative brethren believe, as a general thing, spring from their hostility to Catholicity because it teaches the truth, and en-

joins purity of heart or sanctity of life. Men do not reject a religion for such a reason, however corrupt or vicious they may be; for that is precisely what the worst of them believe religion should do. It may be a reason why they neglect to practise it, but it is not a reason why they seek to drive it from the world. The real cause is to be sought in their own political passions and convictions opposed to the political system maintained in her name, or as essential to her interests, by the *oscurantisti*, and we have little doubt that the great body of them would gradually abandon their hostility if these would cease to interpose themselves as an opaque substance between them and her, and to prevent them from seeing the immaculate spouse of God in her own resplendent beauty.

We of course do not accept the politics of the *oscurantisti*, for we are republicans, and opposed to the social system they defend. We are of the New World, not the Old. But we do not quarrel with them simply because they differ from us in politics. They have the same right to defend their honest political convictions that we have to defend ours. What we deny them is the right to defend their political system in the name of our common religion, and to claim for it the positive sanction of the church. They have no such right in relation to their politics, as we have no such right in relation to ours. If they are Catholic, so are we; and we claim to be as good and as orthodox Catholics as they are, as firmly attached to our faith, and as submissive to the Holy See. It is for them to vindicate their Catholicity to us, as much as it is for us to vindicate ours to them; for it does not follow that a man is a good orthodox Catholic because he defends antiquated despotism, and anathematizes liberty. We arraign not them as unorthodox on account of their politics, and they must not question our Catholicity on account of ours. Our quarrel with them is not that they are *oscurantisti*, but that they associate their *oscurantismo* with the church, and obscure her fair face with their own dark shadow. We know nothing in the temporal order of *Catholic* politics. A Catholic church we know and love; a Catholic civil polity, except in a negative sense, we know not. La Mennais was not condemned because he opposed the old monarchical system of Europe, and defended democracy; but because he attempted to do it in the name of religion, represented it the duty of the church to cut herself loose from the governments with which her chief as-

temporal prince was necessarily associated, and to make common cause with the people in their war for liberty ; or, in other words, because he defended his democracy as *enjoined* by Catholicity. The church does not proscribe monarchy and prescribe democracy, or proscribe democracy and prescribe monarchy. She positively approves, she positively condemns no form of civil polity, and therefore no form can either be defended or opposed on her authority, and she should never be dragged into our political controversies and conflicts. Besides, neither proscribing nor prescribing any particular form, she can never be a party to any revolution having for its object the change of the form of government.

There is no doubt that the people we speak of honestly believe that the material interests of the church are so bound up with the political order now generally warred against by the European populations, or at least by those who take the liberty to speak in their name, that they would be grossly compromised by the change demanded—that of securing to the people in each nation an effective voice in the management of their own affairs. But we would ask them to reflect seriously whether, after all, religious interests could suffer more by the success of the movement party than they must suffer by association with a civil regimen that has lost its moral power, is opposed by the sentiments and convictions of the mass of thinking people, and is sustained only by a rigid system of repression by material force, which tends naturally, and cannot but tend, to exasperate and brutalize the public mind? What hope for religious interests is there under the despotic governments of Europe, when, as in France, the church can address the public on her own affairs only by permission of the minister of the interior, or the *préfet de police?* Has not our experience during the last forty years proved that under the domination of cæsarism, whether in large states or small states, the church is restricted in her freedom, and her interests sacrificed to the pettiest reasons of state, while the people,—from her supposed league with the political order of which she is only the victim,—are every day becoming more and more alienated from her, and exasperated against her.

That there is something to be apprehended from the success of the movement party, we do not deny ; but what is, after all, the very worst that can befall Catholic interests ?

The party may for the time being deprive the clergy of political influence, rob the sovereign pontiff of his temporal principality, and render the church as poor in this world's goods as were the apostles when they went forth from that "upper room" in Jerusalem to convert the world. Her priests and religious may lose what remains of their former ample revenues, and be reduced, as they already are in Great Britain, Ireland, and the United States, to live on the alms of the faithful, and every now and then exposed to be insulted or even assassinated by the fury of a mob. Here is the worst to be expected. It is, no doubt, bad enough, but nothing to frighten the followers of him who won his kingdom by dying on the cross. The church may suffer from plethoric wealth and worldly prosperity; from poverty and adversity never. Her most glorious ages were her martyr ages, when she concealed herself in the catacombs, or was lacerated by wild beasts in the amphitheatre. It was then she conquered the world to her Lord,—not by slaying, but by being slain. Were she driven back anew to the catacombs, or cast anew to the lions, she would still survive in her divine beauty and majesty, still continue under her chief her divine mission with unabated vigor and unabated success. We overrate in our worldly-mindedness the material interests of the church, and suffer them to make cowards of us, and to wed us to a policy which embarrasses the visible head of the church, and restrains his freedom of action.

Here is the worst. How much worse is it, after all, than what has often occurred, and is continually occurring, under the *régime* the *oscurantisti* seek to maintain or restore? And, what is more to the purpose, how much of this will be averted by wedding the church to that old *régime*, and placing her in open and direct hostility to the movement party? Are the people struggling for liberty less to be trusted than kings and kaisers struggling for dominion? Have we read history; or have we only gone to sleep over its open pages? Even the old French revolution, in the very tempest of its fury, went not further than professedly Catholic sovereigns more than once have gone. Did Pius VI. die in exile? So did St. Gregory VII. Did the republican armies invade Italy, and inflict terrible injuries on that beautiful country? So did Frederic Barbarossa, with his twenty-five years of war, rapine, and devastation, inflict far greater injuries. And how much greater were the horrors of the republican entry into Rome, in the eighteenth century, than the capture of

that city, and its sack which continued for nine months, by the soldiers of the Emperor Charles V. in the sixteenth? Or how much worse fared the church in France, even under the reign of terror, than in England under Henry VIII., Edward VI., and the daughter of Anne Boleyn? Why such distrust of the people, and such confidence in kings and kaisers? Why such maledictions on the crimes of the people, and such ready condonation of the greater misdeeds of anointed sovereigns? Is it because crimes are the exception with the people, and the rule with kings and kaisers?

Our *oscurantisti* might take, if they would, a lesson from the popular revolutions of 1830 and 1848. Under these revolutions we saw, indeed, isolated cases of violence, the outbreak of the fury of an infidel mob here, or the insolent tyranny of an infidel *commissaire* there, but no systematic outrages on religion, the clergy, or the vested rights of the church. In Belgium the revolution emancipated Catholics from their thraldom to a bigoted Calvinistic king, and gave them the control of public affairs, and if they have lost it since, they have only themselves to thank. In France the church prospered far more under the monarchy of July than under the empire or the restoration, and never was she freer, never did she speak with a bolder or more energetic voice, or make richer conquests for her Lord, than under the republic of 1848. In the various German states the revolution, so far as it affected Catholics at all, gained them rights and improved their *status*. Even in Rome, where it showed its worst features, it did not make systematic war on the clergy, confiscate the goods of the church, or suppress the freedom of the Catholic worship. If, indeed, republicans drove the Holy Father from Rome and deprived him of his temporal principality, republicans were found to restore and reinstate him in his temporal dominions. If he has lost it again, it is not to republicans he owes it, but to imperial France, to Louis Napoleon, whom our French and other Catholics have been wont to laud as a second Charlemagne, or a second St. Louis, and whose revival of the empire even Father Ventura likened to the resurrection of our Lord from the dead. Have our conservative friends retained the memory of these facts; and have they asked themselves why those popular revolutions did not assume a decidedly anti-Catholic character? Let them bear in mind that it was because at the time men's minds were beginning to be disabused of the false notion which the *oscurantisti* do their

best to generate and confirm, that the church is leagued with the sovereigns and hostile to all movements in behalf of political liberty; because a large body of the clergy and a larger body of eminent Catholic laymen had imbibed the truth without the error of the movement initiated by the Abbé La Mennais, and proved by their words and their deeds that men can struggle bravely for liberty without disloyalty to the church; because, in 1848, Gioberti and his friends had coupled the advocacy of liberty with the defence of the profoundest philosophy and the highest-toned Catholicity; because Pius IX., gloriously reigning, had inaugurated his pontificate in 1846 by breaking, as temporal prince, with the repressive policy of his predecessor, amnestying political offenders, recalling political exiles, and promising his subjects liberal institutions; and, last, but not least, because the bishops and clergy of France, the day after the proclamation of the republic of 1848, formally accepted it, as it was believed, without any *arrière pensée*, exerted themselves, and exhorted the faithful to exert themselves also, to restrain the revolution, to restore order, and consolidate the government of the nation by itself. Here are the reasons why these revolutions did not assume a decidedly anti-Catholic character; why they in general respected the rights of the church, and did not interrupt the clergy in the performance of their sacred functions. They are reasons, too, which prove our position that the movement is directed against the old political *régime*, and that it makes no war on the church when the church makes not war on it, or when no war is made on it in her name.

Now, do our conservative friends believe themselves able to arrest the movement party? Have they asked themselves by what means they expect to do it; what they would gain if they should do it; and what would be the consequence of attempting and failing? Suppose Austria, backed by Russsia and Germany, should intervene, what could she do? At best restore the *status quo*, that is to say, Austrian prepotence in the peninsula. Is that what you want? Would that settle any thing? Would it not leave all the old causes of disaffection in full operation, and only repeat for us the experience of the last forty, not to say the last four hundred years? The odium of the Austrian rule would be cast on the church, and she would have to bear the blame of a policy of which she would be the victim. The war would be renewed at the first opportunity, and victory would at last,

as it must, declare for the liberal and national party. If you have succeeded in placing the church, even in appearance only, on the side of the defeated, what have you secured for her, but the well-known *væ victis?* They who expect help from Austria are like the children of Israel whom the prophets reproved for turning to Egypt and trusting in the chariots and horsemen of Pharaoh.

We may be wrong, but we have long been decided in our conviction that peace, durable peace we mean, between church or state and the people of Europe, is impossible till the old system is abandoned alike by statesmen and churchmen, liberal institutions are established, and the relations of church and state are placed on the same footing they are with us in the United States. Without arraigning in the least the old system of mixed civil and ecclesiastical government which prevailed in the middle ages, and some vestiges of which still remain, or doubting in the least its wisdom and excellence for the time when adopted and for centuries afterwards, or being prepared to maintain that our American system is better than that, if that were still practicable, we must say that we do not believe that the church will recover her influence over the populations of Europe, and win back to her communion those who have gone astray, till she is loosened from all political connection with the state, and voluntarily consents to forego all state patronage, and contents herself with simple immunity in her inherent rights as the spiritual kingdom of God in this world; nor until the state ceases to regard itself, or to be regarded, as *episcopus externus*, as the Cæsars were sometimes called, and consents to leave the church full and unrestricted freedom and independence in spirituals,—perfectly free to do whatever she thinks proper to advance the interests of religion without permission asked or permission granted. We believe this, whatever was the case in the past, or whatever may be the case in a distant future, is now the best arrangement practicable; and we think, also, that the breaking up of the *status quo* in Italy affords a not unfavorable opportunity of introducing it.

But as strongly as we are convinced of the growing necessity of abandoning the old system and of introducing what we must be permitted to call the American system, we have been opposed and are still opposed to effecting the change by force or violence, or by any means incompatible with good faith and the sacredness of vested rights. After a

change has been effected we may accept it, though we joined not in effecting it, and which, though believing it necessary, we had opposed with what strength we had, because we were opposed to the means adopted for its introduction. The *status quo* we have defended as long as we could see the least prospect of retaining it. It was broken down by the unprovoked and unjustifiable war of France and Sardinia on Austria in 1859, and what has followed since is no more than was to have been expected when Napoleon evoked the revolution and summoned the Italians to arms. We opposed that war, not because we were in favor of Austrian prepotence, or even hostile to the unity and independence of Italy, but because we distrusted the intentions of Napoleon, and because we saw no way open to that unity and independence without a flagrant violation of public law and vested rights. We do not believe it lawful to do evil that good may come, and we believe right is never violated with impunity. We opposed the war, as the first step in what we regarded as an unjustifiable policy. But our warnings fell on listless ears. Catholics then had confidence in Louis Napoleon, who was to drive Austria out of Italy, protect the Holy Father in his temporal dominions, and thrash England. We should gladly have accepted the plan of a federal union for Italy under the presidency of the pope, recommended by the two emperors at the peace of Villafranca, and wrote in favor of it. We still hoped for it after the annexation of the duchies to Sardinia.

We understood the Napoleon-Cavour policy. It was for France to expel Austria, to prevent all intervention by non-Italian powers, and to leave the several Italian powers to settle their own affairs the best way they could. If Sardinia, by using the revolution, by encouraging filibuster operations, by intervention at need with her own army, and by *ex post facto* suffrage, could effect the union of all Italy, with the exception of the city of Rome and its environs, she was to be free to do it, without opposition from France. At least such was the policy, supposing Napoleon to act in good faith toward the father-in-law of his cousin. If he observed good faith it was still possible, it seemed to us, to defeat the policy, and to prepare the way for a confederated Italy. It was not unreasonable to suppose that the pope and Naples would be able to resist both Sardinia and the revolution. We hailed, therefore, with joy, as our pages show, the acceptance of the command of the papal army by the brave

Lamoricière, and the accession to that army of recruits and volunteers from every rank and every country of Christendom. We regretted that we were too old to join them. All honor to those noble volunteers, and a place of refreshment and eternal rest to those who fell fighting against immense odds at Perugia, Spoleto, Castelfidardo, and at Ancona. They fell fighting for public right, and the inviolability of independent states, the victims of a treachery seldom equalled.

But the ease with which Garibaldi with a handful of followers made himself dictator of Sicily in the name of Victor Emmanuel, the feeble resistance offered by the royal army, the defection of the royal fleet, the treachery of the Neapolitan ministry, the entrance of the dictator into Naples without opposition, the withdrawal of the king from his capital with the loyal part of his troops without striking a blow, appeared to prove that the people of southern Italy, or at least their leaders, had been gained to the Cavour policy, and that all hope of seriously opposing it, especially when Sardinia, without any declaration of war, invaded Umbria and the Marches, must be abandoned. We could see, when writing our article on the *Rights of the Temporal*, no power in Italy strong enough to resist effectually, as we had hoped, the policy, and things are still more unfavorable now. The Neapolitan army has since fought well, and proved that our calculations were not wholly without reason. But, though at the time we are writing the royal army still holds out at Gaeta, victory, unless aided by Napoleon, is hopeless. If left to herself, Italy, for aught we can see, must become either Mazzinian or Sardinian. The defeat of the papal army, and the virtual annihilation of the royal forces at Naples, change the whole aspect of the case, and we felt last October, and we feel to-day, that the policy we opposed can be no longer successfully resisted. The point of honor is saved, and enough, we think, has been sacrificed to abstract political right, which, after all, is never an absolute right, requiring to be maintained at all hazards. It may always be yielded without any abandonment of principle when its further maintenance has become impracticable without inflicting greater evils than it can prevent. Things have gone so far now, we think the less evil is in letting them go further, and to avail ourselves of the breaking down of the old system to introduce the new. We do not think it possible now to restore the old system if we would;

and personally, we would not now if we could. Restorations are always unhappy, and when a system is really dead, the best thing is to bury it out of sight, and let the living go to the work of the day. The church will not suffer, for she has the capacity to adapt herself to all changes that go on in the world around her.

We think it desirable now to settle on a durable, and, as far as possible, a satisfactory basis, both the Italian question and the Roman question. The illustrious Count Montalembert, from whom we never differ without some misgivings, appears still to hope to settle both questions by an Italian confederacy. It is too late, in our judgment, to hope any longer for that. It has been strongly opposed by Great Britain, and, we presume, never seriously favored by the emperor of the French, and only thrown out by him to amuse the public, quiet the minds of Catholics, and mask his ulterior designs. Besides, a confederated Italy would now be too weak to stand without Austrian or French protection, which means Austrian or French domination; for it is clear that the Italian people have gone beyond it, and would not now be satisfied with it, or give it a firm and cordial support. They demand not now, whether republicans or monarchists, union, but unity. All proves this; and a confederacy is not in their thought, and could be established only by foreign power or influence. Their disaffection everywhere, unless in the city of Rome, undeniably springs from the passion for unity. Whatever the form it assumes, we repeat, it does not originate in hostility to religion, though some of them may be without faith; not in opposition to the papacy as a spiritual sovereignty, nor yet in the bad government of the several princes dispossessed. It is not that. It is that the old governments are in the way of a unitary and independent Italy. They are opposed to being parcelled out into several petty states, each with its separate government, and no one strong enough to sustain itself without a non-Italian alliance; and they are determined to constitute an Italy capable of taking rank as a great power, and of maintaining her independence alike of France and of Austria. No internal reforms in the several Italian states, no liberal constitutions, no administration, however wise, just, or liberal, would remove or in any degree weaken their disaffection. Nothing will satisfy them but the unity and independence of Italy. A few years ago they would have consented to federal union, but they will not now.

But this unity and independence is not possible without the surrender to Italy, by the Holy Father, of his temporal principality. His principality cuts the peninsula, from sea to sea, into two parts, and is more indispensable to Italian unity than Venetia herself, never but in part Italian. The only grave obstacle to the national policy is the temporal government of the pope, and this obstacle is all the greater and more embarrassing because the pope is a spiritual person, the chief of religion, and the states he governs are the states of the church. Here is the secret of the hostility to the papal government, and, in some sort, to the church herself. We count for nothing what is said against that government; we blow to the winds the charges of tyranny and oppression brought against its administration. They are brought to discredit it in the public mind, and to gain a pretext for depriving the Holy Father of his states, and incorporating them into the new Italian kingdom or republic. The real objection is not to any thing it has done or not done, but to its existence; and as long as it exists at all, it will not cease to be opposed by the active and controlling portion of the Italian people. Here is the fact, the fact we have now to deal with.

Now, is there any imperative religious or social interest that requires the maintenance of the temporal government of the pope, when it seems clear that its existence can serve no longer the proper end of civil government, and can only tend to alienate the affections of the Italian people from the papacy, and to give occasion to a vast amount of crime, sacrilege, and infidelity? M. de Montalembert, in a recent letter to Count Cavour, expresses himself against great centralized states, and in favor of small confederated states. In principle we agree with him, and should go with him in practice if we believed there was the slightest probability of getting the great centralized states of Europe to consent to become small confederated states. We are the citizen of a federal union, and defend the system wherever practicable, with all our might. But when you are surrounded by great centralized states, if you are a small state, or a loosely confederated state, like the German bund, you hold your independence only at the mercy of your neighbors. When all Europe was divided into small feudal states, when Venice and Genoa were the great commercial capitals of Europe, the division of Italy, under a sort of suzerainty of the pope, into several separate and mutually independent states,

was in harmony with the political order of the times, and did not hinder her from maintaining the rank of a great power, or from leading the civilization of the world; but when the maritime discoveries of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth had opened new routes of commerce, and transferred the seats of trade from the Italian states, successively to Portugal, to Spain, to Holland, and to Great Britain; when the monarchs, by the aid of the commons, had gained the victory over the feudal nobility, and established great centralized monarchies; and above all, when the old public law of Europe, which asserted the inviolability of sovereign states, however small, had ceased to command respect, and European diplomacy had adopted a system of political atheism, and unscrupulously made reasons of state override reasons of religion and morality; then this division of Italy placed her out of proportion with the new times, deprived her of her former rank and weight in the scale of European states, and reduced her to a mere "geographical expression." For three centuries and more she has been a battle field between France and Spain, or France and Austria, or a ball to be cast by European diplomacy into one scale or the other as necessary to keep or restore the balance of power. For three centuries or more she has ceased to hold the political rank to which she is entitled by her traditions, her geographical position, her fine climate, and productive soil, and the genius, the capacity, the education, and the industry of her people, and as things are and are likely to be, it is morally certain that she cannot recover it so long as she remains parcelled out into several petty states, each too weak to stand alone.

We may be told that the Italian people will gain nothing by becoming united and a great power, and entering upon the rivalry with the other great powers in the race of mere material civilization, and that she would have been far wiser to have remained contented under the paternal rule of the pope and her old dukes, grand-dukes, and petty kings, devoting herself to science, art, and literature. Perhaps so, if she were contented. But the precise difficulty is, she was not contented, and could not be persuaded to be contented. When a people are tired of their nonage, you must recognize their majority, and let them set up a separate establishment of their own. Persuade the Italians that they would be better off as they have been for three hundred years, than they will be when they gain their unity and independence, and

we shall have not a word to say. But the doctrine we have been all along advocating in this article is, that no civil government is a good government, does or can answer the end of its institution, if it generally and permanently fails to meet the sentiments and convictions, wants and wishes of the people who live under it, whether the fault of the failure is on its side or on theirs; and when they are generally and permanently bent on a change within the limits in which change is allowable, the change must not be resisted. When the division of Italy did not prevent the Italians from holding the political rank due to their country, the papal government was a good government; it was in harmony with the times, and incompatible with no national interests; nay, it was eminently national, nearly the only truly national government in Italy, and the chief support of Italian nationality and independence against the German, the Frenchman, and the Spaniard, as well as of European civilization against the Saracen and the Turk. Italy and all Europe owe, and always will owe, a debt of eternal gratitude to that government, and we are very far from believing the new Italian government will ever succeed in making its memory forgotten. We love it and honor it for what it has done, and could still do, if the Italians would be contented to let it stand. It has been only by fraud and violence that it is overthrown, and no Catholic heart but will feel a pang to learn that it is suppressed. Yet, without offering one word in extenuation of what we regard as the guilt of Napoleon, Victor Emmanuel, and Count Cavour, we see not how it can in future, things being as they are and are likely to remain, serve the cause of either religion or society, and we see no way of restoring peace but by yielding to the pressure of circumstances, and suffering it to go to make up the new kingdom of Italy under the house of Savoy.

In Italy herself we see no human means of restoring and preserving the pope's temporal principality. Austria, as things are, cannot do it. France could, but will not. The emperor of the French holds the city of Rome and its environs; but if in the name, not in the interest of the Holy Father. He is at Rome to gain credit with Catholics as the only active protector of the father of Christendom, to hold Sardinia in check, to have something to exchange with her for the island of Sardinia, or some other portion of Italy; or if Sardinia relucts, to let loose the revolution, and so gain a plausible pretext to interfere as the friend of religion and

order, and establish French domination over both the pope and all Italy not retained by Austria. As the case now stands, there are, as far as we can see, four alternatives, and only four, for Italy: 1. Austria and the *status quo*. That nobody desires. 2. French domination, and the Holy Father a prisoner or pensioner of France. That is much worse. 3. The revolution, establishing the humanitarian republic, or installing the people-god, under the Mazzinis, the Saffis, the Crispis, the Bertanis, and men of their tribe. Worse and worse still. 4. The political unity and independence of Italy under the liberal constitutional monarchy of the house of Savoy. If there are any other alternatives, we cannot imagine them; we know not what they are. Of the four we have enumerated, the last is certainly the least objectionable; and supposing it accepted by the Holy Father with a just indemnification to the Holy See, it strikes us as, under the circumstances, no bad solution of the Italian question, and even of the Roman question. It is the best solution that is likely to satisfy the Italian people. It is the only solution that can protect Italy against worse solutions, and prepare the way for placing the relations of church and state throughout the world on the American footing. Without Sardinia, we have no power in Italy strong enough to put down the Mazzinians, or that can absorb them and prevent the experiment of the humanitarian republic from being repeated. Without the speedy organization and consolidation of the kingdom of Italy, rallying the body of the Italian people to its support, it will not be possible to prevent the establishment of French, or in case of the defeat of France by a coalition of Austria and the northern powers, not likely, the restoration of Austrian domination in the peninsula.

As we read the horoscope of Europe, the danger to the unity and independence of Italy lies precisely on the side of France. Napoleon, we presume, wants an Italian kingdom, but he wants it strong enough to be useful as an ally, while it is weak enough to stand in need of French protection. He would have it nominally independent, but really a vassal of his own empire. Hence we find him stopping his victorious arms at the Mincio, leaving to Austria a part of Lombardy and all of Venetia; and also demanding of Sardinia the cession to France of Savoy and Nizza, or Nice. He does not want an Italy strong enough to suffice for herself, and he will be the first to raise a disturbance if he finds

it likely to become so. He must be defeated, or all is lost. How defeat him without Austrian intervention, which could be effectual only in case the Italians coöperated heartily with Austria in their own defence, which, as yet, we cannot expect them to do? It is necessary to rally the whole Italian people, at least with the exception of the Venetians, around the king of Italy, and by the popular confidence render him so strong that, backed as he is sure to be by the moral and diplomatic support of Great Britain, who is bent on defeating the emperor's Italian policy, Napoleon will judge it advisable to leave Italy to herself. We believe the freedom and independence of the Holy See demand the constitution of a united, strong, and independent Italy, able to defend herself against any single power disposed to attack her. After the loss of her own temporal estates, this becomes highly desirable for the Holy See, and is the only thing that can atone for their loss.

Certainly, as regards the interests of religion, the Sardinians are to be preferred to the Mazzinians, and we can see no reason, when all causes of political rivalry or dissension are removed, why a powerful and independent king of Italy should not be as loyal to the church, to say the least, as the emperor of the French, or the emperor of Austria. He would always stand more in need of her moral support than sovereigns at a greater distance, and his interests would lead him to pursue a policy that would command it. We know Victor Emanuel and his advisers have not given the best evidence in the world of their loyal Catholic intentions; but their acts which have called forth the paternal chastisements of the Holy Father, inexcusable as they certainly are, cannot be said to be unprecedented in the history of Catholic states, and by no means preclude the hope of peace between their authors and the church. We think scant justice is done to the Italian people, and that sufficient allowance is not always made for the peculiarities of their situation. It is easy to call them a miserable rabble, villains, robbers, cut-throats, cowards, traitors, assassins, infidels, fiends of hell, and all that, but from all we can learn, we think—though some among them, as in every nation, deserve these epithets—the Italian people, as a nation, are a brave and noble people, and however far they may be led astray for the moment by their political and national passions and interests, they are at bottom sincerely a Catholic people,—none more so,—strong in their faith, ardent in

their devotion, and warmly attached to the Holy See; and, we doubt not, when the Italian kingdom is once constituted, when the passion excited by the struggle to found it shall have had time to subside, and the interests disturbed by the change shall have adjusted themselves to the new order of things, it will be found the most truly Catholic kingdom on earth, and the most loyal and firm supporter of Catholic interests as they will exist when the old system of mixed civil and ecclesiastical government has been fairly given up by both church and state. The chief causes of collision heretofore existing will be no longer operative. In a political point of view, the establishment of a free parliamentary government really representing the body of the nation, by so powerful a state as Italy must become, if united and independent, will throw the preponderance on the side of liberal institutions, and hardly fail to make an end of both Jacobinism and cæsarism throughout the continent of Europe, restore Italy to her political primacy, and, what to us Catholics is of moment, give the leadership of civilization to a Catholic nation.

We shall be told, we doubt not, that the Catholic should have nothing to do with political exigencies and complications; but, recognizing the rights of the Holy See, he should defend them with all the power he has, regardless of consequences. So we should the *spiritual* rights of the Holy See, which are inalienable and can bend to no political exigency. We have all along contended that there is and can be no compromise of the spiritual, and we have on more occasions than one had a severe battle to fight with our latitudinarian and compromising Catholics, who would conceal or explain away every thing in their religion offensive to "our separated brethren." On this head we are safe. If any man in the country has the character of a stern, uncompromising Catholic, we have it. It is for politics to bend to religion, not religion to politics; and our precise quarrel with the *oscurantisti* is, that they, in our judgment, sacrifice the interests of their religion to their Old World politics. They, not we, are the party to be rebuked on this head; at least on this head we have no lesson to learn from them. The only rights of the Holy See we have intimated could be yielded are certain political rights, which, it seems to us, can no longer be successfully defended, and which, as things are, we think can be yielded without detriment to religion or society. Foreseeing what was likely to come, we took

occasion, last October, in discussing the rights of the temporal, to meet this objection, by showing that the right of the pope to his temporal principality, though the right of a spiritual person, is not itself a spiritual, but a temporal right; or, in other words, his temporal principality is a temporal, not a spiritual principality, and therefore stands on the footing, and subject to all the conditions, of any other temporal principality justly acquired and legitimately held. There is then no question here of the spiritual rights of the Holy See, or compromise of any principle, doctrine, precept, or right, in the religious or spiritual order.

We hardly need repeat what is so well known to our readers, that we carry our views of the supremacy of the pope, as representative of the spiritual order, as far as any man can do. We hold that he has, by virtue of his office as supreme vicar of our Lord on earth, supreme authority in all that touches the law of God, the law of conscience, or wherever there is a question of doctrine or morals, or of ecclesiastical administration, and the full right, as the vicegerent of God, to rebuke, reprove, chastise, and even deprive of his dignity for Catholics, any and every professedly Catholic prince who forgets, in his civil administration, the law of God, the rights of the church, the liberty of the Catholic conscience, and proves himself determined to oppress, cruelly, grossly, and persistently, his subjects. This, we maintain, is his inherent and indefeasible right as vicegerent of God, as the divinely appointed chief of religion, and as the father and protector of the faithful. This is enough, and, as many Catholics hold, too much. But we do not hold, and never have held that the pope holds his temporal principality by the same title by which he holds this power. We have heard his right of temporal prince defended on various grounds: on the ground of first occupant and prescription; the grants or concessions of princes, Constantine, Pepin, Charlemagne, the Countess Matilda; on popular suffrage or request of the people; on the necessity of protecting and providing for the people abandoned and left without a civil ruler by the iconoclastic emperors of Constantinople; but we have never heard it pretended that he holds it by virtue of his commission as vicar of Jesus Christ, or by the title by which he holds his apostolic authority in the church. His right is an acquired right, valid, inviolable, but still acquired and outside of his right as supreme pontiff. No doubt the spiritual government of the

church is more or less mixed up with the pope's temporal government, and many of the existing arrangements for the administration of ecclesiastical affairs are more or less modified to meet, or are based upon the fact that the pope is a temporal sovereign, and has a temporal principality. The supreme administration of the state and the supreme administration of the church are, for the most part, in the same hands. Much in the mode of transacting ecclesiastical affairs may require to be changed if the separation of church and state be carried out, but still the papal state, as any other, lies in the temporal order.

Assuming this, the whole question we have been discussing lies in the order where compromises are allowable and even necessary. No temporal right, whether held by a secular or a spiritual person or corporation, is absolute, and to be maintained at all hazards. It is held in subordination to religion and society, and when in the changes that take place it becomes incompatible with the good of either, it may be surrendered or redeemed, though not taken away by violence, when not forfeited by abuse, which in the present case is not to be pretended. We assert the principle. It is not for us to apply it. All we wish to establish here is, that though mixed up with the practical administration of ecclesiastical affairs, the pope's temporal government, in its origin and character, is neither a spiritual nor a *quasi*-spiritual government, and therefore with the consent of the pope may be suppressed. As supreme judge of religious interests, the pope is free to act in the case as he judges proper, but how far the feeling among Catholics, that it is in some way intimately connected with the papacy, and essential to it, a feeling that has to be taken into the account, may embarrass his freedom, we are unable to say. All we say is, that we hold him free to consent to a total severing of all *political* bonds between church and state, and we see no other way, with the tendencies of the modern world such as they evidently are, of arriving at a passable solution of the terrible problems pressing every day more and more for solution.

This solution involves in a certain sense the triumph of the *politiques*, as they were called in the time of Henry IV., or what we have strenuously opposed under the name of political atheism, over public right, or system of international law and vested rights introduced by the sovereign pontiffs into Christendom, and consecrated by Christian

diplomacy. We confess it; but all history proves that a victory against the church is a defeat. Our Lord won his kingdom in being crucified by wicked hands; the early Christians conquered the world in being slain, not by slaying. When the Jews shut their ears to the word of God, the apostles turned to the gentiles; and we must turn from kings and kaisers who have betrayed their God, betrayed the church, betrayed society, and betrayed themselves, to the people. THE CHURCH AND THE PEOPLE STILL LIVE. Here is our hope for the future, and here our readers may see why we so strenuously defend the popular cause, so strenuously advocate for all Christendom free forms of government, forms which secure to the people a constitutional and effective voice in public affairs; why we so earnestly insist on the education of the people, on a high and thorough education, as far as practicable, of the whole community; why we defend the political separation of church and state, and wage unrelenting war against the *oscurantisti*, or defenders of the old order of things now out of date. Right or wrong our policy is clear and well-defined, and holds together in all its parts. Through the people we believe the church can revindicate her system of public right and international law, and recover, though under another form, more than she has lost through the perfidy of the sovereigns and the intrigues and complications of politicians. The majority of the American people are un-Catholic, if not anti-Catholic, and yet no people as a state has more scrupulously observed the great principles of natural justice and public right insisted on by the church; and there is no country on earth where the church is as free and independent and her relations are on so satisfactory a footing as in these United States. To those who doubt, we point triumphantly to this grand fact in proof of the justness of our views. Through the people invested with political power, free and intelligent, without forming with them any political bonds, the church may gain a victory, which will more than compensate her for what she has lost by the politicians and sovereigns.*

*The *Syllabus* of Pius IX. condemns the separation of church and state in the sense asserted by the liberals, which means the independence of the state of the law of God, and its right to pursue any policy it pleases, without regard to the rights or authority of religion. What the liberals really mean by the separation of church and state is the omnipotence of the state, and its right, in all matters it chooses to call civil, to trample on the rights or freedom of conscience. The pope condemns

in the *Syllabus* the separation of church and state in this sense, and so does every man not an atheist. God is sovereign, and the state is as much bound to obey the law of God as is a simple individual. Whoever believes in God holds so much.

We no more approve the separation of church and state in this sense than does the Holy Father himself; and we should be no less quick and determined to denounce any action of the state that should restrict the freedom or independence of the church. The liberals mean, by the separation of church and state, the supremacy of the state and its perfect freedom to suppress the church, if it sees proper, confiscate her goods, and exile or hang her priests and religious, whenever these choose to obey God rather than men. We mean by the separation of church and state, the incompetency of the state in spirituals, and the perfect freedom of the church to follow her own laws in the spiritual order, and to teach and govern her own members according to her own constitution, as the kingdom of God on earth, without leave asked or obtained of the state. In a word, we approve and urge the continuance of the relations between church and state which subsist in this country. That is to say, civil protection against violence and spoliation, of all religions not *contra bonos mores*, and interference with none. We still insist that the state even here needs the church.

There is no difference between His Holiness and us with regard to religious liberty, or the obligation of all men to whom it is presented to accept and obey the Catholic religion. Neither sanctions religious indifference, or holds that salvation is possible in any other than the Catholic religion. No man has the moral right, or the right before God, to profess any other religion. No Catholic denies, or can deny this, and remain a Catholic, for to deny this would be to deny that his religion is *Catholic* and obligatory. But though all men are bound morally to receive the Catholic faith, no man can be forced to accept it, against his will or his convictions, either by church or state. To receive the faith is and must be a free act, and neither the church nor the state has any authority to compel any one to receive it. This is, and always has been, the doctrine of the church, as it were easy to prove from the canons of councils, and the teachings of approved theologians. This is the doctrine asserted by us. The doctrine condemned in the *Syllabus* is a very different doctrine; the doctrine that man is morally free, or free before God, to be of any religion he chooses, or of none, which is a virtual denial of the moral law of the universe, and the emancipation of men from the dominion of God. No sane man can pretend it.

The liberty of conscience condemned by Gregory XVI., of immortal memory, and by Pius IX., now gloriously reigning, means that man is not bound to obey God, unless he sees fit to do so; that he is subject to no superior, and under no law but his own will and pleasure. This is not liberty of conscience, but the denial of conscience itself. No man who denies God has any conscience, nor has any one who denies the obligation to conform to the law of God; for conscience is the application, by the man himself in his own interior of the law of God; to his own acts, approving or condemning them. If there is no God, there is no law of God; if no law of God, there is no application of the law of God to one's own acts, and then no conscience. Every sensible man, Catholic or non-Catholic, does and must condemn, not true freedom of conscience, but what, under the name of liberty of conscience, the popes have most justly censured. —February, 1868.

POPE AND EMPEROR.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1861.]

M. Cayla's weak and silly pamphlet, *Pope and Emperor*, has made no little noise among non-Catholics, and considerable importance has been attached to it on the supposition that it was written under imperial inspiration to prepare the French mind for a separation of the church in France from communion with Rome, and its erection into a schismatic national church under the emperor as its supreme pontiff. We think this supposition is gratuitous. We find in the pamphlet no mark of the imperial mind, and we detect in the policy it recommends no *Idée Napoléonienne*. The emperor may have been quite willing to permit its publication, but its responsibility, we presume, rests with the obscure journalist under whose name it is sent forth.

We think none too well of the emperor's Catholicity to believe him capable of adopting the policy recommended by M. Cayla, if he regarded it as necessary or useful to his own interests or those of his dynasty; or, at least, of postponing or sacrificing the interests of the church, without any scruple, to what he regards as the interests of the state; yet we do not believe him hostile to the church, unless where she is hostile to him; and we believe him too able a politician not to see that he could gain nothing, and might lose much by separating from Rome and placing himself at the head of a schismatic church. He has no religious motives, and we can see no political reasons he can have for doing it. France is the most powerful Catholic nation in the world, and could gain no increase of power or consideration by breaking with the pope, and placing herself on the line with other heretical or schismatic states. She has nothing to fear from the politics of Rome, for she is strong enough to defeat any coalition of Catholic powers the pope, if so disposed, could form against her. The other Catholic powers, with Austria at their head, would not be a match for her, and could defeat her

Pape et Empereur. Par J. M. Cayla. Paris: 1860.

arms or her policy only by coalitions with non-Catholic powers; and these coalitions could be as easily formed against her as a schismatic power, as they could be against her as a Catholic power.

If France were a small or weak state in comparison with other Catholic states, and communion with Rome compelled her to adopt a policy which she regarded as contrary to her own political or social interests, she might have a pretext for breaking that communion; but such is not the case now, and it is not likely to be the case hereafter. She has undeniably the leadership among Catholic powers, and, though she may force her policy upon them, they cannot force theirs upon her. Neither has the emperor any thing to apprehend from the old system of public law and Catholic politics sustained by the supreme pontiffs in past ages. He has not only emancipated himself, but also all Europe from that system. The treaty of Paris, March, 1856, put an end to Christendom, and with it to all apprehension from papal politics. The appeals of the Holy Father, backed by nearly all the bishops throughout the world, however they may touch Catholic hearts and move Catholic sympathies, bring no response from the political world. As to exterior politics, the emperor, then, has nothing to gain by schism. France could only lose her Catholic prestige among Catholic powers, and the sympathies of all Catholics throughout the world, without acquiring any additional respect from non-Catholic powers.

In the interior, the emperor could hardly be more independent than he already is. With the edict of Louis XIV. relative to the four articles of the French clergy, in 1682, which he has revived, and the *lois organiques* promulgated by his uncle along with the concordat of 1801, which he refused, when dictator, to repeal, he has nearly all the substantial power over the church in France that he would have in case he were its acknowledged head. He has all the power over the church in France that the old French kings had, and they, Fénelon tells us, "were more popes in France than the pope himself." He could hardly have more power to subject the church to his will were he to adopt the policy of the pamphlet, while his responsibility would be much increased. It is true, his appointments of bishops need the confirmation of the Holy Father, but, ordinarily, these appointments are confirmed as a matter of course, and it is not worth while to throw off

entirely the papal power, in order to get now and then a favorite appointed. Just now Rome has refused to confirm, as bishop of the see of Vannes, the Abbé Maret, not unknown to our readers; and the emperor very possibly, is not pleased. But the contest will not be pushed to extremes by either party, and will end in a compromise, or in one or the other party's giving way. He cannot, on account of occasional opposition of this sort to his will, afford to break with the Holy See, to isolate himself from the whole Catholic world, and to lose that influence, so important to him, which he has exerted and still exerts over the Catholics of other countries, especially Catholics in non-Catholic states, as the representative of the first Catholic power in the world.

The "Napoleonic idea" is not to separate France from the Catholic world, but to place her at the head of that world, and, through the pressure her chief may bring to bear on the pope, to compel it to follow her lead, and to support her policy. The pope is a necessary element in the Napoleonic policy; and to withdraw France from his communion would be a political blunder. It would lose the emperor a useful friend, if it did not raise him up a dangerous enemy. The elder Napoleon reëstablished the papal authority in France, because he wanted the pope as an ally, by whose aid he might secure the coöperation of Catholics in his policy, and through them and his own military and administrative genius, be able to make all non-Catholic powers his vassals, and secure to his dynasty the empire of the world. He found the pope indeed less tractable that he had hoped, but the blunder of attempting to coerce him into support of his policy lost him the throne of France, and sent him to fret himself to death on the barren isle of St. Helena. The present emperor understands tolerably well the blunder of his uncle, and will not be likely to repeat it, although he no doubt counts less than his uncle did on the aid to be derived from the pope.

The policy recommended by M. Cayla is inconsistent with what is evidently the policy of the emperor. The emperor's policy, we take it, is to favor by turns all the parties in France, without giving himself to any one of them. He will give no one party a complete victory over another; but, without completely satisfying any one, he will labor to make each feel that it has, upon the whole, more to hope and less to fear from his government than from any other govern-

ment that could be established in its place. When he finds the church party too strong for their enemies, he will restore the equilibrium by favoring the anti-church party; and when this party becomes too strong for his purpose, he will favor again the church party, and do some act that will gratify his Catholic subjects. He seeks to maintain the equilibrium of parties, and his command of all, by alternately exciting the fears and the hopes of each. Thus, in accordance with the wishes of the liberals, he makes war on Austria, permits, perhaps encourages Victor Emanuel to rob the Holy Father of the greater part of his temporal dominions, and to win back the sympathy of Catholics, sends an expedition into Syria ostensibly to protect their brethren against Mahometan ferocity.

His Italian policy, as long as it was directed chiefly against Austrian prepotence in the peninsula, met generally with the approbation of his Catholic as well as of his non-Catholic subjects; but when it became directed through Sardinia against the temporal dominion of the Holy Father, in accordance with the original programme, as we understood it from the first, it alarmed the French prelates who had hitherto supported him, offended the universal Catholic sentiment, and combined against him nearly the whole episcopate of France, backed by all that remains of the old Catholic, Bourbon, and Orleans parties. He accordingly directs against the bishops, the apparent leaders in the movement, the stringent measures against the press which they had most cordially approved when directed against their enemies. He strengthens himself against them by gaining over more fully the liberals through some slight concessions to liberty. This is his policy; and, in accordance with this policy, he may have encouraged the publication of the pamphlet before us to operate on the fears of the French episcopate, and also on Rome, and, through the threat of a schism, to induce both to cease their opposition to his policy. Yet we do not believe he has the slightest intention of carrying the threat into execution. When the pamphlet has effected the purpose of inducing Rome to confirm his appointments, and the French bishops to withdraw their opposition, it will be forgotten, and the emperor, by some act really serviceable to Catholic interests, will recover the confidence of the church party.

The emperor understands, perhaps better than any other man in France, the real French character. He knows that,

as long as he does not formally break with Rome, as long as he does not place the Gallican church in open, avowed schism, he may manage ecclesiastical affairs very much as he pleases, without meeting with any serious opposition from the French people. Yet the French are, after all, tenacious of the name of Catholic, even when they have little faith and less practice; and they know perfectly well that they would forfeit that name were they to cease to be in communion with the Holy See. We do not believe the emperor could safely break with Rome, and, after the example of the old revolution, establish a new civil constitution of the clergy. His uncle found that he could not govern France separated from the centre of unity, and one of his first acts on acceding to supreme power was to abolish the civil constitution of the clergy the revolution had imposed, and to reëstablish communion with the Holy See. France is more Catholic to-day than she was then, and we believe that the attempt to create and render permanent a religious schism would cost him his throne, and send him to St. Helena to occupy the grave he has there purchased of the British government.

That there is a party in France that thinks with M. Cayla we do not doubt; that that party is not without influence we have just as little doubt; but the emperor will never suffer it to become predominant if he can help it. Yet even that party is in the main opposed to the pope on political rather than on religious grounds; for it is indifferent to all religions rather than actively hostile to any. The political reasons which move them are fast disappearing. That non-Catholic communions should regard the pamphlet as a sign, does not surprise us; but the day for states to secede from the communion of the Holy See has gone by, because there no longer exist any powerful political reasons why they should do so, and religious or theological reasons have lost their force. The political power of the Holy See is gone; nations, great or small, are no longer bound by ecclesiastical laws, or by fear of the political hostility of the pope; and they pursue, undeterred by threats or excommunications, the policy they judge best. There is no longer, in fact, any political dependence on Rome, and Napoleon III. is as much master in his own dominions as in theirs are heretical or schismatic sovereigns. There is, then, no motive for seceding. They have already all the real independence they could have by seceding.

The tendency of the modern world is not in the direction the pamphlet suggests. It is not to the concentration of the civil and ecclesiastical power in the same hands, whether the hands of the pope or of the emperor, but to the separation of church and state—to the emancipation of politics on the one hand, from the control of the spiritual authority, and religion from the authority of the state on the other. The watchword of the day is not, UNION OF CHURCH AND STATE, but RELIGIOUS LIBERTY; and though, in the minds of those who vociferate the words in the loudest tone, religious liberty means little else than the liberty of infidelity, and of making war on the church of God, there is a logic in the human mind that will ultimately compel it to be understood to mean that conscience is free before the civil law, and accountable to God alone, that all religions not *contra bonos mores*, or incompatible with the public peace, must be alike free before the state. Some rejoice in this tendency; some deplore it. We hold it to be irresistible by any human means, and, therefore, cease to war against it. The policy is carried out in our own country, and we have grown up under it. Finding the church freer here than anywhere else on the globe, we are not disposed to quarrel with it, and we actually believe Catholic interests are better protected and promoted here than they would be if the clergy had an orthodox Cæsar to bind or gag their adversaries, and to do their work for them. We feel no hostility to it, and personally like it. All we ask of the state is, that it should acknowledge its own incompetency in spirituals, and recognize and protect our equal rights as citizens. If men choose to be Catholics and go to heaven, the state must not hinder them; if they choose to be infidels, heretics, schismatics, and go to the other place, the state must let them go, and leave them to the consequences of their abuse of their freedom.

The aim of M. Cayla is not religious liberty, but the usurpation of the spiritual authority by the chief of the state. Thus he says: "Victoria of England is queen and papess; the king of Prussia is king and pope; the Protestant sovereigns of the German bund exercise at once religious and political powers; in Sweden, Denmark, and Norway the kings are popes; Alexander II. of Russia is czar and pontiff; Otho of Bavaria is king and pope at Athens. The Sultan of the Turks is emperor and pope. In almost all these states the union of the two powers, especially in

England and Prussia, has favored the development of the national instincts and of liberty. . . . What is good and useful with others will be good and useful in our dear France, that land fruitful in grand and generous ideas." So let Louis Napoleon be recognized as emperor and pope, and be for France the supreme head of the church as well as of the state. Let him break with Rome after the example of Henry VIII. of England, and unite in himself, in their plenitude, both powers.

Our poor author seems not very fruitful in religious ideas, and we have not found in his pamphlet a single moral or religious conception. All his thoughts stop this side the grave, and are of the earth earthy. He seems utterly unconscious of the religious bearing of the question he raises, and, in fact, presents no religious motive for the change he proposes. He is evidently a man without religious convictions, and without religious instruction. He has no conception of religion as law, binding alike on the prince and the subject, and which no one can deliberately violate without sin. God with him is without authority, and man without accountability. He notes no distinction between truth and falsehood, or between right and wrong. The chief of the state is his God, and national prosperity his heaven. His mind is singularly empty of all "grand and generous ideas." All religions are alike to him, the true and the false, the good and the bad, and he has the simplicity—we can hardly call it the impudence—to hold up Mahometan Turkey as worthy, under her political and religious organization, of the imitation of Catholic France.

It seems never to enter the head of our French pamphleteer that what he proposes is incompatible with the essential constitution of the church, and he seems to suppose that Catholics may separate the church in France from the Holy See, unseat the pope, and put the emperor in his place without ceasing to be Catholics. We have not found a word in him that indicates the slightest consciousness that he is proposing the abolition of the Catholic religion, and the resuscitation of defunct heathenism. If he wishes the old Roman cæsarism, under which Cæsar was at once imperator, *pontifex maximus*, and god, why can he not say so in so many words, and let his readers know that it is cæsarism, gentilism as it existed before the conversion of Constantine, that he demands, and not the Christian religion, which combated and vanquished it? Is it that he is ignorant that one can-

not be a double-distilled heathen like himself, and also at the same time a good orthodox Catholic? The cæsarism which consists in clothing the chief of the state with the two powers in their plenitude cannot be defended by a follower of him who is King of kings and Lord of lords, and who has made the secular subordinate to the spiritual. Under the Christian law the two powers are distinct, and whatever authority the spiritual, as the superior, may exercise over the secular, the secular has no spiritual power, and can exercise no ecclesiastical functions whatever. So at least the church teaches as we have learned her teaching; and to deprive the church of her spiritual head, and to give her a layman for her supreme governor, is simply to destroy her, by converting her from a spiritual to a secular institution.

Under this point of view M. Cayla raises no new question. What he proposes is simply that the emperor should force, if force is necessary, French Catholics to become Protestants, schismatics, or heathens. This is all. If they consent to become such, we shall think they are very silly, very mad, or very wicked, but we cannot help it. They may do so if they choose, as men may lie, steal, commit murder, but they cannot do so without ceasing to be Catholics, without forfeiting their Catholic name, and the sympathies of the whole Catholic world. They would cease to be catholic, and become a sect. So much we wish M. Cayla to understand, and those outside the church not to forget. Whether French Catholics, devoted as they are to their emperor, and naturally prone to cæsarism as many of them are, and have lately proved themselves, will consent willingly to the policy recommended, or by any power the emperor can wield, can, in any considerable numbers, be forced to adopt it, is another matter, with regard to which we feel quite at our ease. Frenchmen have proved more than once, light and frivolous as they may appear, that when occasion calls they can be heroes and martyrs. Better not push them too far. They can not only die, but they can erect barricades, and underderstand very well the art of making revolutions.

We, of course, can waste no time in discussing M. Cayla's policy from a religious or theological point of view; but as he professes to be something of a statesman, we may consider it for a moment from the point of view of statesmanship. The state is not and cannot be the church, but still the church presupposes it and consecrates it. The state is a necessity of natural society, which cannot subsist with-

out government of some sort. The true basis of the state is justice, and its legitimate end is the common good, expressed by the two sacramental words, ORDER and LIBERTY. Order without liberty is despotism, and liberty without order is license. The destruction of either is fatal to the common good, and the legitimate ends of natural society. Where the two powers in their plenitude are united in the chief of the state, however it may be where they are united in the chief of the spiritual society, and the prince is at once emperor and pope, there may be order in the sense of despotism, but there is and can be no liberty. There the prince is supreme in both orders—is the living law for both body and soul, and the *dictum* of the Roman jurist, *quod placuit principi, legis habet vigorem*, is theoretically and practically true. The prince is absolute, and interprets and applies alike the law of conscience and that of civil prudence without appeal. Where the two powers are separate, each with its own representative, and in its own order independent of the other, civil despotism can be tempered, and to some extent restrained, by spiritual freedom and independence. But where they are both united in and represented by Cæsar, who is at once imperator and *pontifex maximus*, like the old Roman Cæsars under paganism, there is no guaranty of freedom; the government is an unmitigated despotism; the prince is absolute, and the subject is bound not only hand and foot, but soul and body, and made both morally and physically a slave. The union of the two powers contended for by the author is repugnant to the very end of the state, since incompatible with liberty, essential to the common good.

Now can M. Cayla be so charmed with the imperial despotism already existing in his "dear France," as to wish to extend and intensify it by adding to it the most complete and unmitigated spiritual despotism? He approves the revolution of 1789, and in the name of that revolution invokes the emperor to assume the papal authority over the church in his empire. Would he have us believe that this twofold despotism, reducing both body and soul to slavery, is the last word of that revolution, and yet expect us to approve it? Is that despotism what he as a patriot and a statesman desires for his beautiful country? How long does he think France would remain the "land fruitful in grand and generous ideas," if his policy were to prevail? "When the gods reduce a man to slavery," say the ancients,

"they take away half of his manhood." M. Cayla would go further and take away the other half also. Even our American slaveholders claim, in theory at least, a right only to the bodily services of their slaves, but he would give to the nephew what his uncle had not, dominion over the very souls of his subjects. He would make the emperor, as the Grand Turk, the only free man in his empire, and he thinks it a grand and generous idea to reduce all Frenchmen to abject slavery in both soul and body, and that in doing so he is making provision for the growth of "grand and generous ideas." "Grand and generous ideas," where there are only timid, heartless, crouching slaves; where there are no men, no *generosi!* Is the man mad? Is he besotted? Does he think because he has lost his senses, if he ever had any to lose, that all Frenchmen have lost theirs? Is the old Gallic fire extinct, is the old Teutonic sense of individual independence dead, in French bosoms? Does he believe his countrymen the emasculated and abject slaves of the bas-empire, that he dares insult them with so base a proposition?

If M. Cayla had learned even the first rudiments of statesmanship, he would understand that the true statesman studies to distribute, not to centralize the powers of government. The first grand division is that between the spiritual and the temporal, or church and state. This division is made under the new law by God himself, by giving to the church her own organization independent of that of civil society, and rendering her a complete kingdom or commonwealth in herself. This division of church and state is not enough to secure full and adequate civil and political freedom, but it is one of its principal conditions. Where the church is independent of the state, and the clergy hold from an authority independent of the civil, there is a moral and spiritual power ever present that maintains the interior freedom and moral independence of the subject, and that serves to mitigate the despotism of the political sovereign. Owing to this independence of the church the bishops and clergy in France are able to offer some resistance to the imperial despotism, and to keep alive in the hearts of Frenchmen the memory of freedom. Reduce the bishops and clergy to servitude, make them dependent on the emperor as their spiritual superior, and there would be in France no power, body, or corporation resting on a basis of its own, and capable of making a stand for any sort of lib-

erty. The church would cease to represent the rights and authority of the spiritual order, and become only a part of the machinery of administration, an instrument of the imperial despotism. Grant that the church in France, holding from the pope, and to a certain extent independent of the state, is capable of offering resistance to the policy of the emperor; grant, what we by no means concede, that the prelates as a matter of fact offer an inopportune or unjustifiable opposition, still a wise statesman will not seek to lessen far less to destroy their independence or to prevent the possibility of opposition, for the time may come when that independence and power of opposition may be as necessary to protect the sovereign against his subjects as it is now to protect the subject from the excesses of power—to protect order as it is now to protect liberty.

The evil of the political and civil organization of France, as admitted by her wisest and ablest statesmen, is in the centralization of power, and the absence of independent political powers or bodies in the state, subordinate to the central power indeed, but not created by it, or holding from it. The imminent danger of a dissolution of our federal Union at the moment we are writing, cannot make us deny that the sovereignty of the Union is derived from the states, or wish to convert the states into prefectures holding from the federal Union. The exaggeration or abuse of states' rights threatens the Union to-day, but those rights may be necessary to-morrow to protect the states and through them liberty from the despotism of the Union. In no possible civil constitution can you secure great advantages without greater or less corresponding evils, and no man is less worthy of being called a statesman than he who hopes so to constitute the state as to exclude the possibility of evil. In France there is a complete centralization of power. The departmental and communal governments, if governments they may be called, do nothing to decentralize it, for they derive from the central power, depend on it, and are only conveniences for local administration. They stand on no bottom of their own. The French noblesse once had a political existence, but they are now a merely titular nobility, without political functions or significance. There are no corporations, institutions, or public bodies in France that have any political rights of their own, or whose consent is necessary to the legality of any measure the emperor may choose to adopt. We will not pretend to say what the

senate and legislative body may in time become, but at present they have no real political power, and can impose no real restraint on the imperial will. They are in reality only instruments of administration, and present only a mockery of representative government. The whole power of the state is in the hands of the emperor. Now add to his powers as chief of the state the supreme ecclesiastical power in its plenitude, as M. Cayla proposes, and tell us what liberty is left either to the nation or to the individual? The emperor could say then, not only *l'état c'est moi*, but also, *l'église c'est moi*. He would then be himself emancipated from all control, civil and moral, and the French people would be absolutely subjected to him in both spirituals and temporals.

The liberty of the press is null in France. Discussion and publicity are tolerated only so far as pleases his imperial majesty, and the means of bringing the intelligence and moral force of the nation to bear in favor of liberty or wise and just government can even now hardly be found, and would be wholly annihilated were the emperor able to silence the bishops, or to bring them wholly within his power. If he could fill the sees at will with creatures of his own, and suspend or depose any prelate who showed any independence, or who dared give utterance to unpalatable truths, or expression to unwelcome sentiments, there would and could be no free voice in the empire besides that of the emperor. Intelligence would soon grow feebler and feebler, the mind would stagnate, literature would lose its originality, freshness, and vigor, moral sentiments would languish, and the whole tone of society would become low and servile. Men would disappear, for they would find no exercise for their manhood, and the emperor would soon find himself the only man in his empire, and having no men to command, no men to reign over, would himself soon cease to be a man. Is such a state of things what the author would bring about in his *chère France?*

There are no bitterer enemies of the temporal government of the pope than the class of persons represented by the author. Nothing shocks them more than to find priests exercising political powers; but they see nothing improper in politicians exercising sacerdotal powers. When it is a question of the union of the two powers in the chief of the church, they are indignant, remind the clergy that their "kingdom is not of this world," and clamor for a separation of church and state; but when it is a question of the union

of the two powers in the chief of the state, they change their tune; they think the union then very reasonable, very just, and adapted to a nation prolific in "grand and generous ideas." Then they demand not the separation of church and state, but their union. They cannot endure that the Holy Father should have a house of his own, and the temporal government of a small state in Italy with about three millions of subjects; but they would be charmed to see the autocrat of the most powerful state in Europe joining to his power as temporal prince the spiritual supremacy over thirty-six millions of consciences. Now it strikes us that it is wiser, if the two powers must be united in one person, to unite them in the person of the supreme pontiff than in the person of the emperor, for we would rather fall under the political authority of priests than under the ecclesiastical authority of politicians. Priests may sometimes blunder in politics, but statesmen never do otherwise than blunder in spirituals, and as spirituals are much the more important, blunders in them are much more hurtful than blunders in secular matters.

We have here no occasion to discuss the propriety of merging the state in the church, or aggregating the powers of the state to those of the priesthood, for we said all that is necessary to be said on that point in the article on *Separation of Church and State.* The separation of the two powers does not mean, in our mind, the aggregation of the powers of the church to those of the state, or those of the state to those of the church. In the ordinary sense in which the word is taken, we defend not a theocracy, or the placing of the temporal government in the hands of the priesthood, but we see not what could be gained by placing the government of the church in the hands of statesmen and laymen. M. Cayla and his friends would cry out against us with all the force of their lungs if we should propose to merge the state in the church, and make the supreme pontiff supreme in temporals as well as in spirituals; but are we expected to receive with more favor their proposition to merge the church in the state, and make the emperor supreme in spirituals as well as in temporals? Can they not see that their proposition involves the union of the two powers as much as does that which they oppose? Do they not see that if in theocracy they lose man, in their *statocracy* they lose God? if in the former there is a pantheistic tendency, in the latter there is an atheistic tendency? Is atheism any

better than pantheism? If the pope would make but a poor emperor, is it certain that the emperor would make a good pope? Is it certain that the administration of civil government in subordination to spiritual and eternal interests would be a greater evil than the administration of the spiritual government in subordination to purely local and temporary interests?

The difficulty with these men is that they are political atheists, and believe in no spiritual order. They regard the church as being in reality no more spiritual than the state. They see in man nothing but the human animal, and in the universe no order but the political. They exclude from their universe the whole order represented by the church, that is to say the whole moral order, as distinguished from the physical and material. They attempt to found the state without any recognition of moral and religious ideas, on material interests alone. They eliminate the soul, the spirit, the heart, the nobler part of man, on which alone depends all that is great, grand, noble, heroic, or touching in human society or human character, and then labor to establish and maintain government by mere brute force. Reducing men to brutes, they would govern them as brutes. And this is what they call the progress of civilization! The state proceeding independently of moral and religious ideas and principles is a mere physical machine, and its force is mere brute force. The installation of the chief of the state as supreme pontiff is not the elevation of the state to the moral and religious order, but is the suppression of that order or its depression to a level with the material order, which amounts to the same thing. It would be the materialization of religion, and the substitution of physical force for moral right.

Now we tell M. Cayla and his friends that the suppression or subordination of the moral and religious order, or the reduction of man to the mere human animal, puts a people out of the condition of being well governed, or of sustaining a government that can permanently advance or even protect purely material interests themselves. The emperor of the French is trying the experiment, but when the moral force of the French nation accumulated before his accession to power is spent, he will find himself face to face with a nation of brutes, or with an infuriated mob, and his empire gone. The whole history of the modern world proves, as does the whole history of the ancient gentile world, that the

attempt to maintain society with mere human animals can never be successful. Even the gentiles had to bring in the gods, and in the absence of religion resort to superstition. The state itself must be founded in moral ideas, or else it has and can have no real, solid, or permanent basis, for Plato proved to you centuries ago, that all reality is in ideas, and that what is not ideal is mutable and transitory. It is, then, an essential requisite of a well-ordered state that it should recognize and respect the freedom and independence of the ideal order, and not attempt to subject to itself the spiritual, the universal, the unchangeable, and the eternal—the only real.

For us Catholics this ideal, spiritual, or moral and religious order, on which all that is permanent, good, or really useful in society or the state depends, is represented by the church, whose supreme governor is called the pope. To aggregate the functions of the pope to those of the emperor or chief of the state is to bring this whole order into subjection to the material. It leaves in the breasts of the subjects of the government only two motives to which it can appeal for support, namely, interest and fear. Where these are the only motives that can be appealed to, or that can have scope for their activity, all the noble sentiments of the heart, tenderness, devotedness, loyalty, heroism, disinterestedness, all that goes to make up the nobility of man, the grandeur and charm of human society would be enfeebled and gradually suppressed, and the nation would become a nation of cold-hearted, cruel, and selfish cowards. The whole mind and soul, the whole activity of the people would be absorbed in worldly pursuits, and nothing would be esteemed that does not directly or indirectly contribute to material development and prosperity. We see it all through the modern world. The sense of morality is weakened, and well-nigh extinct, honor or honesty is forgotten, loyalty is despised, treason ceases to be a crime, and there is not public virtue or public spirit enough left to carry on a free government. The only possible remedy is in emancipating the moral order from the control of the state, of leaving the church free and independent to rehabilitate moral ideas, to develop and strengthen the nobler and more disinterested sentiments of the human heart, to free men's souls from their slavery to things of time and sense, and to infuse into them moral courage, and render them capable of wedding themselves for life or for death to truth, to right, to justice. Self-interest or fear can

never produce this moral heroism, and without it you can never have a well-ordered state, that is, a state in which order and liberty are united. This moral heroism is impossible in a state where the moral order is excluded, or the spiritual is subjected to the temporal. The policy M. Cayla recommends would then be no less fatal to the state than to the church.

The instances M. Cayla assigns in proof of the secular wisdom of his policy do not, when carefully examined, prove any thing to his purpose. That England has developed her national instinets, whatever that may mean, and under some relations preserved or advanced liberty in spite of her separation from Rome and the subjection of her church to the royal supremaey, we do not deny; but that her sehismatic and royal policy has served the eause of liberty or of national prosperity we cannot admit. The first effect of that policy was to destroy the old English freedom, to reduce to zero the independence of parliament, and to render the monarch absolute. It is idle to talk of the liberty of Englishmen from the death of Cardinal Wolsey to the summoning of the long parliament under Charles I., except their liberty to war against Catholicity and to persecute Catholies. The freedom which Englishmen now boast of enjoying, consists in part of the recovery of the liberty possessed by the nation before the schism, and in part of conquests made since the great rebellion in the seventeenth century, and is due to the memory of the past and to the fact that a very considerable portion of the English people never did submit, and never by all the power of the state could be made to submit, to the royal supremacy in matters of religion. The old Puritans had no objection to using the state to impose their religion on those who would not willingly accept it, but they no more than Catholics admitted the right of the state to judge of religion. The state, they held, was bound to obey the word of God as expounded by godly ministers, and to protect and enforee only the religion enjoined by what they called the church. The English Puritans, aided by the Scotch who rejected episcopacy and held the king bound to obey the kirk instead of governing it, were able to overthrow the royal supremaey in both church and state, which has never in religion been practically reëstablished for more than a small fraction of the people subject to the British erown. England owes her present liberty to the Puritans and other dissenters, and to the fact that the Scotch are for the most part Pres-

byterians, and the great body of the Irish are Catholics. Victoria may be the head of the Anglican church, but that church is the church of only a small minority of those who cheerfully acknowledge and affectionately submit to her as queen.

Prussia has extended her territory by war and conquest, but her progress toward political liberty has been just in proportion to the relaxation of her king in his control of ecclesiastical matters, and to the increase of the number of his subjects who refuse to recognize his popedom. One-third of the population of Prussia are Catholics who do not own him for pope; add to these the old Lutherans who stand out against his new-fangled Evangelical church, and those who recognize no church, no religion of any sort, and you will find that he is pope for only the smaller number of his subjects. The solidity of Russian progress may be questioned, for like nearly all modern states she is eaten up with corruption. But be this as it may, Russia certainly owes nothing to the usurpation of papal functions by her emperor. Had she remained in communion with the Holy See she would long ago, we can hardly doubt, have fulfilled her mission of driving out the Turks, restoring the Christian East, and making Constantinople the capital of her empire. The most formidable dangers Russia has to apprehend arise precisely from the subjection of the church to the state by Ivan the Terrible, and the assumption of the papacy by Peter the Great. The nation then lost its liberties, tzarism became established, and the religious innovations introduced by the synod of St. Petersburg acting under the authority of the emperor have created a formidable schism in the bosom of the empire. The whole church groans in its bondage and sighs for deliverance. The old Russian party which reject the imperial innovations and threaten to make common cause with the revolutionary party, are much stronger than is commonly supposed, and if they do, the Russian emperor and the Russian pope may experience the fate of Louis XVI. of France. As to Turkey, "the sick man," we need not enlarge. Neither the internal nor external condition of that empire says much in favor of the union of the two powers in the chief of the state. It may, however, be taken as a fair example of what France in a couple of generations would become, were the emperor mad enough to adopt the policy recommended by our author.

Poor M. Cayla is as unsuccessful as a historian as he is

as a statesman. He supposes the Frank monarchs created the papacy by creating the bishop of Rome a temporal prince, and investing him as their vassal with the government of the states of the church. The papacy, therefore, grows out of the temporal principality, and the bishop of Rome is pope because he is king, not a king because he is pope. The author could not have made a greater blunder if he had had a schismatic Anglican divine for his teacher. As to the precise date of the origin of the temporal sovereignty, or the precise causes which made the pope a sovereign prince, we shall say nothing now. It is enough to say that the pope never was a subject of any temporal prince, and never can be. He represents him who is King of kings and Lord of lords. He is above all earthly monarchs by the law of Christ, and if he ever submits to a temporal sovereign even in temporals, it is as our Lord himself paid tribute to Cæsar, for the sake of peace, and to avoid scandal. The status of prince belongs to him by right of his office as vicar of Christ, for by that office he is declared independent, and clothed with plenary authority to govern all men and nations in all things relating to salvation. He never was the subject of the Roman emperor, much less the vassal of the Frank monarchs. It was the pope that made Pepin le Bref king of the Franks, not Pepin that made the bishop of Rome pope. It was not Charlemagne that made St. Leo III. pope, but St. Leo III. that conferred on Charlemagne the imperial dignity, and made him his coadjutor in the temporal government of the Roman states. The papacy existed and was acknowledged by Catholics throughout the world, to say the least, long before the accession of the Carlovingians to the Frank monarchy.

The papaey never depended on the temporal sovereignty, and would exist if the temporal sovereignty were lost. The bishop of Rome was not made pope by acquiring the temporal principality, but that principality was acquired by him, or conferred on him, because he was already pope, that he might be independent in his spiritual government of the universal church. Even the temporal power, if such you insist upon calling it, which the pope so long exercised as the chief of the political as well as of the religious world, did not depend on his temporal sovereignty, nor was it sustained by that sovereignty. He was the arbitrator between sovereign and sovereign, and sovereigns and their subjects, not because he was sovereign of the Roman states, but be-

cause he was the father of Christendom, the supreme representative of God on the earth. Deprive him of his temporal dominion you would do a great wrong to the Holy See, but you would not deprive him of one particle of his legitimate authority as pope. They who imagine that the loss of the temporal principality would involve the destruction of the papacy, and put an end to the Catholic Church, reckon without their host. In the providence of God the pope has become a temporal prince; in the providence of God he may cease to be a temporal prince; but he will remain what he has been from St. Peter down to Pius IX., now gloriously reigning, the vicar of Jesus Christ, the vicegerent of God on earth. The temporal principality gives him no ecclesiastical power or right. As pope he is all without it, that he is with it. The depriving him of it releases the Catholic from no obligation to be in communion with him, or to obey him as the chief of his religion.

But though the loss of his temporal dominion would not in the least affect the spiritual authority of the pontiff, who in the Catacombs as in the Vatican or the Quirinal would be equally the vicar of Jesus Christ and the vicegerent of God, yet it might have a disastrous effect on his freedom and independence in its exercise, and for this reason Catholics defend it, and the enemies of the papacy make war against it. What effect it would have in this respect we shall not stop to inquire, for that would lead us into a discussion foreign to our present purpose. But his entire freedom and independence in the exercise of his spiritual sovereignty is the divine right of the Holy Father, and essential to the well-being of the church. The church is not simply presbyterian, or episcopal, but apostolic, that is to say, papal. Our Lord founded his church on Peter, and continues the apostolic power in Peter's successor. The suppression of the papal authority would be the suppression of the church herself, or her perversion from the church into a sect, even though her rights and dogmas should remain unchanged. There may be differences of opinion among Catholics as to the best practical means of securing in the present state of things the papal independence, but there can be none as to that independence itself, or as to the duty of Catholics to maintain it at all hazards. Never was that independence more seriously threatened than now, since the conversion of the Roman empire. Never was the duty of defending it more urgent, and never was it more necessary

that all loyal Catholics should be on the alert to discover and defeat the machinations of the politicians.

M. Cayla shows us very clearly, if the same thing were not otherwise shown, that it is idle for Catholics to rely for the freedom and independence of the church on political power constituted as it now is in France and most other continental states. He says to us, contrary to his intention, "put not your trust in princes." We do not believe the emperor of the French is in his intentions toward the church below the average of Catholic sovereigns, and we are far from believing him disposed to adopt the extreme policy M. Cayla recommends, but his antecedents, his declarations, his present conduct, all go to prove that he means to be master in his own empire, to subject the clergy to his will, and compel the pope to submit to his policy. Having defeated Austria, who had so long domineered over the Holy Father and subjected the clergy to her police, he is now determined to put France in her place. Without creating or approving a formal schism, he will yet exert all his power, if necessary, to prevent the pope at Rome, or the bishops and clergy in France, from offering any serious opposition to his secular policy.

This is no more than should have been expected from the first. We know nothing more idle than to look for an orthodox Cæsar, who will stand by the Holy Father and maintain the freedom and independence of the church. Such a Cæsar has never been known. Cæsar may have religious sensibility, he may even understand the necessity of religion to uphold his power and to keep his subjects loyal and submissive; but he can never wish the freedom and independence of the church in his dominions; for if free and independent she divides power with him, and he would have no division of power. He would reign supreme and alone, a God on earth. He can tolerate no brother near the throne, and suffer, if he can help it, the church to exist no further than he can use her in the interests of his government. This lies in the very nature of cæsarism, whether called Christian or pagan. Cæsar never can be the supporter of the freedom and independence of the supreme pontiff, for that means the freedom and independence of the church. He never does willingly and never can sustain the pope any further than he can use him. Hence the fearful struggles in the middle ages between the pope and the emperor. The pope would maintain the freedom and indepen-

dence of the church as a spiritual kingdom complete in herself; the emperor would have no constituted power or body in his empire that was independent of his authority, and which he could not control. The pope would maintain the church independent; the emperor would subject her to the political authority. Hence the struggle. Hence the inveterate hostility in all ages of the cæsarists to the papacy.

We can see no way of guarantying the freedom and independence of the supreme pontiff, and therefore the freedom and independence of the church in each state so long as cæsarism is suffered to stand. The fault is not in the man; it is in the system; and we can never expect Cæsar and Peter to live in peace together. There is no human security for religious freedom, but in making war to the knife on cæsarism, in whatever form or guise it may show itself. We cannot rely on concordats, for Cæsar will either not keep his word and execute them, or he will struggle to pervert them to instruments of tyranny in regard to his subjects. The parties are not equal; the one is armed, the other is unarmed. The one wields the physical power of the state, the other wields only the power of faith, which in our days is weak. Spiritual censures are despised, and the popes can no longer combine a political force sufficient to compel the perjured prince to keep his engagements. We can succeed only by limiting the power of government, by establishing a free government, which guaranties the political equality of the citizens, and secures in the general freedom of the citizen the freedom of religion, as is done in our own country. This we believe is the only practicable way of attaining adequate guaranties for the freedom and independence of the church. We must labor so to constitute the state that every man shall have recognized by the constitution, as one of the inherent and indefeasible rights of the citizen, the right to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience. This right of conscience implies full and entire freedom of the church in the state, and can be infringed only by those acts which would infringe the recognized rights of all citizens whether Catholic or non-Catholic.

The political liberty we demand is, even in reference to the temporal order itself, a great good and worth struggling for; but at our age, after having fought so many battles for it, undergone so many defeats, encountered so many discouragements, experienced so many disappointments, and

seen so many brilliant hopes vanish, we should not continue the struggle were we not profoundly convinced that it is necessary as the condition of securing the freedom and independence of our religion. The body is of little account; it will soon be dust, and whether it suffers a little more or a little less, whether it smarts under the lash of a taskmaker, or wastes away under disease, is a matter in itself worthy of no serious consideration, certainly of no serious struggle to one who, at furthest, must soon bid adieu to this world and all its interests. But the liberty of the mind, the liberty of the soul, the liberty of conscience, the liberty of religion, is a good one is never too old to struggle for, and which is cheaply purchased at the expense of the dungeon, the stake, or the scaffold. It is the sum of all liberty, and is a good which one may carry with him into that life which never dies. We ask political freedom, we ask political guaranties of the rights of men, because we ask freedom of conscience and the full freedom and independence of our religion. We ask not freedom to oppress the consciences of others, but freedom to follow our own, and this freedom we think can be secured by founding the state on equal rights, and making the liberty of religion the political right of the citizen.

We know perfectly well that such a *régime* gives the church no advantage before the state over the sects. She and they will stand on a footing of perfect equality before the civil constitution. She cannot use the state to force them to recognize her authority, and they cannot use it to force her children to renounce their spiritual mother, and accept their heresy. But this is only in accordance with the general order of Providence. Our Lord proffers his grace to all, but he forces no one to accept it. We arraign not the past; "sufficient for the day is the evil thereof." We pronounce no judgment on the abstract rights either of the church or of the state. We ask not what has been, nor what would be, if all rights could be practically asserted and carried out. We look only at what is practicable, men being as they are, and the world as it is. Whatever heated disciples, who know not what manner of spirit they are of, or old men, oppressed by their memories, may demand, we are persuaded that we can secure freedom for the church only by conceding equal freedom to the sects. We can secure liberty for truth only by conceding liberty for error, liberty for good only with liberty for evil. This all the world will concede, and with this we must be content.

With this we for ourselves are content. We have confidence in truth, and certain of having the truth, we fear nothing from the free and open encounter with error. We do not want the state to bind and gag our adversaries, or to dispatch them for us. We want no advantage over them but what we have in the intrinsic superiority of our religion, and in this we are true to the spirit of our church, who asks for her celestial Spouse only free and willing servants, who serve him from choice, from love, not from servile fear or compulsion. The officiousness of civil government and half-pagan disciples insisting on the legislation of ancient Rome, where the two powers were united, not separated as under the Christian law, has always embarrassed her, obscured her spiritual loveliness, and raised her up innumerable enemies. If it had comported with the designs of our Lord to have used force to compress error or to advance truth, it would have cost him nothing to have suppressed at once all error, and left truth no enemy to grapple with. Nay, he could have prevented all error, all sin, all evil. But it pleased him to create man with free will, and it pleases him in his government of man to respect that free will. He leaves man the liberty of error, the liberty of evil, otherwise there would be no error, no evil in the world. The state is bound to suppress and punish violence, and maintain peace and equality of rights, and when it does so much, it probably does all that can be of any real service to the cause of truth and religion. All the church needs to command intelligence, and to win souls to Christ, is an open field and fair play. If you will neither gag nor bind her, she asks not that you gag or bind her adversaries. Fénelon, when he went on his mission to the Huguenots, stipulated that the dragoons of the king should be withdrawn, and no force be used or displayed. The church is stronger in her simple vestments, armed only with the sword of the Spirit than when clad in the armor and armed with the sword and lance of Cæsar. When the stripling David went forth to meet the challenge of Goliath, who had defied the armies of Israel, he refused the sword and armor of Saul, and advanced in his simple shepherd's garb, with a shepherd's sling and five smooth stones from the brook; so goes clothed and armed the champion of truth to do battle with the giant Error. He wants not the incumbrance of Saul's armor. He takes nothing from the king. With his sling and smooth stone he smites the giant on his head, and fells him to the earth.

The great fault with us all is our want of confidence in truth. We feel that truth is an infant that cannot stand alone, or a child not to be trusted to itself. We must swathe it, hold it up, and lead it. We fear it cannot sustain itself, much less sustain us. We treat it as if it were error. But we should know that truth, and that only truth can stand alone, and that truth and only truth can sustain itself or sustain us. Truth is great and will prevail. Of all things truth is the most powerful and the most prolific. He who has the truth and dare trust it, dare confide himself without reserve to it, is omnipotent, and no power on earth or in hell can stand against him. Never yet was a true word honestly spoken that fell to the ground and was absorbed as water in the sand. God himself tells us his word shall prosper in the thing whereunto he sends it, for his word is truth. The truth honestly spoken is sure to reach some heart, to germinate, and in its season to bear fruit. Let us then have confidence in truth, and never fear that truth can be put to the worst in a free and open encounter with error. All heaven and all that is good and powerful on earth fight with it, and for it, and render it invincible. If ever truth fails to ride forth conquering and to conquer, it is because she is bound in the house of her friends, or held back by their untimely fears and miserable cowardice.

We have, then, no wish to see our church using the state to suppress dissent, and to force a uniformity which has no foundation in conviction and affection. We believe that for the civil government in our days to do more for her than to maintain her simple freedom to teach and govern according to her own doctrines and laws those who are willing members of her communion, would be to do little good and immense harm. Deprive error of all power to use the state against her, and she can well consent to forego all power to use the state against it. Let her and the sects stand on the same footing before the state. Let the state recognize as before herself the equal rights of her and them, and protect those rights simply as included in the equal political rights of the citizen, which are regarded as anterior to the state, and which the state is instituted to protect and defend under the name of liberty. Under such an order the church can live and flourish, and better than under a government which professes to favor her, and which is sure to demand a liberal cession of her liberty as the price of the

favor it extends to her. But this order can be realized only where political liberty is recognized and constitutionally guarantied. Hence the reason why we wage such unrelenting war against cæsarism, against all the unmixed forms of government, and contend with what strength and ability God gives us for political liberty, or what in the English-speaking world is called "self-government."

M. Cayla's pamphlet shows us the danger the church always has to apprehend from cæsarism,—dangers in part averted in the middle ages, because the pope was then the chief of the political world, and could form political combinations sufficient to hold Cæsar in check. But that is now no longer practicable, for no political combinations can now be formed for defending the rights or interests of the church. We hope the pamphlet will open the eyes of our European *oscurantisti*, and recall the idolaters of Cæsar, or those Catholics who have been so ready to throw both church and state under his feet, to a sense of their dignity as men, and of their duty as Christians. If it have such a tendency, it will have rendered to society civil and religious far greater service than the author dreamed of rendering. There are people who will not regard the good, till alarmed by the evil of its absence. The Spartans taught their sons temperance by exhibiting before them the disgusting spectacle of their drunken slaves. M. Cayla's pamphlet may perform a similar service for the incense-burners to Cæsar, and lead them to appreciate the benefits and necessity of political freedom. If so, the slave will have performed perhaps the best service of which he was capable, and half gain the forgiveness of those whose sense of justice and decency he has outraged.

THE REUNION OF ALL CHRISTIANS.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1862.]

We have heard Father Nampon's work spoken of as a work of rare merit, and we regret that it did not fall into our hands when we could have enjoyed the pleasure of reading it. The few pages that we have ventured to look over have satisfied us that it is an able and learned work, and perhaps the best work of its class that has recently been published. We introduce it to our readers, however, not for the purpose of analyzing its contents, or pronouncing a judgment on its merits. We do it simply to acknowledge its reception, and to thank the unknown friend who has been so kind as to send us a copy. Hereafter, should we recover the full use of our eyes, we may speak of it more at length.

Though we have no intention of reviewing Father Nampon's work we may be permitted, we trust, to make use of its title, as a text for some general and independent remarks of our own on the method or methods of effecting the purpose for which the excellent father has written; namely, the reunion of all Christian communions. It may be that he has anticipated our remarks, or that his views and our own on the subject perfectly coincide; and it may be that he and we differ widely as to the best method of gaining the end we both alike seek to effect. However this may be, we shall present our own views, without seeking to shelter ourselves under his authority, and without meaning to imply that there is any antagonism between him and us.

Father Nampon's title indicates that he seeks in the definitions and doctrinal decrees of the Council of Trent the means of bringing about "the reunion of all Christian communions," and in this he may judge not unwisely. The Council of Trent is justly regarded as one of the greatest

**Étude de la Doctrine Catholique dans le Concile de Trente, proposée comme Moyen de Réunion de toutes les Communions Chrétiennes. Conférences prêchées à Genève, pendant le Jubilé de 1851, sur le Texte nouvellement traduit du Concile de Trente.* Par le R. P. Nampon, de la Compagnie de Jésus. Paris: 1852.

and most venerable of all the councils of the church, and its doctrinal decrees are and must be accepted by every Catholic as infallible truth. But, after all, these decrees do not cover the whole of Catholic faith. They were all framed with the view of pointing out errors to be avoided, rather than indicating truth to be believed. The most profound and diligent study of them could never, of itself alone, give us a full and adequate conception of the Catholic religion. They are negative, rather than positive, and, even when positive, fail to present us truth as a whole, or the several truths they define as integrated in the life or informing principle of the church herself. This is no objection to the council, and detracts nothing from the veneration due it; for it was not its purpose to draw up a *credo*, or to give an explicit statement of the Catholic *credenda*. Its purpose was to condemn the errors and heresies of the innovators and reformers of the sixteenth century, and therefore to present Catholic truth only so far as those errors and heresies impugned it. It gives us the truth not in its entireness, but only so far as it stands opposed to certain errors and heresies, or only so far as necessary to preserve the purity and integrity of Catholic faith against them. The simple statement and exposition of its acts may be very useful, and, indeed, very necessary to enlighten the faithful, and to guard them against the propositions condemned; but they can hardly be sufficient to bring back those who have gone astray to the unity of faith. For that it is necessary to go further, and to integrate the definitions of the holy synod in the living body of Catholic truth. The heterodox have either never had, or have lost, the conception of unity, and, though not destitute of all truth, they embrace it only in its variety and multiplicity. To bring them back into the church, to make them real and not merely formal Catholics—Catholics from internal conviction, not merely through blind submission—it is necessary to restore in their minds that conception, and to present them truth not in detail or in fragments, but in its generative principle, in its unity and universality, as an organic whole, so that they may see that to hold the errors condemned by the Council of Trent, or by any other council, would be not merely to deny particular definitions made on the authority of the church, but the principle, and indeed, the whole *schema* of the Gospel, and therefore to deny Christ himself.

The question of the reunion of all Christian communions

is the great question with all sincere and earnest Catholics; and no inquiry can be more important, and none should have a deeper or more absorbing interest for us, than the inquiry as to the best and surest method of effecting it. The Christian world—embracing under the term both the orthodox and the heterodox—presents to-day a sad spectacle; and nothing is more certain than that both religion and civilization suffer materially from its divisions. All honest and earnest-minded men, of whatever communion, deplore these divisions, and seek to heal them, and to reëstablish unity and peace. All clear-sighted men see and understand that this unity and peace must be real, not factitious, and rest for its basis not on compromise or mutual concessions, but on the unity of truth and conviction. Truth is one, and cannot be divided. It is independent of us, above us, and ours only as it lives in our convictions, and informs our life. It has authority over us, but we have none over it. We have, therefore, no right to restrict it, to confine it, to give it away, or make any pact or compromise with error. Certain it is, then, that the reunion so ardently desired can be effected only on the basis of truth; and that unity, to be real and permanent, must be the unity of truth itself, living and operating in the convictions of all Christians. We, as Catholics, can yield, in order to effect it, nothing of truth or of Catholic faith; and the heterodox, or those separated from us, can just as little yield any thing of the truth contained in their doctrines and convictions. They are as much bound to stand fast by the truth they have, as we are to stand fast by the truth we have. Any attempt, therefore, at reunion by way of compromise, by mutual concession, would be wrong in principle, and necessarily fail in practice. The reunion is possible only by means of a doctrine that at once embraces all truth in its unity and universality—presented to the understanding of all the parties concerned so as to accept and integrate in dialectic harmony the several elements of truth which they may respectively hold, and which, by not being held in that harmony, now produce the divisions to be healed.

We, as Catholics, profess to have truth in its unity and universality; and, if truly Catholic, we certainly so have it. But do we, in our ordinary methods of dealing with the heterodox, actually present it to their understandings in its unity and universality? Do we present the truth we have in such a manner that it is seen to embrace in dialectic har-

mony the truth, or portions of truth, which it must be conceded they also have? Do we enable them to see clearly that what they are required to accept from us is only truth, and that what they are required to give up to us is only error? These questions are both pertinent and important; and questions from which we should not recoil. Let us take the ordinary method of our controversialists in dealing with those who are separated from us, what we call the *Method of Authority*, and see if there is not something lacking in the truth we present, or at least in our mode of presenting it.

This method begins by establishing the dominion of God over his creatures, and his right to govern them as he judges proper. From his right of dominion it proceeds to infer his right to delegate his authority to angels or to men, and to govern through them or by them, as his ministers or vicars. It then, by what it calls "motives of credibility," proves the fact that he has so delegated his authority, and delegated it to the Catholic Church, which it identifies with the church in communion with the see of Rome, and presided over by the pope, the visible head of Christ's kingdom on earth. Having established this much, it concludes, with an invincible logic, that what the church teaches is and must be true; since, teaching by divine authority, she must be infallible, for God is truth, and can in no sense authorize the teaching of error. After having established the infallibility of the church, the only question to be asked is, What does the church teach? The fact that she teaches a doctrine sufficiently accredits it, sufficiently authorizes its belief, and renders him guilty of rebellion against God, who, knowing she teaches it, refuses to believe it.

This method is strictly logical, and the "motives of credibility" drawn from the historical facts and monuments in the case are amply sufficient. The argument for the church, or for any particular doctrine she teaches, constructed in accordance with this method, is strictly unanswerable, and, objectively considered, perfectly conclusive. Yet all experience proves that this argument, however clearly set forth, however forcibly put, has practically very little, if any, efficacy, in convincing non-Catholics of the truth of our religion. It silences, but it does not convince. They listen to it, examine it, confess that there is no flaw in it, and remain non-Catholics as before. Most of us, who are converts, have used this argument after our conversion, in our

efforts to convert our former brethren; but very few of us, if any, were ever moved by it to enter the church, and, if it had any weight with us before entering her communion, it was only after the principal work of our conversion had been already effected by other means.

Indeed, though our controversialists all use the method of authority, our clergy actually engaged on the missions have very little confidence in its practical efficacy. Nothing is more common than to hear them express their conviction that men are rarely, if ever, converted by argument, and that there is little or no use in arguing with those outside of the church. They find their arguments so far barren of results, that they seem to distrust the efficacy of any method of proof that is or can be adopted, and to conclude that it is little or nothing that they can do toward the conversion of the heterodox. They even tell us that reasoning is useless—sometimes worse than useless—in the work of conversion, and that we must leave the conversion of unbelievers to the silent, invisible, and mysterious operations of divine grace. Nothing would be more unfair or unjust than to conclude that they are indifferent to the salvation of non-Catholics, and that they take no interest in their conversion. We must not suppose them wanting in Christian charity or in Christian fidelity. We are obliged, therefore, to suppose that their experience has demonstrated to them the practical inefficacy of the method of authority, and, aware of no other likely to be more efficacious, they are led to regard conversion as a miracle, to be effected only by the direct or immediate intervention of Almighty God himself.

The wide-spread conviction of the practical inefficacy of the ordinary method may be gathered from the remarks we so frequently hear, that the difficulties in the way of non-Catholics are not intellectual but moral, and are in the heart, rather than in the head. When our controversialists have failed by their arguments to convince and convert, they ascribe their failure not to the insufficiency or inappropriateness of their arguments but to the bad disposition of non-Catholics, to their hatred of truth, to their pride, their self-sufficiency, their immorality, or their aversion to the pure life exacted by the church of her children, and conclude that it is necessary that grace should subdue the heart before logic can reach the understanding. There is, no doubt, much in this view that is true, and never to be lost sight of; but we should do great injustice to the heterodox were we

to assume that there are none among them who love or desire the truth, who are not puffed up with pride, who are not averse to a pure life, and who never cry out from the very bottom of their hearts, What shall we do to be saved? There are men, not in the church, of high moral character, of sterling integrity, profound science, varied erudition, large experience, sincere and earnest minds,—men who have no overweening conceit of themselves, and are ready to embrace truth when they see it to be truth, wherever they find it, and whithersoever it may lead them. We may deny, and we do deny, to all who are separated from the church, that supernatural life of which heaven is the completion and the reward; but we must not deny them all the natural virtues, and look upon them as one mass of corruption. We must be just to them, and we had better err by overrating than by underrating their moral worth. It seems to us, therefore, that we should seek some other explanation of the failure of our arguments to convert them, than their wickedness, immorality, hatred of truth, or love of error. Our arguments, it is far more reasonable to suppose, fail to convince them, because they do not meet their real intellectual difficulties, and remove the actual obstacles in the way of their conviction. Truth is always addressed to the understanding, and it is only truth that liberates. *Veritas liberabit vos.* Talk as we will of the heart, philosophy teaches us that truth must illumine the understanding before it can move the will.

When we have established beyond all reply from reason the infallible authority of the church, and have found a particular doctrine which it is clear the church teaches, we conclude logically that such doctrine is and must be true. We grant it. But suppose this doctrine contradicts, or, what practically is the same thing, *appears* to contradict my reason, that it is a doctrine which I can by no means reconcile with other things which I know to be true as certainly as I can know any thing. What am I to do? If I am a Catholic, if I already believe, I may conclude that the doctrine is nevertheless true, that the contradiction or unreasonableness is only apparent, and due either to the weakness of my understanding, or to my misapprehension of the doctrine itself. Notwithstanding the difficulty, therefore, it presents, I am able to retain my faith in the church and in her general teaching, but I really remain in a state of suspense in regard to the particular doctrine itself; for no one believes,

or can believe what contradicts his reason or that does not appear to his own mind reasonable. But suppose I am not yet a Catholic, that I am as yet engaged in investigating the claims of the church and her right to be my teacher. What am I in this case to conclude, if such a doctrine is presented for my belief, on her simple external authority? I am logical and determined to admit every logical conclusion from undeniable premises. The infallibility of the church is logically proved to me; I feel, therefore, that I must accept as true whatever she teaches. But here is a doctrine proved with equal logic to be false; for a doctrine that contradicts reason, or is irreconcilable with what I know to be true, *is* proved logically to be false. Now, supposing the doctrine to have this character, logic is found to be in contradiction with itself, and asserts and denies equally the infallibility of the church. You have established conclusively by your argument that she is infallible; you have established by a logic no less conclusive that she is not infallible. What other practical effect, then, can your reasoning have than to create in my mind a distrust of logic itself, and to place me on the declivity toward absolute scepticism?

Now this is the state of mind into which not a few are thrown by the method of authority, when taken by itself alone. There are thousands who, listening to our arguments drawn from that method, feel that they cannot deny the infallibility of the church, who yet feel it equally impossible to accept on all points her actual teaching. Of course, we ourselves, with all Catholics, deny that the church teaches any doctrines contrary to reason, or even difficult to believe. But we are Catholics, and we see all her doctrines as parts of one whole, not merely as isolated and detached doctrines. We see them in their relation to the whole scheme of Gospel truth, and therefore apprehend their intrinsic or analogical reasonableness. But the heterodox do not so see them. They see them as isolated and independent propositions, and there is, perhaps, no doctrine of the Catholic Church, when so seen, that does not present insuperable objections to reason. We accept and hold without wavering or shadow of doubt, all the definitions of the holy Council of Trent against the errors of the reformers and innovators of the sixteenth century. But detach these propositions from the evangelical system, take them as isolated and independent propositions, and no one would be credible or intelligible. Their meaning and their truth lie only in their relation to

the whole, and it is only when they are seen and studied in that relation, that they are found reconcilable with one another and with whatever else we know to be true or worthy of credit.

Catholic doctrine must be studied as we study an author's writings. The most profound and orthodox writer may be made to teach heresy and even nonsense, if we select from his pages here and there a text, and interpret it as an independent proposition, detached from its context, and the general scope and design of the author. In this way men, by our mole-eyed critics, though acknowledged to be men of large intellects, logical force and acuteness, varied and extensive erudition, devoted heart and soul to the cause of truth, are made to teach gross absurdities and downright heresies. All the charges of error and contradiction brought against the church, when not drawn from the misconduct of individuals, are obtained by taking her definitions as isolated and independent propositions, out of their proper relations as parts of the systematic whole which she teaches in her creed and is realizing in her life. The impropriety and injustice of taking detached passages from an author and holding him responsible for the sense they may have when detached or taken in other relations, and not seeking and considering the sense they must have when taken in connection with his whole discourse, is admitted by every fair, candid, and just-minded man. It is no less improper and unjust to treat in the same manner the doctrines and definitions of the church, whether done by friends or by enemies.

Yet if, in our mode of presenting and defending Catholic truth, we present not that truth in its unity and universality, but merely in isolated definitions or propositions, what right have we to complain of non-Catholics, if they fail to take those definitions and propositions in their true relation to the whole, and to interpret them in the sense of that relation? Now, it seems to us that our ordinary method of presenting Catholic truth to the non-Catholic mind, which has not, or has lost, the apprehension of that truth in its unity and universality, errs precisely in so presenting it, in not showing the relation of those definitions and propositions to one another and to the whole body of truth in which they are integral, and in which alone they are significant and true. Its defect is not that it is syllogistically unsound, but that it does not present things in their true place and real relations. It leaves more to be supplied by the non-Catho-

lic mind than it is in a condition to supply, and, in plain words, presupposes that it already understands and accepts the Catholic system as a whole, and objects only to certain details or particular facts and statements; which is by no means the case; for its precise difficulty is, that it does not embrace truth as a whole, in its unity, but solely in its multiplicity and variety.

Let us not be misunderstood. We do not object to the method of authority as unsound in itself, or as improper, or not necessary in its place, but as incomplete, and insufficient to meet the intellectual wants of the men with whom we have in our times to deal. Reasons for believing the church infallible, however strong and conclusive they may be, do not and cannot convince them that Catholicity is the true religion, if they are required to receive blindly whatever she teaches. The age, whether to its credit or to its discredit, demands, in addition to the reasons called by our theologians "motives of credibility," to see the reasonableness,—in the intelligible order, the intrinsic, and, in the superintelligible order, the analogical reasonableness,—of whatever the church teaches, or requires it to believe. Men now demand that truth be drawn out and presented to them under scientific forms, so that they may study it in its principles, in its relations, and in its consequences, and harmonize all parts of their intellectual life, and find no break or schism between the several orders of their intelligence, for they aspire to the *gnosis*, and are not satisfied with blind belief. They will not consent to carry reason and science into all the departments of secular life, and to adopt blind and unreasoning belief in religion. They crave unity of thought, unity of science, unity of faith, and, in order to meet that craving, it is necessary to recognize to its fullest extent the province of reason, and to show that revelation, so far from breaking the unity which they crave, but find not, does itself demand it, propose it, and supply its condition. This fact we must understand, accept, and conform to, if we would really gain the command of our age.

The errors condemned by the Council of Trent, though great and terrible errors, are not the precise errors we have now to meet. They are errors of the past, rather than of the present, and have lost their principal hold on modern intelligence. It is important that their condemnation should stand in the acts of the council, a landmark to all future times; but their formal refutation as special errors has

ceased to be a necessity. Undoubtedly, the errors we have now to deal with are, in some sense, the development of germs contained in them, but they are far from being exactly the same. Error as well as truth has a sort of life, and therefore an evolution of its own. But if, under certain relations, the errors of to-day are the errors of yesterday, they are, in their forms and subjective relations, widely different. Were a general council to assemble to-day, it would find it had other work to perform than simply to repeat the definitions of the fathers of Trent. Finality can no more be predicated of Trent, than of Nicæa, Constantinople, Constance, or Florence; and, if no new council has been summoned or needed since, it is because the definitions of the Holy See, without the council, have been more generally receivedand acquiesced in than they were in former times.

Were we to confine ourselves to the doctrinal decrees of Trent, we should confine ourselves to the past, and fail to meet the wants of the present; we should be working for the dead, not for the living, and our labors would be fruitless. The human mind did not die with the fathers of Trent, nor has the world either in or out of the church stood still ever since. The human race has lived, and been as active in evolving both truth and error since as it was before, and renewing for us at each moment the problem: How to preserve the past without interdicting the future? or, How to secure the free development of intelligence without losing the immobility and invariableness of Catholic dogma? Forgetfulness of this on the part of not a few of our theologians, is the chief reason why their arguments produce so little conviction. They recognize no progressiveness in the human mind, and overlook the fact that it lives only by evolution, that in its life it evolves both truth and error, and therefore that its expression of either is never the same in any two successive moments. We objected to Dr. Newman's *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, because it seemed to us to strike at the unchangeableness and permanence of the divine element in Christian faith; but we had done well, if, at the same time, we had more distinctly recognized the fact that the author had in his mind while writing it a great truth—as the late Dr. Channing would say, a "seminal principle"—which it is necessary to accept, if we would not leave Catholic theology to stagnate and die, or if we would reconcile authority with reason, the immo-

bility of the church with the progress of civilization, the immutability of the dogma with the development of intelligence, the divine unchangeableness with human variableness, or retain the past without foreclosing the future.

There are two classes of persons whose intellectual wants are now to be met: the heterodox outside of the church, and the heterodox, the doubting, or unbelieving, nominally within her communion. For these two classes the Catholic controversialist has now specially to labor, and for the second class no less than for the first. Say what we will, boast as we may, both of these classes are now manifestly increasing, and, save by her missions in countries that remain in a stage of civilization below ours, the church is manifestly losing ground. It is all very well when we wish to make up a table of statistics to set down France, Austria, and Italy as Catholic countries, and to count the whole of their respective populations in the number of Catholics; but when we come to the sober fact, we are obliged to admit that only a minority, perhaps only a small minority of them, really adhere firmly in their minds and hearts to the church. It will hardly be pretended that Catholic thought predominates, at the present moment, either in Italy or France: and the Catholicity of Austria may well be judged of by the city of Vienna. That city has a population of five hundred thousand souls or over, and yet we are told that only thirty thousand made their communion last Easter. We are making no inroads worth speaking of on heterodox nations, and the so-called Catholic nations are overrun with doubt, incredulity, and indifference. An intelligent Irish gentleman writes us from Ireland: "You would be shocked to see the number of young Irishmen that are growing up infidels." And if in our own country we keep up, or even increase, our numbers, it is only by new accessions of Catholics from abroad. These facts show clearly and undeniably that there is some defect either in our religion itself, or in our method of dealing with our age. The first alternative is inadmissible, and we must therefore conclude that our Catholic theologians, learned, able, zealous, devoted as they are, have not yet learned the secret of the nineteenth century.

We cannot as Catholics doubt that Catholicity is capable of meeting the intellectual wants and commanding the assent, the love, and veneration of the cultivated classes of our age, or of any other age. So to doubt would be to

doubt that Catholicity is catholic. Our religion is catholic; and, when we say it is catholic, we say that it is not merely actually or potentially catholic in space and time, but that it is also catholic in idea; that is, contains all truth, and all truth, whether we speak of the intelligible order, or of the superintelligible. It is, then, and cannot but be, adapted to the wants of all intelligences, whether high or low, cultivated or uncultivated.

The present sad state of things throughout Christendom evidently is not owing to any defect in Catholicity itself. The reason why those out of the Catholic communion, and so many brought up in it refuse to submit to the church, and to accept and defend her faith, is not on the side of our religion itself. It must, then, be mainly on the side of Catholics themselves, in the fact that either in their thought, or in their conduct, or in both, they remain far below the Catholic type, and present their religion in a restricted and exclusive form, instead of its broad and universal character. We attribute it to the fact that, obliged to carry on a war against Protestantism and various other errors, our theologians have been led to treat even Catholic theology in an exclusive spirit, and to present the church very much in the light of a sect. Catholics, as we meet them to-day, are in spirit and practice hardly less sectarian than the Protestant sects themselves. Not their religion, not their faith, not their church is defective, but they themselves are defective, and fail to recognize the fact that there is truth with those not of their communion, and that all truth, wherever found, and of whatever order, is Catholic truth, and belongs integrally to that Catholicity which it is our privilege and our glory to profess. It is because they themselves give a one-sided or partial development to Catholic truth, or only partially actualize it in their life, that others are led to break away from them, and to attempt to realize the portions of truth which they neglect in heterodoxy and schism.

Catholicity, rightly understood, embraces all truth, whether truth of the intelligible order or of the superintelligible, whether known to us by natural reason, or by supernatural revelation, and therefore embraces not only religion, but also civilization, not only faith, but also philosophy, not only the world to come, but the world that now is, and alike what is speculative and what is practical, for its type is the God-man, the union in one divine person of the human and the divine, the finite and the infinite. It is never

exclusive, but always conciliative, mediative between extremes, and harmonizing all opposites. It asserts and countenances no contradiction between faith and reason, between religion and society, between earth and heaven, time and eternity, God and man. It contains and presents the dialectic principle by which these terms, though forever distinct, are harmonized, by which man is united to God, and the universe made one complete and dialectic whole. Such is Catholicity in its principle, and such is the end it contemplates. But this Catholicity is received by finite minds to be actualized in their own life, or to be practically applied by them, and their application of it will always, till the final judgment, be more or less affected by their own finiteness. The actualization, being the work of the finite, has always a tendency to become exclusive, one-sided, and, therefore, sophistical.

Now, if Catholics in any given age or country fail to perceive the universality of Catholic truth, and apply themselves to its development and actualization, not in its unity and integrity, but in one of its terms to the exclusion of the others, they become one-sided, and cease to be truly catholic—give to it a disproportionate development, exaggerate it, and destroy its harmonious relations, and provoke a like exclusiveness or exaggeration by those in whom the neglected terms predominate, in an opposite direction. Thus if they take the religious side as distinguished from that of civilization, and turn their whole attention and energy to the cultivation of the ascetic life, to the relations of man to God and the ultra-mundane life, they disturb the proportion between religion and civilization, and leave that portion of Catholic truth which pertains more especially to secular society and human government, undeveloped and unapplied, or to be developed and applied in an irreligious sense, and in an anti-catholic spirit. A schism is thus effected in the Christian world, and the church in her practical operations ceases to control the application of the whole truth committed to her keeping, and to preside over and to direct the development of all orders of human intelligence. Both religion and civilization become sophistical, each warring against the other,—two antagonistic worlds, without any recognized principle of dialectic union and harmony between them.

This is what actually happens in our own age, and throughout nearly all Christendom. A schism is effected in the

body of Catholic truth, or between religion and society, heaven and earth, eternity and time. The two sides of Catholic truth are developed and applied separately as if distinct and, in some sense, contradictory truths. Religion and civilization no longer walk hand in hand. Although the great principles which the church had infused into the modern world, and which the vicars of Christ on earth have never ceased to labor to develop and apply, are still more or less operative in modern society as the elements of all its real progress, they operate without their proper religious connection, as if earth had no relation to heaven, or rather as if earth were itself heaven, the final destiny of man, and his complete glorification. Both religion and civilization suffer severely from their unlawful divorce. On the one side, civilization loses its ideal character, its noble sentiments, and its spiritual aims; on the other, religion becomes exclusive in its spirit, stagnant in speculation, and impotent in practice. The church loses her hold on the hearts and intelligence of the age, and seems unable to proceed in her work. The men who control society and its development pay little or no regard to her interests or her behests. Her excommunications have lost their terror for tyrants, and check not ambitious princes in their mad career of spoliation and sacrilege. The men who lead or give tone to the science and literature of the age are not in her communion, or, if in it, are not of it. Her children, those who profess the greatest devotion to her as their spiritual mother, are cast down, despair of the future, and either seek consolation in contemplation or inaction, or else labor without hope and with only a factitious energy to reproduce a past which can never return.

Now, it is, in our judgment, to this state of things that we must attribute the little efficacy of the ordinary methods of Catholic controversy in recalling to Christian faith and animating with Christian life the two classes of persons that we have described. We make no account of the old theological errors and heresies of the reformers, for they were doomed from the beginning to a short life; they lived at first, and could live, only by virtue of the Catholic truth the reformers carried with them when they separated from the church. When that truth should be exhausted, and exhausted speedily it was sure to be, they must die, and dead they already are, although as yet their dead bodies may remain above ground. Here and there you may find fossil-

ized Protestants attempting to galvanize them into a sort of spasmodic life; but all we need say is, "Let the dead bury their dead." Protestantism, as it was held by the reformers and innovators of the sixteenth century, has exhausted the little of truth it had in the beginning, and must go the way of all error. We need not labor to refute it, for it has refuted itself. Time, the activity of the human mind, the progress of events has done our work for us; and its adherents, in so far as they are living men, are ready to enter our communion the very moment that we show them that religion and civilization, authority and liberty, the infallibility of the dogma and the progress of intelligence are not contradictories, but simple contraries united in dialectic harmony by catholic truth. And this which would suffice for those separated from our communion, would equally suffice to reëstablish the faith, and imbue with Christian life those who are in our communion, but who are not of it.

Our controversial theologians seem to us for the most part to fail in the work they have now to perform, because they write in an exclusive or sectarian spirit, and proceed on the assumption that there is no error on the side of those in the communion of the church, and no truth on the side of those who are separated from it. They proceed as if Catholics always gave to the truth they hold from the church a really catholic development, as if they always fully understood it, appropriated it, and actualized it in their life. They appear to take it for granted that it is not only necessary to preserve the past as the germ to be developed, but as the type or ideal to be realized. They contend for tradition, but do not appear to appreciate the fact that true catholic tradition is not merely an external, and therefore a dead tradition, but also an internal, and therefore a living tradition. They assert the Word spoken, but leave out of sight, at least to a great extent, the fact that the Catholic Word is not only the Word spoken, but the Word speaking. The Catholicity they assert is a Catholicity that has been, rather than a Catholicity that is; and the church they propose is the church of the middle ages, not the church of the nineteenth century. That is to say, they are sectarian and not catholic, and fail to present the church as really the church of all ages, and of all nations, as much at home in the modern world as in the mediæval world, and able to live in as harmonious relations with modern civilization as with the ancient. They, in fact, tend, by their writings, to widen

and perpetuate the schism between the church and society, instead of diminishing and finally effacing it.

To meet the difficulties of non-Catholics in our times, it is necessary for our theologians themselves to rise to the conception of Catholic truth in its unity and universality, and to find in its principle the principle of the dialectic harmony of all things and thus attain themselves to a full understanding of that unity to which they would bring back the heterodox mind, whether in or out of the church. All truth, of whatever order, is homogeneous, and is integrated in a common principle. There is distinction, but no separation between one truth, or one order of truth, and another. There may be contrariety but there can be no contradiction. God and man are distinct, but not contradictories. The assertion of God as real, necessary, and universal being does not exclude the existence of man as his creature; nor does the assertion of the existence of man as an existence capable of thinking and acting according to the faculties given him, exclude the existence of God as his Creator. The two are distinct, but exist in dialectic harmony through the medium of the creative act. What we say here we may say everywhere, of all realities, and of all orders of intelligence. There is no contradiction in nature, or in the works of God, or between God and his works. There can, then, be no contradiction between the authority of God and legitimate human activity, and consequently none between Catholic dogma and human liberty (we say liberty, not license). There can, on the same principle, be no contradiction, taken in their real relation, between earth and heaven, time and eternity, the terrestrial destiny of man and his celestial destiny, between the goods of this life, and the goods of the life to come. Hence no contradiction between the church and society, religion and civilization, when both are rightly understood, or taken in their real relations one to another.

Having seized upon this great dialectic principle, the work of controversy becomes chiefly a work of exposition and explanation, that of pointing out and establishing the real relation between the several terms assumed to be contradictories, showing through what causes or mistakes the assumption of contradiction is made, and proving that it has no real foundation in the nature and constitution of things. Being a work of exposition and explanation, it is a work of conciliation, and to be performed in a catholic and not in

a sectarian spirit; it is a work of love, not of hatred or wrath, and a work that tends to union and peace, not to division and war. In prosecuting it, we must not begin by condemnation or denunciation, but by presenting the truth to the understanding, and leaving it by its own light to correct the errors into which finite and passionate men may have fallen. It is a work which can and should be done with tenderness to human infirmity, and with respect for human dignity and strength. In our view of the case, little else is needed to heal the divisions of the present, and to bring back the heterodox to the orthodox faith and communion, than to present clearly and fully to the understanding of the age Catholic truth in its integrity, and the church as she really is, alike in her relation to the Word-made-flesh, and to human society.

The chief reason why so many men fall into heterodoxy and schism is, that they regard the church as merely an external, arbitrary, positive institution, without any real or necessary foundation in the constitution of things. They regard her as an isolated institution, with only an arbitrary relation to God, or Christ, the Redeemer and Saviour of mankind. They see no necessity for her in the divine plan or scheme of salvation, no reason for her but the arbitrary will of God, and no analogy between her and the natural order. They see no office she fulfils that might not, in their judgment, be fulfilled just as well without her, by other agencies or ministries. Such an institution seems to them repugnant to the character of God, who does all things by weight and measure, and is always strictly dialectic and logical in all his doings, as he must be since he is the logos, or supreme reason itself. Then again, judging her by the character of her members, whether cleric or laic, they find it difficult to perceive that she really and effectually fulfils the office for which it is said she has been instituted. They do not perceive that Catholics are much freer from vice and error than other men, or that they have fewer disputes or less wrangling among themselves. The superiority claimed by Catholics, either for themselves or their church, is not always evident, and no history is fuller of scandals or apparently more discreditable to human nature, than the history of churchmen. Putting these things together, the heterodox, however dissatisfied they may be with their own condition, or however anxious they might be to attain to a higher and more comprehensive unity, see not

that they would gain much by entering our communion and conforming to the church as she appears to them.

It will be of no use to begin by abusing them for their error, or charging them with being led to their anti-catholic conclusion by their vices, their pride, their hardness of heart, or their hatred of truth. Such indeed may be the case with them, and no doubt is with many of them, but we must bear in mind that they are men as well as we, and that human nature in them is very much what it is in us. They are wrong, fatally wrong, but their error is not to be refuted by simply asserting that they are warring against the truth and guilty of rebellion against God. It must be corrected by presenting them the church as she is, not as they suppose her to be, and by showing them that the infallibility and sanctity we claim for her do not necessarily exclude the errors or the wickedness of individual Catholics. We must show them, what is true, that the church is not simply an external authority, or an external institution to which is arbitrarily delegated authority in matters of faith and morals, but that she has her reason and constitution in the incarnation of the Word; not merely an external delegated authority, but also an internal, inherent, and living authority by virtue of the indwelling and informing Word, whose incarnation she, in some sense, continues. The church is not separated from Christ,—is not simply an outward and positive institution established and preserved by his power and authority, but is, in principle, Christ himself. In becoming really united to the church, we become really united to Christ, are regenerated in him, and live his life, as individuals in the order of generation live the life of Adam. (*Quia ego vivo, et vos vivetis.*) The Word was incarnated in an individual, but the incarnation extends beyond the individual assumed, as the generic principle of a new or regenerated mankind, so that, in some sense, the Word becomes incarnated in the race. The church, if considered in its principle, is Christ, the God-man; if considered in relation to the development or effects of the incarnation, it is the regenerated human species, or humanity raised to the palingenesiac order, and placed on the plane of its progress toward glorification, or its complete union through the incarnate Word with God, the finite with the infinite. This, as we understand it, is the radical conception of the church in her intrinsic and real character. Her relation, then, to Christ is not simply an external, arbitrary, or mechanical

relation, but a real, internal, and necessary relation, as real, as intimate, and as necessary as the relation between the human species and Adam its progenitor.

Hence we may see the reason of the dogma that "out of the church there is no salvation." Salvation is only in the palingenesia or regeneration; for man has and can have, as a rational being, his perfect beatitude only in being united to God, since he has the innate and unquenchable desire for an infinite and unbounded good, to be found nowhere but in God, the supreme good itself. Now, a man out of the church stands in relation to salvation, as a man in the natural order out of humanity. A man not in humanity—not born of Adam—is simply no man at all; he can neither live a human life, nor attain to a human destiny. So a man out of the church is a man out of Christ, out of the order of salvation, and can neither live the life of regenerated humanity, nor receive its reward. If we suppose the order of regeneration at all, we must suppose the dogma, "Out of the church, no salvation." So far, there is and can be no objection to the dogma. The only question here to be asked is, Who are or who are not in the church? or, What is or is not meant by being out of the church? The question may be raised, and has been raised, whether the dogma means or does not mean that salvation is possible to any who are not united to the external or visible body of the church? It is no part of our present purpose to attempt to answer that question, one way or the other. No doubt all who belong to what theologians call the "soul" of the church, that is, are united to Christ in the regeneration as their head, are in the way of salvation; and just as little that those who die without being so united can never be saved.

The outward or visible church, in its essential constitution, is no more arbitrary or destitute of relation with Christ, than the church internally considered. The progress of the Christian life is by virtue of the Word, not merely of the interior Word, but also of the Word exteriorly expressed. We may consider the Word as the substantial creative act in the interior of the divine being, by which all things are made, and without which nothing can be made; but, unless the Word is expressed, or, so to speak, exerted *ad extra*, there is no act of creation. So the Word incarnate, which is the church interiorly and intrinsically considered, must be expressed or extrinsecated, and this expression or extrinsecation in the outward or mimetic order is the visible church.

If we suppose the Word, and suppose it operative, we must suppose it creating, forming an external regenerated society, just as much as, if we suppose in Adam a productive principle actualizing itself successively, we must suppose a visible natural society, or human society in the natural order. If we suppose a visible society, we must suppose for it a government and laws; therefore a visible constitution which expresses and realizes or copies in the visible order the interior and invisible constitution; and hence you have the visible church, with the pope representing, in the visible order, the centre and head, which, in the invisible, is Christ.

The church is no accident or after-thought in the Creator's works. Her existence is not exceptional or isolated in the plan of divine Providence, and is essential to the fulfilment of that plan. Creation is the extrinsecation of the Word eternal in the bosom of the Father, and the full or complete extrinsecation of the Word requires the full and complete creative act; and the full and complete creative act requires the Incarnation, or hypostatic union of man with God, the finite with the infinite. Creation can go no further than the Incarnation, for in it the creature is raised to infinite power, and becomes one with the Creator. The Incarnation gives birth to the church, which is, in some sense, its continuation, or rather its actualization in the race. Prescind the church, or suppose her to fail, you suppose either God to have had no purpose in creating, or his purpose to be incapable of being effected. If you suppose creation, and suppose it such as it is, you must suppose the church, and therefore that she enters as necessarily and as essentially into the original plan or constitution of things, as man or any other existence in what we term the natural order. The church, then, is no more arbitrary or exceptional than is nature itself; her laws are no more arbitrary or exceptional than the laws of the natural order; and she and nature are both constituent and necessary parts of one complete and harmonious whole. The church is as necessary, *necessitate ex suppositione*, as the cosmos, and the cosmos itself is neither intelligible nor explicable without her. We say necessary, *necessitate ex suppositione*, that is, on the supposition that it pleases the Word to create *ad extra*, or to give an external expression to himself, which he was free to do or not to do. It is always necessary to bear this in mind when we are explaining the church, showing her place, her office in the plan of divine Providence, or vindicating her

claims to our love and obedience, in order to escape pantheism, or not give any countenance to the doctrine that God is a necessary creator.

Christ bears to the church the same relation that Adam, in the order of genesis, bears to the human family; and the church lives in Christ the theandric life, as mankind live in Adam the purely human life. This living of the life of Christ is what we call the Incarnation in the race. The church is in him, and he is in the church; and as he is in the church, and is the Word made flesh—perfect God and perfect man united in one divine person—she has in her the Word, the idea, the truth (*Ego sum veritas*), and therefore is and must be infallible. Her infallibility is her permanence or continuance, as the incarnation of the idea or Word on the earth.—*Ego sum vobiscum.* The idea, or the Word, cannot fail, for it is God himself; and the church cannot perish or fail, unless God himself should perish or fail.

Modern rationalists may concede this much, but when they do so they understand it in a pantheistic sense; for, while they admit that the Word incarnates himself in the race, they overlook or deny that he incarnates himself in an individual, and, by so doing, recognize no proper incarnation at all. The Word was made flesh in an individual man, and the union of the divine and the human is personal or hypostatic. God creates all existences each after its kind. The *kind*, the *universal* of the schoolmen, is as really created as the individual, but never without the individual. The universal is real, but really subsists in the particular, and the particular subsists in the universal. Never is there the one without the other. There is no universal man without an individual man, and no individual man without the universal man. Through the incarnation there is created a new order of life, which we call the "theandric" life; but this order of life must, according to the analogies of creation, be created in an individual. Hence Christ is termed perfect God and perfect man,—perfect man, because in him humanity is complete, and humanity, like every other genus, is completed only in the individual. Hence we say the incarnation is properly and primarily the assumption by the Word of an individual man, or of man individuated. The union between the Word and the individuated man is hypostatic and personal; but the union between the church and Christ is not individual, personal, or hypostatic, but a

union which, while it unites her intimately with him as her informing principle and life, leaves each of her individual members his distinctive personality, and therefore his distinctive personal activity.

Considered in her relation to space and time, or in her work on the earth, the church is engaged in the explication and actualization, of the life begotten by the Word made flesh, as men, in the order of genesis, are engaged in the explication of Adam or the potentialities of humanity. This explication and actualization is the explication and actualization of the idea. It is twofold, internal and external. The external is the extension of her communion in space, or geographically, and goes on by what is called conversion; the internal is the explication and actualization of the intuitive idea in the order of reflection, or its appropriation and application in the actual life of individuals and society. The life of the church is in this twofold explication and actualization, or in the internal and external evolution of her principle of life. Whenever and wherever either of these ceases, she in the actual order becomes inoperative, and no longer responds externally to the interior energy of the Word. Such a case has sometimes happened in particular countries and at particular epochs in her history. There are countries where the church, once living and vigorous, seems to die out, either from external or internal causes; and there are times when she seems to pause in her career; to lose her hold on the human mind, to be incapable of progress, and to show no signs of spiritual or of intellectual activity; when faith seems eclipsed, charity to have grown cold, and her children, despairing of the future, turn toward the past in the vain hope of restoring its life, and making it again the present. But these eclipses of faith are never, and can be never more than partial; and the losses on one side are usually repaired on another; for her ideal life is immortal and universal in its principle, intrinsically active, and can never cease wholly to find in her activity an outward expression and realization.

The condition of the internal explication and actualization of the Word in the life of men is the same as that of all intellectual explication and application of truth. Philosophy teaches us that all truth in its principle is given us in the primitive intuition, in the divine judgment, "Being creates existences," affirmed by God himself to us, creating our intelligence, and presenting all truth as its object.

But the human mind is incapable of perceiving by its own act the truth immediately in the intuition; for this would be seeing the truth in itself, which is the prerogative of God alone. If we could take the truth from its intuitive presentation, immediately see or apprehend it in itself, our intelligence would be the equal of the divine intelligence, and our intelligencing would, like his, generate the Word and be identical with it. In consequence of our finiteness, it is not enough that the truth be intuitively presented; it is necessary that it be also sensibly re-presented. Hereafter we may be able, by virtue of our supernatural union with God, to see truth directly, without the reflex operation of the mind, and without sensible representation; but at present, at least, we can see and know the Word only as expressed. Without its external expression the ideal is intuitively present indeed, but cannot be explicated and appropriated by our intelligence. This external expression of truth is the external word or language.

Now, Christ in the church is intuition, and intuition is the permanent presence of truth, and of all truth. But this truth becomes ours only through our act; and our act is an act of reflection. It is necessary then, to the appropriation and possession of truth by us, that it should not only be presented intuitively, but that it should be represented through the medium of language, which is the instrument of reflection. The church lives, evolves, and applies the ideal truth, therefore, only by the union of the word speaking and the word spoken. The word spoken is revelation or external tradition. Revelation or tradition taken alone, severed from all relation with the internal tradition or Christian intuition, would be dead, or would be useless for us; because it would have no connection or possible relation with the principle of our interior life and activity; there would be in us no power to receive it, to apprehend it, to understand it, or to apply it, that is, to use it in the evolution of truth. It might as well be presented to an ox or a horse, as to a man. Yet, it is absolutely necessary to our practical understanding and explication of the intuition. We cannot hear the word speaking unless we hear also the word spoken. In addition, then, to the infallibility of the church as ideal, as having all truth in her intuition, she must be infallible in preserving in its unity and integrity the word spoken, or language, which is the medium of all reflection. It is only on the condition of this infallibil-

ity that the church can exist or fulfil her office in the explication and actualization of the theandric life, or the plan of divine Providence in creation be realized.

But it is necessary that we be on our guard against misunderstanding this infallibility, against extending it beyond matters to which it properly belongs, or applying it in a sphere in which it has no existence. This infallibility extends only to the ideal, or the preservation of the ideal, in so far as represented by language, or what we call the word spoken. It does not extend to the evolution, the appropriation, or actualization of the ideal by the human mind. Dogmas are infallible, and the church infallibly preserves them; but the dogmas are all ideal, that is, contain not the truth as appropriated and actualized by us, but the principle or principles to be by us developed, appropriated, actualized, in our own understanding and life. For after the church has proclaimed to us infallibly the infallible dogma, we must still ask, What are its contents? or, What does it mean? This question the church does not answer by her infallible authority save negatively, or so far as to prevent us from losing on the one hand the ideal truth it contains, and, on the other, the superintelligible which it affirms. Beyond this there remain freedom and scope for the activity of our own minds, and the right and the necessity of examination.

We have stated that, though in a general or generic sense Christ is incarnated in the race, his incarnation in the race is not a personal or hypostatic union between God and men. Our personal and individual activity remains, and must be asserted, unless we would fall into pantheism, the greatest of all sophisms. The infallibility of the church, which is derived from the incarnate Word, or rather is the infallibility of the Word itself, does not, then, extend to our personality, take away that personality, deprive us of our liberty of mind, or suppress our proper human activity. The ideal church is infallible, but the individual members who compose the exterior body of the church have no privilege of infallibility, and are liable to err both in their understanding and application of catholic truth. The infallibility of the church, then, neither excludes individuals of whatever rank or dignity in the church from error in the reflex or practical order, nor does it deny or supersede the necessity, in all who would comprehend and know the truth, of personal activity and private examination.

Catholics have not always been just in their criticisms on

what they call the "private interpretation" asserted by Protestants. The error of Protestants is not in asserting the right of private interpretation, or the examination and interpretation for themselves of the doctrine or truth contained in the Holy Scriptures. They use their reason to ascertain in the best way in their power the real meaning of the language of Scripture; we do, and are obliged to do, unless we would remain intellectually dead, the same thing in regard to the doctrines and definitions of the church. We can here no more dispense with examination and personal understanding than they can. In this respect neither they nor we are to be blamed. But the difference between them and us is very great. They deny the living tradition of the church, in which, and in which alone, is found the key to the sense of the Holy Scriptures, and they have no infallible teacher to come to their assistance, and prevent them from ruining the dogma, losing the idea the Christian is evolving, or explaining away the superintelligible, that is, the mysteries, only analogically intelligible to our reason, and from falling into complete rationalism, whence the declension to pantheism is easy and, in fact, inevitable. We by means of the church, which preserves the idea in its integrity, and supplies us the living Catholic tradition, have a sure protection against either of these errors. The church, by renewing her definitions whenever occasion demands, preserves the unity and integrity of language or the external word, and by her own interior life and instinct, in which all her members to some extent, if really her members, participate, prevents us from losing the idea, or breaking the internal continuity of Catholic life.

Understood in this way, the infallibility of the church and the freedom and activity of the human mind are seen to be not contradictories, as is sometimes supposed, but simply contraries reconcilable one with the other, and capable of coexisting in dialectic union and mutual harmony. The same may be said of authority and liberty; they are contraries, but not contradictories; each has its appropriate sphere, and the sphere of neither excludes that of the other. The bugbear conjured up on this subject grows out of a pantheistic error, which absorbs the human element in the divine, and overlooks or denies, what the Catholic doctrine asserts, that the two natures are united by the incarnation in one person, but remain forever, without confusion or mixture, two distinct natures. The divine element in our

religion never absorbs the human; the human element always remains, and always must remain; and consequently there remains, and always must remain, a sphere of human activity.

There is no doubt a tendency even in some Catholics to extend authority so far as to exclude human liberty, as amongst non-Catholics there is a much stronger tendency to extend liberty so far as to exclude authority. Both tendencies are wrong, and fatal in their nature. To extend authority so as to exclude human liberty, is pantheism: to extend liberty so as to exclude authority, is license, and, pushed to its last consequences, is nihilism. The authority, as the infallibility of the church, is the authority of the Word, and therefore ideal. It does not pertain to individuals, and can never rightfully restrain the free evolution and appropriation by the mind itself of Catholic truth. God created man a free activity, or free second cause, and therefore is said to have created him "after his own image and likeness." In elevating him by grace to the theandric life, it could never have been his intention to restrict or supersede, in any respect whatever, man's original freedom. The design of the Gospel is not to take away man's freedom, but to confirm it, to elevate it, and to assist it in attaining to the end for which he was created. Man is to work out, with the assistance of grace, his own salvation. Authority so understood or so extended as to interfere with this free working, or to restrain man's spontaneous activity, would defeat the very design of Providence, and prevent him from attaining to salvation. The working would be transferred from him to authority itself, in whose hands he would become merely passive, and therefore dead. The meticulous orthodoxy of our age overlooks this fact, and, if it does not actually destroy our intellectual life, it at least impairs our intellectual health by over-watchfulness and over-nursing. It runs to the contrary extreme, and, in seeking to guard against the license of the age, it suppresses the natural and legitimate liberty of thought and action. The consequence is that truth makes little or no progress amongst us, the mind remains undeveloped, and we cease to be active and living men.

The exaggerations of authority into which we have been driven by the exaggerations of liberty on the part of non-Catholics, are the chief cause of the weakness of the church in our times, of her inability to recall to her communion

those who have broken away from it, and to retain her hold on the intellect and consciences of large numbers of the cultivated brought up in it. Under these exaggerations, no man is free to have convictions of his own, or, if he have convictions, to express them. The inquiry is not, What is true, what is necessary, what is good, what is proper? but, What does authority say? or, What does authority permit to be said? You are convinced perhaps that certain things are true, but you must not say them, because authority disapproves of them, or does not wish them to be said. In this way the lofty aspirations and noble instincts of the soul are repressed, life is stunted in its growth, and devotion to the right, to the just, to the noble, gives way to a low, narrow, and demoralizing expediency. The rights and dignity of manhood are sacrificed, and men become mere puppets in the hands of illegitimate authority, or seek indemnification for the repression of their nobler nature in low cunning, diplomatic arts, selfish intrigue, or the indulgence of the baser passions. While such is the case, it is impossible to carry on the explication and appropriation of the Word, either externally or internally, to make any favorable impression on those outside of our communion, or to reëstablish in their faith and love those already in it, who are conscious of their manhood and cannot believe that the divine destroys the human which it creates and sustains. It is very necessary as it regards both the internal and the external evolution of catholic truth, that we be as much on our guard against the exaggerations of authority as against the exaggerations of liberty, and at least as much in earnest to favor the evolution of truth as the suppression of error. Truth is mightier than error, if you give it fair play; and its free and full evolution will without any care or thought on your part extinguish error. Truth suffers in the house of her friends, who are too afraid of allowing her to go abroad, lest she should take cold, sicken, or die.

What we say of authority, we may say of infallibility. Infallibility is the prerogative of no individual in the church, for, as we have seen, the infallibility is internal in the church as the theandric race, not in the church as individuals. The pope is infallible *ex cathedra*, that is, with the church, and the church is infallible with the pope, though neither is infallible without the other; for neither without the other is, strictly speaking, the church. The pope individually, the bishops and clergy individually taken, or in

their individual capacity, are individuals, and have no prerogative of infallibility, and, though always respectable, venerable in reference to the office they fill, to the pontificate and sacerdocy essential to the very existence of the church which they represent, have infallible authority only in the Word which is the interior life of the regenerated human race. Their individual opinions and wishes may deserve great weight, and are always to be treated with profound respect, but, in so far as they are only their individual opinions or wishes, they are neither authoritative nor infallible. It does not follow, because I differ in opinion from my pastor, from my bishop, or even from the pope, that I am wrong and must give up my opinion. I may hold my opinion until I am rationally convinced of its falsity or unsoundness, unless the church herself, acting in her unity as the representative of the Word, declares it to be false, unsound, or dangerous. Any attempt to suppress my opinion or my freedom of opinion, in any other way is repugnant to the real spirit and authority of the church, and is an indignity offered both to my freedom as a man, and to the rights of authority itself; for it is an attempt to usurp power and play the tyrant. Usurpation offends alike legitimate authority and those subjected to it; and it is as much my right and my duty as a Catholic to resist usurpation, as it is to bow in submission to the legitimate authority.

Tradition, we have said, is both external and internal, and, rightly considered, is the continuity in the external and the internal life of the church of the word speaking and of the word spoken. The great error of Protestantism was that, by rejecting tradition, it broke the continuity of the Christian life, and thus severed itself from the theandric life of Christ. But if we take only the external tradition prescinded from the internal, we fall into an error of the same kind, and no less fatal. The external is the past, is the word that was spoken, which it is always necessary to preserve, for there is no continuity of life without preserving the past. But there is also in the church an internal tradition, or the continuity of her internal life, proceeding from the immanence of the Word. The church speaking speaks always according to this interior tradition, her present interior life; and as this life is a continuous evolution and explication of the Word, it gives always to the external tradition a broader and a deeper significance; it destroys not its truth, renders it not false, but shows that there is

more in it than was at first apprehended, that it covers a broader field or has a deeper and richer meaning than was at first supposed. There is in this way, or in this sense, a continuous development and progress of truth in the church. The true rule, then, is always to interpret her monuments of the past by her present life, not her present life by her past monuments. This view is admirably brought out by Dr. Newman in his *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, and is a highly important contribution to modern theology, for which he deserves the gratitude of every theologian. The denial of this would be to deny to the church catholicity both in time and in idea or truth, or, what is the same thing, to deny that she is a living church. It would be to make her a dead church, as Protestants make the external written word a dead book. We must interpret, therefore, the past life of the church by her present life, for, though she is ancient, she is never old.

This doctrine allows us to assert for the church all the liberty or freedom of action with regard to modern civilization that she exercised in regard to either the ancient or the mediæval. Those who would confine her to the mediæval world, or bind her back to that order of civilization as the only Catholic order, or as the type of Catholic civilization, forget that she is a living church, overlook her present freedom, and impede her in the evolution and application of catholic truth to the circumstances and wants of our own age. They place her in unnecessary antagonism to modern progress, and de-catholicize her, and compel her to anathematize it. Such are the worst enemies of the church, and, in fact, though they know it not, are hardly less removed from Catholicity in the full sense of that term, than are the cultivated classes out of her communion. Catholicity does not and cannot war with human progress or the progress of society, for it is the principle of that progress itself, and not it, but mistaken and misguided Catholics, who comprehend not the Christian spirit, and forget their church still lives, that are opposed to it, make war upon it, and seek to revive a civilization, a science, a literature, an art which the human race has outgrown. Because religion under the Roman empire after Constantine was associated with Roman imperialism, or because in the middle ages it was associated with feudalism, with privilege instead of equality, they imagine practically, if not theoretically, that it must always be so associated, and that to associate it with any other order of

civilization, or of social organization, would be to deprive it of its essential character, and to manifest an un-Catholic and an irreligious tendency.

Here arises the conflict. Human society is progressive, and is continually evolving and appropriating the idea or principle in which is its life. On it goes, and on it will go, whether individuals go with it, or seek to hold it back. They only who go with it are powerful, for they have not only their own strength as individuals, but the strength of the race itself. They are irresistible in the natural order, for humanity itself works with them. But those who array themselves against them have only their individual strength, and are impotent before them. Now to attempt to array the church against them, is to attempt to array her against humanity, and to place the Word, which is alike the life of the race and the life of the church, in contradiction with itself. This, to a great extent, is what has in our times been attempted by a certain number of our Catholic friends. They have, without intending it, and without perceiving it, brought about this conflict, and effected apparently a divorce between the church and humanity, or, in other words, have dissolved Christ—against which the apostle admonishes us. They have sought to prevent the life of the church and the life of humanity from flowing on together as one dialectic and harmonious life. A war is thus stirred up between religion and society, which is alike injurious to both, and which, but for human infirmity, human prejudice, and human passion, could never have arisen. There is no necessity for it in the essence or in the teaching of religion; for religion accepts the earth as a means, and contemns, despises, or wars against it only as the end, or when substituted for heaven itself. To make any progress in recovering those who are lost, and in extending the influence of the church over the world, it is necessary that these misguided Catholics should correct their mistake, and learn that to war against the irrepressible instincts of humanity is not a Catholic or a religious duty; and it is necessary, on the other hand, that the men of the age, who turn their backs on the church and on religion, should learn that their social progress and development can never secure the good they seek, unless effected from religious motives, and in subordination and subserviency to the palingenesiac destiny of man.

The sanctity of the church, we may add, depends on the same conditions as the infallibility of the church. Her

sanctity proceeds from the indwelling Word, who is her life. As the Word is necessarily holy, so she, as the ideal church, must also be holy;—holy in her doctrines, in her spirit, in her tendency, in her life;—holy as Christ himself is holy. Of this there can be no question with any one who really understands what the church is, or who does not confound her with a mere aggregation of individuals. Individuals are holy by participation of her life, or the Word immanent within her. This participation is by way of communion, and communion is by way of the sacraments. In this we see the necessity and the significance of what is called the sacramental system of the church. We must be born into her life, or we cannot live it. We are born into it in the sacrament of baptism, hence called the sacrament of regeneration. But life needs to be sustained. All life is sustained by assimilation, and the true Christian life is sustained by the assimilation to our life of the theandric life of the Word made flesh. This is done through holy communion, or the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is therefore called the sacrament of sustentation or life. But, as our freedom remains, we may lose by our misconduct this life, or interrupt our communion with the life of Christ. It is necessary, therefore, that there should be some means for recovering this life, when lost, and of renewing this communion, when interrupted by sin. Hence the sacrament of penance, the sacrament of restoration or reconciliation. Had we space, we could go through with the other four sacraments, and show that they are all necessary provisions for the origination, the continuance, and completion of this communion, through which we participate in the life of our Redeemer and Saviour. But this whole subject of the sacraments, involving as it does that of the pontificate and the sacerdocy, is too vast for our present limits, and we must reserve it as the subject of future essays, should it please God to give us strength to write and opportunity to publish them.

Individuals have in the means of this communion with the Word all the means of sanctity, and are more or less holy in proportion to their more or less faithful use of them. That all individuals in the church, that even all churchmen attain to the highest degree of sanctity possible, is by no means pretended; but if the scandals in the church are greater, as it is sometimes alleged, than in the world outside, it is because her type or ideal of perfection is higher, and more is expected of Catholics than of other men. If there is much in

the history of churchmen that is discreditable, we must remember that it is not because they fall below the average of mankind, or even so low, but because their type or ideal, with which we compare their actual conduct, is infinitely higher. The type of the priest is the God-man, the Word made flesh. His ideal is Christ;—and what wonder that he fails frequently to actualize that ideal? What you note as scandals in the clergy would not be noted at all, or at most but partially, in other men; and, though it must be admitted that the clergy in all ages fall far below their type, as was to be expected, since they are men, and have the natural infirmities of men, a passable acquaintance with history will satisfy any fair-minded man that, as a rule, they are far above, in intelligence and virtue, in earnestness and sanctity of life, any other class of men, equally numerous, that can be selected. But, be this as it may, as we do not confound individuals with the church, so neither do we confound the clergy with the priesthood. As the infallibility of the church is in no sense individual, and in no sense depends on the personal character, intelligence, wisdom, or sagacity of individuals, so the sanctity and efficiency of the priesthood do in no sense depend on the individual or personal merits of the clergy. We need but understand the real character of the church in all its branches, and to bear in mind that the real presence in the Eucharist has a general as well as a particular meaning, to prevent the conduct of individuals, whether cleric or laic, from scandalizing us, disturbing our faith, shaking our confidence in Catholic truth, or weakening our devotion to Christ as he lives and manifests himself in the church.

We have opened in these remarks, we may say in conclusion, many questions, and great questions, some of which would require even volumes thoroughly to discuss, and to render plain and fully intelligible to ordinary readers. Some of them we hope to be able to take up and treat more at length in our future numbers. Our purpose thus far has been not to settle the questions we have raised, nor to establish by elaborate arguments the points we have made. We have wished simply to indicate what, in our judgment, are some of the defects in our ordinary methods of presenting and defending Catholic truth, and at the same time to draw attention to a method not usually adopted, though by no means a contradictory method, which we think is better adapted to the present intellectual and moral state of the heterodox, whether in or out of our communion, and which may be

made more efficacious in their conversion. We have indicated, rather than developed this method, and those to whom it will seem a novelty may fail to perceive all its bearings and capabilities, and therefore condemn it. All we ask of them is fully to understand it, and not to pass judgment without a full knowledge of the cause. The method is substantially that by which we were ourselves led into the church, and, in setting it forth, we are giving the link which unites our present thought to that which led us out of rationalism, and, through divine grace, brought us to the foot of the cross. We resume the continuity of our own life, which for a time, we own, was interrupted by causes not necessary here to specify. We resume our identity, and speak not merely from a Catholicity we have put on, but from a Catholicity which we have assimilated in our own mind, and integrated in our own life. This may be nothing in favor of the line of argument we have adopted, but then it is nothing against it.

CATHOLIC SCHOOLS AND EDUCATION.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1862.]

The importance of education in general needs in no sense to be dwelt on in our country, for no people are or can be more alive to its utility and even necessity than are the American people, especially in the non-slaveholding states; and no people have, upon the whole, made more liberal provisions for its general diffusion. There would seem to be just as little need of dwelling on the importance and necessity of Catholic schools and Catholic education for our Catholic population. All Catholics feel, or should feel, that education, either under the point of view of religion or of civilization, is useful and desirable no further than it is Catholic. Catholic truth is universal truth, is all truth, and no education not in accordance with it is or can be a true or a useful education, for error is never useful, but always more or less hurtful. Every Catholic, then, indeed every man who loves truth and wishes to conform to it, must be in favor of Catholic schools and Catholic education, if they are Catholic in reality as well as in name.

So believing, our bishops and clergy, supported by various religious communities, have lost no time in making the im-

posing effort to provide under their own direction schools, academies, colleges, and universities for all our Catholic children and youth. They have felt the necessity of giving our children a Catholic education, as the best and surest way of securing their temporal and spiritual welfare, of promoting Catholic interests, and of converting this whole country to the Catholic faith. Yet, strangely enough, they are very far from receiving the hearty and undivided support of our whole Catholic community. Great dissatisfaction has been expressed, and in quarters entitled to respect, with our colleges and female academies, and not a few whose love of Catholicity and devotion to the church cannot be questioned, refuse to join in the movements for parochial schools, or the establishment of separate schools for our children under the care of our clergy. Whence comes this division of sentiment? Whence comes it that our colleges and conventual schools do not meet the unanimous approbation of Catholic parents and guardians? Whence comes it that so many amongst us prefer the public schools of the country to schools conducted by Catholics? What is the explanation of these facts? How are they to be accounted for? If these schools, whether for the higher or the lower branches of education, are really Catholic, and educate throughout in accordance with Catholic truth, how should it be possible that honest and intelligent Catholics should differ among themselves as to the policy of establishing them, or that any should hesitate to give them their cordial support? These are questions which need and must receive an answer.

There are a great many people, honest people, but not over and above stocked with practical wisdom, who imagine that whatever is done or approved by Catholics in any age or country, in any particular time or locality, must needs be Catholic, and that opposition to it is necessarily opposition to Catholicity itself. These people never doubt that schools and colleges, under the patronage and direction of the bishops, religious orders and congregations, and the regular and secular clergy, must necessarily be truly Catholic in character and tendency, and hence they conclude that dissatisfaction with them or opposition to them must indicate a heterodox tendency, or the absence of a thoroughly Catholic disposition. They transfer to the bishops and clergy as individuals the veneration and respect due only to the priesthood and the prelacy, and to the individual members of the church the infallibility that can be predicated

only of the church as the living body of Christ. But we are permitted neither by Catholic faith nor by Catholic duty to make this transfer, and all experience proves that there is neither wisdom nor justice in making it. It does not necessarily follow that schools and colleges are Catholic because founded and directed by religious orders and congregations approved by the church, or by bishops and parish priests; and therefore it does not follow that dissatisfaction with the schools and colleges, or even opposition to them, is any indication of a heterodox tendency, or of any want of true Catholic faith and devotion. Such schools may themselves fail to educate in a truly Catholic spirit, or to give a truly Catholic character to their pupils, and thus leave it possible that the dissatisfaction or the opposition should arise not from the fact that they are Catholic, but from the fact that they are not Catholic, or that, in spite of their name and profession, they are really sectarian and heterodox. The dissatisfaction, in such case, instead of being a reproach to those who feel and express it, would be no mean proof of their Catholic discernment, their strong desire for really Catholic education, and earnest devotion to Catholic interests.

There need be no question as to the purity of motive and honesty of intention on the part of those who are engaged in founding or supporting schools and colleges for imparting a Catholic education, or even of those who tolerate the expression of no opinion adverse to the system of schools adopted, or to the quality of the education imparted. The bishops and secular clergy, the religious orders and congregations of both sexes engaged in the work of education, are animated, we doubt not, by the most sincere desire to do good, and are doing what they in their best judgment believe the most likely of any thing in their power to promote the interests of our holy religion, and to provide a truly Catholic education for our children. Any hostile criticism which should in any sense impeach their motives or intentions would be manifestly unjust, and should not be tolerated. But the subject of Catholic education itself cannot be prudently withdrawn from discussion, either private or public; nor can its discussion be confined to the prelates and clergy alone. The laity have, to say the least, as deep an interest in it as have ecclesiastics or the religious, and they have in regard to it the common right of all men to judge for themselves. Parents have certain duties growing out of their relation as

parents which they cannot throw upon others, and they must themselves discharge them according to the best of their ability. They are bound by the law of God to give their children, as far as in their power, a truly Catholic education, and they are free to criticise and to refuse to support schools, though professing to be Catholic, in which such education is not and cannot be expected to be given. They are not obliged to patronize schools, because founded or directed by Catholics, any more than they are to support a tailoring or a hatting establishment, because owned by a Catholic who employs Catholic workmen, or because recommended by bishops and parish priests. We protest against the assumption that so-called Catholic schools, collegiate or conventual, parochial or private, because under the control of Catholics, participate in the immunities of the church, of the priesthood, or of the prelacy, and are sacred from public investigation and public criticism; or that we are necessarily bound by our Catholic faith and Catholic piety to patronize or defend them any further than we find them Catholic institutions in fact as well as in name.

The first question, then, for us Catholics to settle relates to the catholicity of the education imparted in our so-called Catholic schools. Catholicity, as we have elsewhere shown, is the idea in its plenitude, and therefore the catechism tells us that the church is catholic, because "she subsists in all ages, teaches all nations, and maintains all truth." She, then, is catholic (potentially) in space and time, and (actually) in idea—as she must be, since her life is the life of the Word made flesh, of him who was at once "perfect God and perfect man"—and therefore the whole truth living and individuated in both the divine and human orders in their dialectic union. It is for this reason that the catechism says she "maintains all truth;" and it is because she maintains all truth, and all truth in its unity and integrity, that she is called the *Catholic* Church; and it is because she is catholic in idea, that is, embracing in her ideal all truth, human and divine, that is she is actually or potentially catholic in space and time.

Catholic would say *universal*, and when predicated of truth means universal truth, all truth, and all truth in and for all ages and nations. They whose views are not universally true, are not applicable to all times and places, and to all subjects, may have truth under some of its aspects, but they are not Catholics. They are heterodox, sectarian, or

national. Men cease to be Catholics, in the full sense of the term, by denying the universality of the idea or life the church is living, the principle she is evolving and actualizing in the life of humanity, and alike whether they deny this universality in relation to space or in relation to time, in relation to the natural, or in relation to the supernatural. They deny Catholicity who deny that it embraces the whole truth in the human order, as they do who deny that it embraces the whole truth in the divine order. To deny it in relation to the natural order is as much to deny Catholicity, as it is to deny it in relation to the supernatural; and we depart as widely from it in denying its catholicity in time, as we do in denying its catholicity in space. The rule of St. Vincent of Lérins says *quod* SEMPER, as well as *quod* UBIQUE. Catholic truth is simply truth, all truth in the intelligible order and in the super-intelligible, in religion and civilization, in time and eternity, in God and in his creative act.

Catholic education must recognize the catholicity of truth under all its aspects, and tend to actualize it in all the relations of life, in religion and civilization. Its tendency is to aid the church in the fulfilment of her mission, which is the continuous evolution and actualization of the idea, or the life of the Word made flesh, in the life of humanity, or completion in mankind of the incarnation completed in the individual man assumed by the Word. The completion of this work is the complete union of men, through Christ, with God, the finite with the infinite—the true term of human progress, or final cause of the divine creative act. All education, to be Catholic, must tend to this end, the union, without absorption of either, or intermixture or confusion of the two natures, of the human and the divine, and therefore of civilization and religion. It must be dialectic, and tend to harmonize all opposites, the creature with the creator, the natural with the supernatural, the individual with the race, social duties with religious duties, order with liberty, authority with freedom, the immutability of the dogma, that is, of the mysteries, with the progress of intelligence, conservatism with reform; for such is the aim of the church herself, and such the mission given her by the Word made flesh, whose spouse she is. Fully and completely up to this idea we expect not education in any age or in any nation to come, but this is the type it should aim to realize, and be constantly and, as far as human frailty admits, actually realizing. Such is the character and tendency of what we term Catholic education.

It is with this ideal standard of Catholic education that we have the right to compare our Catholic schools, and we must judge them as they, by the instruction they give, and the influence they exert, tend or do not tend to its realization. We hazard little in saying that our so-called Catholic schools, in their actual effect, tend rather to depart from this standard than to approach it. They practically fail to recognize human progress, and thus fail to recognize the continuous and successive evolution of the idea in the life of humanity. They practically question the universality of the idea by failing to recognize as Catholic the great principles or ideas natural society is evolving and actualizing in its career through the ages. They do not educate their pupils to be at home and at their ease in their own age and country, or train them to be living, thinking, and energetic men, prepared for the work which actually awaits them in either church or state. As far as we are able to trace the effect of the most approved Catholic education of our days, whether at home or abroad, it tends to repress rather than to quicken the life of the pupil, to unfit rather than to prepare him for the active and zealous discharge either of his religious or his social duties. They who are educated in our schools seem misplaced and mistimed in the world, as if born and educated for a world that has ceased to exist. They come out ignorant of contemporary ideas, contemporary habits of mind, contemporary intelligence and tendencies, and large numbers of them sink into obscurity, and do nothing for their religion or their country; or, what is worse, abandon their religion, turn their backs on the church, and waste all their energies in seeking pleasure, or in accumulating worldly wealth. Of the young men educated in our colleges, a certain number have become priests and religious, and fill the ranks of the clergy and continue the religious orders. Of these we have nothing to say. But, of the others, we would ask: Do we find them up to the level of contemporary civilization, and foremost in all those movements fitted to advance intelligence, morality, and the general well-being of society? Do we find them showing by their superior intelligence, their superior morals, and their loftier aspirations the superiority of their religion and the salutary influence it is fitted to exert on civilization? With very few exceptions, we fear we must answer: This is not the case. Comparatively few of them take their stand as scholars or as men on a level with the

graduates of non-Catholic colleges, and those who do take that stand, in most cases, do it by throwing aside nearly all they learned from their alma mater, and adopting the ideas and principles, the modes of thought and action they find in the general civilization of the country in which they live.

Whence comes it that such, in general terms, has been thus far in our country the effect of what we proudly call Catholic education? We cannot ascribe it to any innate incompatibility between Catholic truth and the civilization of the country, for that would be to deny the catholicity of the idea; nor to any repugnance between it and modern society, because that would be to deny its catholicity in time. The cause cannot be in Catholicity itself, nor can it be in our American order of civilization, for Catholicity, if catholic, is adapted to all times and to all nations,—as the catechism tells us, when it says, she "subsists in all ages, and teaches all nations." If we educated in conformity with Catholic truth, those we educate would be fitted for their precise duties in their own time and country, and they would be the active, the living, and the foremost men among their contemporaries and fellow-citizens. When such is not the case, we may be sure that our education fails, in some respects, to be Catholic, and is directed to the restoration of a past severed from the present, and therefore an education that breaks the continuity of life either of the church or of humanity; and therefore is essentially a schismatic and heterodox education. It repeats substantially the errror of the reformers in the sixteenth century. These reformers may have had honest and even praiseworthy intentions, for there was then in the church, or rather amongst Catholics, as there always is, need enough of reform—deep, thorough, and wide-reaching reform , but they erred fatally in breaking the continuity of the divine-human life, and in aiming either at reproducing an order of things which had passed away, which they called "primitive Christianity," or in leaping to a future which could have no connection with the past, and be no development of what it contained in germ,—the law of all true reform, as of all real progress. The cause of the failure of what we term Catholic education is, in our judgment, in the fact that we educate not for the present or the future, but for a past which can never be restored, and therefore in our education are guilty of a gross anachronism.

We do not mean, and must not be understood to say that

the dogmas, that is, the mysteries, as defined in the infallible speech of the church, are not scrupulously taught in all our schools and colleges or that the words of the catechism are not faithfully preserved and duly insisted upon. We concede this, and that this gives to our so-called Catholic schools a merit which no others have or can have. Without the external word, the life of the internal expires, and when it is lost or corrupted, there are no means, except by a new supernatural intervention of Almighty God, of renewing the interior Christian life. This fact is of the first importance, and must never be lost sight of or underrated. The man who has not lost his faith, although his faith is inoperative, or, as theologians say, a "dead faith," is always to be preferred to him who has no faith at all; because he has in him a recuperative principle, and it is more easy to quicken it into activity, than it is to beget faith in one who has it not. The education given in our schools, however defective it may be, must always be preferred to that given in schools in which the dogma is rejected or mutilated, and can never be justly censured, save when compared with its own ideal, or with what it should be and would be, were it truly and thoroughly Catholic.

The fault we find with modern Catholic education is not that it does not faithfully preserve the symbol, that it does not retain all the dogmas or mysteries, so far as sound words go, but that it treats them as isolated or dead facts, not as living principles, and overlooks the fact that the life of the church consists in their continuous evolution and progressive development and actualization in the life of society and of individuals. They themselves, since they are principles and pertain to the ideal the church is evolving and actualizing, must be immutable, and the same for all times, places, and men. They are the principles of progress, but not themselves progressive, for the truth was completely expressed and individuated in the Incarnation. The progress is not in them, but in their explication and actualization in the life of humanity. The truth contained in them is always the same, can neither be enlarged nor diminished; but our understanding of them may be more or less adequate, and their explication and application to our own life and to the life of society may be more or less complete. Their evolution is successive, progressive, and continuous. This fact, which lies at the bottom of Dr. Newman's theory of development, though not always presented by him in an orthodox

sense, is what our Catholic education seems to us to overlook, and practically to deny. It seems to us to proceed as if the work of evolution were finished, and there remained nothing for the Christian to do, but to repeat the past. It aims not at the continuous evolution and realization of the Catholic ideal; but to restore a past age, an order of things which the world has left behind, and which it is neither possible nor desirable to restore, for it could be restored, if at all, only as a second childhood. It is now "behind the times," and unfits rather than prepares the student for taking an active part in the work of his own day and generation. It either gives its subjects no work to do, or a work in which humanity takes no interest and will not work with them,— a work which all the living and onward tendencies of the age obstinately resist, and which, if there is any truth in what we have said, is adverse alike to the present interests of both religion and civilization.

There can be no question that what generally passes for Catholic education, whether in this or any other country, has its ideal of perfection in the past, and that it resists as un-Catholic, irreligious, and opposed to God, the tendencies of modern civilization. The work that it gives its subjects, or prepares them to perform, is not the work of directing and carrying it forward, or of bringing it into dialectic harmony with religion; but that of resisting it, driving it back, anathematizing it as at war with the Gospel, and either of neglecting civilization altogether, and taking refuge in the cloister, in an exclusive or exaggerated asceticism, always bordering on immorality, or of restoring a former order of civilization, no longer a living order, and which humanity has evidently left behind, and is resolved shall never be restored.

This, in our judgment, is its great mistake, a mistake that denies the truth of humanity, and virtually condemns or places in abeyance, the human element of Christianity. It virtually denies the human, because it denies that the human evolves in its life Catholic truth, and pronounces its developments false, its tendencies irreligious, and its irrepressible instincts satanic. We mean that its tendency is in this direction, and hence the manifest and undeniable schism today between the church and humanity, between religion and modern civilization, which, if we understand it, implies a schism between God and man. It runs to one extreme, as rationalistic education runs to another and an opposite ex-

treme. Extremes meet. Rationalists condemn the church, because, they say, she is opposed to civilization, and to humanity itself; and many Catholics condemn the civilization humanity in her progress evolves and effects, because, they say, it is opposed to the church, incompatible with religion and the rightful supremacy of God. Both agree as to the fact and the character of the antagonism, and neither seems disposed to inquire whether a medium of reconciliation, of dialectic union, be or be not possible, so that the church, which presupposes humanity, and humanity, which cannot attain to its end, or realize its destiny without the church, may move on in harmony, without any contrariety of will, as there was no contrariety of will between the human and the divine in Christ, the God-man. If there is any truth in Catholicity, or unless our understanding of it be totally false, there is no necessity for this schism either in the nature of the church or in the nature of humanity, and it does and must result only from a defective theology on the one hand, and a false philosophy on the other.

These remarks apply to Catholic education not in our own country only, but throughout no small part of Christendom. In scarcely any part of the Christian world can we find Catholics,—we mean men who are earnest Catholics, firm in their faith, and unfaltering in their devotion to the church,—among the active and influential men of the age. In all, or nearly all countries the Catholic population is the weaker, and the less efficient portion of the population in all that relates to the war of ideas, and the struggle of opinions. Those Catholics who see this and have the courage to place themselves in harmony with the times, are looked upon as, at least, of doubtful orthodoxy, and not unfrequently are held up to clerical denunciation. Even when they are not cried down as heterodox, they are pushed aside as imprudent or unsafe men. It is very widely and, we fear, very generally believed, that true Catholic duty requires us to take our stand for a past civilization, a past order of ideas, and to resist with all our might the undeniable tendencies and instincts of the human race in our day. We are required by the present dominant sentiment of Catholics, to resist progress in every sense and direction, except in the purely ascetic life of individuals, and to content ourselves with the explication and application of the dogmas of the church, the great and immutable principles of Catholic life, given in past times, and embalmed in the opinions of the theologians

of other ages, and the dry, technical, and well-nigh unintelligible formulas of the schools. Hence Catholic education, or rather the education adopted and generally approved by Catholics in our age, especially in our country, fails to produce living men, active, thinking men, great men, men of commanding genius, of generous aims, and high and noble aspirations; and hence it also fails to enable the church to take possession of humanity, and to inspire and direct its movements.

But the objection we urge has a peculiar force and application to Catholic education in our country. Our Catholic population, to a great extent, is practically a foreign body and brings with it a civilization foreign from the American, and in some respects inferior to it. The great majority of our congregations are of foreign birth, or the children of foreign-born parents, and the greater part of our bishops and clergy, and of our professors and teachers, have been born, or at least educated, abroad, and they all naturally seek to perpetuate the civilization in which they have been brought up. Those even of our clergy and of our professors and teachers who have been born and educated in the country, have been educated in schools founded on a foreign model, and conducted by foreigners, and are, in regard to civilization, more foreign than native. We state the fact as it is. We are not condemning it; we may regret it, but we could hardly expect it to be otherwise. The original settlers of the country were, for the most part, non-Catholic, and but comparatively few of their descendants have been or are Catholics. The very large Catholic population now in the country has not been the growth of the country, but has been chiefly supplied by a foreign and a very recent migration. This is the fact,—a fact which is no fault of the Catholic population, but a fact that must be taken into the account in forming a judgment of the Catholic education in our own country. Catholics from the Old World necessarily bring with them their own civilization, which, whether we speak of France or Italy, Ireland or Germany, is, to say the least, different from ours, and, in some respects, even hostile to it.

But this is not all. The civilization they actually bring with them, and which without intending it they seek to continue, is, we being judges, of a lower order than ours. It may be our national prejudice and our ignorance of other nations, but it is nevertheless our firm conviction, from

which we cannot easily be driven, that, regarded in relation to its type, the American civilization is the most advanced civilization the world has yet seen, and comes nearer to the realization of the Catholic ideal than any which has been heretofore developed and actualized. We speak not of civilization in the sense of simple *civility*, polish of manners, and personal accomplishments, in which we may not compare always favorably with the upper classes of other nations; but of the type or idea we are realizing, our social and political constitution, our arrangements to secure freedom and scope for the development and progress of true manhood. In these respects American civilization is, we say not the term of human progress, but, in our judgment, the furthest point in advance as yet reached by any age or nation. Those who come here from abroad necessarily bring with them, therefore, a civilization more or less inferior to it, and which, in relation to it, is a civilization of the past. If they educate, then, according to their own civilization, as they must do, they necessarily educate for a civilization behind the times and below that of the country.

The fact of this inferiority is conceded, or virtually conceded, by our bishops and clergy themselves, in the reason they assign for establishing separate schools for Catholic children. They tell us, and, we must presume, tell us truly, that, if the children of Catholics are educated in the common schools of the country, they will lose their religion and grow up Protestants, or at least non-Catholics. But why so, if the Catholic population represents a civilization not inferior to that represented by the non-Catholic? If Catholic children and Protestant attend the same school, why are the Catholic likely to become Protestant, any more than the Protestant are to become Catholic? The danger alleged could not exist if the Protestant or non-Catholic children did not represent the stronger, and, therefore, the superior civilization. If the Catholic children represented the advancing civilization, the civilization more in accordance with the instincts and tendencies of humanity, and therefore the civilization that has the promise of the future, they would, though inferior in numbers, be the stronger party, and, instead of being themselves perverted, would convert the non-Catholic children, and the opposition to mixed schools would come from non-Catholic, not from Catholic parents and guardians. Why is it that so many of our children, as they grow up and go out into the world, abandon their re-

ligion, lose nearly all memory of the church of their fathers, live, act, and die as Protestants or as infidels? You say, and say truly, that it is owing to the influence of the country; but does not this show that the civilization of the country is stronger, more energetic, and more living than that which you combine, and, to a great extent, insist on combining with the Catholic dogma?

Will you deny our inference, or seek to escape it by attributing the fact to the perversity of human nature, to the seductions of the flesh, and to the temptations and machinations of the devil? To some extent you may do so; but you must take care lest you forget or deny the Catholicity of the Word, and forget or deny that humanity, in the natural order, even though suffering from the fall, is living the life of the creative Word. The ideal of humanity which she is realizing in her progress, is true, an element itself of Catholic truth, and, though distinguishable, yet inseparable from the ideal the church is herself realizing in her divine-human life. It will not do, then, to attribute solely to human perversity, to the influence of the flesh, or to the machinations of the devil, the loss of so many of our children as they grow up; and, therefore, we must maintain that it is in great measure due to the fact that the civilization which Catholics bring with them, and with which they associate their Catholic faith, is inferior, and therefore weaker than the civilization which has been attained to by humanity in our country, and which, unhappily, instead of being associated with orthodoxy, is associated with heterodoxy. The civilization of the country does not owe its superiority to the heterodoxy with which it is associated, any more than the civilization which Catholics bring with them owes its inferiority to the orthodoxy with which it is accidentally associated. The civilization of the country owes its superiority to the truth which it accepts and evolves, and is weakened and prevented from attaining to its full development by its association with heterodoxy, as orthodoxy itself is weakened and prevented from gaining the successes it is entitled to, by being associated with an inferior civilization.

The inferiority of the civilization associated in our country with orthodoxy might be inferred *a priori* from the fact that the mass of our Catholic population are from the more uncultivated classes of the Old World, with whom it would be ridiculous to pretend that civilization has reached its highest point of development. Whatever respect we

may have for the peasantry of Ireland or Germany, how much soever we may honor them for the firmness with which, under the severest trials and temptations, they have held fast to the orthodox faith, we can by no means take them in respect of civilization as the advance-guard of humanity. But the facts themselves, facts which nobody can question, sufficiently prove, as least as to our English-speaking Catholics, that their civilization is of an inferior order. Their sympathies are far closer with the slaveholding South than with the free North, and we need not add that the civilization of the free North is far superior to that represented by the slaveholding South. The civilization of the South is based on slavery as its corner-stone, and slavery is the very essence of barbarism. The distinction between barbarism and civilization is precisely the distinction between slavery and liberty. The true American civilization has its type and seat in the free states, and is best represented by the Puritans and their descendants, who were in fact its chief founders as they are its chief, or, at least, most earnest supporters. Yet, except with a certain number of converts of New England birth and descent, we rarely find a Catholic who does not look upon Puritan New England as the most anti-Catholic portion of the Union, and consider that his best way of promoting Catholic interests is to fight against her.

The great body of our Catholics, no doubt, wish to americanize, and conform to the civilization of the country, but they have hitherto americanized, so far as they have americanized at all, in a southern rather than in a northern sense. The type of the Americanism they aim to adopt is in Maryland, not in Massachusetts; Baltimore, not Boston; and nothing can exceed the hostility of the Maryland type, which, properly speaking, is the Virginia type, to the Boston, or New England type. Indeed, it is these two orders of civilization that meet in mortal combat in the civil war which now threatens the integrity of the American nation. The war is a struggle for life and death, a struggle between a civilization based on slavery, represented by the South, and a civilization based on constitutional liberty and the rights of men, represented by the free states. And, in this struggle, if, as is the fact, the interest and loyalty of Catholics lead them in large numbers to take sides with the North, their sympathies are very generally with the South; and we cannot doubt that, if the South were the loyal party, they

would much more readily fight with the South than they now fight with the North. Even, then, where our Catholics aim to be American, it is not American in the sense of the highest, truest, and most advanced Americanism; but in the sense of the lowest, the least advanced, that which is least remote from barbarism, and the furthest removed from that which the church as well as humanity demands, and never ceases to struggle to obtain.

We are also borne out in our views by the political history of the country. Politically, the southern leaders have for a long time formed their association with the least intelligent, the least advanced classes in the free states, and these southern leaders are those our Catholic population have followed with the most alacrity. This fact proves, on the one hand, that the South represents the lowest order of civilization in the country, and that Catholics are more easily engaged in supporting it than in supporting the superior civilization represented by the northern states. It is not too much to say that the great influx of the Catholic peasantry of different European states into the country, and the conferring on them, almost on their arrival, of political franchises, have done not a little to corrupt our politics, and to lower the standard of our civilization. Their orthod oxy, as yet, has done less to advance, than their inferior civilization has done to corrupt and lower, our civilization a nd morals. However humiliating this fact may be to us as Catholics, there is no use in attempting to deny it, or to disguise it. It is a fact which all intelligent Americans see and know, and it is one which we ourselves should dare look in the face. The opposition to us represented by "Native-American," or "Know-Nothing" parties or movements, is not opposition to us as orthodox Catholics, nor, in itself considered, to us as foreigners, but simply as representatives of a civilization different from the American, and, in many respects, inferior and opposed to it. We have practically, if not theoretically, insisted that our orthodoxy and our foreign and inferior civilization are inseparable; and the heterodox American people have in this agreed with us, and hence their opposition to us, and ours to them. Heterodoxy, with the heterodox of our country, is no longer a living principle, and is retained only because associated, accidentally associated, with a superior and more advanced civilization. Orthodoxy is opposed not because there is any opposition to it on its own account, but because it is believed

to be inseparably wedded to that inferior and less advanced civilization that has come hither with it from the Old World, and which many honest Catholics think, if they ever think at all on the subject, is identical with it.

Now, the objection to Catholic schools, especially those for the people at large, is that they tend, and for a time at least must tend, to perpetuate the association of orthodoxy with this inferior civilization, and thus injure alike the country and the church. These schools must be taught chiefly by foreigners, or, if not by foreigners, at least by those whose sympathies and connections, tastes and habits are un-American; because what is wanted by their founders and supporters is not simply the preservation of orthodoxy, but the perpetuation of the foreignism hitherto associated with it. Schools which should associate real Americanism with orthodoxy would be hardly less offensive or more acceptable to them than the public schools themselves. They must, therefore, be conducted and taught by men who will keep up the old association, and prevent the association of real Americanism with orthodoxy. Yet it is precisely this latter association which is desirable both for civilization and for religion, and it is only by breaking the old associations, and forming the new in good faith, as we are in fact required to do by orthodoxy itself, that Catholics can cease to be in this country an isolated foreign colony, or a band of emigrants encamped for the night, and ready to strike their tents, and take up their line of march on the morrow for some other place.

These are some of the reasons which have led many of our most intelligent, most earnest, and devout Catholics to form their unfavorable judgment of Catholic schools and Catholic education, as they now are, and for some time are likely to be, in the United States. They are solid reasons as far as they go, and fully justify the dissatisfaction with them we began by recognizing. They prove that here and elsewhere, but especially here, Catholic education, or the education given by Catholics, is below the wants of the age and country, and prove that, from the seminary down to the primary school, it stands in need, whether we consult the interest of orthodoxy or that of civilization, of a wide, deep, and thorough reform. Yet, after long reflection and much hesitation, some would say opposition, we must say that we do not regard them as sufficient reasons for abandoning the movement for Catholic schools and education supported by

our bishops and clergy. It may be that the movement was premature, and that it would have been better to have used for a longer time the schools of the country, as the early Christians did those of the empire, before attempting to establish schools of our own, save for the education of the clergy. But it is too late to discuss that question now. The movement has, wisely or unwisely, been set on foot, and gone too far to be arrested, even if it were desirable to arrest it. Our bishops and clergy have decided that the movement shall go on, and the Catholic cause can never be promoted by any anti-hierarchical action. Much good may be done that is not done by or under the direction of the hierarchy; but no good end can ever be obtained in opposition to it. This consideration is of itself sufficient to deter us from opposing the movement, and of inducing us to accept it at least as *un fait accompli*, and to make the best we can of it.

That we are to have schools and colleges of our own, under the control of Catholics, we take it is a "fixed fact." Whether the movement for them is premature or not, it is idle, if nothing worse, to war against it. Let us say, then, to those who regard the education actually given by Catholics as we do, and who have not seen their way clear to the support of primary schools under the control of Catholics as a substitute, in the case of Catholic children, for the common schools of the country, that we regard it as our duty now to accept the movement, and labor not to arrest it, or to embarrass it, but to reform and render truly Catholic the whole system of Catholic education, from the highest grade to the lowest. Let it be our work not to destroy Catholic education, but to reform and advance it. The first care of all Catholics should be the preservation of orthodoxy, and, in the actual state of our Catholic population, it may be that orthodoxy will be better preserved by schools under Catholic direction than it can be by sending our children to the public schools. The objections we have set forth are, after all, only temporary and accidental. They grow out of the present and past state of our Catholic population, and must disappear under the slow but effectual operation of time and causes already in operation amongst us. We might gain something under the point of view of civilization by adopting the schools of the country; but, as our prelates and clergy are strongly opposed to them, and have done much to bring them into disrepute with Catholics, we

should probably lose, under the point of view of orthodoxy, more than would thus be gained. Schools under the control of Catholics will, at least, teach the catechism, and though they may in fact teach it as a dead letter, rather than as a quickening spirit, it is better that it should be taught as a dead letter than not be taught at all. It is only by preserving the dogma intact that we do or can preserve the Christian ideal, or have the slightest chance of securing our final destiny. The hopes of the world for time and eternity are dependent on the preservation of the orthodox faith.

The reform in our schools and in education will go on just in proportion as it goes on in our Catholic community itself, and perhaps even much faster. The dissatisfaction we hear expressed with our collegiate education for boys, and with that of our conventual schools for girls, is an encouraging symptom; it proves that there is, after all, a growing americanization of our Catholic population, and that the need of an education less European and more truly American is daily becoming more widely and more deeply felt. It will be more widely and more deeply felt still as time goes on, and as Catholics become more generally naturalized in habit, feeling, and association, as well as in law. It indicates also the revival of Catholic life in our population, that Catholics are becoming more earnest and living men, and unwilling that their orthodoxy should be wrapped up in a clean napkin and buried in the earth. In proportion as their Catholic life revives and grows more active, they will demand an education more in accordance with Catholic truth in all its branches, than is that now given. The demand will create a supply. And when the present civil strife is over, the integrity of the nation reëstablished, and American civilization has proved itself capable of subduing the barbarism of the South, and of marching onward and upward with humanity, in her career of progress to union with the infinite, we trust Catholics will find and feel themselves real Americans, differing from other Americans only in the respect that orthodoxy differs from heterodoxy, truth from error, life from death. Then our schools will assume their true character and position, and exert a truly Catholic influence. They will preserve orthodoxy not as a dead letter, not as isolated and inoperative dogma, but as a quickening spirit, as living and operative truth. Then, under the point of view of civilization, instead of tending

to recall a dead past, they will accept the living present, and associate the living civilization of the day with the orthodox faith,—reunite in a living and productive whole the scattered members of the torn and bleeding body of truth, and aid both the church and the nation in carrying forward our civilization to the last term of its progress. Then our schools will send out living men, live with the love of God and of man,—men of large minds, of liberal studies, and generous aims,—men inspired by faith and genius, who will take the command of their age, breathe their whole souls into it, inform it with their own love of truth, and raise it to the level of their own high and noble aspirations. Let us console ourselves for what Catholic education now is with what it may become, and with what we may by well-directed effort aid it in becoming. This is the conclusion to which we ourselves have come, and if we are not satisfied with Catholic schools and education as they are, we are satisfied with their capabilities, and shall henceforth content ourselves with doing what in us lies to bring them under the great law of progress, which we have insisted on, and which is the law of all life, even of the divine life,—as is proved in the eternal generation of the Word, and the procession of the Holy Ghost, or in the assertion of theologians that "God is most pure act," *actus purissimus.*

ESSAYS THEOLOGICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND HISTORICAL, ON THE REFORMATION IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.

ESSAY I.

All facts are symbolic, and reveal or symbolize to him who knows how to read them, a truth or reality which transcends or informs them, that is their principle and cause, and which they exteriorly express or manifest. Creation is a fact, but not a fact complete in itself, signifying no reality or relation beyond itself. The creative act, and therefore the universe as a whole and in all its parts is simply the expression *ad extra*, or the extrinsecation of the eternal Word or Logos, who was in the beginning, who was with God, and

who was God, and nothing created is really understood or intelligible, save in its relations to the creative Word by whom all things were made, and without whom nothing is made, or can be made. Our senses may apprehend the visible phenomena of the universe, but we really know or fully understand the universe or any thing in it only as we penetrate beyond the visible or the sensible, the symbolic veil or mimetic bark, and seize the intelligible, the *νοητόν*, that transcends it, and which it expresses. The real word is never the sensible word, the sounds which strike the ear, or the characters written or printed on paper, and which are addressed to the eye, but the sense or meaning they symbolize to the understanding. The visible or sensible phenomena of the universe, natural or supernatural, are simply sounds or characters, the external word, if you will, what the Greeks call the mimesis, but significant only as symbols or imitations of the internal word, and the internal word or meaning symbolized, if in the created order, is itself dependent on a more interior word still, and is significant only as it is apprehended in its union with the eternal Word through the medium of the divine creative act.

Hence, real science, as Plato taught us long ago, does not consist in knowing facts in their simple visibility, or in the simple apprehension of sensible phenomena, but in knowing the intelligible, or *idea*, on which they depend as their cause and principle, in which is their real significance, and which they symbolize to the understanding. The sensible copies or imitates the intelligible, but the true object of science is the intelligible or supersensible, not the sensible. We do not know nature, even though we know all the sensible or material phenomena of the universe, if we know them only as sensible and unrelated phenomena, with no recognition of their intelligible meaning and relations. The sensible does not stand alone, or rest on itself; it depends on the intelligible, what Plato calls the *idea*, both to exist and to be known. As there are and can be no sensible phenomena without intelligible reality that transcends and informs them, so can there be no sensible apprehension, as distinguished from mere organic affection, without intelligible intuition. It is never enough, then, in any case whatever, to apprehend the simple material fact, it is always necessary to go further, and ascertain its intelligible meaning, or the idea it symbolizes, manifests, or reveals to the understanding.

The facts or events of history are symbolic in like manner

as any other class of facts. The facts are the sounds and characters, the sensible word of history, but they are not in themselves history, or the internal or intelligible word in which is all real historical significance. A man may know them all, but if he knows them only as sensible and unrelated facts, he knows as little of history as he knows of the Greek language who knows only its written characters; for to him the characters are inexpressive, insignificant, and present or represent no intelligible or noetic object. Sensible facts, as external words, are significant only to the mind, and truly significant only to the mind that knows how to read and interpret them. The historian but imperfectly performs his task who is a mere chronicler. Chronicles are sounds or characters, but not the intelligible words of history. They are often preferable, when full and faithful, to many so-called elaborate philosophic histories, because they give the materials which the student may use and interpret for himself. But they are not history. The history is in the intelligible facts symbolized by the material or sensible facts.

It is necessary in reading historical works, by whomsoever written, to bear this in mind, and to guard against supposing that we know general or particular history, because we are familiar with the sensible or material facts in the case. No fact or event stands alone in God's universe. All the facts or phenomena of any given history have an intelligible origin, or a supersensible principle, on which they depend, and take place only by virtue of and in accordance with some supersensible or transcendental law, in fulfilment of some purpose or plan of the Creator. None of them are arbitrary, accidental, or isolated, for all creation is by the eternal Word or Logos, and therefore must be logical in their origin, medium, and end, and therefore in dialectic relation to the principle, medium, and end of creation itself. To know any, apparently the least significant, fact of nature or history, really to understand it, it is necessary to see it not merely as an isolated or unrelated fact, but in its relation with all other facts, and to the dialectic law of all life. In fact, we cannot see or apprehend it in its real character unless we have in our minds the true theory, or *schema*, of the universe, natural and supernatural, and its relation to God as its prototype, archetype, and creator. The true historian must be a theologian and a philosopher, and study and relate historical events from the point of view, and in the light of a true and adequate theological or philosophical doctrine.

Every man does and must write history from the point of view of his own theology, from the point of view of his own doctrine of God and the universe. He cannot do otherwise, if he would. Every man must look at or contemplate objects as they appear from his own stand-point. If his stand-point is not sufficiently elevated, and his vision sufficiently comprehensive to take in the universe of facts in their completeness, in their true order and real perspective as they appear to the Creator himself, he can never write absolutely true history, or history absolutely trustworthy. The only absolutely trustworthy history is the history written under divine inspiration, as that given us in the Holy Scriptures. He who sees things only from a low, narrow, sectarian stand-point, a narrow, unsound, or defective theology or philosophy, not only cannot give a true interpretation of historical facts, not only cannot give a true appreciation of them, but he cannot even give a true, full, and impartial narration of them. All are not even perceptible from his stand-point, and all that are perceptible, and even perceived, will not be noted. Many not unrecognized will be neglected, or thrown into the back ground, as insignificant and of no account. A false perspective will be maintained throughout, and facts will be exaggerated, mutilated, presented in a prominent light, or thrown into the shade, according to the exigencies of his theological or philosophical doctrine, and this too, without any malice, or any intention of misrepresenting, perverting, or falsifying history. This is inevitable, so long as human infirmity and human imperfection remain.

J. Merle d'Aubigné has written several volumes of what he calls the History of the Grand Reformation. He is a Swiss Calvinist, and writes from the point of view of Calvinistic theology, a modified Manicheism. He proceeds from the assumption of two principles—Divinity and Satanity—in eternal conflict, without any medium of reconciliation or dialectic harmony between them. Being a Protestant, Rome represents for him satanity, and Protestantism Divinity, and the significance of the great movement of the sixteenth century was God rising up to put down Satan. All his facts are adjusted to this theory, and those which do not tend to sustain it are omitted, misstated, or explained away. The distinguished Catholic bishop of Louisville, not rising always to the point of view of the Catholicity he professes, and not always bearing in mind that Catholicity

is catholic, and embraces and integrates in itself all truth, differs from the Swiss historian very little, except in assuming in opposition to him that Protestantism represents satanity, and Rome Divinity. For him, though there were abuses among Catholics that needed reforming, the reformation was satanic in its inception, progress, and termination. It originated in impatience of restraint, in the spirit of disobedience, in the love of riches, in a craving for license, and hatred of truth and holiness. Its significance for him is the uprising of Satan to dethrone the Son of God, King of kings, Lord of lords, and Author and Finisher of our faith. He corrects many of the errors and misstatements of his Protestant contemporary, brings out and places in a prominent light many facts the Calvinist had neglected or suppressed, but from him hardly more than from his adversary can we get a real insight into, or understanding of the Protestant reformation as a world movement, or production of the *Welt-Geist*. From neither, nor from both together, can we get a full, clear, faithful, and impartial statement even of the sensible facts in the case. Neither, in fact, writes history. Each writes as a controversialist, and each introduces only the facts necessary to make out his case, and establish his side in the controversy. One is almost as sectarian as the other, and neither approaches the subject from the real catholic point of view, and studies it in the light of the idea, which, as theandric, embraces at once in their distinction and union all the truth of God and all the truth of man, and whose life is the life of the church or the regenerated human race. Both remain as far as possible in the sensible region, and the Catholic prelate makes almost as little account of the theandric idea and life of the church as the Protestant minister himself.

If there is any truth in the doctrine we are asserting, the historian of the Protestant reformation should approach the study and explication of its facts from the really Catholic point of view, for it is only Catholic truth that enables us to do it from the point of view of the creative Word, or from the point of view of God himself. Catholicity is the ideal truth, or Idea or Word made flesh, who says of himself: I am the way, the truth, and the life. Catholic *truth*, considered in itself, or objectively, is God incarnate, and the *life* of the church, that is, the regenerated human race, is the life of the Word made flesh, as the life of men in the order of regeneration is the life of Adam, and the

way to God as our final cause, or to our end, the eternal beatitude, is by living this life. In this there is nothing arbitrary, nothing anomalous, nothing not in harmony with the universal order of things.

The whole Christian order, nay, the whole created order, rests for its basis on the mystery of the trinity or triunity of God. God is inconceivable as living being, as actual God, or as the philosophers and theologians say, most pure act, unless conceived of in the threefold relation of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. God cannot be actual unless he acts, for without acting he can be conceived only as potential, or *in potentia ad actum*. He cannot be infinite intelligence without infinitely intelligencing, for an intelligence that does not intelligence is simply no intelligence at all. The intelligence to be actual, must express itself, at least interiorly, and to be infinite it must have an infinite expression. The interior expression of intelligence, the expression of intelligence to itself, or expression of itself by taking itself as its own object, is the generation of the Word, the exact image of the intelligence expressed. The Father as generative principle knows himself, and this knowing of himself as the object of his own intelligence, begets the Son, or generates the Word, who, though bearing the relation to the Father of filiation, as the Father bears to him the relation of paternity, is yet identically God, and the express image of the Father. The Father must turn to the Son, and the Son to the Father, and from their mutual spiration must proceed Love, or the Holy Ghost. Deny this, deny the generation of the Word and the procession of the Holy Ghost, eternal and immanent in the divine essence, and you deny that God is most pure act, or actual in himself, and are obliged to assume with Hegel, that he actualizes himself only extrinsically in creation, and first attains to self-consciousness in man.

This view of the Godhead neither denies nor obscures the unity of God, for the unity of God is predicable of his being or entity, and the triple relation of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, asserted by Christian theology, is the mystery of his interior essence, and is the interiority, or very essence of his being. If we may so speak, it is prior to his being and constitutive of it. The very essence of God is relation, but a relation that has its terms in the essence itself, not out of it. The unity is not the *primum*, is not prior to the triplicity, and the relations do not proceed from

unity as first, second, third ; but the relations themselves are the *primum*, and precede, if the expression be permissible, unity, as in being *essentia* precedes *esse*. They are the essence of the divine being, and constitutive of the divine unity, by virtue of which God is perfect, complete, actual, living being, or real being in opposition to the *reines Sein* of Hegel, which is simple possibility, and as such identical, as Hegel truly says, with *das Nichtsein*, or not-being. The error of Hegel is in not perceiving that what he calls *das Sein*, *das Ideen*, and *das Wesen*, are intrinsic, and that the progress from the first to the second, and from the second to the third, which is living, active being, or being in its plenitude, is intrinsic in the bosom of the divine essence itself. He makes them extrinsic, and hence supposes that God in himself is incomplete, and completes himself in the universe. The complete, full, actual, living God, according to him, is God and the universe, or, rather, the universe is God completed or actualized. Hegel understood perfectly well that the three relations asserted by Christian theology are essential to the conception of the divine being as actual or living being, but he did not understand that they are intrinsic relations without extrinsic terms. He understood that there must be a progression in the divine life, but not that the progression is intrinsic and immanent in the divine essence. Not understanding the Christian doctrine, he made the progression necessary to his completion as *das Wesen*, or living being, extrinsic, toward an extrinsic term. Had he conceived the relations, the progression, or divine generation and procession as in the very bosom of the Divinity, therefore necessary, eternal, and immanent, he would have escaped his pantheism, and the nihilism in which his philosophy as all pantheistic philosophy necessarily terminates.

The triad asserted by Christian theology, including the relation of subject and object, generation and generated, paternity and filiation, and their mutual operation, or love, the end or consummation of all operation, in the very essence or intrinsic nature of God, is not opposed to the unity of God, but is that unity itself, which is not a numeral but a supernumeral unity. Numeral unity is finite, is a unit, and may be followed by other units ; but the divine unity is a universal unity, a unity all-embracing, and all-sufficing. God as one is not simply one in number, but one universal, complete, independent, and self-sufficing being, including in-

trinsically the principle of unity and multiplicity, of identity and diversity. That is to say, he is a living and self-sufficing unity, or being in its plenitude. Embracing the triad in his essence, he is pure act. His potentiality and actualty are eternally and necessarily coincident in the bosom of his own being, and consequently there is in him no potentiality to be actualized, no abstract to be concreted, no idea to be realized, and we can say of him that he is, not that he is *becoming*, *das Werden*. Hence we escape the error of Hegel, Leroux, Cousin, as well as of the Buddhists, that God is in himself simply *das reine Sein*, or mere potentiality, and becomes actual, or attains to the plenitude of being only in creating or operating extrinsically. Indeed, all philosophy that excludes the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, and starts from simple unity with the old Eleatics, runs necessarily into some form of pantheism. It starts and must start with the idea of the same, the identical, and exclude the idea of the diverse; but without the same and the diverse dialectically united in the Prototype it is impossible to conceive of a universe distinct from God, or of a universe distinguishable from him even by his creative act. The only possible refutation of pantheism is in the assertion of the mystery of the Trinity, the internal generation of the Word and procession of the Holy Ghost eternal and immanent in the divine essence itself. For it is only by that assertion that God can be asserted as being in its plenitude, and therefore in himself sufficient for himself.

The generation of the Word and procession of the Holy Ghost are necessary and eternal operations immanent in the divine essence itself, for by them is only asserted the eternal actualization in himself of his own essence. He is necessarily and eternally what he is—is what he is by the intrinsic and eternal necessity of his own being, not by a free voluntary act of his own will, for the divine will itself is one and common to all the persons of the Godhead. By virtue of the intrinsic, necessary, eternal, and immanent operations he is in himself necessarily and eternally, actual being, perfect being, being in its plenitude, or, in scholastic language, most pure act, and therefore is in himself sufficient for himself, needing nothing, and capable of receiving nothing from without, or from any extrinsic operation. Hence he can never be under any necessity, internal or external, of operating extrinsically, or of creating an externa-

universe. While the internal operation is necessary, the external operation, or the extrinsecation of the eternal Word in an external universe, is and must be a free, voluntary act, dependent entirely on his own will. Hence all theologians tell us creation, or every act of God *ad extra*, or extrinsic act, is a free act. God is free to create or not to create, as he sees proper; but if he creates at all, he must create after the divine pattern or archetype in his own mind, that is to say, after his own eternal and immutable Word or Idea, identical, as St. Thomas teaches us, with his own essence. *Idea in mente divina nihil est aliud quam essentia Dei.* The universe has and must have its prototype in the divine essence, and be an extrinsic copy out of himself of the eternal and immanent operations in himself—the extrinsecation of his own essential triad. *Deus est similitudo rerum omnium*, says St. Thomas after Plato, or rather after St. Paul, who teaches that the terrestrial copies the celestial, as the Lord says to Moses, "See that thou make all things after the pattern shown thee in the Mount." It must be so, otherwise creation would not be the expression of the Word, and we could not say that God creates all things by his Word; or of the Word or Logos, with St. John, "All things were made by him, and without him was made nothing that was made."

The prototype of the created universe is in the Trinity or interior essence of God, and the universe therefore must copy extrinsically in the chronotope the interior and immanent motions eternal and immanent in the bosom of the Divinity. These motions are two: the generation of the Word, and the procession of the Holy Ghost. In the generation of the Word the action is from the Father as principle, and in the procession of the Holy Ghost the action, immanent action, returns to the Father as end. And hence we may say—only remembering that we are speaking of the interior essence of God, in so far as made known to us analogically by revelation, and that the terms of the relation are intrinsic in the divine essence itself—that the Father is principle, the Son or Word the medium, and the Holy Ghost the end or consummation. The universe, which is the chronotope or the expression of the divine essence in time and space, or, so to speak, God extrinsecated, must have the two corresponding motions, the motion from God by way of creation, which we call the cosmic motion, responding in time to the generation of the Word in eternity,

and the motion to God as the end, without absorption in him, responding in the chronotope to the procession of the Holy Ghost in eternity, or in God. In creation or every act *ad extra* all the persons of the Godhead concur, the Father as principle, the Son as medium, and the Holy Ghost as end, consummator, or sanctifier.

The Word generated turns necessarily to the Father, the generator, because in essence one with him, and living only in him, and this turning to him completes the generative act, consummated in the procession of the Holy Ghost. The act is completed in God, because it is intrinsic, having its term in the divine being itself. The external act as the divine creative act must copy this act, and receive its complement or consummation only in returning to God from whom it proceeds. Hence creation has not only the cosmic motion, or motion from God as creator, but a motion of return to God, through the medium of the Word, as final cause, or the Holy Ghost, which return is end, consummation, sanctification, glorification. The second motion complementary of the cosmic motion, we call palingenesiac, from the Greek palingenesia (*παλιγγενεσία*, Matth. xix. 28), new-birth, or regeneration. This second motion must be that of return to God, for the creature has not its being, either the principle or the end of its being, in itself, but in God only, and exists only in that it participates of the divine being, through the divine creative act. Hence its origin, medium, and end are alike in God. "In him we live, and move, and have our being." "Of him, and by him, and in him are all things." "The Lord hath made all things for himself." God is the principle, medium, and end of creation, which is, as far as it goes, the extrinsic expression or image of himself, having the type it is realizing in his own essence.

Pantheists and emanationists are right when they restrict their doctrine to the interior, immanent, and eternal operations within the divine essence; they are wrong only when they transfer it from the intrinsic to the extrinsic, from eternity to time and space; for then it becomes sophistical and denies itself. For, if God be only byssos, as say the Gnostics, void, with the Buddhists, *das reine Sein*, with Hegel, which is the *potentia nuda* of the schoolmen, he cannot operate either intrinsically or extrinsically and cannot render himself plenum or pleroma by creation. Yet the created universe copies the intrinsic relations of the divine

essence, and is not the divine triad in itself, but its external copy, image, or expression, that is to say, God extrinsecated, or, so to speak, the extrinsic God, proceeding from the intrinsic by a free creative act, and completing itself only in returning to God, since God in creating creates God. The two motions asserted by the emanationists are intrinsic in God, and copied by the created universe. The universe proceeds from God, and returns to God, *mediante* the creative act, and in return to God as its end, it becomes God, as the emanationists say, but only God by participation, not by nature or by identity of essence. The cosmos may in this sense be regarded as the initial extrinsic God, and the palingenesia as the extrinsic God, or God in the extrinsic order, actualized or completed. That is, in the palingenesia the creature attains to oneness, not identity, with God, and is God in the only sense in which the creature, remaining creature, can be one with the Creator, the finite with the infinite. It is only by this return to God in the palingenesia that the creature can be completed, its potentiality actualized, and its beatitude obtained, as all religions and all philosophies of any nerve unanimously teach. The motion to the end is given initially in the creative act itself,—"The Lord hath made all things for himself,"—and hence palingenesia is the completion or fulfilment of cosmos.

But the initial or incomplete cannot complete itself by itself, for the potential is reduced to act only by the actual, and the cosmos can no more return to God, than proceed from God, without the divine creative act. God was free to create or not create, that is, to extrinsecate the Word or not, as he chose, and having chosen to extrinsecate the Word, he was still free to give it the highest possible extrinsecation or not, as it pleased himself. But if he resolved to extrinsecate his creative act, he must express his Word, and therefore extrinsecate his own eternal and immutable idea, or, in other words, follow in his creation the type eternal in his own essence. So, if he resolved to carry his creative act to its apex, to give extrinsically the fullest possible expression of his own intrinsic essence, he must become incarnate, and take the creature up into hypostatic union with himself. Neither creation nor incarnation is absolutely necessary, for God, as we have seen, suffices for himself; but both are necessary *necessitate ex suppositione*, as say the schoolmen. The Incarnation is necessary to the completion, consummation, or glorification of the cosmos.

The Incarnation is not initial creation, but, as it were, a new creation, presupposing the initial or cosmic, and referring solely to the medium and end or consummation of the cosmos. The incarnation of the Word, though not the passion of Christ, would have been necessary on the supposition that God intended to give his creative act its highest complement, even if Adam had not prevaricated and the human race fallen from its original state of innocence. Whether he would have become incarnate if man had not sinned, we know not. The common opinion of theologians is that he would not, and this may be thought to be confirmed by the *O felix culpa* which the church sings in her office for Holy Saturday, and by the fact that our Lord is most frequently represented in the Holy Scriptures under the character of Redeemer, Liberator, or Saviour,—"Thou shalt call his name Jesus, for he shall save his people from their sins,"—and by the further fact that his work is represented as one of mercy, pointing to and culminating in his death on the cross. But however this may be, the Incarnation would have been necessary, even if man had not sinned, to complete the creative act, and effect the complete reconciliation or dialectic union between the creature and the Creator.

In himself God is complete being, being in its plenitude, by virtue of the generation of the Word and the procession of the Holy Ghost, eternal and immanent in his own essence. As the supra-rational triad, as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the divine essence is dialectic, and contains the prototype of all dialectics. The Father is the principle, the Son or Word is the medium, and the Holy Ghost is the end. There is in the divine essence itself a progression, immanent and eternal progression, be it remembered, from the principle through the medium to the end or conclusion, the consummation or completion, as is taught us in the *Filioque* in the creed. The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son,—from the Father as principle, and from the Son as medium. To deny the *Filioque*, and maintain, as the Greeks are said to do, that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father alone, would be to deny the essentially dialectic character of the divine being, to deny all medium of progression from the principle to the end, and to represent the divine essence as consisting of the two extremes without middle term, or medium of union. The Father and the Spirit would stand without their *nexus*, as absurd as it would be in logic to at-

tempt to draw a conclusion from the extremes without a *medius terminus*. The same heresy transferred from the interior of God to the chronotope or divine extrinsecation, would present the extrinsic and the intrinsic as two extremes incapable of reconciliation. It would make both God and the universe sophistical. It would deny all *nexus* or medium between God and creature, and deny alike the procession of existences from God and the return of existences in the palingenesia to God. It would disjoin fundamentally the first cause and the final cause, and sunder absolutely the principle and end. This is the grand heresy, as we shall see before closing our essays on the Protestant movement in the sixteenth century, of all rationalists, and of most pietists and mystics. These deny all medium of the return of existences to God, and fall either into complete pantheism or into an absurd dualism, and represent God and the universe, each as standing by and sufficing for itself. The denial of the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son as medium is tantamount to the denial of the unity of God. It denies all logic, because it suppresses the middle term. It denies the copula between subject and predicate, being and existences in the ideal formula. The universe can proceed from God only by means of the creative Word, and return to him as their final cause only by the same medium. Hence it is by the Word all things are made, and by the Word as mediator that we return to God as our last end. The orthodox doctrine of the Trinity is therefore the origin and basis of all logic, and they who deny it, they who omit the Word, the Logos, whence logic itself, as the medium, are doomed to an incurable sophistry, if they attempt to make any assertion at all. Deny the Father as principle, you can assert no medium or end; deny the Son as mediator or medium, and you have no connection or relation between the principle and the end; deny the Holy Ghost as end, and you can only say two, two, never two and two make four. Whether, then, we speak of the procession of existences from God, the cosmos, or the return of existences to God, the palingenesia, we must recognize the Word, called by the Greeks also the divine substantial or immanent creative act,—for the type or idea, according to Plato, is not passive, but causative, creative,—as the medium between the principle and the end. In the cosmos the Father is principle, and the Son is the medium; in the palingenesia the Father is the principle, the Son is the medium, and the

Holy Ghost is the end; and hence, while the Son is called the mediator, the Holy Spirit is termed the sanctifier, that is, consummator, represented in every syllogism or argument as the conclusion.

The generation of the Word and the procession of the Holy Ghost are eternal and immanent in God; but the Incarnation is in time, is chronotopical, and therefore an act *ad extra*, and an act in which, as in every act *ad extra*, the whole Godhead concurs; but as an act mediatorial, as a means to the end, only the Word or Son, medium in the Godhead between the principle and end, is incarnated or can be incarnated. The Incarnation, or assumption of human nature in hypostatic union with God, not being in the cosmos, for if it were it would deny all distinction of principle, means, and end, and identify the two cycles, the cosmic and the palingenesiac, generation with regeneration, and therefore deny all progression from or to God, must be effected by the immediate creative act of God, and therefore supernatural, in the sense that every immediate act of God, or divine act not done through the agency of second causes, or concreative act of creatures, is a supernatural act, and gives birth to a supernatural order,—not disconnected or essentially different from the natural order, indeed, but in reality related to it, and harmonizing dialectically with it. Supposing God intended, when resolving to extrinsecate his creative Word, to give it the highest possible expression, and to complete his creative act, by raising the finite to infinite power, the creature to oneness with the creator, the supernatural is not an afterthought in his creation, but integral in his original plan, and the natural and supernatural are but parts of one indissoluble whole, and differ from each other only as the initial or inchoate differs from the completion or fulfilment. It is well for those who are in the habit of supposing that the natural and supernatural, nature and grace, stand opposed one to the other, to bear this in mind, for they are opposed only as the initial is opposed to the completion or fulfilment.

Taking the view of Catholic truth as thus far presented, we find the Trinity, or the eternal and immanent generation of the Word, and the procession of the Holy Ghost, which we must assert, if we assert God at all as actual living being, or being in its plenitude. God expresses his intelligence in himself, and generates the Word, the express image of himself, and the same in essence with himself. "The Word was

with God, and the Word was God"—"the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his substance." The Son turns to the Father, and the Father to the Son, and from their mutual spiration, the Father as principle, the Son as medium, proceeds Love or the Holy Ghost, the complement or perfection of the immanent progression of the divine being. God chooses to express himself externally, and thus creates the universe, which is himself extrinsecated, for it must express his Word or not be any expression of him at all. It expresses his essence externally in time and space, as the Word expresses it internally, in his own bosom, to himself. He chooses, as we learn from revelation, not only to redeem man from the fall, but to carry in man his creative act to its apex, to complete the divine being in the extrinsic or participated order, and thus incarnates himself in man, and raises the creature to union with himself, making the finite one with the infinite, the created one with the Creator, that is to say, God *mediante* the creative act. The type copied is in his own essence, the Father concurring as principle, the son as medium, and the Holy Ghost as end. So that by the return of the creation in man to God, which is in the second cycle, and responds externally to the procession of the Holy Ghost internally, the participated being is completely actualized, perfected, and God is all and in all, externally and internally.

Here, as to the principle, medium, and end, is catholic truth, that is, universal truth, one and catholic, for it embraces at once in the real order, and in dialectic harmony, both God and the universe; God in his interior essence and in his exterior manifestation or expression. But we have seen that there is in God a progression, immanent indeed, eternal, with its term in his essence itself. This progression has its expression in the external universe, or in the extrinsecation of the creative act, and this progression in the external cannot be immanent and complete instantaneously, as it were, but is in time and space, the chronotope, and therefore is successive. It, however, copies the divine idea, and follows its type. It must, then, not only develop in time and space, the external expression of the internal chronotope, or ideal time and space, that is the ability of God to extrinsecate his creative act, but it must have its own interior and exterior expression, for the universe as a whole and in all its parts, represents the divine idea, and copies the progression of the interior essence of God. Each creature is, in its

order, God in miniature, or the created God representing the eternal, uncreated, living, and self-sufficing God, in its own order and from its own point of view. The extrinsecation of the Word or creative act is the created universe. The completion or fulfilment of this extrinsecation is the Incarnation, or the creature become God. The extrinsecation of man become God, or of the Word made flesh, that is, of the theandric Word, is the church; bearing as to the Word incarnate, first, the relation which the universe bears to the internal, by whom all things were made; and second, the relation analogous to that which the human race, in the order of genesis, bears to Adam, its progenitor, as has been time and again explained in these pages. The Incarnation being in time the theandric Word is the Word extrinsecated, and therefore must follow the law of the chronotope, and the progression of its life must be progressive, not in eternity only, but in time, and therefore be the successive explication of the theandric idea. But this successive explication and realization in time would be impossible without its extrinsic expression. Hence the necessity of the external church as well as the internal. The church is the theandric universe, or universe successively returning to union with God, or, in the participated sense, becoming God, attaining to its end or consummation, which is its transfiguration in God, or glorification.

The universe is the extrinsic explication of the mystery of the divine essence, and as such must have in time a progression corresponding to the immanent and eternal progression asserted by the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, in that essence itself. But in the extrinsic, that is, in the chronotope, the explication is successive, and the progression is from a principle, by a medium, to an end or term not identical with itself. Hence the creature does not attain to the term of its existence at once, in the very instant of its creation, but is created *in potentia* to its end. Hence God creates all creatures in genera and species, creates kinds, which are each according to its own law successively developed. This order of successive development is the order of generation, having its origin and archetype in the generation of the Word, whence the relations of paternity and filiation. The genera and species do not subsist without individuals, any more than individuals subsist without genera and species. There is no humanity separate from the individual man, and no individual man without humanity,—

humanitas. Adam was a perfect man in the order of genesis or generation, for in him both the race and the individual were coincident. He was created as the race individuated, and though all individual men as individuals were in him only *in potentia*, in him was the entire human race, and therefore potentially all individuals. The successive individuation of the race, through successive births, is only the explication in the actual order of what was virtual in him. Hence we can understand why his fall, or the degeneracy of the race in him, affects all his posterity, or how it is that all men sinned in him; for all were in him as the race, and it is only as the race that original sin is asserted of Adam's posterity.

The theandric Word, or Christ, is at once the theandric individual and the theandric race. The Word assumed human nature individuated, completed in the individual assumed, not, however, an individual isolated from the race, but an individual in whom the race subsisted. He was the second Adam, the theandric Adam, and the progenitor of the whole theandric race. All who pertain to the regeneration are virtual in him, as all pertaining to the order of generation were virtual in Adam. Hence his power to expiate or atone for their sins, and their ability to share in his merits. They suffered and bore the penalty of their sins in him, because they were in him, and for the same reason they share his merits, and enter into his glory. They were in him, as included in the theandric race; and when actually regenerated by grace, or born into the palingenesia, actually individuated in the order of regeneration, they are in him individually, or one with him, according to his prayer to his Father, "Let them be one as we are one."

But if all the elect are virtually in Christ as the second Adam, their individuation in him, or the explication of the potentiality of the theandric race, as in the first Adam, is progressive, successive in time, and therefore must follow the law of all progression, and have its principle, medium, and end. The principle is grace, for we are born of Christ by grace, not by natural generation; the medium is the sacrament or sacraments, the end is the Holy Ghost, or love, the complete union with God. But as the prototype is always in the divine essence, and the archetype in the divine progression or explication of his Word, the progression must be an extrinsic as well as an intrinsic progress, and have its extrinsic as well as its intrinsic medium. Hence the church

must be external as well as internal, and express externally as well as internally the theandric life or progression, as the body is the outward expression of the man. The external is the extrinsic expression of the internal, and therefore must copy or imitate it as its idea or model. Now, as God is one, and in creating expresses one divine Word, giving origin to one universe, as the Word made flesh is one, giving origin to one theandric race, and as the internal church is one, being the Word made flesh, so must the external church, which expresses the internal, be one. As the internal is catholic, since it is the Word made flesh, the indissoluble unity of Divinity and humanity, and therefore including all truth and all reality, for man is the *résumé* of all created orders, and all creation in his return to God attains to its end, the external church must be one and catholic, potentially catholic in time and space, and actually in the idea, or the ideal truth it expresses. As there is but one God, as there is but one cosmos, but one Word made flesh, but one Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, there can be but one faith, one baptism, and but one church, either externally or internally.*

If there be any truth in what we have thus far advanced, there is in the divine being his own reason of being, and the law, not the necessity, of all external creation. He could not have expressed his Word extrinsically without creating an external universe, nor could he have made that universe an extrinsecation, so to speak, of himself without adding to generation regeneration, to the generation of the Word the procession of the Holy Ghost. Without its return to God in the Holy Ghost, through the medium of the Word, the progression would have been initial, incomplete, and no image, even in the external order, of his infinite, immanent, eternally consummated progression. This return could not have been effected without the second act, or incarnation of the Word; for, without that act, you would have had generation but no regeneration, and no procession in the extrinsic order of the Holy Ghost, and, consequently, no consummation, no sanctification, no glorification, consequently no beatitude.

It may be said that God might have made the return of the creature instantaneous with its birth, or the palingene-

* We refer, for a further exposition of this point, to what we have said in *The Reunion of all Christians,—ante* pp. 482 *et seq.*

siac cycle consentaneous with the cosmic, leaving no interval of time between them; but to have so done would have destroyed the liberty of second causes. If he created man after his own image and likeness, he must create him with moral freedom, and leave his return to God to the freedom of his own choice. He must, in such case, have made a universe which would by no means express his own freedom in the act of creation, or express in time his own progression; for the external expression of the progression of the divine being is and must be a progression in time,—not a progression without any term indeed, as our modern progressists assert, which is the most lively image of hell we are able to conceive, but a progression whose term is the infinite. Progress for ever going on, and never reaching its term, it the greatest of all sophisms; is, in fact, the hell of the reprobate. It does not imply that man is infinitely progressive, but that he is not progressive at all,—that he remains for ever seeking and never finding. Infinite progress is progress to the infinite, and finds its term in the infinite, which is heaven, glorification; for then the finite is glorified in its union with the infinite. Progression in God is immanent progression and excludes all idea of succession, or of time. But progression in creatures involves, necessarily, the idea of the chronotope, and is inconceivable without an interval, longer or shorter, between the beginning and the end.

Besides, if we suppose genesis and palingenesia coincident and consentaneous, we resolve progression in the extrinsic order into the intrinsic and divine immanent progression, and take away all concreative act of creatures, and the end is attained to by the immediate supernatural act of God, without the coöperation of creatures. Creatures then cease to be second causes, or to be in any sense concreative, that is, creative by the aid of the divine *concursus*. This would deny the divine image in his works, deny that he creates after the idea or type eternal in his own essence, and would make him the only actor in the universe, which would place us on the declivity to pantheism.

Yet the objection implied amounts to nothing. God expressing himself extrinsically expresses himself under the relation of time and space, and his expression in regard to creatures leaves necessarily a potentiality to be reduced to act, genera to be specificated, and species to be individuated, the initial or inchoate to be finished, fulfilled; but in

regard to himself, his act is eternally complete, and there is no interval between its commencement and its end. For him there is no past, no future, but "one eternal now." All in his mind, as in his decree, is present, is fulfilled. The interval is in relation to us, and it is we, and we only, to whom moments succeed, because, being finite, we can attain to the infinite only successively, by a succession of acts. Man is not in his origin God, but a God—by participation—that begins. The potentiality of Adam is only successively actualized, and only by successive births and generations is the race complete in him individuated. The individuation is completed in the new-born infant, but the capabilities of the individual are not all developed and actualized by the divine creative act, without his own concreative act, or series of acts. So with the Christian. All the elect, all the predestinated were really, from the first instant of the Incarnation, in Christ, as you and I were in Adam, when God created him after his own image and likeness, and created him with the male and female principle—"male and female created he them"—as much as we were when he separated the female principle from the male, and formed woman from the side of Adam, "bone of his bone, flesh of his flesh;" but as individuals we are virtual, not actual in him, till begotten anew by grace, and regenerated, or born again. Time and space pertain to the potential, and mark the process of its reduction to act; and as this reduction is only by the coöperation or concreative act of the creature, it must be in relation to the creature successive, in time, though in regard to God it is simultaneous. Consequently, whether it is done a day earlier or a day later, as we say, if so be space is left for the free election and coöperation of the creature, it in no way affects the reason or truth of things.

If we are right as to the principles of Catholic theology we have briefly and inadequately stated, our position must be conceded that the proper point of view for studying the great movement in the sixteenth century, as any other great world-movement, is that of Catholic theology, for that theology is really catholic, universal, embracing all the truth of God and the universe. It places the student at the point of view of God himself, the point of view of the divine Word or Logos, by whom all things are made, and of which the universe is the extrinsic expression. From this point of view we may appreciate it as truly and as fully as fallible men may appreciate any thing.

We will say, in conclusion, that what we have thus far said must not be taken as a full and complete treatise on the great mysteries touched upon, or as containing a solution of all the questions that may be asked in relation to the Trinity, the Incarnation, creation, or the church. We have left many gaps, some of which the reader, if good-natured, may fill up with what we have heretofore published in these pages on the same topics, and others will be filled up as we proceed with the essays to which this must be regarded as a theological and philosophical introduction. Our design is to furnish our readers with a series of articles intended to present a thorough theological, philosophical, and historical appreciation of the great Protestant movement, and, in principle, of all heterodox movements in ancient or modern times. We may move slowly, and not unlikely disappear before completing our task. But we shall do what we can.

In what we have said we have laid down the principles we shall develop and apply as we proceed. The appositeness of some of our remarks will not be seen till we advance, and till then many things will appear to be too indistinctly stated, and to be left unsupported, or to be assumed without sufficient reason. We could not help it, unless we had expanded our introduction into a whole course of theology, and made it longer than the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas. Nevertheless, perhaps, taking what we have said by itself, independently of what is to follow, it may not be worthless. It may lead some minds to a better understanding of the dialectic character of the divine essence and creative act, and to trace the relations of the created universe back to their prototype in the triple relation of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, eternal and immanent in the divine essence. We have wished, as far as our limits would permit, to show that the universe, internally and externally, is the extrinsecation of the divine essence, and its procession from God in the cosmos, and return to God in the palingenesia, is an external manifestation and realization of what is essential, eternal, and immanent in the divine being,—God producing exteriorly a created God, responding to himself, and in its consummation to be united to him, as the human nature is united to the divine in the incarnation of the Word.

We do not suppose that we have said any thing to which the eminent prelate, whose History of the Reformation we have referred to, would object; for he is a Catholic prelate,

and far more learned in Catholic theology than we are. We venerate his character, and have heretofore prized, and should still prize, were he not disposed to withhold it, his private friendship. All we permit ourselves to say is, that in our judgment he does not write his history from the really Catholic point of view, and, though he is orthodox as to dogma, he is sectarian, partisan, in spirit and tone. Also, that he fails to penetrate the external fact, and to seize its methexic sense. We think there is more in the movement than he sees, that it has a deeper and a less unchristian sense than he detects, or than we ourselves had detected in our earlier essays on the subject.

All our readers know that we regard the Protestant movement as heterodox, and heterodoxy as always in itself hurtful to men and society. We are Catholic, not Protestant; but we wish, if possible, not merely to show the sophistical side of the so-called reformation, but also its dialectic side. We wish to show its truth and its error, its good and its bad, and to fix its real character in relation to the evolution of truth and the progress of civilization. This done in a calm and catholic tone, with a spirit of justice, and a tolerable comprehension of the movement as a world-movement, can justly offend no Protestant, and need give umbrage to no Catholic. Catholicity embraces and integrates in herself all truth, wherever she discovers it, for all truth is hers. She is strong enough in herself to be always just, always impartial, always sedate, without prejudice, without passion, without fear. We can never recall the heterodox to Catholic unity till we can gain from them a hearing—and a hearing from them we cannot gain till we learn to treat their understandings with respect, and their characters with justice.

No man worthy of the name ever consents to compromise his principles for any end whatever, for no good ever comes of a lie. An uncompromising Catholic is simply a Catholic, nothing more, nothing less. We make no compromise with heterodoxy when we recognize in the heterodox some elements of truth, and commend in them what is worthy of commendation. There is neither wisdom nor justice in endeavoring to keep our own people orthodox by painting the heterodox blacker than they are. Falsehood, deception, even for a good end, though too often practised, is never allowable. All deception, every lie is a sophism, and a sin against the dialectic order of things, and against God, in

whose essence is the prototype of all dialectics. "The first of all gospels," says Thomas Carlyle, "is that a lie is a lie, and no lie shall live." No casuistry can explain away the sophistical character of falsehood, or make deception harmless. We have no right to practise what are called "pious frauds." Catholicity is real, truthful, honest, straightforward, and can tolerate no sham, make-believe, or humbug. All such things are sophistical and heterodox. Besides, such things are bad even as a policy. Let us bring up our children to believe that Protestants have nothing but falsehood in their doctrines, and wickedness in their practice, and the first decent Protestant they meet will convince them of their own want of truth and honesty. In many things very commendable, and very important in the progress of civilization, there are Protestants who are superior to not a few Catholics. The old safeguard system no longer serves any good purpose. We must protect our children from error by teaching them the truth, and being always truthful in all our relations with them and with others.

ESSAY II.

The Protestant movement in the sixteenth century originated inside, not outside, of the church. Luther and his associates, as well as the nations that embraced the Gospel as they expounded it, had all been baptized and brought up in the Catholic communion, taught the Catholic faith, and accustomed to the Catholic worship. Luther was a Catholic, an Augustinian monk, a priest, and a doctor of divinity. He had been noted for his piety, his earnestness, his zeal, his ability, and his learning, and, for aught that appears, the people who followed him, and received his words as those of a divinely commissioned teacher, were, prior to the movement, as well instructed in the Catholic faith, as devout, as sincere, as earnest, and as intelligent Catholics as the people of the several nations that continued to adhere to the church. How, then, came Luther and his associate reformers to break away from the Catholic communion? and how could they induce a full third part of the population of Europe to follow them into heresy and schism?

It may be said, and said truly, that in all, or nearly all, the countries where Protestantism became the established religion, it was established by the intervention of the civil power, by the civil suppression of the old religion, and the

civil enactment of the new. But this, though for the most part true, only partially removes the difficulty. The civil power is wielded by the people, or by princes and magistrates who have the support of the people. The princes and magistrates of all the nations that became Protestant, and through whom Protestantism became the established religion, had themselves all been brought up in the Catholic faith, and had practised more or less devoutly the Catholic worship. How came these princes and magistrates to reject the Catholic religion, and how came enough of the Catholic population to reject it with them to enable them to suppress the old religion by authority, and establish the new by force? The German princes, the Swiss cantons, the kings of England, Denmark, and Sweden, and the nobles of Scotland, France, and Holland, could never have made any successful move for the new religion, if they had not been able to count on a portion at least of their clergy, their universities, and their people, for there is nothing before which power alone is more impotent than the religious convictions of a nation. If the more numerous, or, at least, the stronger and more influential portion of the population of the several states that separated from the church had not been favorable to the change proposed, it could never have been carried into effect.

It may be said the reformers and the princes and the magistrates who espoused their cause were bad men, men impatient of the authority of the church, greedy of ecclesiastical property, and in love with license, and that they carried the people with them by flattering promises, and pandering to their baser passions. Nobody will seriously contend that the chiefs of the reformation, whether cleric or laic, titled or untitled, were immaculate; but it will be difficult to prove that they were not, in the social and Christian virtues, on a level with the average of their contemporaries who adhered to the Catholic cause. Luther suffers not in this respect by a comparison with Bembo, Sadoleto, Wolsey, or even Leo X. Scandalous as were some of the courts of Germany, they were at least not more so than the courts of Venice, Florence, and Rome, and as much as we may say against the court of Henry VIII., it was even less corrupt and corrupting than that of Francis I. There is no evidence that the people of the northern nations that embraced the new religion were in any respect inferior in morals, in honesty, in social and domestic virtue, to the southern nations;

and, if we except Spain, we may assert without much hesitation that they were the least corrupt part of Christendom. They may have been less polished, less refined than the populations of France and Italy, but they were probably the best, the most sincere and honest, in fact the most really Catholic, and the least paganized portion of Christendom.

It does not appear that Luther, so long as he remained in Germany, surrounded only by honest, simple, and hearty German manners, ever meditated any reform in the church, or any disturbance of the settled order of things. His first impulse in that direction seems to have been given by what he saw and experienced at Rome, whither he had been sent by his superiors on some affairs of his order. It was not what he saw in Germany, but what he saw in his journey through Italy, and during his stay in the capital of the Catholic world, near the tombs of the apostles, that started his doubts, and quickened within him the spirit of the reformer. All the evidence in the case proves that he was moved in the beginning by an honest disgust of the abuses he everywhere encountered, and which were upheld, or, at least, not actively interfered with by the highest dignitaries of the church, and by a sincere, earnest, and not un-catholic desire to effect much-needed and loudly-called-for reforms. There is no reason to suppose that in the outset he was not moved by a sincere Christian spirit, an earnest love of truth, and an honest desire to advance the real interests of religion; and there is just as little reason to believe that if his motives had been properly appreciated by the Roman court, and the great dignitaries of the church, and that if he had found on the part of the church, or the managers of her affairs, a disposition to reform abuses, and to return to the purity and simplicity of the Gospel, as was subsequently manifested by Pope Adrian VI., he would not have lived and died a faithful and obedient son of the church.

The abuses in the church at the beginning of the sixteenth century may not have been greater than at some previous epochs, but it is well known that they were great and scandalous. They were not abuses by princes or people alone, but they were abuses of administration, for which the authorities of the church were themselves responsible. The wisest and holiest men in the church saw them, grieved over them, and demanded their reform. It was a common saying, that the church needed reform "in her head and in

her members." The whole church admitted, a few years after, in the Council of Trent, that the demand for reform was not unjust, for that council was called to reform abuses, no less than to condemn the doctrinal errors of the innovators, and its labors in the cause of reformation went on *pari passu* with its labors for the suppression of heresy and the maintenance of orthodoxy. Viewed in its inception and the intention of its originators, the Protestant movement was an honest movement of reform, and found its development and completion, not in the establishment of schismatical and heretical communions, but in the doctrinal definitions and reformatory decrees of the holy Council of Trent. In all probability, if the Catholic authorities had had the wisdom to discover in the outset the real aim of the movement, and the real character of the northern European nations, their downright and earnest spirit, so different from French levity and Italian astuteness, or diplomatic craft, and the courage and disinterestedness to acknowledge the justice of that movement, and to second it with their power and influence, it would have resulted in a much-needed and salutary reform, without any breach of Catholic unity, or even of Catholic discipline.

Yet the church is the outward visible expression of the Word made flesh, the body of Christ, and infallible and holy. How then could abuses creep into her administration, and she ever become corrupt, and need reforming, "in her head and in her members?" And how, if she could stand in need of reform, could her ministers, the pope and bishops, fail to discern the honest intent of good Catholics demanding reform, and instead of encouraging, even aiding them, denounce them as enemies of the church, and by their opposition drive them into heresy and schism? It is impossible on any theory of the reformation, in any degree historically sustainable, to throw the whole responsibility of that movement on the reformers alone. On any hypothesis that can be reasonably adopted the chief responsibility does and must rest on the Catholic hierarchy, that is, on the external and visible authorities of the church herself. How, if those authorities were in their external and visible character infallible and holy, could they have allowed the growth and continuance of a state of things like that which the reformers assailed? and how could we throw on them the chief responsibility of the schismatical and heretical result of the movement in the northern nations of Europe?

Here is a serious difficulty for the Catholic historian, if he is bound to maintain the sanctity and infallibility of the church in the universal and unqualified sense in which we are supposed by non-Catholics to hold them. If we held that every Catholic pastor from the pope down is privileged with a special illumination of the Holy Ghost so as never to err in any matter of discipline or administration, and that no pastor ever neglects or improperly or imperfeetly performs his pastoral functions, we should be obliged to maintain that no error or corruption could ever find its way into the church, no portion of the Catholic people could ever be misinstructed or uninstructed, no error could ever go uncorrected, no abuse could ever be connived at, and the external church would always be the exact and express image of the internal. There could, on this supposition, never, on the one hand be any thing to reform, and on the other, never originate in the church and among Catholics any movement like that of the sixteenth century. But sanctity and infallibility, in this sense and to this extent, we are not obliged to assert; and we know from history the external visible church does not possess them, for she has never manifested them. All history proves that in administration, in the management of ecclesiastical affairs, the pastors of the church are not incapable of error, or incapable of conniving at abuses, and of neglecting to a greater or less extent the performance of the solemn and most pressing duties of their office. If the divine commission to teach carries with it the pledge of infallibility in teaching, as it undoubtedly does, the divine commission to govern carries with it no pledge of infallibility in governing, for all secular rulers govern by divine appointment, even when elevated to office by popular suffrage, since, as the apostle says, *non est potestas nisi a Deo.* The pope may be infallible in declaring the law, and yet not be infallible, though authoritative, in its application, for he may be misinformed as to the facts. The pastor may even know the true doctrine, and neglect to teach it. Men clothed with the prelacy and the sacerdocy may abuse their trusts, or use their office for their own selfish ends. Judas was one of the Twelve, and he betrayed his Lord for thirty pieces of silver. Peter was the prince of the apostles, the head of the apostolic college, and yet he denied his Master, and basely declared with an oath that he knew him not. Holy men who seek to correct the evils of their times may be persecuted by the pontiffs of the church. Savonarola

was burnt as a heretic and imposter by order of Alexander VI., perhaps because he set his whole soul at work to resist the tide of heathen corruption that set in with the *renaissance*, and because he refused the sacraments to that modern pagan, Lorenzo the Magnificent. The fact is, save in dogma, save in what pertains to the divine idea,—faith and morals,—the infallibility and sanctity of the church cannot be asserted, and are not claimed by the church herself.

It has been established in our preliminary essay that truth, therefore the church, the true church of God, is and must be one and catholic. There is, there never has been, there never can be but one true religion. Religion was in the beginning what it is now, and what it will be to the end of the world. Men could never have attained to union with God as their last end without Christ or the regeneration, for cosmos can be completed or fulfilled only in palingenesia. Whatever is true, whatever is just, whatever is good in any of the various religions which have obtained among the nations of the earth is either an anticipation or a reminiscence of Christianity, and is integral in the one catholic religion. The church is catholic because she is universal, because she holds, teaches, and administers the one universal and immutable religion. The epithet *catholic* is not applied to her as a proper name, but as a simple appellative, expressive of her real character,—the unity and universality of the idea she is realizing in time and space for eternity. All the principles of the church are universal, both in their significance and in their application. They are, too, principles which are recognized by all religions, asserted in the universal beliefs of mankind. Free all religions of their negations, their abnormal accretions, and local colorings, reduce them to what in them is affirmative, invariable, and universal, and you have the principles of the catholic or universal religion held and taught by the church. It is only because she holds and teaches them that she is or is called *catholic*, that is, universal. She is universal, for she holds and teaches universal truth.

In their principles, all religions, the various heathen mythologies—the grosser as well as the more refined, not excepted—are Catholic, in some sense Christian, and their history is and must be included in the history of the Catholic church, for in her is the type of which they are so many corruptions, and which in their upward motion they tend to recover. Truth is older than error, and the pure

precedes the corrupt. Righteousness precedes sin; the normal is prior to the abnormal. God made man upright, but man has departed from his original uprightness, and bent his form under inventions of his own. The various religions which prevail or have prevailed have their point of departure in the Catholic religion, and are various and diverse only by virtue of their various abortive attempts to realize it. Divest them of their errors, collect their symbolism, and reduce them to their type, and they are one and catholic, and therefore true and holy. In all religions, in all philosophies, in all thought, and in all speech, we find asserted, in some form, the essential Triad or the mystery of the Trinity. In all religions we find a more or less confused recognition of the divine progression asserted in Christian theology as the generation of the Word and the progression of the Holy Ghost, also of the creation of the world, and the incarnation of the Son, as the medium of man's redemption and return to his Maker. Homer and Hesiod in their theogonies only misapprehend, misinterpret, or travesty Christian theology. The same may be said of the Hindus and Buddhists. Divest them of their inconsistencies, their absurdities, and take the basis of their theogonies and theologies, and you have the Christian Trinity, the creation of the world—the cosmos—and the Incarnation —the palingenesia—or the return of the universe to its Maker as its consummation. Plato speaks at times almost like a Christian father, and more than one Christian author has called him the *divine* Plato.

St. Thomas, after St. Augustine and all the great doctors and fathers of the church, maintains that there has been only one revelation, and that the whole Christian revelation was made, in substance, to our first parents in the garden. It must have been so made, for the revelation of the superintelligible is essential to the conduct of human life, and the direction of man's intelligence and will to the attainment of his last end, or the fulfilment of the purpose of his Creator in his existence. The revelation was as necessary to Adam as it is to any one of his posterity. Moses organized the Jewish commonwealth and the Jewish priesthood, gave the law to the Jewish people, and prescribed the Jewish ritual; but he nowhere professes to institute a new religion, or to make a new revelation of the divine mysteries. The prophets foretell events, and reprove the backslidings of priests and people, but they only repeat and explain or

apply the truth already revealed and known. Even our Lord himself reveals no new doctrine—no new faith, or new moral principle. He came not to found a new faith, but to fulfil the promises made to the fathers, to do the things necessary to perfect or complete what had been the faith from the beginning. None before him could be glorified, for the palingenesia or regeneration, before his incarnation, existed only in promise and predestination; but before him faith was the same that it was after him—only before the Incarnation it was faith in Christ who was to come, while it is now faith in Christ who has come. The revelation of the truth, and of the principles of human conduct was from the beginning, and may, in some sense, be regarded as a continuous fact, but the acts or deeds which perfected it were performed only in the fulness of time. The church existed from the beginning, identically the church that now is, only it was Christian before the advent of our Lord by anticipation, as it is now by the real presence.

Errors are, therefore, no more inexplicable in regard to Christian truth since, than before the coming of Christ. The truth could be known and was known before as well as since his coming. The facility of knowing it may have been less, yet with due diligence it could be known, and was known, as we learn from the history of the patriarchs. St. John Chrysostom teaches that Abraham knew it, even in Chaldea, in the midst of the darkness and corruptions of Chaldean idolatry. Why, then, did the gentile world mistake it, or overlay it with their abominable idolatries and superstitions? The notion that these idolatries and superstitions grew up and developed themselves, because the gentiles had received no revelation, and were left to the blindness of nature, cannot be maintained. Superstition presupposes religion of which it is an abuse; idolatry is simply an abuse of symbolism. Men did not begin by worshipping the sun as a divinity. They at first worshipped the sun as the symbol or the emblem of the invisible, life-giving, and life-preserving God. They did not begin by adoring the idol or image made of wood, silver, or gold as the numen, but as a symbol of the invisible and divine, and their worship of it was as innocent and as rational in its origin as the reverence with which we regard the crucifix, the picture of the Blessed Virgin, or the image of a canonized saint. The error was in gradually confounding the symbol with the symbolized, the image with the imaged. The symbol at

first presented, gradually obscured, and finally absorbed the idea, took the place of the numen, and was worshipped as a god.

Polytheism does not precede monotheism, or originate in ignorance of the unity of God. It has had in history two sources, one in the misapprehension of the divine progression asserted by Christian theology in the generation of the Word and the procession of the Holy Ghost, giving to that progression extrinsic terms, and thus explaining it in a pantheistic sense; the other, the perversion of the true doctrine of saints and angels. The Greeks and Romans had their dii majores and their dii minores, their greater gods and their lesser gods. Their greater gods were their way of apprehending and expressing the triune God of revelation, and the unity and diversity of the divine essence. Their minor gods, their demons and heroes, were divided into two classes, the supernal and the infernal. The supernal originated in the true doctrine of angels and saints, misapprehended and misapplied. They never gave supreme worship to these, for they never confounded them with the supreme and eternal Divinity. The infernal gods answered to the fallen angels of Christian theology. They offered sacrifices, cruel and bloody sacrifices, to these indeed, yet not as gods worthy to be loved and adored, but as to powerful and malignant spirits whom it was necessary to appease.

Pantheism itself, that mother error, and supreme sophism, is not the error of men to whom no revelation of the superintelligible has been vouchsafed. It grows out of the effort of the human mind to grasp, on the one hand, the divine progression asserted by revelation, and, on the other, to explain the immanence of the cause in the effect. Confounding creation with generation, and the generation of the universe with the generation of the Word, leads logically to pantheism, for in the generation of the Word, the generator and the generated are one and identical. The world, if generated, must be one and identical with God as generator. This is pantheism. It is easy to derive polytheism, even the most disgusting forms of African fetichism, from pantheism; for pantheism confounds the universe as a whole and in all and every of its parts with God; but it were impossible to derive pantheism from African fetichism. It is easy to descend from high to low, not so easy to ascend from low to high, and not inaptly may we say here with the Latin poet:

Facilis descensus Averni,
* * * * * * *
Sed revocare gradum, superasque evadere ad auras,
Hoc opus, hic labor est.

Nothing has less historical or philosophical support than the theory, which finds many advocates among men who ought to be superior to it, that the human race commenced its career of development in the weakness and helplessness of infancy, without supernatural revelation of truth or the assistance of divine grace, and has gradually worked its way by its own internal strength and energy up from the lowest form of African fetichism to the sublime monotheism of the Hebrew and the Christian. Men are, no doubt, progressive by religion, but through the weakness and limitation of their nature they have a constant tendency to corruption, to lose the unity of speech, therefore the unity of the idea, and to fall into the grossest and lowest forms of error. What in the gentile or heathen world of antiquity modern rationalists regard as germs of progress are, in reality, reminiscences, are fragments of the broken and scattered body of truth originally possessed in its unity and integrity.

Prior to the advent of our Lord and the institution of the Christian church the truth was revealed and known; but prior to his advent the church lived and could live the life of the Word made flesh only by faith and hope. It had not the real presence, and was the church not in possession, but in expectancy. It had priests, but they could offer only symbolic sacrifices—sacrifices which were only a shadow of the real sacrifice that has been offered on Calvary, and is continued on our altars. There was everywhere promise, but nowhere fulfilment, and the faithful died in hope, but without having obtained. All nations looked forward to and desired him who was to come, and bring in the reality of the good things promised. But even under the Christian church, though the real palingenesiac life may be lived, not merely believed in or hoped for, it is not and cannot be completed in this world. Its completion is glorification, that is to say, heaven, eternal beatitude by union with God. In this life we enter the way, are *viatores*, pilgrims seeking a city whose builder and maker is God, in which, and in which alone, is our home. While we are on the way, are *viatores*, though in the palingenesia, and consequently under the order of grace, and blessed with an abundance of grace

which the faithful before Christ had not and could not have, for it as yet existed only in the predestination and promise of God, we retain our nature alike in its nobility and in its weakness, alike in its upward and in its downward tendencies. We have the same liberty of will, the same power to abuse the gifts of God, and to fall into error and sin. The church herself as the visible expression of the Word made flesh, the incarnate God, is holy, infallible, and indefectible, but the individual members of her communion are neither infallible nor impeccable. They may lose the infallible speech of the church, lose the unity of language, fall into error, and fail in the sanctity of life, as did, though hardly to the same extent, individuals and nations before the Incarnation, or as do those still remaining outside of Christendom.

The church as an outward, visible body is placed in the world, and is subject to all the accidents of time and space. She has the one and catholic truth, and is infallible in her speech, infallible in teaching and defining the infallible revelation she has received; but the men to whom she teaches it, and for whom she defines it, are fallible, and incapable of comprehending it in all its relations and in all its significance. God himself can enable a man to comprehend it fully, in all its length and breadth, in all its bearings and applications, only by taking him up into hypostatic union with himself, as human nature was taken up when the Word assumed flesh in the womb of the Virgin. Such comprehensive understanding belongs to men only in the glorified state. Divine inspiration itself does not give it; and the men whom God inspires to reveal his truth, the prophets and apostles, utter more than they know, more than they understand. The word they utter is greater than their understanding. The spirit possesses them. The burden of the Lord is upon them. The humble Mary conceives by the Holy Ghost, and brings forth her Maker and her Lord. The church herself here below comprehends not in the full sense either herself or the Word she expresses. Her infallibility is not in her human understanding, and she brings forth the truth only as she conceives by the Holy Ghost. She speaks infallibly only by virtue of the perpetual inspiration or assistance of the Holy Ghost who dwells in and speaks through her. Her pastors who are her organs, singly or collectively, assembled in council or dispersed in their dioceses, comprehend not all that is sym-

bolized by the words they speak, or contained in the doctrine they teach. Of the church we may say:

> Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus
> Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.

Neither the *spiritus* nor the *mens* is human, or, though it moves and sustains the human, is comprehended by it. There is more in the word uttered than any of the human organs of its utterance know or understand. The word is greater than they, truer than their understanding. Hence it is that the infallible teacher addresses not an infallible understanding, and there is in this life no infallible human understanding, no universal and infallible comprehension, of the truth divinely revealed. As Dr. Newman would say, the human mind cannot take in the whole idea at one view, and we add, nor by a succession of views. When we have taken our highest, broadest, and most comprehensive view, there is always an infinity of truth above and beyond us. There is when we speak always more than we see. Take any doctrine of the church, or the simplest proposition of faith, meditate it, and it swells out on all sides, rises and expands before the mind, into a universe of truth, and we are lost in its immensity, and can only fall down and adore in awe and silence.

Even when there is no misunderstanding or false understanding, the words in which the church expresses the truth she is commissioned to teach may be very inadequately understood, and will mean more or less according to the capacity or culture and development of the particular mind addressed. Our Lord makes it the duty of every one who would be his disciple to take up his cross and follow him. But taking up the cross and following him will not mean the same thing to every mind, and under all circumstances. Our Lord says, "Whosoever shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him will the Son of Man be ashamed when he comes in the glory of his Father with the holy angels." To some these words mean simply being ashamed to profess one's self a Christian, or to make the sign of the cross before sitting down to meat with those who count the cross a reproach. To others they mean this and much more. To them it means being ashamed to espouse the cause of innocence, right, truth, justice, when it is unpopular, and brings its advocates into disrepute with the great, the respectable, the fashionable, or, in a democratic country, with the peo-

ple. There is no cross, there is no especial merit in professing one's self a Christian where all profess to be Christians, or in wearing the cross when it is a fashionable ornament. There is no cross in defending the popular truth, which everybody asserts, everybody holds, and nobody impugns. Christ is confessed before men, and his cross is borne by espousing the cause of the poor and friendless, in bringing up and standing by the neglected, the forgotten, the unpopular truth, the truth that impugns popular errors, reproves popular credulity, popular ignorance, popular superstition, and rebukes popular prejudices and fashionable vices. They who pounce upon the brave and generous spirit who defends the unpopular truth, insists on unfashionable virtues, labors to instruct and elevate the ignorant and neglected, weds himself to the cause of suffering humanity, pleads for the enslaved, the oppressed, and the down-trodden, and speaks out for those who are dumb and cannot speak for themselves, are among those who are ashamed of Christ, and of them, even though they fast four times a week and pray five times a day, will the Son of Man be ashamed when he comes in the glory of his Father with the holy angels.

The church can teach the revelation she has received only through the medium of words, and all words are symbolic, and from the nature of the case can be interpreted only by the mind to which they are addressed. Words do not interpret themselves, and are significant only in the interpretation the mind to which they are addressed gives them. The revelation the church has received is the revelation of the superintelligible, which, even when revealed, is only analogically intelligible. The mysteries can be expressed only in words or symbols taken from the sensible and intelligible orders, which are below the superintelligible, and can express it only by way of analogy. All words are inadequate to the full expression of the mysteries, because the human mind itself is inadequate to their comprehension. The church says of the Word, the Son, that he is begotten, not made, *genitum non factum*, generated, not created. In this she seizes on an analogy in the intelligible, to give us some notion of the superintelligible. But if we take too literally the terms used, and assume that the analogy holds true throughout, we fall into the error of the Greek and oriental theogonists and mythologists, and introduce not the principle of sex, but sex itself into our conception of the

Godhead, and pave the way for the assertion of male and female or androygnous gods. We may then indite poems on the generation and birth of the gods, after the example of Hesiod and Homer. It is mistaking the analogy of generation, or pushing it too far, that has introduced the myths of male and female divinities, their amours, and their progeny. These myths all have a basis of truth, and originate in the effort of reason and imagination to bring within the sensible and intelligible order the supra-rational mysteries of the generation of the Word and the procession of the Holy Ghost. The Holy Ghost, under the name of Eros, Love, is made by turns the eldest and the youngest of the Gods. Regarded as proceeding from the Father and the Son, as the end or consummation, he is the youngest; but as the idea of the end of the progression is first in the mind, and precedes the actualization, he may also, in the language of the mythologists, be called the first-born of the Gods.

In explaining as far as possible the generation of the Word and the procession of the Holy Ghost we use the term *progression* as expressing some analogy to the mystery revealed. Yet the term is neither adequate nor, in all respects, exact. Properly progression is the reduction of the potential to the actual, and therefore is a term of the chronotope, or of time and space. It consequently is not strictly applicable to God, in whom the potential and actual are coincident, or, rather, who is all actual, most pure act, and therefore excluding the potential as in need of actuation. The term is used only analogically, and the progression intended is not progression in time and space, but a mysterious progression immanent and eternal in the divine essence itself. The word *person* is applied also to each of the three terms of the triad, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and yet this word in the sense used in the sensible and intelligible orders cannot be applied to any one of these mysterious and supra-rational relations. Taken in its ordinary sense, the term person could not be used, for it would, on the one hand, assert each relation as finite, and, on the other, imply tritheism. If the relations in the Godhead were persons in the sense Peter, James, and John are persons, there would be three Gods, not one only God, and we should fall into the error of the polytheists, and not only divide, but anthropomorphize the Divinity. As a matter of fact, large numbers of honest, well intentioned Christians, no doubt, do in their

own minds understand the Trinity in a tritheistic sense, as many in endeavoring to avoid tritheism lose the triad altogether. The terms used to express the superintelligible are all taken in an analogical sense, because the superintelligible is even by revelation apprehensible by us only through sensible and intelligible analogies.

The superintelligible is above our intelligence. We may know by reason that the superintelligible is, for reason is capable of asserting her own ignorance, and her own impotence. Above our highest reason there is the unknown, and to us the unknowable. In this superintelligible is the root of the intelligible, as in the intelligible is the root of the sensible. It comprises the essences of things, the very essence of God himself. In it is the mystery of existence, life, thought, our origin, medium, and end. We can know it only as supernaturally revealed; but even the supernatural revelation does not change its character, and bring it into the order of the intelligible. We know it, when revealed, only analogically, by the analogies reason detects between it and the intelligible. This analogical knowledge is what is called knowledge by faith, "the substance of things hoped for, and the conviction of things not seen,"—*argumentum non apparentium*. It must, in some sense, be known or intellectually apprehended, or faith would not and could not be an intellectual act, and it cannot be directly and immediately apprehended by and in itself, or faith would be indistinguishable from science. The apprehension which is not science, and yet is intellectual apprehension, is what we term knowledge by analogy, and it is through analogical apprehension that faith and science are brought together or united in our intellectual life.

We know that theologians in their analysis of the act of faith resolve it into the assent to the proposition *Deus est verax*, and hold that *Deus est verax*, God is true, is the ultimate object of faith. We believe what the church teaches, because we believe the church; we believe the church, because we believe God; and we believe God, because he is true, *verax*, *prima veritas in essendo, et in dicendo*. But *Deus est verax*, or God is true, and can neither deceive nor be deceived is a rational truth, in the intelligible order, and a proposition of science, not simply of faith. Besides, to believe that God is true is not all that is required by faith. We must believe the words of God, or the things he reveals. Be it that we believe them because we believe

him, still we must believe them, and believe them we cannot unless they signify something to us, have some intelligible meaning for our intelligence. Words that have no intelligible meaning for us, are empty words, and in believing them we simply believe nothing at all. Let it be that the words of Scripture or the words of the church are true and infallible, they are in themselves only sensible signs or symbols, and signify to me only the meaning I intelligibly give them. There must then be belief of the things revealed, and there can be none unless they, and not the mere words, are in some sense apprehended by our reason or intelligence. As the things revealed are mysteries or pertain to the superintelligible, they can be apprehended only by analogy, and consequently the words by which they are expressed or symbolized can be taken and interpreted only analogically. There is no help for this, because the things revealed and received by faith transcend our limited intelligence, and cannot be directly apprehended and understood.

The interpretation of the symbols, whether the written words of the Holy Scriptures, or the spoken words of the church, is the work not of the infallible teacher, but of the reason and intelligence of the reader or hearer. The teacher furnishes the cypher, but the mind of the taught furnishes the key—the words meaning nothing unless addressed to intelligence, to a reasonable and reasoning mind. It is the mind of the believer that detects the analogies symbolized by the words of revelation. The church cannot supply mind to the believer, furnish ideas and brains too. No doubt the human mind was originally constructed with a view to the apprehension of truth, and that there is between it and language a certain natural correspondence. Words are the sensible expression of intelligence, and human words have a relation to the mind analogous to the relation of the divine Word to the Father; but only in the intelligible order. The human mind has no language which is for it the expression of the superintelligible, save by analogy; for it has no superintelligence. Words are not and cannot be to it direct and simple signs of the superintelligible. They are sensible, and naturally and by their own force symbolize only the intelligible, from which are borrowed the analogies which bring partially within our apprehension the superintelligible. Now these analogies even the strongest and best-educated minds may mistake, misconceive, or misuse, and thus fall into error. The church with

all her infallibility cannot prevent this, for she can only define the symbol, and prevent the loss of unity of speech. There is, then, always room in the church for subjective error, which may with obstinate and indocile minds develop into heresy.

The church is infallible in her definitions, but then her definitions must be understood and appropriated by minds that are fallible. She defines a dogma, and pronounces an anathema upon whoever denies it; but then the mind necessarily asks what it means. That no one can be saved out of the church is, no doubt, clearly a Catholic doctrine. But does this mean that no one can be saved who is not joined to the external communion of the church? Can one belong to the soul of the church without being joined to her visible body? What is it to be in the church? Some theologians give a strict and rigid sense to the words; others give them a very wide and accommodating sense. One concedes the possibility of salvation to none not in her external communion; others think all who desire the truth and walk uprightly according to the light they have, though out of her external communion, may hope for heaven. The church in defining the real presence in the Eucharist uses and approves the use of the word *Transubstantiation*. But in what sense is the term to be taken? Is the word *substance* to be taken in the sense of the Greek term Ὑπόστασις? In the sense of οὐσία, or in the sense of *essence?* Does she mean that the substance of the bread and wine is changed into the substance of the body and blood of our Lord? Or does she mean that the substance of the elements leaving their natural properties and appearances is removed, consumed, or annihilated, and the intelligible body of Christ substituted in its place? These and many other questions must be asked and answered, especially questions as to the nature and essence of matter, and as to time and space, before we can say we understand the definition of the church. Words, at first sight, may seem very plain and easy to be understood, that, subjected to the manipulations of the theologians, become very dark, obscure, and uncertain in their sense.

The church, we are told, has defined the immaculate conception of Mary, the mother of God, or that Mary was conceived without stain of original sin. Hence we are told that the immaculate conception is raised to the dignity of a dogma of faith. But has the church defined it to be a

dogma of faith, or simply declared it to be a fact always believed, and to be believed by the church? Are not all dogmas of faith Catholic principles, that is, principles universally true and applicable? How can a simple individual fact be a principle, and a Catholic principle? The fact we do not question, but of what is it the principle? What in the Catholic system of truth or of life originates in it, or depends upon it? It may be true, that is, a real fact, without being a dogma of faith; it may also be a dogma, a principle of faith; but we apprehend that it would be difficult with our present theological knowledge, or the received Catholic system, to see of what it is the principle, or that any thing in Catholic doctrine depends on it. The most we can say of it is that it was a special privilege to Mary personally, but without being an integral principle in the body of Catholic truth. Then, again, what is it the Holy Father has really defined in his late decree on the subject, in addition to what had always been conceded by those who were supposed to question the immaculate conception? It was always agreed on all hands that Mary was in the second instant, conceived, as she was born, without sin. The definition now promulgated says she was without sin in the first instant of conception. Does this first instant mean any thing different from the second instant of St. Thomas? Mary was of the race of Adam, and, as included in the race, sinned with all the rest of us in him. From that sin she no more than any one else could be redeemed, but by the merits of Jesus Christ. Concede that his merits could be applied by way of anticipation of his incarnation, passion, and death on the cross to her redemption, they could not be so applied prior to her conception, for prior to that moment there was no subject of their application. They could be applied only in the instant of her conception, or simultaneously with it. If this is what is meant by the first instant, it is precisely, as we understand it, the second instant, or *actus secundus* of St. Thomas, and nothing has been affirmed that has ever been denied. Again, does not the decree of the Holy Father touch a physiological question, and, by asserting that Mary was rendered immaculate in the first instant of her conception, imply that the soul, as well as the body, is generated, and that soul and body are united in the first instant of conception?

We might bring other instances, but these are sufficient to show that after the definition of the church, the mind

asks, and must ask, What is defined, what is the meaning of the dogma? for unless we attach some meaning to the words used, the dogma is for us as if it were not, and nothing for us is defined. The determining of what the words mean, and the relation of their meaning to the whole body of catholic truth, is and must be, from the nature of the case, the work of the human mind itself, of private examination, or of private judgment; and, as the human mind is fallible, there may always be more or less of doubt, uncertainty, and error, even with the best informed and the best disposed. Hence St. Augustine says, "Err, I may, but a heretic I will not be." Err, the best of men may, but no one can be a heretic unless he chooses, for to be or not to be a heretic depends on one's own will.

We know that St. Paul is sometimes quoted to prove that doubt itself is sinful, for he says, "He that doubteth is damned." Doubteth what? Whether it is lawful or not to eat meat sacrificed to idols. For he who does a thing of the lawfulness of which he doubts, goes against his conscience, and sins. But doubt in intellectual matters is not necessarily sinful. In fact, the first proper human act, or first act of reflection is a doubt, and till a doubt arises in the mind there is no act of reflection, no examination, and consequently no development or progress of intelligence. It is not till we pass from doubt to affirmation or denial in a sense hostile to truth that our doubts cease to be innocent, and we are culpable. Yet all heresy originates in the innocent doubt, and hence in its origin, its intellectual origin, it is not sinful, but the result of a proper awakening and exercise of the mind. It becomes culpable heresy when it proceeds to deny the truth, to affirm the contrary, and persist with a blind obstinacy in so doing. For then it is not truth that is desired, sought, and loved, but one's one opinion. Then the man is a heretic because he prefers his own opinion to truth, or places his judgment above the judgment of God, in reality makes himself God.

Undoubtedly, what all the pastors of the church throughout the world, and in all times hold in common, or agree in teaching, is Catholic doctrine, and infallible truth; but the pastors taken singly may err through ignorance as to many and even important points of faith and morals. No one man knows the whole truth, in all its principles, relations, and consequences. With the best intentions in the world the wisest and most learned may on some points fail to seize

the exact truth, may misapprehend and mistake it. St. Augustine wrote a whole book of *Retractations;* Pope John XXII. questioned in his sermons, or, at least, proposed for discussion, the doctrine that the saints enjoy the beatific vision immediately after this life, before the resurrection of the body; and Pope Clement VII. repeatedly stated that he was not informed on the legal question raised by Henry VIII., in his demand that his marriage with Katharine of Aragon should be declared null. All pastors are not learned men, or profound and erudite theologians; and many who pass for learned, have learned only a form of words which they repeat without much thought of their real meaning, or any serious attempt to study their meaning in its relation to the principles of Catholicity, or with the whole body of revealed truth, regarded in its unity and integrity, as the living expression of the Word made flesh.

The pastors of the church, taken singly, provincially, or nationally, are not incapable of neglecting to a greater or less extent the integrity and purity of doctrine, or of suffering the faith to be in part mixed up with local traditions, or national reminiscences, or to receive a one-sided development and practical realization. We should always remember the sacred calling of the clergy, and speak of them with veneration even for the sake of their office, but it cannot be denied that they are not always vigilant in the discharge of their pastoral duties. Few heresies, if any, have ever been originated by laymen. We can recall the name of no heresiarch who was not a priest or, at least, a religious. Arius was a presbyter, Nestorius was an archbishop, Luther was a presbyter and a monk, Calvin belonged to the *clerici*, Cranmer was a priest and an archbishop, La Mennais, Hermes, and, if you call him an heresiarch, Gioberti, were all priests. The pastors, often through their own incapacity, their peculiar notions, their indolence, their employment at court, or their devotion to their own interests or the interests of their relations, suffer the people to remain generation after generation with the *minimum* of religious instruction, as we may see even now with the poor people of Mexico, Central and South America. They, also, are often compelled to suffer them so to remain by the barbarism, revolutions, invasions, conquests, and disorders of their respective times and countries.

Then again, times change. Many interpretations and applications of truth, which, when first made are just and sal-

utary, become through subsequent changes inadequate, false, and hurtful; and yet so many interests, so many vested rights, and so many habits and customs have grown up under them, and demand their continuance, that it is exceedingly difficult to make the necessary modifications, sometimes impossible to do it, without creating greater evils than those to be redressed. What was useful grows into an abuse by the changes time and events introduce, and becomes a greater abuse by its longer continuance; yet it becomes so complicated with other things, with perhaps the whole framework of society, that the ecclesiastical authorities may well hesitate to lay the axe at its root, and to attempt a reform which they might find themselves in the end unable to effect. Always will there be a class who profit by the abuses, or by arrangements which have outlived their day, and these will always be disposed rather to retain than to correct them, while those who suffer from them are usually the unprivileged and the weaker party, who are impotent to redress them. Having been accustomed to suffer, and never having known any thing better, they are not always aware that they are bad, and are often the first to resist changes from which they themselves would be the chief gainers. In our own day the monastic orders are recommended on the ground of the relief they formerly afforded the poor. A single convent, we are told, fed every morning at its gate eighteen hundred poor persons. That certainly was well, when there were within reach of a single convent so many persons in need of being so fed. But might it not be still better to effect those political, social, and economical changes that would prevent the growth of so numerous a population able to keep soul and body together only as fed at the convent gate?

All education proceeds and must proceed on the supposition, that things are fixed and are to remain as they are. The teachers do not and cannot prepare their pupils in advance for changes which may or may not take place. The hierarchy have not any special gift of prophecy, and cannot be expected to foresee all that may come. They must labor for the place and the hour, and shape their conduct to things as they find them. They must labor for to-day, and leave to-morrow to take care of itself. "Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof." The church of the catacombs adapted herself to her condition at the time, and instruction and education were then naturally directed to the wants and

duties of a persecuted and socially unrecognized church. This world was not for Christians. They had no hand in and no responsibility for its government. For them the end of the world had come, and they naturally, inevitably gave to the ascetic or purely religious side of Catholicity a disproportionate development. When the church emerged from the catacombs, received liberty and a legal *status* in the empire, the faithful found themselves unprepared for the work necessary to reform the civilization of the Græco-Roman world, and to save it from destruction. Catholicity on the side of civilization had remained undeveloped, and Christianity found herself unable to heal the disorders of the state. Even under the Christian emperors it was nearly as null as under the pagan emperors, when obliged to seek refuge in the catacombs. Constantine made the despotism of the empire more complete than it had been under any of his predecessors; Theodosius favored rather than checked, the despotic tendency of the state; Honorius was orthodox, but it was his only virtue; and the conquest of Rome by Alaric the Goth, was, perhaps, the first step in advance toward a better political and social order. As a rule, sincere, earnest, pious, and devout Catholics meddled even under the Christian emperors prior to the downfall of western Rome very little in political or state affairs, and the courtiers were persons of loose morals or suspected orthodoxy.

After the Roman emperors came the barbarians, free from many of the vices of the *bas empire*, bold, courageous, energetic, with a strong sense of individuality and personal freedom, but ignorant, uncultivated, impatient of restraint, and for the most part heathens or heretics. For the first time the church had to commence the work of christianizing society, or civilizing states and nations. Naturally she drew upon her reminiscences of Græco-Roman civilization, and followed as far as practicable the order of civilization she had known for four hundred years, more especially as nearly all her pastors, prelates, and simple priests, with the vast majority of her laity belonged to the old Roman population. The first effort was to romanize, as they were converted, the barbarian conquerors. This met with the most success in Gaul, especially in the kingdom of Neustria; but the result was most unhappy, for the Neustrians exhibited the vices of both the Gallo-Romans and the barbarians, without the virtues of either. Gradually, how-

ever, as the Austrasian Franks became the ruling people in Gaul and Germany, the effort to convert the barbarians into Romans ceased, and the free spirit, the love of liberty of the Germanic family were accepted, and what we call the middle ages were instituted. What rules in the middle ages is feudalism, neither exclusively of barbarian nor of Roman origin, but formed by a mixture and modification of elements derived from both sources, with several elements supplied by the church herself. Feudalism knows nothing of what in our times is called the rights of man, and nowhere recognizes the broad principle of human equality. It was founded on inequality and privilege, and rested on vested or chartered rights. There were estates, but hardly a state. There were the king, the nobility, the commons, and the church, all with their vested or corporate rights.

In the feudal constitution of Europe, the church was recognized as a divine institution and authoritative in all matters of faith and worship, but she had her place, so to speak, as a chartered corporation, and her temporal rights rested on the same basis with those of the king, the nobility, the municipalities, or chartered cities. Her prelates, her bishops, and mitred abbots, were for the most part princes and barons, received homage and service from their vassals, and did homage and service to their liege lord for their fiefs. The Holy See, though never suzerain of the kingdom of France or of Germany, was suzerain or feudal sovereign at one time of nearly all the rest of Europe, with the exception of the Byzantine empire. Having temporal rights and possessions held and regulated by the feudal law, the church in her temporal interests became mixed up with the whole feudal order, and to no inconsiderable extent dependent on its continuance and strict observance by all classes of the feudal society for the free and full exercise of her spiritual rights, or unimpeded discharge of her spiritual functions.

The church did not create or establish feudalism; it grew up and was developed from the political and social elements introduced by the German conquerors, mingling with other political and social elements retained from the overthrown Græco Roman world. The church introduced directly or indirectly, as far as she could, the principles of Christian morality, manifested more especially in their effects on slavery. The church never did and never could recognize what is called chattel slavery, the slavery recognized by the

Roman law. For her the slave was a *person;* he might under certain conditions be held to service, but he was a *person* with moral rights and moral duties, free in his soul, and responsible for his conduct to his God, in like manner as his master. She insisted for the slave on the rights and obligations of Christian marriage, therefore of the Christian family, and consequently of a domicile or home. This of itself transformed chattel slavery into serfage or villanage, and prepared the way for the transformation of the serf or villain into the free peasant. She modified what had been the *jus gentium*, or universal law of nations, that captives taken in war may be reduced to chattel slaves, and taught that, though they may be held to ransom, they cannot, if Christians, be reduced to slavery. She also insisted on the humane and Christian treatment of bondmen, and enacted that the bondman receiving orders became a freeman, not only because he then became as it were a bondman of Christ, but because the freedom of the *clerici* from human bondage was one of her recognized corporate rights as a legal corporation in the feudal society. She thus, as far as the social and political order permitted, recognized and asserted the principle affirmed by the civil law, that all men are born free, and can be deprived of their liberty only as a penalty for crime.

Feudalism rested, it has been said, solely on vested as distinguished from natural rights. The state was an estate, alienable or transmissible as any other estate. The feudal sovereign was a proprietor, not the representative of the majesty of the state, as was the Roman imperator. This is as true of the German emperors as of any other of the feudal sovereigns of Europe. Indeed, in the beginning the emperor was not *emperor* of Germany, or of the Germans or Franks. The imperial title and dignity conferred by St. Leo III. on Charlemagne, king of the Franks and Lombards, and patrician of Rome, were Roman, conferred by the acknowledged sovereign of Rome, and without significance outside of the Roman state. Save in Rome, of which the pope was sovereign, the emperor was simply a feudal king; for the pope did not erect, and never had or claimed the power to erect, the dominions of Charlemagne into an empire, to reëstablish the Roman empire of the West, and to transfer it from the Romans to the Franks, or, rather, the Germans. He gave the imperial title and dignity to the patrician of Rome, so far, and only so far, as related to

his own temporal dominions. The title and dignity were Roman, received from the acknowledged sovereign of Rome, in consideration of the aid and protection afforded and to be afforded the Holy See, and the Roman sovereign in the temporal government of his subjects in Rome and the Roman states. Thus Charlemagne assumes the title of Defender of the Holy See and Coadjutor of the pope in his temporal government. This explains the oath of Charlemagne, wherefore the pope had the right to elect and crown the emperor, and wherefore the emperor could ordinarily be crowned only in the city of Rome.

The emperors subsequently were not satisfied with being only emperors in Rome, and feudal sovereigns elsewhere. Hence arose the fearful struggles between the popes and emperors which fill so many pages of mediæval history. The Suabian sovereigns, or emperors of the Hohenstaufen family, pretended that St. Leo III., in crowning Charlemagne, or Karl der Grosse, as emperor, restored the Roman empire of the West, and transferred it to the Germans—a recognition of authority in the pope over temporal matters greater than any pope has ever claimed. They called their dominions the Holy Roman Empire, took the title of kaiser, and claimed to be the legitimate successors of Augustus Cæsar. This was to strike a deadly blow at the feudal constitution of Europe, and to change entirely the basis of European sovereignty. It would, if admitted, have materially affected the relations of the church with secular society, deprived her of all her corporate rights, and placed her rights and interests as a corporation at the mercy of the emperor. She may have had originally no especial regard for the feudal constitution, and no special repugnance to the constitution of imperial Rome, but now all her temporal interests were blended with the feudal order, and she used all her spiritual and secular power to maintain it, and to defeat the attempts of the German emperors to overthrow it and reëstablish for all Europe imperial Rome prostrated by the barbarian conquest.

The church had then become in her temporal interests and in her administration intimately connected with the feudal order, as she has since been with the monarchical order, which for the greater part of Europe supplanted it, and necessarily arrayed against her all who wished to get rid of feudalism, as she now arrays against her a large portion of those who wish to get rid of monarchy. The church

and feudalism got the better of the Hohenstaufen; but the principle of imperialism was not suppressed, or essentially weakened. It was adopted by every feudal sovereign in Europe; all of whom struggled to become representatives of the majesty of the states, instead of being simple proprietors, and each being among his nobles only *primus inter pares*. The struggle continued with varying success down to the sixteenth century, when the monarchical principle triumphed over the feudal, and political monarchy representing the state took the place of the proprietary monarchy representing only the personal and vested rights of the feudal chief. The feudal system had its good points, and also its bad points. It was never an order suited to a highly civilized state. It secured the personal liberty of the nobles, or barons, and of corporations in their corporate character, but afforded no protection to the unprivileged people as individuals, and no security for national unity and the national authority. The noble's liberty was guarded against his suzerain; he could protect his vassals and serfs from oppression by the lord paramount; but these had very little protection against his own tyranny and oppression. Each baron was a despot in regard to those under him, and often a bad neighbor to his equals. The castle halls may have been the scenes of noble hospitality and festive mirth, but the castle keep and donjon had many a tale of wrong, of violence, cruelty, and horror to tell. There are always oppression and wrong where there is no effectual restraint on the will or the passions of the ruler, whether he be king or kaiser, feudal baron or modern slaveholder. The world, religion, humanity, civilization has probably no reason to regret that the feudal ages have passed away, and that feudalism only lingers in a few benighted corners of Europe.

The changes attempted by the Hohenstaufen were directed against the feudal system, and against the church only in the respect that she was one of the elements of that society, with her material interests intimately bound up with it, as before the barbarian conquest they had been with the Roman empire. If society had been prepared for them, and they could have been effected with the consent or cooperation of the church, they would, it may be, have set the civilization of Europe forward some two or three centuries, for they would have anticipated by so much the great national monarchies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which, however out of date now, were unquestion-

ably, in their day, a great advance on feudalism. In order to vindicate the church, it is not necessary to suppose those great but unsuccessful emperors were moved by hostility to religion or to the legitimate authority of the church. It may be conceded that they comprehended that the feudal order comported only with a semi-barbarous and transition state of society, and that they consulted the interests of civilization as well as their own personal ambition and love of power. Their attempts, no doubt, were premature, were too exclusively directed to the revival of the cæsarism of the Roman empire, without a due regard to the new social elements introduced and the new interests created by the German conquerors, and would, if successful, have gone far to extinguish that sense of personal liberty and independence cherished by feudalism, and reëstablished imperial despotism; yet with some modifications they were ultimately successful, and in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the king is a national sovereign, representing the majesty of the state, not a mere personal proprietor.

The church had no hostility to this change in the character of European sovereignty, considered in itself, and her reminiscences favored it. Feudalism had not been of her creation, and had given her much trouble. But her political and social position were determined by it; she herself, in her external and transitory constitution, had, so to speak, become feudal. She was herself suzerain of several important kingdoms, and held kings and princes as her vassals; her prelates were almost everywhere, especially in Germany, princes and barons, joining to their spiritual a greater or less extended secular jurisdiction; her own rights as proprietor were secured by charters, and held by the same general tenure as the rights of all other members of the feudal society. No doubt she was acknowledged to be a divine society, and to hold certain rights immediately from God, yet the free exercise of those rights themselves as political and social rights depended on her chartered or vested rights as a corporation. She was, therefore, naturally placed on the side of the feudal order of society, for, practically considered, her own rights and interests and those of that society were inseparable, and must stand or fall together. She had law, public and private, chartered and vested rights on her side, and could not yield without a struggle to the emperors. If the pope himself could have foreseen all the consequences of the struggle, he could not have done otherwise than he

did, for he had no power to force the prelacy wedded to feudalism to give up their possessions, and to aid him in destroying the very social and political constitution which made them feudal proprietors, lords, barons, and princes. The rights of the church were held to be the rights of God, and the pope as their trustee and guardian was bound to defend them by all the means at his disposal. Hence he engaged in the struggle, and placed the church on the side of feudalism against the attempted revival of Roman imperialism, and the constitution of proper national sovereignties.

In this struggle which lasted under one form or another from Frederic Barbarossa to Charles V., we must find the germs, as to its political and social character, of the Protestant movement. In this struggle, complicated by the papal residence at Avignon, and the great western schism, the papacy lost much of its prestige, and by its increased expenses became burdensome. It had in the first instance been assailed by the imperialists, but it began to be assailed at length by what at first had been its own party. It was in fact defeated by the party of national sovereignty, and compelled to enter into concordats with the sovereign princes; and, at the epoch of Luther, the church had virtually abandoned the cause of feudalism, and was making the best terms she could with monarchy in its modern and anti-feudal sense. If England, Denmark, and Sweden be excepted, the political character of the Protestant movement was that of feudality against imperialism, therefore a retrograde, not an advance movement; and, directly contrary to modern pretensions, the party supporting the movement in Germany, Italy, France, Scotland, and Switzerland was the party of the past, not the party of the future, and the reformation demanded, as will hereafter be more distinctly shown, was a reformation by way of restoration, and not by way of progress.

The ecclesiastical abuses which were so numerous and so much in need of correction in the sixteenth century were rendered such by the various changes which had taken place in public opinion and in secular society. The most that can be said against the church in regard to them is that she did not in all cases foresee the changes, and provide for them, and that she sometimes resisted them after resistance had become unavailing. Institutions, wise and good when adopted, become corrupt and corrupting when they

outlive their day and their reason. Principles never grow old or obsolete; they never change, and are necessarily always the same; but the institutions intended to embody or realize them in the world of time and space, where all is in a state of perpetual flux and reflux, may grow old, become effete, or effective only for evil. They need change or modification to meet the new wants and the new conditions of things. The tendency of churchmen is usually conservative, and they are, as a rule, slow in foreseeing, accepting, and conforming to these new conditions. They do not always see the necessity or the propriety of the changes attempted, and are not always quick to detect the precise moment when resistance to them has become useless, and they must be accepted as inevitable. But in this churchmen do not especially differ from statesmen, and the evil can be prevented by no purely human foresight or purely human virtue.

The church, any more than other governing bodies, never governs with a view to change. The clergy have seldom fully comprehended the doctrine of the continuous evolution of truth, or continuous progress in the explication and application of the idea, except in the sphere of the individual life and conscience. They wish to give the institutions, which, though ecclesiastical, are yet only human in their origin, the fixity and permanence which they rightfully affirm of Catholic truth. They are, consequently, often found behind their age or country, instead of being in advance of it, and inspiring and directing its progress. They fix their eye mainly on the individual, and labor for progress in the interior life, without paying much attention to the fact that the race is operative in the individual, and that all progress in the interior demands expression in an exterior progress. The interior life must develop itself in the exterior, and, if the exterior is fixed and rendered unchangeable, the growth of the interior is checked, stunted, and, perhaps, prevented altogether. They, again, are apt to forget that the spirit at work in society and often carrying it on in spite of itself, is invigorated by the Catholic idea, and tends to the common destiny of the race. Not all that proceeds not from the hierarchy, or operates not under their immediate direction is anti-catholic or un-catholic, and to be rejected or resisted by the sincere, earnest, and orthodox Christian. The Word made flesh embraces the race as well as the individual, the human as well as the divine.

But not all change is progress. Man proceeds from God and tends in his normal state to him. All progress is in the return to God as our final cause, the final cause of creation itself. But there is the fact of human degeneracy as well as of human progress to be taken into the account. Man has an ascending tendency, and also a descending tendency. Society, as the expression of the human, may tend to the ABOVE, or it may tend to the BELOW, *Infernus*. Changes may spring from or favor either of these two tendencies, and therefore there may be changes to be resisted as well as changes to be encouraged. A discrepancy between the church and society may as well arise from her resisting abnormal changes, as from her slowness in approving and encouraging normal changes. The clergy may at times be right as well as wrong in resisting society, and in resolutely refusing to go with it. By their very office it is their duty to labor with all their zeal, energy, wisdom, and virtue, to conform society to the Christian type; and this renders it necessary for them to oppose society whenever and wherever it tends to deviate from that type, or to place obstacles in the way of its realization. Society is regressive as well as progressive, and the discrepancy between the church and society may and not unfrequently does arise not from the opposition of the clergy to progress or their unwillingness to aid it, but from their efforts to stay the tide of degeneracy, or to arrest society in its downward tendency.

It is easy from these observations taken together to explain without impeaching the sanctity and infallibility of the church in any sense she herself requires us to assert them, how it could happen that in the sixteenth century there were great ecclesiastical reforms necessary, and how the ecclesiastical authorities could fail to perceive and properly appreciate the motives of the reformers, and by an unwise resistance drive them into heresy and schism. We can hold fast to our Catholic faith, we can retain our deep and burning love for the church, the spouse of Christ, and yet recognize a good motive and a Catholic thought in the outset at the bottom of the Protestant movement, for in the outset it was not Protestant. It was a movement in the church, by Catholics, and it became Protestant only subsequently, after it had been expelled from the church. How it came to embrace its errors and to be thus expelled, will be the subject of future essays. We have in this said enough to show that we may treat the movement as an his-

torical movement, as an historical fact, and judge it as such without any fear of harming the Catholic cause. The church has nothing to dread from facts, and her cause can never suffer from their free, fair, and full recognition and assertion.

ESSAY III.

It is a grave mistake to regard the great movement in the sixteenth century as a Protestant movement, and the reformation effected as a Protestant reformation. The reformation was Catholic, not Protestant. It originated with Catholics, in a Catholic spirit, and for a Catholic purpose; it was inspired by Catholic faith, and undertaken with an earnest desire to advance the cause of religion and civilization. Its normal development was eminently Catholic, and found expression in the doctrinal definitions and reformatory decrees of the Council of Trent. Like every great movement its progress encountered numerous obstacles, which more or less obstructed its course, diverted a part of its current into an abnormal channel, and gave rise to various heterodox confessions and communions included under the general name of Protestantism; but its regular course was onward in a Catholic direction, resulting in the evolution and appropriation by the church of Catholic truth.

It is a grave mistake, also, to regard the reformation as an untoward event, and detrimental to the Catholic cause. It was necessary for the continuance of the evolution of the idea, the explication and appropriation of Catholic faith, and both religion and civilization have gained by it. The sixteenth century, rightly considered, is not a century Catholics should look back upon with shame or regret, and those among us who deplore it, and denounce it as an epoch of a lamentable interruption of Catholic progress and a sad falling away from the faith, fail to comprehend it in its dialectic relations, and confound the spirit that quickeneth with the letter that killeth. Nothing was lost that deserved to live; no eclipse came over faith; no real progress was interrupted. Without the reformation effected in that century, the promise of our Lord to be with his church all days unto the consummation of the world, would have been broken, orthodoxy would have been lost, the infallible word have been corrupted, error and superstition would have resumed their old empire, Christianity been supplanted by gentilism, and the church have proved a failure. Such a deplorable result was

not possible; it was not in accordance with the designs of Providence, nor with the attributes of God. It could not happen. The idea, the very life of the church, is Christ himself, the Word made flesh, and because he lives she also lives; because he cannot fail, she cannot fail. The reformation was therefore both necessary and inevitable, and we may honor the age in which it came.

The Protestant doctrines and sects, which took their rise in the movement, were not the reformation, were not its normal results, and should never be taken as its characteristics. They were only its temporary accidents, and will disappear without leaving a trace behind them, when Catholics themselves learn to appreciate the reformation itself, and to accept it as one of the glories of the church. These doctrines derive their strength from our ignorance, and these sects their vitality from our defective comprehension of the catholicity of our own church. They live and flourish because we are not ourselves truly Catholic. They are in our present condition even useful to us. They are the Philistines whom the Lord suffers to dwell in the land to prove us, to keep us active, watchful, on the alert, and to prevent us from falling into the dead and corrupt state into which we were rapidly falling before the reformation. When we have no longer need of them they will disappear. That they are in some sense necessary to the church is evident from the fact that all attempts to crush them by force have failed. The forces of Catholic Europe have never been able to bring back a single Protestant nation. Charles V. tried and failed; Philip II. tried and failed; Louis XIV. tried and failed; Napoleon tried and failed. All efforts by force, diplomacy, or controversy, fail, and must fail, till Catholics cease in any respect to rely on the civil arm, and gain sufficient confidence in truth to dare trust their cause under God to reason and common sense. Not till then will these doctrines and sects disappear, or we fully comprehend the real significance of the reformation, and reap all its fruits. When we have risen to the level of the reformation, and have ceased to seek the continuance or revival of that old mediæval world which properly ended with it; when we learn that truth is always living, and cannot die; when we learn that force is impotent against thought, that the church is a purely spiritual kingdom, and are willing to regard her as distinct and separate from the kingdoms of this world, and to meet the spiritual with the spiritual, Protes-

tantism will go the way of ancient Gnosticism, Manicheism, or Arianism. It will recede as we advance in the understanding and realization in life of our own faith.

The reformation in its normal results was a progress in the evolution of the idea, an advance in the explication and actualization in the church and in society of the universal and immutable principles of the Catholic faith. The idea is the Word-made-flesh, Christ, the God-man, of whom the church is the expression in time and space. The work of the church is to form Christ, the hope of glory, in the individual, and in society. The idea is universal, infinite, and inexhaustible, but it is realizable by us in this life only in a finite and imperfect manner, and therefore only successively, or progressively. The end of man is the complete evolution and assimilation by divine assistance of the idea, or perfect union in Christ with God,—or oneness with Christ, who is one with God. Man is destined to become, in Christ, God, as Christ himself is God. This is the end of his creation; that is to say, the union, without a loss of the distinction of nature, of the human with the divine, the finite with the infinite, the creature with the Creator, man with God. Progress is in going to this end, or, which is the same thing, the actualization, by the assistance of grace, of the possibilities of our nature. This actualization is successive, not instantaneous,—in time, not in eternity. Hence man is finite, and in time is subjected to the law of progress, and his true life, till reaching his end, is in the continuous progress in the evolution and assimilation to himself of the life of the Word made flesh. The progress is not of the idea, not a progress of truth objectively considered, but a progress in its explication and assimilation by the human understanding; not in the actualization of its possibilities, for in itself it is already pure act, but of our possibilities, the potentiality of human nature. Man's possibilities are infinite, and hence he is progressive to the infinite; and as long as he remains below the infinite, if really living, he is and must be progressive.

It has been seen in a former essay that a reformation in the church, and by the church, may become necessary, and be effected without impugning either her sanctity or her infallibility, in any sense in which Catholic dogma requires either to be asserted. The church in her idea, through the indwelling Holy Ghost, is infallible and holy, but Catholics, as individuals, are both fallible and peccable. Infallibility

and impeccability are the privilege of no individual in the church, whatever his rank, dignity, or authority. Hence errors and abuses in the Catholic body, or the church as the congregation of individuals, are possible, and not of unfrequent occurrence. It was never the design of our Lord in founding his church to take away our human free will, or to supersede the exercise of our human understanding, and it is always possible for us, in or out of the church, to abuse our free will and to misemploy our understanding. Man aspires to God, as inspired by him, and has an onward and upward tendency to him as his last end; but he has also a downward tendency, or tendency which bears him away or holds him back from God. Christianity accepts and assists the onward and upward tendency, and enables our nature to complete itself in union with the infinite. But she always and everywhere is resisted in this work by the contrary or downward tendency,—a negative rather than a positive tendency indeed, a *vis inertiæ*, which has to be overcome before the soul can take unfettered her upward flight. Subject to these two opposing tendencies, man can never remain contented in perfect inaction, nor can he, whether in the church or out of her, go on in a continuous career of progress without encountering obstacles all but insurmountable. The work of evolution and assimilation is always resisted by the downward tendency of our nature, and at times is apparently arrested by it. There is a pause, an apparent stand-still, till the individual and society concentrate their forces and make preparations for new and stronger efforts to sweep away the accumulated obstacles to progress, and resume the onward and upward course. Hence reformations are needed, and are effected.

The upward tendency of the soul is her aspiration to God, to life, to the plentitude of life, the plentitude of existence, to which she can attain only in Christ, in whom dwells the fulness of the Godhead, and in whom the divine creative act is completed. Man was created for God, and God is his being, his supreme good, his beatitude. Created for God he aspires to him, and in the regeneration or palingenesiac life is progressive to him, and therefore is, since God is infinite, progressive to the infinite, or infinitely progressive. The modern rationalistic doctrine of progress is right in asserting that man is infinitely progressive; but is wrong in asserting that he is progressive without end, or without ever being able to reach the term of his progress,

as well as in mistaking both the principle and the medium of his progressiveness. The progress asserted by the rationalist is really no progress at all. Progress is going towards an end, and where there is no end there is no progress. With the rationalist man is always *becoming*, never *becomes* God. He falls into this error by mininterpreting or rejecting the Incarnation. If he accepts the Incarnation, it is as an individual fact, not as a principle of life. Rejecting it as a principle of life, or not recognizing it at all, he is necessarily restricted to simple cosmic existence, in which he has and can have no end; for cosmos is and can be completed or fulfilled only in palingenesia. Cosmos is the procession by way of creation of existences from God, and palingenesia in their return through Christ, the Word made flesh, to God, or their fulfilment in attaining to their end or final cause. Palingenesia, or regeneration in Christ, depends on the Incarnation. Men become Christians by the birth of grace in Christ, as individuals are men by being born of Adam. All the elect are in Christ, the father of regenerated humanity, as all men were from the first in Adam, the father of cosmic humanity. As Christ is the second Adam, the complement of the first, as well as repairer of his fault, it follows that men have not their complement, therefore their end, in the first Adam, cosmic order, or the order of genesis.

Without regeneration in Christ, man remains purely cosmic, inchoate, initial, incomplete, unfulfilled. The possibilities or capacities of his nature are not only unactualized, but unactualizable. His life is without end or aim. He is a rainless cloud, blown hither and thither by the winds, a wandering star, a fig-tree that bears no fruit. Take from him all hope of entering the palingenesia and fulfilling his existence, and his life is death, and he is literally suffering the pangs of hell. This is the condition of all who are excluded from the regeneration, or are out of Christ. Hence it is that out of him there is no salvation, and that his is the only name given under heaven among men whereby we can be saved. Christianity saves us from the desolating doctrine of progress without end, not by denying all progress, but by accepting progress, giving it a term, and assisting us to reach it. In the regeneration men are not tantalized by a good which forever eludes their grasp, or which forever allures them on, and recedes in proportion as they advance. In and through Christ, man not only aspires to

God, but attains to him, and without ceasing to be man, becomes one with him.

Satan did not lie to our first parents in assuring them that they should be gods, or as gods. In Christ men become Christ, and Christ is God. "When he shall appear we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is." He has promised us that "we shall be made partakers of his divine nature." Man was from the first intended to become God. The deception of Satan was not there; it was in so telling the truth as to persuade our first parents that they were or could become God in the terrestrial paradise, or in their simple cosmic existence. This was persuading them that the possibilities of their nature were already actualized, and that they were already gods, without regeneration in Christ and glorification in the celestial paradise. Adam neither erred nor sinned in aspiring to be God, nor in believing that he could become God; but both erred and sinned in assuming that he was already God, and acting on that assumption. This was the primal falsehood, the original sin, whence the degeneracy of the race, and all our errors, sins, and woes. It assumed the possible to be the actual, the earthly paradise to be the celestial, the initial to be the completion, genesis to be palingenesis, and the cosmic life to be the eternal life in God.

This original sin was not only the individual sin of Adam, but was the sin of the race, for the race was all in him. It has therefore descended upon all individuals born of him, for they all participate of the race. In all ages and nations it has adhered to human nature, and been the grand obstacle to human progress. It is a clog on all the efforts of the soul to rise, and is what we call the downward tendency, or degeneracy of the race. Its primal sophism is not that man may become God, but that man is God; not that in the regeneration he is progressive to the infinite, but that he is already in possession of the infinite, and therefore of his supreme good. It originates all those terrible conflicts in the soul between the flesh and the spirit, between the spirit that aspires to God as its supreme good, and the flesh that grovels in the earth, the inferior nature that clings to the earthly, and relishes only sensual goods. It is the fruitful mother of the wars that rend society and devastate nations, and of those fearful battles waged at intervals between the past and the future, to keep the race back under institutions it has outgrown, and which cramp and confine it, or to con-

quer for it the power to advance, and to continue its march through the ages. Always, and everywhere, in the individual and society, in church and state, is it present as the enemy of life and progress, obstructing the evolution of truth, the growth of holiness, and the actualization of Catholic faith.

The Christian spirit is the spirit of life, the spirit of progress, of development and growth. It says always with St. Paul, "I count not myself to have apprehended; but this one thing I do, forgetting the things that are behind, and stretching forth to those that are before, I press toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus." The apostle avoids the error of Adam, who counted himself to have comprehended, and of the modern rationalists who assert progress without end, or deny that the goal is attainable. He asserts progress, and progress that can reach its term, "the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus," that is, consummation in glory, or union with God. The original sin of Adam into which he was seduced by Satan, that man is God, which denies progress, and the error of the modern rationalist, that man is progressive without end, which also virtually denies it, are alike opposed to the Christian spirit, and incessantly combated by it. They are, after all, but two phases of one and the same thing. The former is the original sin of the conservatives, as they call themselves, the obscurantists as they are called by their opponents. These assume, in principle, if not in form, that they have comprehended, and that any departure from them is a departure from God. Their convictions and their attainments are the measure of the true and the possible. They are God, or like God, from whom all must take the law, and learn the distinction betwen good and evil. The latter is the error of the rationalists, radicals, or revolutionists, for whom nothing is sacred, fixed, or stable. These hold that all things are in a perpetual flux; that the universe rests on a movable foundation, and that God is a *becoming* [*das Werden*], continually growing, filling up the void in his being, and enlarging and strengthening his faculties. Man with them is mounted upon an everlasting treadmill, continually stepping, but never advancing. The first class mistakes earth, the latter hell, for heaven. The church asserts stability with progress, and progress with stability, conservatism with progress, and progress with conservatism, each in harmony with the other, and both in harmony with the dialectic law of the universe.

As truth avails us only in proportion as it is evolved and appropriated by the human understanding, the church always asserts and aids progress both in the individual and in society, for Catholicity includes civilization as well as religion. The palingenesiac supposes the cosmic. The Christian idea is the Incarnation, the hypostatic union of the divine and human natures in one divine person. But the progress the church proposes and aids is resisted by the two classes of errorists described, by those who resist all progress, and those who render it impossible by denying it all end. These, though never able to hinder progress altogether, are able often to obstruct or retard it. Hence reformations become necessary to remove the obstacles they interpose, and which are a barrier to further progress. The operations of these two classes of errorists, both born of original sin, and marking the downward tendency of our nature generate errors and abuses in the church, in spite of her divine wisdom, and her utmost vigilance. In the sixteenth century these abuses were great, but neither greater nor more numerous than they had been for at least three centuries before. The reformation came then, because then the divine life of the church had become more active and energetic, and she had acquired the freedom and strength necessary to correct them. The church is always and everywhere a living and active force, and her power is always intrinsically the same. Obstructions dam up the stream, but diminish not the force or quantity of its waters. The waters accumulate silently behind them, and suddenly sweep them away, and clear their channel. It is no reproach to the church that she meets with obstacles, but it is to her glory that she is able to surmount them, and continue on in her course. It is nothing against her that reformations, from time to time, become necessary, but it is a proof of her divinity that she is able to effect them.

In the sixteenth century the moment had come when the long-accumulating waters of life could break through the dams and dykes sin and error had erected against them. The long-desired reform had become possible, and in her Council of Trent the church effected it, arrested the abnormal development, and opened the pathway for future progress. The reformation she effected was all that the times permitted, or that could then be prudently attempted. By the doctrinal definitions and reformatory decrees and canons of the council, the church secured her past evolutions without fore-

closing the future. But it is not to be assumed that with that council all reformation was brought to an end. The work of explication and appropriation of truth in the life of individuals and nations must go on to the end of the world, and always is there in both the same morbid tendency to be resisted, the same imperfection to be overcome. The same causes, in principle, that made the reformation in the sixteenth century necessary, may hereafter render many others equally necessary. Indeed many earnest Catholics think, that another in the church, and by the church, is already needed. There is even now an apparent pause in the works of the church, and progress, as far as it goes on at all, seems to go on outside of her communion rather than within it, and many of her devout children are so afraid that she will sever herself from the past that they do their best to shut her out from the future. It is the holiday of *conservatives*. The party of the past in the church, and the party of the future out of the church, both sophistical and mischievous when operating separately, are debating the world between them, and a new council—not merely an informal assembly of prelates at Rome, having no promise of the assistance of the Holy Ghost in their deliberations and decisions—is, perhaps, not uncalled for.

But, though the Council of Trent stayed the progress of heterodoxy, and fixed the conditions of orthodox and legitimate development, it did not convert the heterodox or heal the schism. A large part of Europe remained, and still remains separated from the Catholic communion, apparently lost to the church. Yet, perhaps, not entirely lost, for even the heterodox in some sense pertain to the Catholic world. They are Catholics in their reminiscences and potentialities. They are for the most part, though not Catholics, Christians. They hold not Catholic truth in its unity, integrity, and purity; yet they hold it, and under some of its aspects develop it with an earnestness, a zeal, and a success which we do not always find among the orthodox. Moreover, the more glaring of the errors of Luther and Calvin are either explained away or openly rejected; the rationalism so rife a few years since in Germany and elsewhere has received a notable check from Protestant theologians themselves, and is now as prevalent in the so-called Catholic nations as in the non-Catholic. The higher class of heterodox theologians are nearly up to the theology of the Council of Trent. Old prejudices are much softened, heated passions on both

sides have in a measure cooled down, and very few non-Catholics would now find any serious difficulty in accepting the church were she presented to them free from all hitherto associated with her that is not Catholic.

Yet, though the movement was Catholic, and its normal results were collected and embodied by the Council of Trent, the question still remains, whence came its abnormal development, and why did not the council put an end to Protestantism, and heal the schism which still continues? On one side the movement deviated from the Catholic line, and resulted in founding creeds and sects hostile to the church, and which still with more or less fierceness seek her destruction. Whence this deviation? And why this continuance of Protestantism after the publication of the acts of the Council of Trent? These are questions which require a deeper, a broader, a more generous answer than they usually receive from either Catholic or non-Catholic theologians. The immediate cause was, no doubt, the impatience of the reformers, the slowness, not to say reluctance, of the church authorities in effecting the reforms acknowledged to be necessary, and the indiscreet zeal with which Catholic controversialists defended, not the faith, but opinions and practices, which had obtained in the church, and were and are in no sense essential to Catholicity, and indeed improperly associated with it. The remote cause is, of course, in original sin, the downward tendency of human nature, or the degeneracy of the human race, common alike to Catholics and to non-Catholics, and in which originates the universal and persistent opposition to the evolution and appropriation of truth or the idea. Yet, whatever may have been the cause, it must not be assumed to have been or to be all on one side. All the blame is not due either to Catholics or to non-Catholics. That morbidity, which we call original sin, though never a total corruption of nature, attaches to the race, and is common, though in varying degrees, to all men, whether in or out of the church. Catholics had not individually or socially realized completely in their life, moral, intellectual, or religious, the Catholic type; and they who became Protestants did not understand the great law of progress, and that truth is effective only as it is evolved and assimilated by the individual and by society. They did not understand the law of continuity, and labored for a restoration rather than a progress, for destruction rather than reformation. They concluded from the abuses

against the use, and sought as the only means of guarding against them to make an end of the church herself. They fell into the error of Adam, rejected the evolutions effected by the church, closed, in theory, at least, the future to the human race, and sought to turn it back to the undeveloped Christianity of the first century.

There is in all men a strong tendency to conclude in religion against its divinity from the imperfections and vices of its human ministers. The clergy are men, and in all ages and nations have the infirmities of men. They never perfectly realize the sacerdotal type, for that type is Christ, the God-man, and therefore men conclude against the type itself, and say, let us have no priests at all. Nothing is more sophistical. If the clergy fall further below their type than other men do below their respective types, still in learning, science, and virtue they as a body rise far above the average of other men. The priesthood is from God, a heavenly treasure committed to earthen vessels, deposited, if you will, in fragile vases. The vase may be unworthy of the treasure, but the worth of the treasure depends not on that of the vase. Catholics are bad, it is said; therefore the church is worthless. But if men are so bad with the church, contemporary heathen nations can assure us that they would be infinitely worse without her. The morbid reformers, who became Protestants, were not above the sophistry of the vulgar. They drew general conclusions from particular facts; and assuming the soundness of their logic, fell into heresy and schism. They beheld, indeed, the truth under some of its aspects, but they saw not how they could hold in the church the truth they saw, though neither the whole truth, nor the truth at all, in its Catholic relations, and they went out from the church, and made war against her. A truer comprehension, either of their own doctrines or of Catholic faith itself, would have saved them from doing either, for they had and have no positive, no affirmative doctrine or principle not reconcilable with the official teachings of the church.

In answering the questions raised, care must also be taken not to ascribe too much to the personal virtues or the personal vices of individual actors. In either the normal or the abnormal development, in or out of the church, the race always counts for much more than the individual. It will not, indeed, do to say, with the school of Hegel and Cousin, that individuals count for nothing, and that in his-

tory there are no individuals, but simply ideas, principles, causes, impersonalities. This were to exclude all influence of free will on historical events. Great men are not always the product of their age, as that school maintains; they are sometimes the creators of their age. The weak man bends to the circumstances of his times; the strong man bends them to his will, controls them, and makes them work out his purpose. What our people most want in their present crisis is the strong man, a great man, a great statesman, a great general, and the want may prove fatal to them. Not seldom do great men control events, and change the current of history. The condemnation of democracy is, that it tends to produce a low common level, and either produces no great man, or excludes him from all part in the management of public affairs. Had Pitt had a Wellington to place at the head of the armies he sent against revolutionary France, Napoleon Bonaparte would have never been heard of, save as a respectable marshal in the armies of the Bourbons; and if we had had a Jackson instead of a Buchanan at the head of our own government there had been no southern rebellion. If Bohemond, instead of Godfrey, had commanded the first crusade, it is not improbable that the whole East would have been conquered and recovered to Christian civilization, for he would not have been restrained by his scruples from beginning the work by taking possession of Constantinople. But even individuals are great by their humanity rather than by their individuality. The individual participates in the race, and has in him something of all men. In this participation, not in his individuality, lies the secret of his greatness. They who partake in the highest degree of the race, have the largest humanity, the broadest and richest human nature, are the great men, the men of genius, called men of *genius* because they participate beyond the ordinary degree in the race, are born, not made.

Ideas, causes, principles, operate, indeed, through individuals, and individuals are real, not, as pantheism teaches, mere appearances, sense-shows, illusions. Nevertheless, individuals are not all the reality there is. Man does not subsist without men, but neither are there men without man. The race is not an empty word, nor a mere aggregation or collection of individuals. The individual, always excepting the first Adam and the second, is the individuation of a higher reality than himself. The strength and greatness of men is in their participation of this higher reality, in their

human nature, their manhood, through which they touch and participate of God. Individuals die; the race survives —*non omnis moriar*—and the deeds of individuals enter into history only as they are done in the strength of humanity, and through humanity in the strength of humanity's God, after whose image and likeness man was created. It is then, and then only that they are *res gestæ*, evolutions of the ideal, and fit to be recorded.

Personal virtues and vices are every thing to the individual, but they rarely, if ever, decide the great events of history. Alexander of Macedon was far the inferior in personal virtues of Godfrey of Bouillon, the leader of the first crusade; yet with ten thousand horse, and thirty-five thousand foot, he invaded and conquered Asia, Egypt, and Lybia, founded the great city of Alexandria, impressed something of the Hellenic character on all the nations he overran, and opened the way for his successors to found Greek states on the site of his conquests, which flourished ages after his death. Godfrey, at the head of ninety thousand horse, and, it is said, three hundred thousand foot, invaded Asia, established the petty, sickly Frank kingdom of Jerusalem, which soon disappeared, and left no trace of the Frank spirit. In personal virtues Godfrey was far the superior, in bravery and skill as a military leader, the equal of Alexander, while the Frank chivalry he led were at least not inferior to the Macedonian Greeks. Whence the difference of results? Alexander invaded Asia as the representative of the masculine and superior civilization of the West, and carried with him the interests and force of humanity. Godfrey went on a pious pilgrimage to the church of the Holy Sepulchre, the representative of a pious sentiment, indeed, but not of an idea essential either to religion or to civilization, for men can pray acceptably anywhere and everywhere. The recovery of the Holy Land was a pious thought, but not a cause for which men will, save in moments of pious fervor, pour out their blood and treasure. The pontiffs who encouraged the crusades, may have hoped to secure the East and restore it, or elevate it to the Christian order of civilization; but if they proposed any thing of the sort, even to themselves, they expected it only as an indirect and incidental result of their unloosing Europe upon Asia. It was not their direct, determined, and avowed object, and so they failed, and the crusades are to be recorded only in the psychological history of the race. Alexander represented a

cause, and succeeded, for his cause was mightier than that opposed to him. He left his mark on all the East, and did much to prepare it for the reception, when they came, of the preachers of the Gospel. Godfrey represented a generous and holy sentiment, but no cause which stirred the heart of humanity, and his conquests were few, limited in extent, and short-lived. When Europe ceased to care for them, they were lost, and the East remained as unchristian in faith and civilization as it was before the invasion.

Against the school of Hegel and Cousin we must, no doubt, take care to maintain the free intervention in history of both Providence and human will, and the effects of either the historian cannot foresee or foretell. Yet the free intervention of Providence is the intervention of the Logos, and therefore logical, in accordance with the dialectic law of all creation. It is never arbitrary or capricious, for Providence is always and everywhere the action of eternal reason, of the supreme wisdom itself. Even the intervention of human free will, is the intervention of a rational soul, made after the image and likeness of God, and must be in some measure logical, and imitate the dialectic action of Providence. It can never interrupt the dialectic designs of the Creator, or introduce any thing not embraced within them, since known to God are all things from the beginning, and nothing ever does or can take him by surprise. He can never be dependent on any creature for any portion of his knowledge. He is the adequate object of his own intellect. To him all is certain, fixed, complete, for to him there is no past, no future, and all is present. If we could behold his works as he beholds them, the philosophy of history would have the certainty and scientific character of mathematics, and all history could be written *a priori*, for it would be to us only the logical development of his creative act. It is owing solely to our limited faculties and still more limited knowledge that it appears to us any thing else, or that we cannot so write it. Even now, availing ourselves of what we know from revelation and reason of the divine plan in creation and incarnation, redemption and salvation, we can go far enough to comprehend that history has its law, and that every historical development, even the most abnormal, has its logical cause, and its logical side, and tends to the realization of a logical conclusion.

The rise and continuance of Protestantism, though not absolutely impersonal, are not explicable by the personal

vices or the personal virtues either of its chief actors or of their chief opponents. Undoubtedly, the remote cause of both may be traced to that morbidity of the race which we call original sin, but that sin, save in Adam, is the sin of the race, not the actual sin of individuals, and affects the individual only as he participates or subsists by participating in the race, or as theologians say, human nature. Like all great historical events, Protestantism, whatever its personal consequences, was in its causes, to a great extent, impersonal, and historically considered, inevitable. It may, therefore, be investigated without personal wrath or bitterness. History is chiefly impersonal, and should be studied no more in a pessimist than in an optimist spirit. Individuals are active in it and without individuals there would be no history; but always is there something more than individuals in it,—something superior to them, and which controls them, instead of being controlled by them. It is in this something superior to individuals and which after Plato and some of the Greek fathers, may be called the *methexis*, the methexic element of history, that the historian must seek the higher law of individual action and of historical events. It is this, the direct participation of God through his creative act, that is chiefly to be regarded, and with this no reasonable man can quarrel, or be angry, for it is impersonal. As we may study history in a calm, serene spirit, without anger or passion, so we may relate facts without fear. Facts have their principle in the methexis, and are and will be facts, whatever pains we may take to disguise or conceal them. They are equally facts whether we know and disclose them or not. The historian should never be deterred by fear of giving scandal. Even if the facts make against civil or ecclesiastical rulers, more injury, St. Gregory the Great tells us, results from attempts to hush them up, than from publishing them. The Holy Scriptures are very frank in disclosing the errors and failings of the chosen people, and do not spare the most eminent of the patriarchs, not even David, said to be "a man after God's own heart." Catholicity is the truth, and no facts, if facts, can contradict it, or imply its falsity. All facts are compatible with truth, and do and must work to a dialectic end. To publish them can do no harm, but must always do good, unless they are perverted, miscolored, mutilated, or presented in false relations, so that they cannot be seen and appreciated for what they really are.

There is nothing that need offend any Catholic in recog-

nizing a logical side in Protestantism, or in assigning a logical cause to its rise and continuance. There must have been a reason why it arose, and why it has continued from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth. Under certain aspects, it must have been reasonable and just, and under those aspects, if we look not beyond them, and regard its other and broader relations, it was not, and is not indefensible. We understand not Protestantism till we have seen it in its dialectic relations, on its logical side, and from a position from which it appears to be true and just. The human mind, however diseased, cannot operate with pure falsehood or seek pure evil, for both falsehood and evil are negative, and oppose to it no real object. The stand-point of the Protestant leaders was too low, and did not permit their eye to sweep the whole horizon of truth; but, assuming their position, they had good and valid reasons for what they attempted, though from the higher position of the Catholic, whence he takes in a broader field, and contemplates truth in its catholic relations, their reasons must be seen to be defective, insufficient, sophistical. But to understand, appreciate, and explain Protestantism, either in its rise or in its continuance, it is not enough to see it on its sophistical side, or in its errors, we must also see it on its dialectic side, and study it in relation to the sophistries it opposed, and the truth it sought to evolve and appropriate.

The reformation was undertaken consciously, deliberately, intentionally, and with foresight of the end aimed at; but Protestantism was an unforeseen, unexpected, and unintended accident. It was neither foreseen nor designed. Luther, in the outset, as far as can be judged from his biography, had no schismatic or heretical thought or intention. He was in the beginning, a pious monk, an exemplary priest, and a learned theologian. He started, it is fair to presume, with the ardent desire and honest intention to correct abuses which he saw prevalent in the church, and which were encouraged or connived at by the authorities themselves, and to bring out prominently certain elements of catholic truth not sufficiently insisted on by contemporary Catholics, whether cleric or laic. He had no thought of defying the pope, breaking with the church, and of founding a schismatical or an heretical confession. He was borne onward by the logic of events to an unforeseen, and, we may believe, a personally painful conclusion, aided, no doubt, or if you prefer it, blinded, by the passions, excited by the con-

troversies his course occasioned, and the resistance he encountered. Pride, self-love, were strong in him, but perhaps equally strong in many of his opponents. What we say of him may be said of the other prominent Protestant leaders, and generally, of the whole Protestant party.

The Council of Trent accomplished in the way of reform all that was practicable, at the time, under the law of continuity, but not all that was needed. The council, in defining the faith and declaring Catholic dogmas, dealt with absolute truth, and was infallible by the assistance of the Holy Ghost, who dwells in the church. But in its reformatory canons and decrees, it dealt with practical matters, and could only arrive at what under the circumstances was prudent. It had to treat rival pretensions, conflicting passions and interests, old usages and prescriptive rights, and could hope to succeed only by conciliation and compromise. The fathers did the best they could, but, perhaps, not all they would, and very likely no member of the council under this head was perfectly satisfied with its doings; and its reformatory and disciplinary decrees and canons are not yet, and never have been, universally received by Catholic nations. They bind only when and where promulgated, and there are countries in which all of them have never been promulgated.

Two tendencies were either favored or not effectively restrained by the council;—the administrative tendency to centralism, and the ethnical tendency to render the church Romanic. Ethnically considered, the council was virtually Romanic, and represented effectively only the Romanic nations—the so-called Latin nations—of Europe. Rome and Italy preponderated. The East was in schism, and so were the Germanic nations of the North. Under the ethnical relation, the council was not œcumenical, and represented at best only the old Roman empire of the West, to which the church since has in a great measure been restricted. The controlling influence in her administration has ever since been Romanic; for, if Austria has at times influenced the Holy See, it has been as an Italian, rather than as a Germanic or Sclavonic power. It is undeniable that the church, since the Council of Trent, has been chiefly, though not exclusively, confined to the latinized populations of Europe, and associated with the Romanic order of civilization. So true is this as a fact, and so generally is it recognized, that some Catholic, and many non-Catholic authors

represent the Catholic religion itself as the religion of the Celtic, as they call the Latin nations, and Protestantism as that of the Germanic race.

The church herself, in her divine-human idea, in her faith, and in her essential constitution, is catholic, and therefore superior to all ethnical distinctions and relations; but her members and her administration, her relations with civilization, are always more or less affected by the circumstances of time and place. Her external relations and appearance in the sixteenth century were widely different from what they were in the twelfth, and in the twelfth from what they were in the third or fourth. In the first period, after emerging from the catacombs, she was Roman and imperial; in the middle ages, she was German and feudal; in the sixteenth, she became Romanic and monarchical. Not that she is not catholic, but that her hierarchy and members are men, and fail to conform her external character and relations to the universality of her interior life. Her members and her hierarchy even are more or less affected by the sentiments, passions, tendencies, and opinions of their age and nation. She is always papal in her essential constitution, but in the earlier ages her administration was practically patriarchal and episcopal; in the middle ages it was feudal, and the relations of the pope and the bishops, and of the bishops and their clergy, were interpreted by the principles of feudal law; in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it was monarchical and tended to centralism. In our own age, where there is a strong tendency to liberalism, Catholics are not wanting who make her democratic, and the late distinguished Bishop England was accustomed to interpret her constitution by the aid of analogies borrowed from that of the United States. Men generally have a tendency to transfer their religious principles to their politics, and more especially their political principles to their religion.

The two tendencies, discernible even in the Council of Trent, have no doubt had a powerful influence in preventing the return of the Protestant nations to the Catholic communion, as they certainly had in originating the Protestant heresy and schism. This is indicated by the fact that the line of separation between Catholics and Protestants is very nearly ethnical and political. The war between them is primarily a war between Germanic and Romanic Europe—at bottom, the old war between Rome and Germany, which began before the Christian era—a phase of which is the in-

terminable war between Celt and Saxon, so injurious to the church even in our own country.

The origin of the war between Rome and Germany, in which for centuries the soldiers on either side were chiefly of Germanic descent, is not explained by the Roman historians, and cannot now be collected from the traditions of the Germans. But war there was, not precisely, as the terms are now understood, a war between civilization and barbarism, but rather between one order of civilization and another. For, though the Romans called the Germans barbarians, and they themselves accepted the name as one of honor, the Germans had at least a rudimentary civilization of a high order. For two hundred and fifty years imperial Rome carried on a war to subjugate and romanize the Germanic tribes, but with only partial success. Those tribes, though occasionally worsted, and obliged to admit Roman garrisons at different points in their territory, retained their national life, and their old Teutonic spirit. At length, provoked to retaliation, they invaded the empire, and, after a struggle more or less fierce and violent, for two hundred and fifty years more, they overturned it, broke it to pieces, and seated Odoacer the Goth on the throne of the Cæsars, near the close of the fifth century of our era.

Prior to the downfall of the Roman empire in the West, the church was ethnically Roman. She had taken a Roman character, adopted in substance the Roman order of civilization, and outside of the empire at least, was regarded as the Roman religion. Rome was the capital of her kingdom, the seat of her central authority, the residence of her supreme pontiff. Her ecclesiastics, pontiffs, bishops, prelates, priests, religious, and laity even, were almost exclusively subjects of the Roman emperor. Their manners and secular customs and usages were those of the several peoples under the imperial government, and the Roman law was made the civil basis of her canons and casuistry. Her patriarchates corresponded to the prefectures, and her sees to the dioceses of the empire, and her ecclesiastical courts and tribunals found their model and their modes of procedure in the Roman. Her bishops were associated by an imperial edict to the Roman magistracy, and were paid, directly or indirectly, from the imperial treasury, as servants of the state. The apostles and their immediate successors, no doubt, carried the glad tidings of the New Law further than the Roman eagles had ever penetrated, but from Constantine down to

the epoch of the conquest, the limits of the empire were very nearly the limits of Christendom. Catholic in idea, and potentially catholic in time and space, the church, after her connection with the state, was practically Roman, and had for her friends and enemies the friends and enemies of the empire, and could convert other nations only by romanizing them.

This is nothing discreditable to the hierarchy; for at that time, the larger part of the civilized world was included within the Roman empire, and the Roman, or Græco-Roman civilization was the most advanced, and the least repugnant to Christianity of any civilization then recognized. Catholicity embraces both religion and civilization, the individual soul and society, and can take root and flourish only with a civilized people. Missionaries may carry it to savages and barbarians, and it may convert them, and enable them to save their souls as individuals; but these missionaries themselves must be civilized, sent from a civilized people, and they can establish Catholicity among savage and barbarous tribes, and leave it reproductive and self-supporting, only as they civilize them. Nor will all orders of civilization serve their purpose. The Jewish repels them by its narrow and bigoted nationality. The Jews recognize in the Messiah only a Jewish prince, and understand not how one can be his follower without making himself a Jew. The first Christians held it necessary to be circumcised, and to keep the law, and it required a miracle to convince Peter, the prince of the apostles, or at least to satisfy his brethren of Jewish extraction, that he might lawfully go and teach, baptize, and confirm gentile converts, without imposing upon them the burden of the Jewish ceremonial law. The caste system, which is the basis of the Hindu civilization, repels the equality and brotherhood of all men, preached by the Gospel, as was evinced in the case of the excellent but mistaken Father Nobili; and one can hardly be a Christian, and live in Chinese society, and be a good Chinese subject, as results from the final decision at Rome of the long controversy concerning the lawfulness of certain Chinese rites, at first tolerated by the good Jesuit fathers. The Roman order of civilization, though imperfect, was cosmopolitan, was, in its *essential* elements, true civilization, and compatible with the faith and practice of Christians. Tertullian tells us that, in his time, the Christians filled the army, the court, the senate, and the magistracy; and though

he may have exaggerated their numbers, it is evident that, setting aside the persecuting edicts of the emperors, a man could embrace Christianity, be a good Christian, and yet remain a Roman citizen. In a word, Christianity being the religion of civilization, could not have obtained its first establishment elsewhere than in the empire, and could nowhere else find a civilization that it could accept or use.

Nevertheless, the subversion of the Roman empire by the barbarians of the North and East, was an advantage to the church, and gave her freedom to develop her catholicity. It broke down the barriers that confined her practically to the Roman empire, and opened the way for other nations to enter her communion, and to come under the influence of her free spirit, and her beneficent action. It prevented the church from becoming, if not in herself, at least in the world's estimation, indurated as the church of a particular state, and as it were threw her doors open for the reception of all nations. The long contact of the Germanic tribes with the empire, and the mutual influence of each on the other, had in some measure germanized the Romans, and romanized the Germans—at least, the immediate conquerors themselves, who had long since left their old homestead, and partially bridged over the gulf between Rome and Germany proper, and rendered the transition from the one to the other less difficult and abrupt. The Germans, as has just been said, had, even before their relations with the empire, a civilization of their own, less developed, less polished, less refined than was the Roman, but fresher and more vigorous, at least, than was the Roman in the fourth and fifth centuries, and capable, when developed under the influence of Christianity, of surpassing it even in its prime. The early civilization of the Germanic family is underrated, because little known to classical antiquity, and because the Germans were undeniably deficient in literary, artistic, and scientific culture; but they had their political organizations, their civil institutions, religion, laws, and manners, and the elements of moral and social progress. After Rome,—we include Rome of the East as well as of the West,—even at the beginning of our era, Germany was the country which interposed the fewest obstacles to the zealous labors of the Christian missionary. And after the people of the Roman empire, the Germanic nations were the first really converted to the Christian religion. The Sclavonic nations were converted later, and the greater part of them only several centuries later.

By the conquest of the empire in the fifth century, Rome ceased in the political order to be the capital of the civilized world, and the Romans to be the ruling people. The church, ethnically considered, lost, in great measure, her exclusively Roman character, and new races and nations entered her communion, and formed integral and influential parts of Christendom. Gradually the half romanized Franks in Gaul, the still more romanized Goths in Spain, and at length the un-romanized Anglo-Saxons of England, were converted, and new blood was infused into the laity and the hierarchy, and men of northern extraction began to impress something of their own character on the external life and administration of the church. From these new accessions she obtained missionaries that could labor with success in the conversion of the Germanic family remaining outside of the old Roman empire. The Germans inhabiting their old homestead, and the Scandinavian kingdoms of the North, were converted by missionaries of their own lineage and language, chiefly from England. These accepted the church as Christian and Catholic, and not as Roman ; and it need excite no surprise that when she became, or appeared to them to be becoming, ethnically Romanic, they should have cooled in their ardor, and fallen into heresy and schism.

The hierarchy, having its chief seat in the city of Rome, and affected by its Roman reminiscences, has always been partial to the Roman order of civilization ; but after the conversion of the Germanic nations, it submitted to Germanic influences, and became to a great extent germanized. The popes invoked the aid of the Franks to protect them from the Arian Lombards, and the iconoclastic emperors of the East. The Franks, under Pepin and his son Charlemagne, Karl der Grosse, or Charles the Great, king of the Franks and Lombards, responded to the call of the pope, and afforded the protection solicited, beat back the iconoclasts, and conquered the Lombards, and gave a portion of their conquest—the city and duchy of Rome, and the exarchate of Ravenna—to the Holy See, and recognized the supreme pontiff as a temporal sovereign. Hitherto the popes, though they held large temporal possessions, and exercised, as did all the bishops of the empire, by virtue of an imperial edict, certain civil functions, and, perhaps, in the disorders occasioned by the barbarian invasion, from necessity, or charity, others not authorized by that edict,

had never claimed or exercised the attributes of political sovereignty, and had always acknowledged themselves in temporals the subjects of the Roman emperor, and when required, paid tribute as such. The pope was first recognized as temporal sovereign, in 752, by Pepin, who had usurped the Frank crown; and his principality was enlarged and confirmed to him by Charlemagne, whom, in the year 800, St. Leo III. raised from the hereditary rank of patrician of Rome, conferred on his father, Pepin, to the imperial title and dignity, and made his coadjutor in the temporal government of his states, and on whom he imposed the duty of defending the Roman church, or Holy See, against all her enemies, domestic and foreign, infidel and heretical. Charlemagne found his office no sinecure, for, the pope's temporal subjects, as hostile to a papal sovereign then as they are now, frequently rose against him, and, but for the intervention and strong arm of the emperor, would more than once have deposed him. The pope, from the very beginning of his reign as temporal prince, has been obliged to rely on a foreign power to support him against his own subjects. No people in Christendom, in fact, have ever been found willing to have a priest for their supreme temporal ruler. Every people, like the people of Israel, demands for its prince, "a man of war, to go in and out before them." The pope felt this, and it may be presumed, that it was the chief reason why he made Charlemagne his temporal coadjutor, and practically committed to him the temporal government of the Roman state. Practically, down to the accession of the Suabian emperors, the pope was only a titular temporal sovereign; the effective government was in the hands of his imperial coadjutor, who governed as sovereignly in Rome as in any part of the German empire; even going so far at times as to make and unmake popes. In their absence, or inability or neglect to attend to the affairs of the papal states, the government usually fell to some Italian count or marquis, or was usurped by one or another of the never-failing Italian factions.

But as the Franks subsided into Frenchmen, and became Romanic—as the people, whatever their ethnical origin, seated within the territory of the old Roman empire, especially in those parts where the old Roman population remained after the conquest in greatest numbers, vigor, and influence, yielded to the operation of Roman traditions, manners, customs, and language, which were still preserved in

a modified form, especially by the church, formed distinct and separate Romanic nations, without the national character and spirit of the original conquerors, the old war, the old antagonism between Rome and Germany was revived, and the battle raged anew that was to decide whether the world should be Roman or German. The Roman politicians and courtiers, filled with reminiscences of the greatness, majesty, and power of Rome, hoped to make her again the mistress of the world, and either through the emperor, or through the pontiff-king, to recover for her, and more than recover, her lost civil and political primacy. The pope has, as vicar of Jesus Christ, no direct civil or political power; but as chief of the hierarchy, and supreme pastor and governor of the church, whose duty it is to feed and govern the flock committed to his charge, he has the right to take cognizance, under their moral and spiritual relations, of the acts of Christian sovereigns as well as of their subjects, and of their public acts no less than of their private acts, and to visit them, when their acts violate the law of God, with the censures prescribed by the canons. If, as in the middle ages, the civil law of Christian states recognizes the canon law as the law of the land, the canonical censures pronounced by the pope must have civil effect, and the full force of judicial sentences pronounced by the civil courts themselves. The pope could, then, not only excommunicate a sovereign, but could depose him, and absolve his subjects from their oath of fidelity. In a society organized on feudal principles, this gave the pope an immense *indirect* temporal power, and placed him at the head of the political as well as of the religious world, by the simple virtue of his office as chief pastor. Through his *direct* power as sovereign of Rome, and his *indirect* power as supreme pontiff, having his see in Rome, the courtiers and politicians might, without absolute madness, indulge the hope of securing for Rome both the spiritual and the temporal primacy, rendering her more powerful than she was under the Cæsars, and of gaining for her a far more extended empire than she had governed before the irruptions of the barbarians. The thought was not without a certain grandeur, but it was Roman, not catholic, and could be carried out only by rendering society and the church, ethnically and politically, Roman. It would have demanded through religion, which is no more Roman than it is German, what the Roman arms had failed, after three centuries of effort, to effect, and re-

quired the conquerors of Rome, in order to be good Christians, to make themselves Roman subjects. It would, if realized, have made the church a Roman national church, and closed her communion to all who would not first submit to be Romans.

But simultaneously with the rise of this Roman policy broke out the quarrel between the popes and the emperors, a quarrel which under one form or another continued till the sixteenth century. The popes did not at first take the side of the Roman courtiers and politicians, and contrary to what a superficial observer would have expected, that side was first taken by the German emperors themselves. Imperial coadjutors of the pope in the temporal government, and virtual emperors of Rome, possessing the old kingdom of Italy, and having a fair prospect of annexing to their dominions by inheritance or conquest, the whole peninsula, the emperors regarded themselves as Roman and Italian, rather than as German. They called their empire the Roman empire, and claimed to be the successors of the Roman Cæsars. Their theory obliterated the memory of the German conquest, and merely annexed Germany to the Roman empire. A part of the Italians, known in history as the Ghibellines, favored the imperial theory, and were among the most ardent and determined of its supporters. Their aim was to make Rome, as the capital of Italy, the seat of universal empire. Dante, in his *Monarchia*, develops and defends the imperial policy. There is one God, one church, one earth, one pope, and there should be, according to him, only one emperor for the government of the earth. The pope should be supreme spiritual ruler, the emperor supreme temporal ruler, dividing the governing authority of the world between them, and both residing at Rome as the seat of universal dominion. The Suabian emperors attempted a policy of this sort, and, perhaps, but for the popes, would have succeeded in its realization, at least for the West. The popes, if for no other reason, must resist it as incompatible with their own temporal sovereignty. Yet the policy was resisted *à outrance* by the national heart of Germany, which had never succumbed to the Roman eagles. It would as Roman and Italian, not as German, have restored the empire to Rome, and northern and central Germany, when the national spirit survived in all its force, could never be induced or forced to support it. Germans might favor it, but Germany would not; and in his

long struggle with Henry IV., St. Gregory VII., or Hildebrand, found his chief support in the prince-bishops of Cologne and Hamburg, and in the dukes of Saxony and Bavaria. Germany had no objection to governing the world, but it must govern it as Germany, not as Rome or Italy. She would not for the empire of the world surrender her own nationality.

The popes, though they opposed with all their power, direct and indirect, temporal and spiritual, the imperial policy, had, nevertheless, themselves in some sense, laid the foundation for it. The emperors grounded their claim to be successors of Augustus Cæsar, on the alleged fact that St. Leo III., in elevating Charlemagne, king of the Franks and Lombards, to the imperial dignity, had revived in favor of the Germans the empire of the West. This pretension does not appear to be well founded even supposing the pope had authority in the premises; for the dominions of Charlemagne seldom, if ever, during his life, in official or other documents now extant, were called an empire. He is called emperor, but not emperor of Rome, of Germany, of Gaul, of Francia, or Italy, or any other known or unknown country. But the act of St. Leo III. was by the emperors and their lawyers, especially after the accession of the Hohenstaufen, so interpreted. Certainly the popes for a time resisted this interpretation; but it would seem that they subsequently let it pass, for the German empire called itself, down to the day of its extinction in 1806, apparently without reproach, "The Holy Roman Empire." The sovereign pontiff certainly did raise Charlemage to the imperial dignity of Rome, and associate him with himself in the temporal government of the Roman state. Charlemagne was the imperial coadjutor of the pope in the temporal government of Rome, if not strictly emperor of Rome, and it was on this ground that the pope claimed and held the right to elect and crown the emperor. But with the extinction in the direct line of Carlovingian and Saxon families, and the accession of the Suabian or Franconian emperors, it would seem that the imperial interpretation was generally accepted, and ultimately ceased to be resisted by the popes. Even some facts in mediæval history would seem to indicate that, for a time at least, the emperors claimed a supremacy, not only in Germany, but in all Europe that had been included within the Roman empire. It is to be remarked, also, that while the popes made no scruple after the elevation of Charlemagne to the

imperial dignity in recognizing the sovereign of Constantinople as emperor of the East, he never would recognize the imperial title in any other western prince, before the closing years of the last century, when Pius VI. gave the title of emperor to the Russian tzar. Perhaps, after all, St. Leo III. had in the elevation of Charlemagne, no such distinct, settled, or far-reaching policy as he is either praised or abused for, and that he acted chiefly in reference to the immediate and pressing wants of his times, leaving the future to Providence and the course of events.

So little is known of the actual circumstances of the age, that it is not easy to judge of the wisdom or the necessity of either the Frank policy in making the popes sovereign princes, or of the papal policy in making the Frank sovereigns emperors. But the political reasons which governed the Frank sovereigns, most likely, were to detach the papacy from the East, and the governing motive of the pope, probably, was to secure a protector and defender of the Holy See against the numerous enemies in arms against her. Western Christendom, in the eighth century, and the first half of the ninth, was in a critical condition. The Saracens had extended their empire over a large part of Asia, along the northern countries of Africa to the western ocean, taken possession of the greater part of the Spanish peninsula, and were invading southern Gaul and Italy; the Saxons, under their brave duke Witikind, at the head of the unconverted Germans in Germany, aided by the Scandinavians of the North, and by the Sclavonians and Tartars from the East, were making their last desperate stand for paganism against Christianity; and the Arian Lombards, the iconoclastic Greeks, and the turbulent nobles, and disorderly populace in Italy, even in Rome itself, threatened not only the independence but the very existence of the Holy See. The pope could nowhere find an armed champion of Christendom, but in the Austrasian Franks. He called, and they answered. Charles Martel defeated the Saracens at Châlons, and expelled them from Gaul; Pepin crossed the Alps, chastised the disorderly Italians, drove back the iconoclasts, defeated and conquered the Lombards, and bound his brow with their iron crown; Charlemagne completed the work of his father Pepin, repulsed on the side of Sicily and Spain the renewed incursions of the Saracens, defeated the Saxon confederacy, again and again, and after an obstinate and sanguinary war, renewed at brief intervals for thirty years,

annexed all of Germany that lay beyond the frontiers of the Roman empire, from the lower Danube to the Baltic and the Northern Ocean, to Christendom. Assailed by powerful enemies on all sides, it is not strange that the popes did all in their power to gain and strengthen the Frank sovereigns, to reorganize the West, and to provide for its future security by elevating to the imperial dignity a prince so able and so willing as Charlemagne, to protect and defend it.

The papal policy secured the West, but it prepared the loss of the East. The eastern emperors were not pleased to lose the popes as subjects, and were still less pleased to see them sovereign princes, and claiming as their own cities and provinces which they held belonged to their empire. They contended that the towns and provinces, originally a part of their empire, when wrested from the Lombards by the Franks, should have been restored them, instead of being given in full sovereignty to the pope. Moreover, they regarded the elevation by the pope of Charlemagne to the imperial dignity in Rome, and his virtual election and coronation as emperor of the West, as an offence to their sovereignty, an unwarranted dismemberment of their own empire; for in the Roman theory, though divided as to administration between two emperors, the one of the East and the other of the West, the Roman empire itself was really one and indivisible. Each half of the empire was Roman, and they could not brook the conversion of either into a barbarian empire. The East was willing to acknowledge the primacy of the see of Rome so long as it remained Roman, and its bishop owned himself a Roman subject. It would commune with a Roman, but not with a German church. Its pride, also, revolted at submitting to the pontiff when he became a temporal prince, a creation of the barbarians, and so set its wits to work to find some plausible reasons for a schism, which in reality already existed. The Frank policy succeeded, and the popes from their recognition as temporal sovereigns, were forced, whether they would or not, to bind themselves to the West, and to follow its fortunes.

The German emperors in their effort to convert their empire into the Roman empire, though favored by the Ghibellines in and out of Italy, were opposed by the popes, the enemies of imperial centralism, the friends of the papal temporal sovereignty, and the Italian Guelfs, occasionally aided by the Venetians. The imperial policy would, after

all, not have revived the real Roman empire, held and administered by a Romanic people, and was more likely, in the long run, to absorb Italy in Germany, than Germany in Italy. For this reason the Italian patriotic party opposed it. It was also opposed by the Romanic states generally, as fatal to their free development and independent existence. The war between the popes and the Hohenstaufen was on one side a war for the conversion, and on the other to prevent the conversion of the German into the Roman empire with the city of Rome for its capital. Other questions were, no doubt, involved, but this was at the bottom of the controversy. The popes, though supported by a strong party among the German princes, and by the Italian Guelfs, were obliged to look for aid in their fearful struggle to the Romanic or southern nations, and to pursue a policy which would tend to elevate them as a counterpoise to the emperor and the Ghibelline princes. This, since the ecclesiastical policy necessarily followed the political policy, carried away not only the pope as temporal sovereign, but the hierarchy itself in a Romanic direction.

The first attempt of the popes to obtain a power in the South to balance the North, was the creation of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and investing under the suzerainty of the Holy See, the Norman adventurer, Robert Guiscard, with its crown, intended to protect the pope's temporal sovereignty against the German emperors, no less than against the Greeks and Saracens. The second step in the same direction was, after the kingdom had passed to the Hohenstaufen, in setting aside the unhappy Conradin, the son of Frederic II., and giving the crown to a French prince, Charles of Anjou. This was an alliance of the Italian Guelfs and the South of Europe against the North, for the protection of the papal temporal sovereignty. It drew sharply the line between Rome and Germany, and made France, already the leading Romanic power, the foremost power of Europe. The final defeat of the Roman imperial policy, with the death of Frederic II., threw the succeeding emperors, till the episode of Charles V., back on their purely German provinces for their chief support, and compelled them to adopt a more exclusively Germanic policy, while it raised up a formidable rival to them in the French, representing then as now Romanic Europe.

The institution of the temporal sovereignty of the pope in the eighth century, necessarily forced upon the supreme

pontiffs the uniform policy of preventing the growth of any great power in the immediate neighborhood of their capital, and of playing off one great power against another. The policy of the Roman court has always opposed, therefore, the union of all Italy in a single Italian state, and also the possession of northern and southern Italy by one and the same non-Italian power. This policy was dictated by the law of self-preservation. Italy united in a single Italian state, or as the possession of a single foreign power, the temporal principality of the Holy See could not be maintained. It would be absorbed, and the popes reduced to their purely sacerdotal and pontifical functions. A weak power, as was the papal state, must always study to have weak neighbors, and seek by diplomacy and the usual arts of state ministers, to prevent its neighbors from uniting, and forming a strong power able to overwhelm it. Assuming, as the popes always did, and always do, that the independence of the pontiff in his spiritual government of the church, demands his maintenance as a sovereign prince, this policy must be regarded as necessary, wise, and just, decidedly for the interests both of religion and civilization. But it may be doubted if it has not been the indirect cause or occasion of the loss of the East and the North to the church, and her present restriction to the Romanic nations of Europe. The pope, no doubt, hoped, by the investiture of Charles of Anjou with the crown of the Two Sicilies, to provide effectually against the union of the southern and northern sections of the peninsula under the same sovereign, either native or foreign, and to raise up a power sufficiently strong to protect the Holy See against all danger from the emperor. But he found in Charles and the French a more subtle and dangerous enemy than he had ever found in any of the Henrys or Frederics of Suabia. The pope and his principality were, it is true, henceforth measurably secure against the empire and the Ghibellines; but he was at the mercy of the French and the Guelfs, the latter of whom, cared even less for the pope than did his old imperial opponents, and supported him only as a means of transferring the hegemony from the North to the South of Europe, or of recovering the empire for Rome and Italy. The advent of a French prince in Italy, was the most disastrous blow to the temporal power of the papacy in the middle ages that has been or could be struck, and proves that the popes in temporal matters are as fallible as other princes. It was in-

directly the cause of the migration of the popes from Rome to Avignon, a papal possession within what was then the Neapolitan kingdom, and the subjection of the court of Rome for seventy years to French influence.

Charles of Anjou is one of the basest characters in history; and, if nearly all the history that is read out of Germany and Italy did not undergo a certain amount of French manipulation, so as to conform to French vanity, and make it redound to French glory, he would pass for the basest and most treacherous sovereign prince the papacy has ever encountered. He became the acknowledged leader for Italy of the Guelf or Romanic party, and, as king of the Two Sicilies, with large possessions now included in the empire of France, senator of Rome, and papal vicar of Tuscany, he used his great power and favorable position to force the pope to administer the affairs of the church solely in his interests. Never had the popes been more obsequious to any temporal sovereign than they were to him, their vassal and creature. The liberal use they made of their spiritual censures to force him upon the people of Sicily, who detested him, as may be inferred from the famous "Sicilian Vespers," and who, after the failure of the heir of Frederic, preferred the government of a Spanish prince, is one of the greatest scandals in the whole history of the Roman pontiffs. Nicholas III. saw the mistake of his predecessor, and did what he could to repair it; but his successor turned back to Charles and undid his policy. Finally, Charles succeeded in filling the papal throne with the founder of the Celestines, a holy man, it is true, but a man of marvellous ignorance and simplicity, who, during the short time he was pope, acted as a mere puppet in the hands of the Neapolitan king. Happily, he had a conscience, and fully convinced of his utter incapacity to govern the church, resigned the papal crown, and was succeeded by Cardinal Gaetano, under the name of Boniface VIII., one of the greatest men and ablest pontiffs that ever sat in the chair of Peter. He labored hard to rescue the papacy from Neapolitan and French or Romanic influence, and to reëstablish ethnical independence and impartiality; but it was too late. The force of events was too strong to be resisted. He became involved in grave difficulties with Philip the Fair, king of France, and his adherents among the Italian Guelfs, and was taken prisoner at Anagni, and grossly treated by Nogaret, the lieutenant of

Philip. He died a few days after of grief and the harsh treatment he had received from the French and the false Colonnas. His successor, Peter Roger, a Frenchman, succeeded him, under the name of Clement VI., removed the papal residence from Rome to Avignon, and founded the line of Limousin popes.

From the death of Boniface VIII., in 1303, to the outbreak of the great movement in the sixteenth century, the history of Europe, ecclesiastical and political, is little else than the struggle between the German group of nations and the Romanic—each for supremacy. The church was necessarily involved in this struggle, because she was intimately connected in both groups of nations with the state, and her supreme pontiff was a sovereign prince, obliged to consult the independence and interests of his principality as well as those of the church herself. The return of the popes to Rome was effected by the temporary triumph of the northern or Germanic influence; but it was followed by the schism of the southern or Romanic nations, who would not hold communion with the pope unless devoted specially to their interests, and under their control; and rather than submit to a pope who would treat Germany with impartiality, they preferred to create a pope of their own. The Abbé Christophe, is his learned *History of the Papacy in the Fourteenth Century*, very properly attributes the western, or more properly, the southern schism, to national prejudices and rivalries; but he takes too narrow a view, when he restricts these rivalries and jealousies to the French and Italians. They were properly the rivalries and jealousies of Germanic and Romanic Europe. Southern Italy went with France, and the part of Italy in which the influence or power of the emperor was greatest, was the most strenuous in its resistance to the schism. The Council of Constance, which healed the schism, was an effort at compromise, in which, as usual, the principal concessions were made by the North to the South. The Emperor Sigismund was a real friend to peace and union, and did all that man could do to preserve the North and the South in the same Catholic communion. But he succeeded only in obtaining a shortlived truce. The South would be united to the North only on condition of governing it. The Romanic nations would rule or secede. In the schism they seceded; but France, weakened and almost reduced to an English province, by her internal divisions and wars with England, they consented to a reunion

in the Council of Constance; yet France, recovering from the disasters of the English wars, and having gained over to her side the north of Italy, involved them anew in the struggle, and forced the northern nations, in their turn, to secede, which left the southern the only orthodox nations in the world, and made the church Romanic. The whole world has called her since, not simply the *Catholic* Church, which is her official name, but the *Roman* Catholic Church, a term which would imply that she was Roman or Romanic, not Catholic.

The Emperor Charles V. might have delayed, perhaps have prevented the schism, if he had comprehended his times, and been equal to his position, as emperor of Germany, king of Spain, and sovereign of the Netherlands and the greater part of Italy. But he was only half German, and early lost the confidence of the northern provinces, so deeply offended by the centralizing tendencies of his grandfather Maximilian I. During his whole reign, Charles acted as a Romanic rather than as a Germanic prince. His son, Philip II., by his absolutist tendencies, his gloomy bigotry, his cruel treatment of Protestants, and his efforts to use the church as a stepping-stone to universal monarchy, lost him the Dutch Netherlands, and confirmed England and northern Germany in their schism. The Emperor Ferdinand II. would have reduced the Protestant princes to submission, and healed the schism between northern and southern Germany; but as that would have secured anew the hegemony of Europe to the Germanic family, France, as the chief Romanic power, threw, under the lead of that able but unscrupulous statesman, Cardinal Richelieu, her power and influence on the Protestant side against him, and forced the peace of Westphalia, which established a permanent division in the empire between the Catholic and the Protestant princes, and secured to Protestantism the real national heart of Germany. Louis XIV. attempted to renew the policy of Philip II., but, as he sought to restore the schismatic nations to the church in the interest of France rather than of Catholicity, he necessarily failed. France has, from the beginning of her history—that is, from the accession of the Capetians, the proper beginning of French history—even down to our own times, been governed in her policy by ethnical or national considerations, and has favored or opposed the ecclesiastical policy of the popes as it did or did not tend to secure her the hegemony among Catholic nations. At bot-

tom, the old war, between Rome and Germany, that, with brief truces, has continued to rage, and still rages, and the war that ever since the southern nations became separated from the northern, has raged, and still rages between the Romanic and Germanic nations, is one and the same war, older than the conversion of either Rome or Germany to the Christian religion. Rome with her legions at first overran Germany, without being able to subjugate her free population; afterward, Germany sent forth her armed tribes, who overran and broke down the Roman empire, and seated themselves on its ruins. These gradually became romanized, and renewed the old war of Rome against their unromanized German brethren. So far as the church is concerned, these have gained the ascendency, and made her, today, almost as exclusively Romanic as she was Roman before the conquest. They have succeeded in driving the North into schism, and now nations can hardly return, or be converted to the church, without giving up their national character and making themselves Romanic.

The Protestant development, or northern secession, took its rise precisely at the epoch of the triumph of the Romanic party. The Romanic party had succeeded in getting the popes and the ecclesiastical power on their side, and left the Germanic nations only the alternative either of submitting to Romanic predominance or seceding from the church. Germany, despairing of using the church in the protection or advancement of her ethnical sentiments and interests, seceded from the Holy See, and carried away with her the whole group of Germanic, Gothic, or Teutonic nations. Many Germans, indeed, remained firm in their adherence to the church, and remain so still, and are among the best and most faithful Catholics we have, but the German nationality seceded, and became and continues Protestant. Ethnical considerations have at all times weighed more with both the northern and the southern nations of Europe, than theological or ecclesiastical interests. As long as Germany could retain her hegemony and be Catholic, she was warm and firm in her devotion to the Holy See, but when she could not, she seceded. The same must be said of the Romanic states. When the true pope, after the return of the popes from Avignon to Rome, ceased to be their creature, they raised up an anti-pope, a pope of their own, and obeyed or disobeyed him as they saw fit. The church has never yet been strong enough to overcome every form of gentilism,

to obliterate all ethnical prejudices, or even to exclude them entirely from her hierarchy any more than from her laity. The Roman, to-day, holds that the temporal government of the world belongs to his city. Gioberti, a priest, a theologian, and a philosopher, with no equal since Plato, maintains gravely, in his *Del Primato*, that the moral and civil primacy of the world belongs to the Italians, and it was for that reason that St. Peter established the seat of the spiritual primacy in Rome, the capital of Italy, and therefore of the universe. Even Americans, trained to the priesthood in the Roman colleges, imbibe a half-conviction that the spiritual primacy and the temporal, in some sense, belong to Rome, and look upon the transalpine states, especially of the North, as barbarians, whom Rome has not yet civilized. With them, of European nations, Italy stands first, France second, Spain third, Great Britain fourth, and Germany last, notwithstanding Catholic Germany is almost the only part of the Catholic world where Catholic thought, to-day is really living and active, where Catholic erudition, science, and philosophy, are up to the level of the non-Catholic world. Whoever has studied history, not as it comes distilled through a Romanic alembic, knows that England was lost to the church almost solely because the head of the church was an Italian and a foreigner, and because she would not be governed by his lieutenant, the Spaniard. It was not because the pope was Italian, or Spanish by race, but because he was Italian or Spanish, or seemed to her to be so, in his policy, that made her rebel against him. She saw, or thought she saw, in the pope, not simply the apostolic father of the faithful, but a foreign potentate, whom she could not obey without sacrificing her English nationality and independence. So she will continue to feel, and believe, so long as the pope remains an Italian sovereign, and consults the special interests and policy of Romanic Europe, or till she herself loses her Germanic character, and becomes Romanic in her ideas, manners, and institutions, which, through Celtic and Gallic influences, may one day happen, as would happen in the United States, an offshoot of England, were it not for the large influx of fresh emigrants from Germany, now much more numerous than those from Ireland.

The Romanic tendency has always been and is a tendency to centralism, for it starts not from the earlier and more liberal period of the Roman civilization, but from a later

period, when that civilization had degenerated into cæsarism, or imperial despotism. The liberties, franchises, and personal independence and freedom of modern Europe, are of Germanic, not Romanic origin. The special tendency of the Romanic nations at the epoch of the reformation was to absolute monarchy, or monarchical centralism. Louis XI. in France, Henry VII. in England, Maximilian I. in Germany, and Cardinal Ximenes in Spain, all had labored to reduce the old feudal nobility, to break up the estates, and to revive the old imperial centralism, which made the emperor the state. In their numerous revolutions against monarchy since, the Romanic nations cling to the idea of centralism—and their great effort has been to substitute for monarchical or imperial centralism, democratic centralism, equally despotic, and far more intolerable and crushing. The present emperor of the French has attempted in the constitution of the French empire to combine in one government both centralisms, the imperial represented by himself, and the democratic represented by universal suffrage, but with what success time alone can determine. Neither centralism could ever succeed with the Germans for any great length of time. The Hohenstaufen attempted it, and failed, not only because opposed by the pope and the Italian Guelfs, but because opposed by the princes of the really Germanic part of the empire. The emperor Maximilian attempted it, but was resisted and defeated, as was Charles V., by the obstinacy of the northern Germans. The attempt of the Stuarts to introduce and establish it in England, lost them the crown of three kingdoms. But all Romanic Europe alternates from the one form to the other, though in the Spanish and Italian peninsulas there are now in progress experiments in behalf of constitutional monarchy, which may or may not prove successful. Perhaps it will meet the fate of our experiment to maintain a constitutional and limited democracy, which, prior to the breaking out of the present rebellion, was fast becoming a centralized and unlimited democracy.

The church, carried away in the ethnical or national struggles in the European republic with the Romanic nations, naturally conformed in her administration to their centralizing tendency. After the virtual defeat of feudalism and the victory won by centralized monarchy, in the latter half of the fifteenth century, the constitution of the church was interpreted no longer according to feudal, but according

to monarchical principles, and her administration became more and more centralized, and the pope from chief pastor became the sovereign lord of the faithful, not in the feudal, but in the monarchical or imperial sense. The pope, as successor of St. Peter, the head of the apostolic college, is by divine constitution the chief pastor of the church, the superior and common bond of all the patriarchs, primates, and bishops, possessing the supreme authority to feed and govern the whole church. Though the church is always and essentially papal, yet, in the early ages, before the irruptions of the barbarians and the downfall of the Roman empire, her papal constitution was less conspicuous, and she would have appeared to a stranger as patriarchal and episcopal, rather than as papal. The pope had *in radice* all the power he now exercises, but the administration was formerly less centralized than it is now. The great majority of causes were heard and disposed of by the diocesans, metropolitans, and patriarchs, and only the greater causes went up to the papal court. The bishops communed through their metropolitan with the patriarch, and through the patriarch with the pope, and the great body of the faithful hardly knew that there was any pope superior to the patriarch. It is only as the court of last resort that the Roman court is heard of, and as such court only in matters which seldom come immediately and directly home to the great body of the laity, or even of the parochial clergy. These seldom had any direct or immediate relations with the supreme pontiff. Pastors were chosen ordinarily by popular election, and confirmed by the metropolitan or patriarch without resort to Rome, perhaps without the transmission of their names to the Holy See. The metropolitan administered through his suffragans the affairs of his province, the patriarch the affairs of his patriarchate, unless in certain specified cases, without any resort to superior authority, though by virtue of that superior authority. Even after the downfall of the Roman empire the same general order for some time remained. The patriarchs, metropolitans, prelates, chapters, or the sovereign of the state filled the vacant sees, without any direct interference of the bishop of Rome. That at one time the Christian sovereigns had the right, the delegated right, of appointing to vacant sees and granting investiture, can hardly be successfully denied. There is a papal constitution extant, forbidding the consecration of a pope till the confirmation of his election by

the Roman emperor, and even so late as St. Gregory VII. the right of confirmation of the election of the pope, elected by the people and clergy of Rome, seems to have been conceded to the German emperors, and was frequently exercised. The right was, no doubt, a concession from the pope, and revocable at his will, as was the right of appointment and investiture of bishops. Either is mentioned here only to show that practically the pope seldom directly intervened in the administration of the church, save in the matters that came up to his court on appeal, and instructions and admonitions to the superior and inferior clergy as to their duty.

But when the great eastern patriarchates fell under the Mussulman power, or lapsed into heresy or schism, and no patriarchate was left standing, except that of the West, the administration became concentrated at Rome, and the business of the Roman see was immensely increased. As the centralizing tendency acquired force in the civil order, it became strengthened in the ecclesiastical, and without any real usurpation of power on the part of the pope, the administration became virtually monarchical, till the pope might say, *l'église, c'est moi*, as the monarch could say, *l'état, c'est moi*. All causes could be carried or summoned directly to Rome, where years might elapse before they could be heard. The expenses could hardly fail to be heavy, and ruinous to all but the rich or parties patronized by the rich. It weighed heavily on ecclesiastics of every rank. The causes too, had to be heard and disposed of for the most part by men alien in nation, in language, in manners, customs, habits, to the nation of the parties in action, and rarely able to decide them on their merits. This evil was hardly relieved when causes were tried and decided by the papal legate in the locality where they occurred, for the legate in later times was pretty sure to be a foreigner, in most cases an Italian. The metropolitans were gradually deprived of their primitive jurisdiction, and suffered to retain only a primacy of honor over their suffragans. The religious orders found their old freedom and independence interfered with; thought and action were subjected to the minutest and most stringent rules and supervision, and nothing was left to personal freedom and spontaneity. This result was not reached all at once, and the system was not fully developed till after the downfall of feudalism and the institution of modern monarchy, but for some time before there was a strong tendency to it.

This centralizing tendency, which, if carried out to its full logical extent, would make the pope and clergy the whole church, and suffer the people to count for nothing, may be, in some degree, detected in the reformatory decrees of the Council of Trent, and certainly has been largely developed since. It is a Romanic tendency, and was one of the causes of the rise, and is a grave obstacle to the extinction, of Protestantism. It is very offensive to the Germanic group of nations, and operates unfavorably upon the development of thought and vigorous action among Catholics themselves. In the church as in the state, it renders the soul feeble and sickly, like a plant without fresh air and sunshine. No doubt liberty has its disadvantages, but despotism has no advantages that have yet been discovered. Under it, whether in church or state, the mind is confined to a space too strait for it; it wants elbow-room, wants courage, wants strength, and is paralyzed and afraid to move, lest it move in a wrong direction, and to attempt any thing good lest haply it end in doing something wrong. Positive characters are held in horror, and are rarely produced; and the chief study is not to obtain the reward of well-doing, but to escape the penalty of evil-doing—not to do right, but to do nothing authority can blame or punish. It wraps the talent God gives in a clean napkin, and preserves it safe buried in the earth, instead of putting it out to fructify and increase. All is prescribed, and nothing is ventured upon that is not prescribed. The religious orders, those light troops designed to be deployed as skirmishers, must have their general residing at Rome, commanding them with despotic authority, without the slightest real knowledge of the distant fields where they are to serve, or of the character of the enemy against whom he sends them. Pastors have little left to their discretion, and feeling themselves answerable in all to the central authority, attempt only to carry out what they suppose to be its policy—lose all propagandist zeal and energy, and suffer the church in their country to be reduced to a few priests, old women, and children. Finding that the policy they adopt is not their own, and never exercising their own judgment on its propriety, they become a hundred-fold more despotic and intolerant in carrying it out than the central authority itself. The luckless Catholic who happens to be a living and thinking man, stands a far better chance at Rome than at Paris, London, Dublin, New York, Cincinnati, or Philadelphia.

The heterodox world see this; they see Catholics rolling along in the old ruts, worn deep by the wheels of time, and feel that, however great their natural ability, their learning, their science, they are allowed to display it only in dressing up and presenting old and dry formulas, which have lost all their significance for the world that is, and are repelled from us instead of being drawn to us. It is in vain we say it is not so, and protest that the church favors freedom and largely develops the intellect. They reply: "We do not see it. Your church places your living men, your Giobertis, your Rosminis, your Venturas, your Passaglias on the Index, and instead of stimulating she represses thought and expression." The modern centralism, with the universal supervision, by authority, of thought and expression, surpassing, it may almost be said, the despotism of an old Puritan congregation over its members, is perhaps congenial to and necessary for the Romanic nations, now almost the only Catholic nations, and who have never yet shown themselves able to use liberty without abusing it. It may operate well for them, since, if not bound, hand and foot, by external authority, very few of them would remain orthodox, or continue in the Catholic communion; but it does not operate well for the northern or Germanic group of nations, who have a very different temperament, and require a very different discipline. It is idle, humanly speaking, to expect to heal the schism by a policy which produced and continues it, and which permits the Germanic nations to become Catholic only by becoming Romanic. The Germans are not wholly averse to stringent political authority, though not partial to it, but they have an intense love of individual liberty and personal freedom. They would do as much as possible for and by themselves. Hence the Romanic policy, save with exceptional individuals, has never been, and never will be, successful. It fails, and will fail to convert the heart of the Germanic nation. Germany was converted to the church, but never was, and never will be, converted to Rome. If it is proposed to recover the Germanic group to the church, a different line of policy must be adopted; the ecclesiastical administration, while it remains papal, must be in a measure decentralized; the pope and clergy must, instead of being held to be the church, be regarded as essential, divinely-appointed, and venerable functionaries in the church; nationalities must be respected and suffered to remain; individuals must be allowed freer scope for generous

thought and spontaneous action, and the government must be more pastoral, and govern less.

The church herself, in spite of her restriction to the Romanic nations, is catholic, and neither Romanic nor Germanic. True, she is called, in modern times, even by some of her own children, Roman—the *Roman* Catholic Church—but *Roman* is no part of her official title, and, save as designating the locality of the apostolic see, is grossly improper. She is the *Catholic*, not the *Roman* church. The Roman church is the particular church of Rome, of which Pius IX. is the archbishop. Rome, in the national or ethnical sense, has no more to do with the church than has any other national capital. The primacy represented by the pope, or possessed by him as the successor of St. Peter, belongs neither to Rome nor to Italy, and the pope, if he chooses, is perfectly competent to transfer the apostolic see to any other capital he may select. Nobody but a Frenchman, who regards Paris as the centre of the world, or a New Englander, who regards Boston as "the hub of the universe," would wish to see it transferred to any other locality, or would not regret its transference. But the pope succeeds to the full apostolic power, and can as well transfer his chair to some other locality as St. Peter could transfer it from Antioch to Rome. We know no law of God that confines it to Rome, to Italy, or even to the European continent. The pope may, as temporal sovereign, be confined to Italy and Rome, but nothing in the constitution of the church compels her chief pastor to be sovereign of Rome, or of an Italian or any other state. We must divest ourselves of the notion that the church by divine institution is Roman, and that to be in her communion we must be the subjects of a Roman or Italian prince, and learn that she is catholic, and independent of all nationalities, if we wish her to be universal—the church of all nations.

In tracing the rise and continuance of Protestantism to the ethnical struggle between Rome and Germany, or between the Romanic and Germanic groups of nations, no judgment is intended to be offered as to the struggle itself. Facts are left to speak for themselves. Things being as they were, and the church placed as she was, it is not easy to say how she could have pursued any other policy than that she adopted, or how it was possible for her to avoid the results which have followed. The Romanic nations were not all wrong, nor the Germanic all right. Each group of

nations wished to be supreme and control the church, and each, when it could not use the papacy for its own purposes, in turn seceded from it, and created a schism. The reader must not, however, suppose that Protestantism owes its origin and continuance solely to the Romanic and centralizing tendencies of ecclesiastical administration. Other causes were operative—political, economical, commercial, and industrial, and religious and theological. These other causes we hope before we die to be able to develop, and to enter into a complete and impartial investigation of the principiples, doctrines, and observances of Protestantism, in relation to those of the church, which would complete our original design; but experience proves that a work of such a character and extent cannot be prudently published piecemeal in the pages of a periodical. Consequently, no more of these essays will appear in these pages, and if they should be completed they will be given to the world in a separate publication.

END OF VOLUME XII.

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
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